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PUBLICATIONS 

OF THE 

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA 



HISTORY 



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P, APPLETON and company, Agents, NEW YORK. 



THE RELATIONS OF PENN 
SYLVANIA WITH THE 
BRITISH GOVERN- 
MENT, 1696-1765 



BY 

WINFRED TREXLER ROOT, Ph.D. 

Sometime Harrison Fellow in History at the 
University of Pennsylvania 

Assistant Professor of History at the 
University of Wisconsin 




UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA 

D. APPLETON AND COMPANY, Agents, NEW YORK 

1912 



F J6/^ 



Copyright, 1912 
By the University of Pennsylvania 



J. 


F. TAPLEY CO. 




NCW YORK 


£Ci.A305896 



CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Chapter I. Introduction 1 

Chapter II. Central Institutions of Colonial Control . . 11 

Chapter III. Administration of the Acts of Trade ... 45 

Chapter IV. The Court of Vice- Admiralty 91 

Chapter V. The Royal Disallowance . 128 

Chapter VI. The Judicial System and the Royal Disallow- 
ance 158 

Chapter VII. Finance and Politics 180 

Chapter VIII. The Quaker and Anglican 222 

Chapter IX. Imperial Defense, 1689-1748 256 

Chapter X. The French and Indian War 293 

Chapter XI. Imperial Centralization 335 

Chapter XII. Conclusion 378 

Bibliographical Notes 397 

Index 409 



PREFACE 

Until recent years, — the last two decades, — it was the 
fashion for historians of our colonial era to treat the Eng- 
lish possessions in America in the domain of American 
history. This practice to a large degree ignored the fact* 
that the colonies were parts of a great Empire/ A pre- 
dominant interest in provincial development and a lack 
of the requisite material on this side of the water are the 
factors chiefly responsible for the neglect to study the 
old British colonial policy. A few writers have not 
failed to understand that the colonies were subject to an 
elaborate imperial system, neither have they been handi- 
capped by the lack of the material necessary to study the 
imperial relation, but their work has been seriously marred 
by a show of the traditional American prejudice which 
views the British policy toward her first dependencies as 
something tyrannical and oppressive. Various forces have 
been at work, and are still active, tending to clear away 
the older parochial and democratic points of view. The 
advance of sound historical scholarship in America has 
substituted for narrowness of vision and false notions of 
patriotism, a catholic attitude, the spirit of the judge, and 
the desire of the investigator to leave nothing undone to 
elicit the truth in full. In the field of colonial history the 
advance has meant the substitution of the modern and nor- 
mal imperial point of view for the old provincial attitude. 
In order to understand clearly and to pass judgment im- 

1 Andrews, Some Neglected Aspects of Colonial Hist., (an address 
delivered before the N. J. Hist. Soe., May, 1900) ; Andrews, Amer- 
ican Colonial History, (Amer. Hist. Asso., Reports, 1898) ; Osgood, 
Study of American Colonial Hist., ihid; Conference on Research 
in American Colonial Hist., ihid., 1908, I; Osgood, American Col- 
onics, I, xxvi-xxvii. 



ii PRP^FACE 

partially on England's first colonial policy, American 
scholars are laboring patiently with material hitherto 
practically unexplored and neglected. The results have 
been embodied in histories and monographs clearing away 
erroneous notions and casting a flood of light on phases 
and periods of British xVmerican history once obscure and 
slighted.^ Praiseworthy efforts have been made by Eng- 
lish and American scholars to elaborate guides to the vast 
mass of material in English repositories, beckoning on the 
investigator to labor in new and interesting fields.^ IMuch 
has been done to make this material accessible in Amer- 
ica in the form of printed collections and transcriptions, 
but much remains to be done.^ Great credit is dae to 
Professor C. M. Andrews of Yale, Professor H. L. Osgood 
of Columbia, and Dr. Beer, the pioneers in this field, for 
their admirable work in calling attention to neglected 
points of view and unexplored material, and for inter- 
preting the relation of the colonies to the Empire in a 
scholarly and scientific manner. 

In the following work the province of Pennsylvania is 
singled out for particular investigation in order to eluci- 
date the nature of British imperialism in its political and 
administrative features during the eighteenth century. It is 
the purpose to describe both the organization and activity 

2 Beer, Origins of the British Colonial System, 1518-1660 (1908), 
and British Colonial Policy, 115J^-1165, (1907); Andrews, British 
Committees, Commissions, and Councils of Trade and Plantations, 
(Johns Hopkins Studies, XXVI, 1908) ; Osgood, American Colonies, 
III, (1907), is a masterly treatment of the imperial system in 
the 17th. century, based chiefly upon printed material readily ac- 
cessible. Professor Osgood is now engaged on a continuation of 
the work, based largely upon new material, viewing the subject 
from the standpoint of the colonies. 

3 Andrews and Davenport, Guide to the Manuscript Materials 
for the History of the United States to 1783, in the British 
Museum, in Minor London Archives, and the Libraries of Oxford 
and Cambridge. (Washington, 1908.) 

4 For a detailed list of the printed material and transcripts, see 
the bibliography appended. 



PREFACE iii 

of the central institutions of colonial control and the work 
of the royal officials in the colonial service administering 
imperial policies. Since the colony is considered from the 
point of view of the Empire, the study falls largely in the 
field of English history. Indirectly it is a part of Ameri- 
can history, for a general knowledge of provincial devel- 
opment is essential to a proper appreciation of the contin- 
ual action and interaction of imperial and local interests 
and ideals. The study will limit itself to that neglected 
middle period of colonial history extending roughly from 
the reorganization of the system of colonial administration 
in 1696 to a second reorganization at the close of the last 
French war. The material on which the work is based was 
drawn chiefly from the transcripts of the Board of Trade 
Papers and Journals in the library of the Historical So- 
ciety of Pennsylvania and the originals in the Public Rec- 
ord Office, London. In addition, manuscript sources, such 
as the Penn Papers in the library of the above society, and 
published collections, such as the colonial records, parlia- 
mentary papers and journals, and the writings of English 
and American statesmen, have been fully searched. 

This work is the result of investigations begun in a semi- 
nary course conducted by Professor Herman V. Ames, at 
the University of Pennsylvania. It was first accepted in 
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy at this university, and has since been 
expanded in the light of more complete investigations. 

I cannot close this preface without acknowledging the 
debt of gratitude I owe to Professor Andrews and to Pro- 
fessor Ames for their constant interest, encouragement, 
and counsel; their kindly criticisms and suggestions have 
saved me from many errors. My thanks are due also to 
the officials of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania for 
various courtesies; to the Publication Committee of the 
University of Pennsylvania for considerate attention; to 
Professor F. L. Paxson of the University of Wisconsin for 



^^ PREFACE 

reading my manuscript and suggesting alterations; and to 
my wife whose inspiration and encouragement have created 
the hope that this study will not be without value. 

^r -,■ WINFRED T ROOT 

Madison, Wis., ^^ui. 

October, 1911. 



CHAPTER ONE 

INTRODUCTION 

In undertaking to set forth the relations between the 
chartered colony of Pennsylvania and the central govern- 
ment, it is realized that the British system of colonial ad- 
ministration will not be as clearly revealed as in the case 
of the royal province. In the latter the powers of the 
home government were exercised immediately through the 
responsible agents of the crown; in the former they were 
exercised indirectly through the officials of proprietors 
and corporations. But the charter to William Penn con- 
tained provisions, peculiar to itself, which drew the prov- 
ince into intimate connection with the central government. 
Furthermore, the inception of a stricter control over the 
colonies in 1696 made this connection still stronger. A 
study of the charter and the system of administration es- 
tablished in 1696 will reveal the nature of these relations. 

The charter to William Penn and his heirs of March, 
1681, passed the seals at a time when English officials at 
home and in the colonies had learned by bitter experience 
the glaring deficiencies of the earlier charters viewed from 
the standpoint of imperial ideals. These defects arose 
from the difficult problem of enforcing imperial policies 
through officials not amenable to direct royal control. 
England's pioneer work in colonization had been accom- 
plished chiefly by private enterprise and initiative, 
authorized by royal charter. The statesmen who drew 
these charters, unable to forecast the development of a 
well-defined imperial policy, bestowed upon the grantees 
large privileges and liberal powers of government and 
took no thought of making provision for a close super- 



2 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

vision of colonial progress by the central government. 
The result was that the colonists, untrammeled by inter- 
ference from home and exhibiting all the characteristics 
of a true pioneer and frontier people, fashioned their in- 
stitutions as they saw fit and ordered their affairs accord- 
ing to their own conceptions, all of which was done with 
little regard for the interests of the Empire. But as the 
economic theories of the earlier part of the seventeenth 
century with regard to colonization found formal and 
definite expression in law by the passage of the acts of 
trade and navigation of the Restoration period, then Eng- 
lish statesmen came to a thorough realization of the de- 
fects of the early charters. It became obvious that the 
development of the colonies toward self-control must be 
checked.^ Their separatist and independent tendencies 
came clearly to light in the case of the New England 
colonies, especially Massachusetts.^ They were charged 
with passing laws contrary to the statutes of Parliament, 
with transgressions of the laws of trade, with denying 
appeals to England, and with a general tendency toward 
independence. In the very year that Penn received his 
charter, that of Massachusetts was threatened with judicial 
proceedings grounded on such irregularities. With these 
facts fresh in mind, it is not hard to understand the rea- 
sons which led to the insertion of provisions in Penn's 
charter looking to an intimate supervision of colonial 
concerns by the central government. 

Pirst,^ provision was made for a strict observance of 
the acts of trade by the requirement that the proprietor 
should appoint an agent to reside in London ready to an- 
swer before the English courts for any violations or will- 

1 Osgood, Amer. Cols, in 11th. Cent., Ill, 22-24, 515-521. 

2/6id., 228-240, 309-335, 395-399; Andrews, Colonial Self -Gov- 
ernment, 256-268. 

3 Thorpe, Amer. Charters, Constitutions, etc., V, 3035-3044; Poore, 
Charters and Constitutions, II, (2d. ed.) 1509-1515; Pa. Col. Recs., 
I, 17-26. 



INTRODUCTION 3 

ful neglects permitted by Penn or his heirs against the 
laws. This agent was required to pay within a year any 
damages awarded by the courts, and if for the space of 
a year Penn neglected to provide an agent or if he failed 
to make payment, the government of the province might 
be resumed to the crown until the obligations were ful- 
filled. Second, provision was made for the exercise of 
the royal veto on colonial legislation by the requirement 
that all laws should be submitted to the Privy Council 
within five years after enactment, such laws to remain in 
full force if not acted upon under the privy seal within 
six months after delivery. Third, the right of the colonists 
to appeal from the decisions of the colonial courts to the 
king was expressly guaranteed. Fourth, the right of the 
imperial Parliament to exercise concurrent jurisdiction 
with the colonial assembly in the matter of levying taxes 
in the colony was maintained by the clause that no taxes 
or impositions could be levied ** unless the same be with 
the consent of the pprietary, or chiefe Governour and 
assembly, or by Act of Parliament in England." No pro- 
vision was made for colonial representation in the Eng- 
lish Parliament. Fifth, the right of the bishop of London 
to appoint ministers for the colony, upon application to 
him by the inhabitants thereof to the number of twenty, 
was clearly stated, and that these appointees should be 
allowed to reside in the colony, '' without any deniall or 
molestation whatsoever." This was an express guarantee 
of the bishop's jurisdiction in a dissenting colony. Tliis 
group of provisions put Pennsylvania in close touch with 
the home government and placed the colony on a footing 
unlike that upon which stood the other charter colonies 
as far as English control was concerned. Through the 
royal veto and appeals pressure could be brought to bear 
to make colonial development conform to English ideals, 
the supremacy of Parliament in matter of taxation was 
clearly affirmed, a due observance of the acts of trade was 



4 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

provided for, and finally, the interests of the Anglican 
Church were carefully guarded. 

In other respects the Quaker colony was made a fief 
or proprietorship on much the same lines as those created 
in Maryland or Carolina. On the territorial side Penn 
and his heirs were constituted " true and absolute Pro- 
priataries " within the area set by the charter, which was 
erected into the " Province and Seigniore " of Pennsyl- 
vania, to be held of the crown by free and common socage 
at a nominal yearly rent. Penn was at liberty to grant 
or lease the lands to settlers in fee simple or fee tail, and 
under such services and rents as seemed best to him. All 
lands were to be held of the proprietor and not of the 
crown. To Penn was given power to erect manors, towns, 
and counties, to incorporate cities and boroughs, and to 
constitute all ports. An equal share of governmental 
powers was bestowed upon him. Penn and his heirs, or 
their deputies, were granted authority to make laws for 
the province with the advice and consent of the free- 
men or their deputies. Thus a modicum of participation 
in government was given to the freemen of the colony, 
but under serious limitations. The qualifications of free- 
men, the nature of the assembly as well as the time and 
place of meeting, were questions not provided for by the 
charter and therefore were left to the determination of 
the proprietor or to the force of circumstances. Moreover, 
the proprietor was given the power, modeled upon that 
possessed by the royal prerogative, to issue ordinances 
without the consent of the freemen, in times of emergency 
or when it was not deemed expedient to call together the 
people. Ordinances were required to be agreeable to Eng- 
lish statutes, and could not deprive the inhabitants of life 
and property. This power gave the proprietor or his 
governor a way to legislate without popular consent, and 
in fact, there were times when the governor availed him- 
self of this authority to offset a refractory legislature. 



INTRODUCTION 5 

The proprietor was authorized to appoint all officials nec- 
essary for the due execution of the laws and to constitute 
all courts without limitation as to kind for the administra- 
tion of justice. Finally, Penn, though as a Quaker he 
preached the iniquity of all war, was created a captain- 
general with all the powers pertaining to that office and 
was empowered to levy, muster, and train the inhabitants 
for military service and employ them in defensive war for 
the security of the province. Such, in a general way, was 
the system of government devised by the charter for the 
colony, — a system thoroughly undemocratic in character. 
The people were subject to prerogative power exercised 
either directly by the crown or placed in the hands of 
private individuals. The proprietor was both the absolute 
lord of the soil and the source of all political power, and 
the crown by reason of the veto power and appellate juris- 
diction formed part of the legislative and judicial ma- 
chinery of the province. This subjection to royal control 
will appear still more clearly in the light of the system 
of colonial administration devised by the English statute 
of 1696. 

The tightening of the machinery of administration 
originated chiefly in a realization of the futility of de- 
pending upon officials outside the sphere of royal control 
to enforce the imperial laws.* The home government at 
first seemed content to rely upon the machinery of gov- 
ernment devised under the royal charters, thus placing 
the execution of the laws in the hands of officials over 
whom the crown enjoyed slight control. Upon the gov- 
ernors devolved the duty of caring for the registry of 
ships, of granting bonds, of inspecting certificates and in- 
voices, and, in general, of enforcing obedience to the laws 
of trade. Upon the judiciary of the colonies fell the of- 
fice of punishing transgressors of the laws. This decen- 
tralized system threw the burden of executing imperial 

4 Osgood, Amer. Cols., Ill, 210 ff.; Andrews, Col. Self-Gov't., 31-40. 



6 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

policies upon officials who, under the conditions, could re- 
fuse to enforce them or only imperfectly comply. Few 
royal customs officers had been present in the colonies till 
the passage of the act of 1672 which levied a duty upon 
the exportation of enumerated comjnodities to other col- 
onies. Thereafter, as occasion demanded, royal customs 
officials were appointed for the colonies.^ These officials 
forced to rely upon the local government for assistance 
encountered insurmountable difficulties in the path of their 
duties. The evidence of such royal agents as Randolph, 
surveyor-general of the customs, Nicholson, a royal gover- 
nor, and others is of one piece on this point. The local 
courts, both judges and jurors, believed to be prejudiced 
in favor of illegal trade, consistently refused to condemn 
breaches of the law.^ The governors of the chartered col- 
onies were found to be men of inferior ability who coun- 
tenanced illegal trade and piracy.'^ In fine, the experience 
of the royal agents is replete with instances where the 
colonies by their laws and actions effectually and indi- 
rectly counteracted the laws of trade. At the same time 
it was found that the customs service itself called loudly 
for a thorough reorganization. Many of these officials 
were of an indifferent sort, and the performance of the 
duties of their office was fearfully lax. Randolph became 
painfully aware of this deplorable condition on his survey 
through the southern colonies in 1692.® Moreover, it may 
be said that the prevalence of illegal trade is good audi 
sufficient evidence of the inadequacy of the existing system 
to enforce the laws of trade. One cannot read the records 
of the time without being impressed with the large amount 

5 Andrews, Col. Self-GovH., 32-34. 

6 Osgood, op. cit., Ill, 230-234 ; Cal. State Paps. Col., 1689-1692, 
524; 1693-1696, 509, 511, 520, 654; 1696-1697; 58, 74; B. T. Paps., PL 
Gen., IV, pt. I, A 7-12. 

T Cal. State Paps., Col., 1696-1697, 72-74; B. T. Paps., PI. Gen., 
IV, pt. 1, A 11. 

sCal. State Paps., Col., 1689-1692, 656-660; 1693-1696, 511, 654; 
1696-1697, 71-72. 



INTRODUCTION 7 

of illegal trade.^ That between Scotland and the colonies 
in contravention of the laws of trade was especially large.^*^ 
It was under such circumstances that English imperialists 
realized that it was necessary to institute reforms in the 
system of administration and to restrict the powers of 
government in the chartered colonies in the interest of 
home control.^^ Such was the purpose of the act of 1696.^^ 
It was of capital necessity in order to secure a maximum 
of efficiency in colonial administration. 

In the main the act of 7 and 8 William III, chapter 22, 
was an administrative measure intended to correct the 
evils laid bare in the colonial system. It required that 
all governors of chartered colonies should receive royal 
approbation and take the oaths enjoined by the acts of 
trade before entering upon the duties of office. Neglect 
to take the oath or neglect of the duties imposed upon 
the governors by the laws carried a penalty of dismissal 
from office and a fine of £1000. The naval officer, the 
governor's agent in matters of trade, was obliged within 
two months after his entrance upon office, to give security 
to and be approved by the Customs Board in England. 
Until these obligations were absolved the governor was 
held liable for the neglects of his agent. To the Lords of 
the Treasury or its subordinate board, the Commissioners 
of the Customs, was given power to constitute such ports 

^Cal. State Paps., Col, 1689-1692, 153, 1693-1696, 511, 520; Mass. 
Hist. Soc, Proceedings, XII, 113-117. 

10 Keith, Economic Causes for the Scottish Union (English Hist. 
Rev., Jan., 1909) ; also Scottish Trade with the Plantations (Scot- 
tish Hist. Rev., Oct., 1908) ; House of Lords Mss., n. s., II, 441-442, 
462-463, 465-466; Cal. State Paps., Col., 1685-1688, 353-354; 1693- 
1696, 323, 510, 519; 1689-1692, 657-660. 

i^ Jour, of House of Commons, XI, 188, 195; Jour, of House of 
Lords, XV, 611; Cal. State Paps., Col., 1693-1696, 279-280, 308, 
321, 399; B. T. Paps., PI. Gen., IV, pt. 1, A 16. 

12 For the details in regard to the passage of the act of 1696, 
see Jour, of Commons, XI, 409, 440, 501, 505, 523; Jour, of Lords, 
XV, 712, 714, 720, 732; House of Lords Mss. n. s. II, 233-234; 
Cal. State Paps., Col., 1693-1696, 639-640. 



8 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

and customs officials in any places in the colonies as seemed 
needful to them. The customs establishment in America 
was put upon the same footing as that in England by 
clothing the officers with the same power and authority 
and placing them under the same penalties for maladmin- 
istration. Provision was made for the trial of breaches 
of the acts of trade in vice-admiralty courts to be estab- 
lished in the colonies. Finally, the supremacy of Parlia- 
ment was maintained by the clause which declared null 
and void all colonial laws and customs contrary to Eng- 
lish laws, passed or to be passed, in which the colonies were 
mentioned. It was also during this movement for reform 
that the English merchants expressed dissatisfaction with 
the management of colonial affairs in England. The colo- 
nial business was in the hands of a committee of the Privy 
Council, known as the Lords of Trade. This resulted in 
the creation of the Board of Trade and Plantations by 
royal commission of May, 1696, whose members should be 
experts in matters of colonial business. 

Legislation looking to reform was now secured and that 
prompt execution of the law should follow was a matter 
of pressing necessity. The Customs Board, the newly cre- 
ated Board of Trade, Randolph, surveyor-general for the 
colonies, and Parliament itself, acted vigorously to this 
end. A system of vice-admiralty courts with royal of- 
ficials was settled in the colonies; the customs service was 
increased and put upon an orderly footing; governors 
were obliged not only to be approved by the crown and 
to take the oath to obey the acts of trade, but were also 
required to give security for the due performance of their 
duties as agents of the crown in matters of trade; naval 
officers were required to give security; new and detailed 
instructions with regard to the acts of trade were issued 
to the governors and royal officials. Such was the system 
inaugurated for centralizing and making more efficient and 
complete colonial administration. It meant an abridgment 



INTRODUCTION 9 

of the powers of the charters in several points. The full 
power to appoint or elect their governors, to establish 
ports, and to constitute all manner of courts was now cur- 
tailed by the force of the act of Parliament. 

When we consider therefore the peculiar provisions of 
Penn's charter together with the provisions of the act of 
1696 we are able to see clearly the intimate relation 
between the colony and the central government. In the 
light of these facts it may not be deemed unprofitable to 
study the working out of these relations, notwithstanding 
the fact that Pennsylvania was governed under a charter 
and not directly by the crown. Before 1696 the provisions 
of the charter were apparently not enforced, but the in- 
ception of the new system and the infusion of new vigor 
into colonial control witnessed an effort to require obedi- 
ence to the requirements of the charter. Moreover, these 
relations between colony and mother country take on an 
added significance when viewed in several other respects. 
The long series of wars between England and France for 
colonial and commercial supremacy in North America in- 
volved the colony as part of the Empire in the important 
question of imperial defense. The development of the An- 
glican Church in the colony in the eighteenth century 
brought on a bitter conflict between the Quakers and 
Churchmen over matters of religion, which took on the 
nature of a struggle between a dissenting colony and the 
state-church system in England. Moreover, we note the 
increased activity of Parliament in colonial matters after 
the Revolution of 1689, legislating for the colonies in a 
number of ways. In fine, in matters of trade, war, religion, 
finance, justice, legislation, both local and imperial, the 
will of the home government was felt in the colony. 

From the standpoint of the colonists all this meant a 
greater subjection to a system not of their own choice and 
a decrease in local self-control; a subserviency of dis- 
tinctly local interests and desires to the interests and needs 



10 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

of the Empire. Furthermore, it is essential to bear in 
mind that the government provided for the colony by the 
charter was monarchical in character. Hence, if the pro- 
prietary system had adhered closely to the lines laid down 
in the charter and had the imperial system been enforced 
to the full, the province would never have become demo- 
cratic. But the social and economic conditions precedent 
for the effectual establishment of a monarchical and im- 
perial system were not present.^^ Soon after the found- 
ing of the province, the living forces of democracy, favored 
by the benevolent attitude of the first proprietor toward 
popular rights, finding themselves out of sympathj^ with 
proprietary and imperial interests and hampered in their 
growth toward self-control by outside authorities, at once 
took up the task of transforming the government in the 
direction of greater autonomy.^* The relations of propri- 
etors to the people as lords of the soil and the source of 
political power brought on bitter and prolonged struggles 
over questions of popular rights and proprietary interests 
and power, which form much of the staple of colonial his- 
tory.^^ But in this larger struggle the fact must not be 
forgotten that there was also an opposition to royal con- 
trol and imperial interests as well. The people were work- 
ing in the direction of independence from any outside 
power whatsoever. This study is an attempt to make clear 
the interaction and opposition of conflicting interests and 
ideals. As a result of this conflict of opposing forces 
emerges the American Revolution and the disruption of 
the Empire. 

13 Osgood, Amer. Cols, in nth. Cent., II, 13-15. 

i4/6i(Z., II, 252-276. 

15 Wrote Franklin in 1764, " Pennsylvania had scarce been set- 
tled Twenty Years, when these Disputes began between the first 
Proprietor and the Original Settlers; they continued, with some 
Intermissions, during his whole Life; his Widow took them up, 
and continued them after his Death. Her Sons resum'd them 
very early, and they still subsist." Works, (Smyth ed.) IV, 
227-228. 



CHAPTER TWO 

CENTRAL INSTITUTIONS OF COLONIAL CONTROL 

It is obvious that a knowledge of the central institutions 
of government as organized to deal with colonial affairs is 
requisite to a proper conception of the colonial system 
of administration. Some idea of the nature and functions 
of the organs of imperial control will not only help to an 
understanding of the manner in which colonial business 
was transacted at home, but also to some appreciation of 
the legal and political relations which existed between the 
mother country and the colonies. This subject for the 
sake of convenience of treatment readily divides itself into 
two parts, executive and legislative control. 

The crown was the chief branch of the English govern- 
ment concerned with the colonies. The organs through 
which executive control over the colonies was exercised 
were the king, the Privy Council, the Secretaries of State, 
the Lords of the Treasury, and the Lords of the Admiralty. 
Besides these departments of state, the royal power was 
exercised through subordinate boards, such as the Board 
of Trade and the Commissioners of the Customs. Chief 
among the executive boards was the Privy Council, which 
included the great ministers of state and some not other- 
wise holding office. Although many of the powers of the 
prerogative over the colonies were placed in the hands of 
the high officers of state, yet the Privy Council never 
parted with two important functions. One the legislative 
function of expressing approval or disapproval of colonial 
enactments, the other the judicial function of hearing and 
determining appeals from the colonial courts, powers which 

11 



12 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

the council enjoys to this day.^ The council performed 
its work chiefly through committees, such as the Committee 
for Hearing Appeals, and the Committee for Plantation 
Affairs.^ Professor Andrews points out that these were 
not standing or separate committees, *' but the same com- 
mittee, that is, the whole Council sitting under different 
titles. " ^ In fact, for the two decades prior to 1696 the 
management of colonial business was placed in the hands 
of a committee of the whole council, known as the Lords 
of Trade.* 

The usual form in which the Privy Council expressed 
its will was the *' order in council." Osgood says, 
^' Within the sphere of the executive they hold a position 
of importance corresponding to that of the statute within 
the province of the legislature." Such orders were is- 
sued concerning a variety of matters which came properly 
within the competence of the council, whether it was a 
minor matter of referring business to another office or 
the important function of appointing a royal governor or 
expressing a decision on a colonial law or appeal. 

Besides the Privy Council, much of colonial manage- 
ment was vested in the offices of the Secretary of State, 
the First Lord of the Treasury, and the First Lord of the 
Admiralty. They were great ministers of state, sworn of 
the Privy Council, and members of the Cabinet, the inner 
circle of the council. These offices, like the council itself, 
existed for the realm as well as the dominions and were 
the representatives of royal authority within their respec- 
tive departments, acting in the name and on behalf of 
the crown. In the sphere of war and foreign relations 

■i^Acts of Privy Council, Col., 11, vi-vii, 826-853; III, 840-853. 

2 Ihid., II, vi-vii. 

3 Andrews, in Amer. Hist. Rev., XVI, 120-121; Acts of Privy 
Council, Col., Ill, viii-ix. 

4 Andrews, British Committees, Commissions, etc., Johns Hopkins 
Studies, XXVI, 111-113; Acts of Privy Council, Col., I, II; Journals 
of Lords of Trade, 8 vols., Feb., 1675 to April, 1696. 



CENTRAL INSTITUTIONS OF COLONIAL CONTROL 13 

the colonies fell chiefly under the administration of the 
secretary of state for the southern department and the 
secretary at war.^ This control was considerable when it 
is remembered that during the period of 1689 to 1763, 
England was involved in a long series of wars and diplo- 
matic negotiations with France. On these matters the 
civil and military officials in the colonies corresponded 
chiefly with the secretary of state, and from him they re- 
ceived orders to proclaim war or peace, to raise troops and 
military supplies, and on allied matters.^ In the field of 
colonial patronage the secretary of state also enjoyed con- 
siderable power. Even in times of peace a general over- 
sight of colonial administration came within the purview 
of this office. The royal governors corresponded with 
him on almost all matters of ordinary concern,^ and to the 
secretary were referred many petitions and memorials from 
the colonies. From 1696 to 1724 this post was held by 
no less than thirteen successive incumbents with an aver- 
age tenure of a little over two years each. Under con- 
ditions which made the secretaryship subject to the vicis- 
situdes of party politics and rapidly changing ministries, 
continuity of administration was possible only because of 
the permanency of the under-secretaries. From 1724 to 
1748 the office was held continuously by the Duke of New- 
castle. Horace Walpole in his memoirs has accused Newcas- 
tle of an extreme negligence of colonial business and of 
an ignorance of colonial affairs, but it may be said that a 
closer inquiry into this matter will probably show that 
his attention to colonial management was greater than is 

5 Todd, Parliameniory Gov't, in England, (2d. ed.), II, 606(;ii»- 
Anson, Law and Custom of the Const., (2d. ed.), II, 152-lGO. 

6 Kimball, Corres. of Wm. Pitt with Col. Govs., etc., 2 vols. 

7 See the correspondence of Governors Morris of N. J. (N. J. 
Hist. Soc, Coll., IV) ; Dinwiddie of Va. (Va. Hist. Soc, Coll., Ill, 
IV) ; and Belcher of Mass. (Mass. Hist. Soc, Coll., sixth ser., 
VI). They corresponded with the secretary on almost all questions 
of colonial concern. 



14 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

commonly supposed.^ From 1748 to 1768 there were no 
less than nine successive secretaries. For five of these 
twenty years the office was ably administered by William 
Pitt, and during the Seven Years' War English arms, 
under his guidance, won renown in every quarter of the 
globe. Outside of Pitt's tenure, the office was the sport 
of politics, handed about frequently to men of decidedly 
mediocre ability in order to meet the plans of the various 
combinations of the Grenville, Rockingham, and Bedford 
factions of the Whig party. 

As already stated part of colonial administration fell 
within the competence of the treasury and admiralty de- 
partments, both of which were composed of boards of 
ministerial rank, presided over by a First Lord of the 
Treasury and a First Lord of the Admiralty. The treas- 
ury board and its subordinate board, the Commissioners 
of the Customs, had charge of the execution of the acts of 
trade, and under their control came the customs officials 
in the colonies, such as the surveyors-general, collectors, 
naval officers, and the governors in matters of trade and 
revenue.^ The admiralty board exercised control over the 
navy in American waters, and vice-admiralty officials were 
commissioned by the judge of the High Court of Ad- 
miralty on warrants issued by the admiralty board.^** 
The chief board of non-ministerial rank concerned with 
the colonies was the Board of Trade. Of this office, its 
personnel, functions, and relations to the other depart- 
ments of government we shall now treat. 

Prior to 1696 colonial management was vested in the 
Lords of Trade, a committee of the whole Privy Council. 

8 Walpole Memoirs, I, 396-397. For a defense of Newcastle see 
Channing, Hist, of U. S., II, 238, 433; Temperly, The Age of Wal- 
pole, Cambridge Modern Hist., VII, 54. 

9 Customs Books (Public Record Office) ; Cal. Treas. Paps., 1557- 
1696, xiv-xvi; Hid., 1702-1707, vii; ibid., 1708-1714, vii; Todd, op. 
cit., II, 523; Anson, op. cit., II, 164. 

io Admiralty Books (Public Record Office) ; Todd, II, 762; Anson, 
II. 176. 



CENTRAL INSTITUTIONS OF COLONIAL CONTROL 15 

The initial impulse toward the creation of a subordinate 
board, separate and distinct from the council, came from 
the merchant classes/^ In 1694 they began to complain 
loudly of the prevalence of illegal trade in the colonies. 
Parliament, acting under their influence, sought to estab- 
lish a colonial office under its own control. The London 
merchants resented the fact that colonial affairs were en- 
trusted to '' courtiers without experience." In the next 
session of the legislature, tlie merchants renewed their 
attempt. Under pressure of this movement the king de- 
cided to create a separate board by royal commission. But 
it seems that after the laborers were chosen and the patent 
was ready, he refused to affix his signature.^-' Again Par- 
liament took up the matter and on December 14, 1695, 
ordered a bill to be introduced providing for a legislative 
council of trade. ^^ The Bristol merchants employed agents 
to lobby for the bill and the commercial towns sought to 
gain representation on the new board.^* The measure was 
stoutly resisted by William III who was very zealous of 
the royal powers. He saw in this effort of Parliament 
a serious encroachment on the appointive power of the 
crown and the setting of a very dangerous precedent.^^ 
The agitation, however, had a salutary effect, for on May 
15, 1696, was issued a royal commission creating the Board 
of Trade and Plantations under the control of the crown.^^ 
This bureau had an existence of varied fortune which 
came to an end with the disruption of England's first 
Empire in the West. 

The work of the board, as outlined in the commission,^'' 

11 Andrews, British Commissions, etc., Johns Hopkins Studies, 
XXVI, 113. 12 Fox-Bourne, Life of John Locke, II, 348. 

13 Cobbett, Pari Hist., V, 977. 

14 Andrews, British Commissions, etc., 113. 

15 Cobbett, Pari. Hist., V, 978. 

16 CaL State Paps., Col., 1693-1696, 632; Acts of Privy Council, 
Col, II, 299. 

17 For a copy of the commission see, B. T. Jour., IX; House of 
Lords Mss., n. s., II, 416; N. Y. Col Docs., IV, 145-148. 



16 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1 7G5 

was two-fold ; the supervision of trade and the supervision 
of colonial administration. In the province of administra- 
tion, in which we are chiefly interested, it was the duty 
of the board to examine the instructions issued to the gov- 
ernors in order to make them full and complete; to re- 
quire an annual statement from the governors as to their 
administrations and to report the essential matters to the 
Privy Council; to consider of the qualifications of persons 
proposed for colonial offices, such as governors, deputy- 
governors, councilors, secretaries, and attorneys-general, 
and to present their names to the council; to weigh and 
examine colonial laws and to represent the '' Usefulness 
or Mischief thereof to our Crown "; to hear complaints 
from the colonies and to advise the council of the proper 
action to be taken thereon, and other matters. All opin- 
ions and findings of the board were required to be drawn 
up in writing over the hands of five members and pre- 
sented to the Privy Council. It is obvious at a glance that 
the board was invested with no power of execution or final 
action, but stood merely as a bureau of reference and 
examination, entirely subordinate to the Privy Council and 
the secretary of state. Herein, as we shall see, lay one 
of the essential imperfections in the organization of this 
office. 

The board was composed of two classes of members, 
eight ex-officio members who were high officers of state, 
such as the principal Secretaries of State, the Lord High 
Admiral, and the Lord High Treasurer; and eight active 
members of non-ministerial rank. The first class were not 
required to be in attendance unless their presence was 
requisite or the public business permitted. The active 
membership, upon which the burden of the work fell, was 
to be composed of '' knowing and fitt persons," accord- 
ing to the words of the commission. The constant labor- 
ers received a yearly compensation of £1000 each.^^ The 

18 It is evident that Lord Monsoii, 1737-1748, and the Earl of 



CENTRAL INSTITUTIONS OF COLONIAL CONTROL 17 

staff of the bureau consisted of secretary, deputy-secretary, 
seven clerks, and was completed by a force of two mes- 
sengers, a porter and a janitress/® The entire establish- 
ment cost the government in salaries about £12,000 a 
year.^'^ Prior to 1718, the crown lawyers acted in the ca- 
pacity of legal advisers to the board, but the expanding 
business of the colonial office required the appointment of 
a special counsel.^^^ The board still continued to consult 
the attorney-general and solicitor-general on questions of 
particular import. One of the most important officials of 
the board was the secretary. This post was held con- 
tinuously by a member of the Popple family, father, son, 
and grandson, from 1696 to 1737.^^ The permanency in 
tenure of the board's staff, such as the secretaries, counsel, 
and clerks, afforded that unbroken continuity in admin- 
istration in the midst of frequent changes in the personnel 
of the board itself and of the vicissitudes of ministries.^^ 
For the first decade after the founding of the board, 
the intention to appoint to that office men of knowledge 
and ability in all matters pertaining to trade and colonial 
administration was fairly well realized. The Earl of 
Bridgewater, Lords Stamford and Dartmouth, who to- 
gether held the presidency for fifteen years, had been 
active members of the former colonial office and had gained 

Halifax, 1748-1761, each received an additional compensation of 
£500 a year as president of the board. Bedford Corres., I, 505-506. 

19 5. T. Jour., IX, 8, 11; XIV, 194; XXXIV, 115, 190; XL, 204; 
LXXII, 348. 

20/Mrf., XX, 23; Cal. Treas. Paps,, 1729-1730, 540, 558, 595, 596; 
1731-1734, 152, 155, 164, 176, 180; 1735-1738, 572, 587, 604, 611, 
615; 1742-1745, 802, 815. 

21 B. T. Jour., XXVII, 133, 203. This post was held by Richard 
West, 1718; Francis Fane, 1725; Matthew Lamb, 1745; and Richard 
Jackson, 1770-1782. Chalmers, Opinions of Eminent Laivyers (ed. 
1858), 9-11. 

22 B. T. Jour., IX, 7; XIX, 165; XXXII, 100. 

23 In the period from 1096 to 1714 there were no less than thirty 
different incumbents; and in the period 1715-1760, about fifty. 
For a convenient list of members see N. Y. Col. Docs., Ill, xv-xvii. 



18 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

a knowledge of colonial affairs.^^ In fact, the first board 
was a capable and experienced body of men. Blathwayt ^^ 
and Locke,^® as secretaries of former colonial boards, and 
by their keen interest in colonization, were well fitted for 
their tasks. Stepney, a diplomat, Meadows and Pollexfen, 
economists of note and public servants of a high type. 
Hill, a man of science, — all thoroughly interested in trade 
and colonies, — formed a strong and efficient colonial 
bureau.'^ But by 1707 these first incumbents had given 
place to others of less ability and experience with the con- 
sequent result of a dwindling of force and activity in the 
powers of the board.-^ In general, down to the accession 
of the House of Hanover, the board exhibited a vigor and 
an interest in its work which cannot be said of the office 
in the days prior to the presidency of the efficient Halifax, 
1748-1761. Frequent meetings were held,-^ colonial laws 
were thoroughly examined and many were disallowed, the 
act of 1696 was carried into execution, great care was 
shown in the drafting of the governors' instructions, the 
qualifications of persons for colonial office were carefully 
examined, and a well-defined policy of vacating the colonial 
charters in the interest of efficient administration was for- 
mulated and vigorously pursued. In many other ways 
the effectiveness of its work was felt both at home and 
abroad. But the period after 1714 tells a different story. 
With the accession of George I and the rise to power of 
the Whig mercantile interests under the leadership of 
Walpole, there came a change in the personnel and con- 

24 Jour, of Lords of Trade, I-VIII, passim. 

25 Channing, History of United States, II, 218-219. 

26 Fox-Bourne, Life of John Locke. 

2^ Diet, of Nat. Biog., XXVI, 389; XXXVII, 192; XLVI, 62. 

28 In 1707, on the accession of the Tory party to power, the per- 
sonnel of the board underwent an entire change. 

'2>9 In the first ten years the board met on an average about fif- 
teen times a month, but after 1708 there seems to have been diffi- 
culty at times in securing a quorum of members. B. T. Jour., 
XX, 35; XXI, 225, 234. 



CENTRAL INSTITUTIONS OF COLONIAL CONTROL 19 

sequent activity of the board.^^ It was a change for the 
worse viewed from the standpoint of effective administra- 
tion. In 1714 a keen critic of the board wrote that many- 
were appointed to that office '' for reasons different than 
their ability. ' ' ^^ Later Horace Walpole wrote that during 
the premiership of his father the board '' had very faultily 
been suffered to lapse almost into a sinecure."^- Burke 
characterized the period as one of '' salutary neglect." 
There is little reason to doubt that in that age of low 
political morality, when the spoils of office were used to 
support the existing administration, the Board of Trade, 
like other offices, offered convenient places to settle and 
reward faithful politicians and henchmen.^^ The conse- 
quence is clear to be seen. In comparison with the board 
of the earlier period, meetings were held less frequently,^* 
fewer attended, the transaction of business was slower, 
legislation w^as less carefully scrutinized, in some cases 
correspondence between the board and colonial governors 
was lax,^^ and the policy of vacating the colonial charters 
was less persistently urged. With these facts in mind 
one is able to appreciate Burke's criticism that the lack 
of effective administration from home suffered ^' a gen- 
erous nature to take its own way to perfection." In the 
first period the colonies were on the defensive, for they 
felt the aggressive powers of the board, but during the 
second period, untrammeled by interference from home, 

30 Chalmers, Introd. to Revolt of Cols., II, 4. 

31 B. T. Paps., PL Gen., IX, K 39; No. Car. Col. Recs., II, 154-166, 

32 Walpole, Memoirs, (2d. ed.) I, 396-397. 

33 Said Burke in 1780 of the Board of Trade, "This board is a 
sort of temperate bed of influence; a sort of gently ripening hot- 
house, where eight members of parliament receive salaries of a 
thousand a year, for a certain given time, in order to mature, at 
a proper season, a claim to two thousand, granted for doing less, 
and on the credit of having toiled so long in that inferior, laborious 
department." Works, (Bohn Lib.), II, 109. 

34 They averaged about ten a month. 

35 2V. y. Col. Docs., VI, 270-271; No. Car. Col. Recs., IV, 173, 
756, 797, 870. 



20 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

they made rapid strides in curtailing the power of the 
imperial government and in fashioning their institutions 
as they saw fit without much regard for the interests of 
the Empire. The Walpolian era was one of commercial 
dominance and if the colonies were liberally and laxly ad- 
ministered in the province of politics, a greater effort was 
made to develop commerce and trade. The reports of the 
board to the king and Parliament on colonial manufactures, 
currency, trade, and similar subjects show a deep insight 
into the economic features of colonization.^^ Walpole fell 
from power in 1742 and Newcastle relinquished the post 
of secretary in 1748, and after this one becomes aware of 
a decided increase of interest in colonial politics. From 
1748 to 1761 the board under the presidency of the able 
and energetic Halifax exhibited a renewed interest in its 
work. 

From a theoretical standpoint the plan of the colonial 
office was fairly well conceived. A bureau composed in 
one part of active laborers possessing ability and experi- 
ence in colonial matters, acting in close cooperation with 
ex-officio members, who represented royal authority in the 
colonies and who were included in the ministry, was well- 
designed to secure unity of purpose, consistency of action, 
and dispatch of business. Ideally considered the arrange- 
ment was calculated to bring together heretofore dis- 
united departments of government, to obviate inter-de- 
partmental frictions, and to secure centralization of au- 
thority. In actual practice the original plan was in no 
ways approximated. In view of the remoteness of the 
colonies from the metropolis and the tedious and slow 
means of communication in that age, harmony and dis- 
patch in the working of the central machinery of govern- 
ment was eminently necessary. Only under such a sys- 
tem would the authority and power of the imperial gov- 

s« Andrews and Davenport, Guide to the MSS. material in the 
British Archives, 192 ff. 



CENTRAL INSTITUTIONS OF COLONIAL CONTROL 21 

ernment be felt and heeded. The ideal was not realized 
till the very close of our period. Quite to the contrary 
the system in actual practice was cumbersome and com- 
plex. The ministers, in whose departments colonial busi- 
ness fell, seldom attended the board as ex-officio members.^^ 
Each department in general pursued its own way without 
much regard for the Board of Trade or other offices. The 
result was a weak sj^stem of divided responsibility, inter- 
departmental jealousy and friction, and no one office be- 
came a center for all colonial business. The naval officers 
and customs officials corresponded with the Customs Board, 
the admiralty officials with the admiralty board, the gov- 
ernors and military officials with the secretary of state 
on matters of foreign relations and war, and the civil offi- 
cials with both the Board of Trade and the secretary of 
state on questions of general concern.^^ Under this sys- 
tem where cooperation was lacking and a general direc- 
tion of affairs was not vested in one office, unity of action 
and harmony of administration were out of the question. 
Everybody's business was liable to be nobody's business, 
or if taken up by anyone it was liable to create jealousy 
in another. Evidence on this point is not lacking. In 
16S'7 the Customs Board petulantly rejected a proposal of 
Robert Quary to fit out an armed cruiser to check illegal 
trade in Delaware Bay because he had slighted its author- 
ity by first applying to the Board of Trade. ^^ This jeal- 
ousy brought to naught a wise proposal and the colonial 
service suffered accordingly. In 1707 the Earl of Suther- 
land, secretary of state, called the board to account for 
reporting on a matter to the Privy Council before it had 
been brought to his attention and directed the offending 

37 On rare occasions they were called in. B. T. Jour., X, 424 ; 
XXIV, 16. At times the board was called to attend the Privy 
Council. Ibid., XIV, 446; XV, 104; XVII, 8; XXXIX, 263; XLI, 
287; LIX, 74. 

ssPownall, Administration of Cols., (ed. 1768), 14. 

39 B. T. Jour., X, 271-274, 346. 



22 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

board to report on no matter relating to his department 
until he was first acquainted.*^ The situation was serious 
when the Earl of Shelburne, president of the board, could 
write in 1763 that '' it frequently happened that contra- 
dictory orders were given by different officers on the same 
points, and more frequently in affairs of difficulty and 
delicacy no orders were given at all, the responsibility of 
both officers being set aside by each having it in his power 
to throw the blame on the other. ' ' *^ Shelburne resigned 
from the board because of friction between his office and 
that of the secretary of state. The failings of the whole 
system were thoroughly realized not only by various mem- 
bers of the board itself but by royal officials in the colonial 
service, and they continually agitated and worked for a 
system of centralized authority. 

Moreover, the Board of Trade, designed as the chief 
office for colonial management, enjoyed no executive power 
whatever. It found itself in a position subordinate to the 
Privy Council and the secretary of state. Two evils re- 
sulted from this. Thomas Povey wrote of an earlier colo- 
nial board ' ' that whatsoever Council is not enabled as well 
to execute as advise, must needs produce very imperfect 
and weak effects. It being, by its subordination and im- 
potency obliged to have recourse to Superior Ministers, 
and Counsels filled with other business, w^^ ofttimes 
gives great and prejudicial delays and usually begets new 
and slower deliberations and results, than the matter in 
hand may stand in need of, by w'^^ means the authority 
and virtue of this council became faint and ineffectual. ' ' *^ 
Burke said, ''Seas roll and months pass between the order 
and the execution; and the want of speedy explanation of 
a single point is enough to defeat a whole system. ' ' *^ 

40 B. T. Paps., PI. Gen., VIII, I, 24. 

41 Fitzmaurice, Life of Shelburne, I, 270. 

42 Andrews, British Commissions, etc., Johns Hopkins Stud., XXVI, 
112. 

43 Burke, Works, (Bohn Lib.) I, 468. 



CENTRAL INSTITUTIONS OF COLONIAL CONTROL 23 

Under the circumstances promptness was a most valuable 
asset, but under the system it was lightly regarded. The 
board did not have immediate access to the king, but re- 
ceived its orders in writing either from the Privy Council 
directly or through the secretary of state; it reported its 
opinions in a ' ' representation, ' ' drawn up by the secretary 
of the board and signed by five members, either to the 
Privy Council directly or through the secretary of state. 
The arrangement was not conducive to promptness.'** 
Moreover, a body which had not the power to appoint one 
of the lowest of officials, but only the power of recommen- 
dation, to consider colonial laws but no authority to dis- 
allow them; in short a bureau which had no plenary ex- 
ecutive power whatever would scarce enjoy the respect of 
the colonial officials. Governor Pownall wrote, *' even the 
meanest of its officers in the plantations looking up solely 
to the giving power, will scarce correspond with the direct- 
ing; nay, may perhaps make court to the one by passing 
by the other. ' ' ^^ Pownall probably knew from experience 
whereof he spoke. Royal officials such as Quary and Ran- 
dolph wrote that the Quakers of Pennsylvania '' cared 
naught for the lords of trade and looked elsewhere for the 
confirmation of their rights. ' ' *^ They counted on the in- 
fluence of William Penn, and in fact he was able to secure 

** In its report of 1721, the board summarized the situation, 
" The present method of dispatching business is lyable to much 
delay and confusion, there being no less than three different ways 
of proceeding therein; that is to say (1) by immediate application 
to Your Majesty by one of Your Secretaries of State (2) by Petition 
to Your Majesty in Council and (3) by Representation to Your 
Majesty from this Board: from whence it happens that no one 
Office is thor'ly informed of all matters relating to the Plantations, 
and sometimes Orders are obtained by surprize, disadvantageous 
to Your Majesty's service; whereas, if the Business of the Planta- 
tions were wholly confined to one Office, these inconveniences would 
be thereby avoided. B. T. Paps., PL Gen., Entry E, ff. 286 et. seq., 
N. Y. Col. Docs., V, 630. 

45 Pownall, Adm. of Cols., (ed. 1768) 17-18. 

4«5. T. Paps., Prop., II, B 34; ihid., PL Gen., IV, pt. 2, C 18. 



24 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

favorable action by appealing to superior ministers in the 
face of adverse reports by the Board of Trade. Governor 
Belcher of Massachusetts wrote that '' The Lords of Trade 
are not very mighty lords; nor are they able to administer 
life or death. ' ' ^^ The thousand leagues which separated 
the mother country from the colonies may account for 
many of the failures to execute imperial policies and is 
no doubt responsible for the development of mutual mis- 
understanding, but it is by no means sufficient to account 
for the imperfections and failings of the colonial organi- 
zation at home. 

One other point demands our attention here. The suc- 
cess with which colonial business was handled depended not 
only on a simple and harmonious machine and on the ability 
and integrity of the men appointed to manage colonial 
affairs, but even to a greater extent on the appointment 
to office of men who had a knowledge gained from actual 
experience in the colonies. It was of the greatest impor- 
tance that the members of the board should have an inti- 
mate knowledge of the needs, the laws, the customs, and 
the temper of the colonists gained from intimate experi- 
ence so that official action might be wisely adapted to the 
colonial situation. It is true that men like Blathwayt, 
Locke and Bladen had a good knowledge of colonial af- 
fairs, but it was not gained by service in the colonies. In 
fact, there never sat at the board as a member anyone with 
a first-hand knowledge of the colonies, and after the first 
decade even those who were appointed thereto were gen- 
erally men of inferior ability. William Penn summed up 
the situation admirably when he wrote in 1701 that there 
was " so little of an American understanding among those 
whose business it is to superintend it. All places as well as 

47 Belcher, Letters, II, 240, (Mass. Hist. Soc, Coll., 6th. ser.). 
Wrote Belcher in 1731, "the Lords of Trade have not been very- 
friendly in these matters. . . . We must treat them with good 
manners, and if thej be unreasonable we must endeavour to do our 
business with the King & his immediate ministers." lUd., 1, 38-39. 



CENTRAL INSTITUTIONS OF COLONIAL CONTROL 25 

people and languages have their peculiarities, and a just 
consideration thereof contributes much to proper methods 
for their respective benefit. ' ' He expressed the wish ' ' that 
there were added to those ingenious persons that superin- 
tend the Colonies some of their former governors that 
served well. For besides that they deserve notice, they 
must needs supply the rest with that knowledge their ex- 
perience has given them; that they wh'o have never been 
in those parts of the world, cannot, though otherwise ora- 
cles, comparably understand. " '^^ In a similar vein wrote 
a memorialist in 1714.*^ *' No part of the British domin- 
ions " said he, ^' has been hitherto so little understood and 
so much neglected," and he held that it was impossible 
for a board to form a proper judgment of colonial affairs 
unless some of the members had a perfect and personal 
knowledge of colonial life. Like Penn, he suggested the 
employment at the board of former governors of good 
service. It is true that the board always laid hold of 
every opportunity to accumulate all the information pos- 
sible before making its report on a colonial matter. One 
of its chief sources of knowledge of colonial conditions was 
the colonial agent.^^ Its dependence upon this source is 
illustrated by a letter from the board to the governor of 
New York in 1698 urging the appointment of a permanent 
agent for the colony in London '' whom we may call upon 
for further information as may be requisite upon occasion ; 
the want thereof has occasioned delaj^s in public affairs. ' ' ^^ 
Most of the colonies employed such agents and they were 
frequently called into consultation by the board. But 
some of the agents were not colonists themselves and were 
employed solely to protect the interests of the colony which 

^8 Duke of Portland, Mss., IV, 30, (Hist. Mss. Com., Report 15, 
pt. 4). 

4S5. T. Paps., PL Gen., IX, K 39; No. Car. Col. Recs., II, 154-166. 

50 Tanner, Colonial Agencies, (Political Science Quarterly, XVI, 
24-49). 

51 N. Y. Col. Docs., IV, 297; V, 361, 473. 



26 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

they represented. They stood rather as advocates of colo- 
nial interests than as judges. Official action was taken by 
those who looked upon the colonies solely from the Eng- 
lish point of view and who knew not American conditions 
by actual contact. The board also availed itself of the 
information offered by proprietors, ex-governors, and Eng- 
lish merchants trading to the colonies. To a very great 
extent the board relied upon the information gained from 
the correspondence of royal officials, such as governors, 
customs and admiralty officials. There was grave danger 
in a dependence upon this sort of evidence. Many of the 
royal appointees in the colonies were not colonists, but 
Englishmen, and in some cases of an inferior sort and of 
a narrow and partisan cast of mind, who spent a few short 
years in the service and went out, as Governor Morris, 
himself a colonist, wrote, " generally to repair a shattered 
fortune or acquire an estate. ' ' ^- This information was 
very apt to be ex-parte in character, yet we find that the 
Board of Trade was content to accept it at full value. The 
lack of expert knowledge of colonial affairs at home con- 
tributed in no small degree to the friction, estrangement, 
and misunderstanding which existed between the colonies 
and the mother country. In several respects the Board of 
Trade challenges comparison of an unfavorable sort with 
the English East India Office ^^ of to-day or the Spanish 
Council of the Indies of former days.^* The former is a 
ministerial office presided over by a secretary of state for 
India who is assisted by a council whose members hold office 
for ten years at least and are chosen from those who have 
resided in India not less than ten years. In Spain, the old 
Council of the Indies was a great department of state, en- 
trusted with the royal authority in all matters relating to 

52 N. Y. Col. Docs., V, 887. Cf. Franklin, Works, (Smyth ed.), 
V, 83; No. Car. Col. Recs., II, 158; Greene, Prov. Gov., 47-48. 

53 Reinsch, Colonial Government, 292, 

54 Roscher, Spanish Col. System, (Bourne tr.), 25-26; Bourne, 
Spain in America, 222-227. 



CENTRAL INSTITUTIONS OF COLONIAL CONTROL 27 

the colonies and whose members were chosen preferably 
from those who had held high office in New Spain with 
distinction. In England of the eighteenth century, au- 
thority was divided, the Board of Trade had no executive 
powers and was not composed of those trained by long ex- 
perience in the field. It is fair to say that had the Board 
of Trade approximated either of the other organizations, 
colonial administration would have been more efficient and 
there would have existed more of an entente cordiale be- 
tween the two parts of the Empire. 

Still another criticism demands our attention here, and 
that is the ill-effects of the fee system on administration. 
Of the iniquities of the fee system in the colonies wo shall 
deal in later pages. But it is a sad commentary on Eng- 
lish colonial administration when the Board of Trade 
could write to a royal governor in 1716 that the laws of 
the colony could not be considered and reported on till an 
agent was appointed to pay the fees and '' it is the same 
case with respect to Councillors; For if the Board had re- 
ported . . . that the persons you had recommended 
should be appointed Councillors by his Majesty, nothing 
would have been done therein, for want of a person to pay 
the fees in the Council and Secretaries Office. ' ' ^^ Gov- 
ernor Belcher of New Jersey was unable to secure his in- 
structions till he disbursed £200 in fees and '' this unex- 
pected Supply set the Wheels into Motion." ^^ This state- 
ment is characteristic of the evidence on this point, but 
it is sufficient to illustrate to what an extent the political 
morality of the age cast its harmful influence on prompt 
and efficient administration.^^ 

55 N. Y. Col. Docs., V, 361, 473. For the fees paid by the agents 
of Conn, at the various offices in England on the Intestacy Law 
and Mohegan case, consult the Talcott Papers, 1, 244-245, (Conn. 
Hist. Soc, Collections) . 

56 Greene, Provincial Governor, 47 and note. 

57 In 1731 the Privy Council adopted a table of fees which was 
posted in the office of the Board of Trade. B. T. Jour., XLI, 230; 
Acts of Privy Council, Col, III, 319-320. 



28 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

The imperfections of the whole system were thoroughly 
realized by royal officials on both sides of the Atlantic. 
The board itself,^^ such efficient members of the board as 
Martin Bladen,^^ and such of its presidents, as Halifax, 
Shelburne,^*^ Hillsborough,^^ and Dartmouth,*^^ were alive 
to the faults of the system and its impotency. Econo- 
mists, such as D'Avenant,^^ or such colonial officials as 
Thomas Pownall ^* and Sir William Keith,^^ were fully 
aware of its failings. These imperialists through reports 
and memorials laid bare the whole system and suggested 
remedies. Through personal influence they sought to 
bring about a reform. In order to centralize authority two 
remedial measures were repeatedly urged. As far as the 
colonies were concerned, they urged that royal government 
should be substituted for chartered control in order to 
bring all colonial administration under the immediate di- 
rection of the crown. This phase of the subject we leave 
for subsequent treatment. As far as England was con- 
cerned they proposed the substitution of centralized for 
divided responsibility by centering all colonial manage- 
ment in the office of the Board of Trade and by erecting 
that office into a department of state, whose president 
should be admitted into the ministry on the same footing 
as the other great ministers of state. Efficient control 
demanded one undivided department which should enjoy 
not only executive powers but should be the center for 
the transaction of all colonial business. This could be ac- 

58 Report of the board of 1721, B. T. Paps., PI. Gen., Entry Bk. E, 
286 ff., N. y. Col. Docs., V, 629-630. 

59 No. Car. Col. Recs., II, 634-635. 

60 Fitzmaurice, Life of Shelhurne, 1, 269-275. 

ei Orenville Corres., Ill, 294-296; Dartmouth Mss., Ill, 179, (Hist. 
Mss. Com,, Report 15, pt. 1). 
62 Dartmouth Mss., Ill, 182. 
63D'Avenant, Works, (Whitworth ed.), II, 29-30. 

64 Pownall, Administration of the Cols., (ed. 1768), 11-27. 

65 Keith, Short Discourse on Plantations, (ed. 1740), 182-184; 
B. T. Paps. PL Gen., X, L 105. 

\ 



CENTRAL INSTITUTIONS OF COLONIAL CONTROL 29 

complished either by carrying out the remedy proposed 
above or else by giving all control over into the hands of 
the secretary of state and placing the board in a position 
of entire subordination to that office. The importance of 
American affairs certainly demanded the creation of a 
separate department of state. But in this respect the best 
interests of the Empire remained neglected and nothing 
was done to reform the system till the colonies had so far 
advanced to a position of political independence that ade- 
quate reforms in the direction of centralized authority 
would have little or no effect in restraining them. 

Under the presidency of the Earl of Halifax, (1748- 
1761), new vigor was infused into the Board of Trade 
through the force of his personality and ability. Halifax 
took steps to put his office on a basis of efficiency and dig- 
nity such as the importance of American affairs demanded. 
In 1751 he urged that the board should be raised to the 
rank of a department of state whose president should be 
created secretary of state for America.^® His suggestion 
was not acted upon at the time, but his persistency was 
productive of one step in the right direction. In March, 
1752, an order in council was issued vesting the patronage 
of all colonial offices, except those under the direction of 
the Customs Board or Admiralty Board, solely in the hands 
of the Board of Trade. For the sake of " greater regular- 
ity and dispatch of business " the colonial governors were 
required to correspond exclusively with the board, except 
in cases of importance and of such a nature as to require 
the immediate attention of the secretary of state or in 
cases where the governors received the orders of the secre- 
tary, in which instances the correspondence was to be di- 
rected solely to the latter.®^ These exceptions referred to 
questions of war and diplomacy which fell properly within 

eeWalpole, Letters, (Cunningham ed.), II, 252, 258; Walpole, 
Memoirs, 1, 199, 220. 

67 J5. T. Paps., PL Gen., XV, 105, 107; N. Y. Col. Docs., VI, 
756-759; R. I. del. Recs., V, 350-354. 



30 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

the secretary's office. On the formation of the Pitt min- 
istry in 1756, Halifax again urged that he should be in- 
vested with the office and powers of a secretary of state 
for America. Pitt refused to consent to this division of 
his office and Halifax resigned.®^ The refusal to take this 
step at that time was no doubt wise. England was then 
engaged in the world-wide struggle with France for colo- 
nial and commercial supremacy and the militancy of the 
times demanded the entire concentration of affairs in the 
hands of the great secretary, "William Pitt. Although 
Halifax was again not successful in his efforts, yet the 
matter was compromised and as president of the board he 
was admitted to a seat in the Pitt-Newcastle ministry of 
1757. Horace Walpole may accuse Halifax of an over- 
weening ambition, but the fact remains that the failings 
of the colonial organization at home and the critical posi- 
tion of American affairs is sufficient justification for an 
ambition so wisely directed. In 1761, with the fall of 
Canada, a backward step was taken. The Earl of Bute, 
the personal friend of the new king, George III, was ad- 
mitted to the cabinet, and to appease Pitt, who v/as not con- 
sulted in the matter, American affairs were partly restored 
to his department.^^ An order in council of 1761 revoked 
the order of 1752 except in that part wliich related to the 
subject of correspondence.'^*^ But a turn in the wheel of 
politics was to bring a better order of affairs. In March, 
1763, the Earl of Shelburne entered the Grenville ministry 
as president of the Board of Trade and the order of 1752 
was restored."^^ But his tenure was of short duration. In 
September he resigned because of a lack of sympathy with 
Grenville 's plans for America and because of friction with 
the Earl of Egremont, secretary of state, over questions of 

68 Walpole, Letters, III, 21, 84, 87; Walpole, Memoirs, III, 34; 
Bedford Corres., II, 249-250. 

69 Walpole, Letters, III, 380, 383, 386. 

70 N. Y. Col. Docs., VII, 459. 

71 B. T. Jour., LXXI, 116. 



CENTRAL INSTITUTIONS OF COLONIAL CONTROL 31 

their respective powers in colonial management/- The of- 
fice with its old insignificance was bestowed upon the Earl of 
Hillsborough.'^ In 1765, upon the formation of the Rock- 
ingham ministry, Lord Dartmouth was made president of 
the board. Hillsborough, fully aware by actual experi- 
ence of the evils of divided responsibility, warned his suc- 
cessor '' that it is absolutely necessary that the same pow- 
ers in every respect with regard to Trade and the Colonies 
should be delegated to Lord Dartmouth, as are vested in 
the First Lords of the Treasury and Admiralty with re- 
gard to their respective departments. Without this Lord 
Dartmouth will suffer continual disappointments and too 
probably undergo undeserved disgrace."^* Dartmouth 
strongly urged what Halifax had attempted before, but 
to no avail and he resigned.'^^ In 1766, the Earl of Shel- 
burne entered the Grafton-Pitt ministry as secretary for 
the Southern department and Hillsborough was restored 
to the presidency of the board. An agreement was reached 
between the two, at Hillsborough's suggestion, whereby 
all colonial business was to center in the secretary's office, 
the board acting solely as a bureau of reference on all mat- 
ters referred to it for consideration.'^^ The order of 1752 
was rescinded in full and the governors were directed to 

72 Fitzmaurice, Life of Shelhurne, 1, 268-278; Walpole, Letters, 
IV, 113. 

73 5. T. Jour., LXXI, 211. 

T^ Dartmouth Mss., Ill, 179, (Hist. Mss. Com., Report 15, pt. 1). 

75 Earl of Chesterfield wrote Dartmouth, " You must be Secretary 
of State in all the forms and privileges of that office. . . . If we 
have no Secretary of State with full and undisputed powers for 
America, in a few years we may as well have no America." Dart- 
mouth replied that he would not concur in any plan " that is not 
calculated to give dignity and credit, as well as effectual authority 
to the person who may undertake to preside over that Department." 
Dartmouth Mss., Ill, 182, (Hist. Mss. Com., Report 15, pt. 1). 
Narrative of Changes in the Ministry, 1165-1169, told by the Duke 
of Newcastle, 96-97, (Camden Soc, Publications, 1898). 

^QCal. State Paps., Home Office, 1766-1769, no. 256; Fitzmaurice, 
Life of Shelburne, II, 2-3: Grenville Corres., Ill, 294-296. 



32 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

correspond with the secretary, sending only '' duplicates " 
to the board, except in cases of war and diplomacy."^ This 
plan was well-conceived and was without doubt calculated 
to give colonial concerns the undivided attention they de- 
served. But the reform did not go far enough. The criti- 
cal posture of American affairs which followed in the wake 
of the Stamp Act demanded not only wise statesmanship 
but the creation of a separate and distinct department of 
ministerial standing for the control of the colonies. Steps 
leading to a realization of this object were taken in 1767. 
Such was the design of Pitt in 1766,^^ but his illness ren- 
dered him incapable of business and forced him into re- 
tirement which left the ministry in the hands of the Graf- 
ton wing of the Whig party. Grafton anxious to detach 
the Bedford faction from opposition, sought to make way 
for the inclusion of some of Bedford's followers in the 
ministry. AVith this object in view Shelburne was ap- 
proached on the question of separating American affairs 
from his office."^^ Unable to secure the advice of Chatham 
in his retirement, Shelburne acquiesced. The plan was 
consummated in January, 1768, and the Earl of Hills- 
borough became the first secretary of state for America.^^ 
The reform came too late. The efforts to strengthen 
the system of colonial administration which followed the 
close of the French and Indian war and the elevation of 
American affairs to the dignity of a department of state 
came at a time when the colonies had practically attained 

77 A^ y. Col. Do€s., VII, 848. 

78 Grenville Corres., Ill, 235. 

79 Fitzmaurice, Life of Shelburne, II, 67-77; Walpole, Letters, V, 
75, 77; N. Y. Col. Docs., VIII, 7. 

80 Said Burke in 1780, " the history of this office is too recent 
to suffer us to forget, that it was made for the mere convenience 
of the arrangements of political intrigue, and not for the service 
of the state; that it was made, in order to give a colour to an ex- 
orbitant increase of the civil list; and in the same act to bring a 
new accession to the loaded compost heap of corrupt influence." 
Works, (Bohn Lib.) II, 109. 



CENTRAL INSTITUTIONS OF COLONIAL CONTROL 33 

the position of political independence and were too far 
beyond the point where they could be controlled by any 
sort of a system except their own. From the point of 
view of the colonists the lack of system was of great ad- 
vantage to them. It left them free to develop their in- 
stitutions in a normal and natural way, unhampered by 
vigorous English control and interference. The inherent 
difficulties of the geographical situation, which placed the 
center of government so far away from the colonies, in- 
deed accounts much for the failure to carry into effectual 
execution imperial control and paved the way for final 
separation. But it may be said that the lack of vigor at 
home due to the complexity of machinery of administration, 
the inferior character of the officials and their lack of an 
intimate knowledge of colonial conditions, the vicissitudes 
of party politics and factional struggles at home, all com- 
bined to prevent a real and effective control of the colo- 
nies by the imperial government. 

Prior to the outbreak of the Civil War in England in 
1641, the crown was the only organ of government con- 
cerned with the colonies; Parliament had not yet come to 
exercise a power to legislate for them. This exclusive 
connection between crown and colonies was a result of 
the fact that at that time the crown stood as the embodi- 
ment of sovereignty in the English state. ^^ Land in 
America was seized in the name of the king, all charters 
to commercial and colonizing companies were issued under 
his name and seal, the powers and privileges bestowed 
upon the patentees were granted away in accordance with 
his will, and control over the colonies was exercised solely 
by the king. But the tie which bound together the colo- 
nies and England was in no sense of a purely personal na- 
ture, such as the personal union between England and 
Scotland before 1707, or between England and Hanover 
after 1714, simply held together loosely by reason of al- 

81 Beer, Origins of British Col. System, 1S78-1660, 300-303. 



34 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

legiance to the same prince. The relations were far more 
intimate.^^ The colonies were dominions or territories, 
not incorporated into the realm of England as was "Wales 
by the Act of Union, but in the status of dependent com- 
munities, subordinate to the sovereignty of England and 
subject to the absolute power of the central government 
to determine their political and governmental rights. 
With the founding of permanent colonies Parliament de- 
nied the crown's claim to exclusive jurisdiction over the 
colonies, holding that it had a right to legislate for them. 
But during the early part of the seventeenth century 
Parliament had not yet determined the extent of its power 
over England. Colonial control formed simply one of 
the fundamental questions at issue in the struggle between 
the crown and Parliament over their respective fields of 
government. Until the Civil War the crown was able to 
uphold its high monarchical pretensions, but during that 
war and the Cromwellian era Parliament established its 
right to deal with the colonies, and in fact emphatically as- 
serted this claim in the words of the act of 1650.^^ It reads, 
'' Whereas the islands and other places in America, where 
any English are planted, are and ought to be subject to 
and dependent upon England and both ever since the 
planting thereof, have been and ought to be subject to the 
laws, orders, and regulations as are and shall be made by 
the parliament." This is precisely the view of the su- 
premacy of Parliament and the subordination of the colo- 
nies stated over a century later in the words of the De- 
claratory Act. 

After the Restoration the right of Parliament to 
legislate for the colonies was not disputed in England 
and during the period of the later Stuarts this power was 
exercised directly by the passage of the famous acts of 

82 Osgood, American Cols, in 17th. Cent., Ill, 6-12. 

83 Beer., op. cit., ch. xii; Osgood, op. cit., Ill, 115-118. 



CENTRAL INSTITUTIONS OF COLONIAL CONTROL 35 

trade and navigation which laid down the principles along 
which the colonies were to be administered. The status 
of the colonies and the power of Parliament over them were 
well defined by the court of common pleas in the time of 
Charles II. Sir John Vaughan, chief justice, said in the 
case of Craw vs. Bamsay, that '' Ireland is a dominion 
belonging to the Crown of England, and follows that it 
cannot separate from it, but by Act of Parliament, no more 
than AVales, Gernsey, Jersey, Berwick, the English Plan- 
tations, all which are belonging to the Realm of England, 
though not within the Territorial dominion or Realm of 
England, but follow it, and are a part of its Royalty. ' ' ^* 
In another case the same justice declared that Ireland, 
the Channel Islands, and the colonies over-sea '^ are of 
the dominions of England ... all of which may be 
bound by Laws, made respectively for them by an Eng- 
lish Parliament. ' ' ^^ These clear cut expressions of opinion 
are comparable with the words of the act of 1650. Thej^ 
show in clearest terms that the union between the colonies 
and England was in no sense personal, but that the colo- 
nies were territories, outside the realm and subject to the 
sovereign power in the English state. Furthermore, these 
statements emphasize the right of Parliament to legislate 
for the colonies. But the question of the legal sovereignty 
in the English state was by no means established till the 
eighteenth century. The revolution of 1689 which saw 
the culmination of the long and bitter struggle between 
the crown and Parliament over questions of government 
was followed by the passage of the great remedial statutes, 
such as the Bill of Rights and the Act of Settlement, which 
guaranteed the liberties of the subjects against the arbi- 
trary exercise of the royal prerogative, and hedged about 
with serious limitations the ancient powers of the crown. 

^4: Reports and Arguments of Sir John Vaughan, (1720), 300. 
85 Ihid., 400-401. 



36 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

With the gradual transfer of power from the crown to 
Parliament in the direction of parliamentary supremacy ^® 
there never arose any question at home of the right and 
power of the imperial legislature to deal with the colonies. 
Therefore, until Parliament exercised the right to incor- 
porate the colonies into the realm or to provide a govern- 
ment for them, they remained eithet under the direct con- 
trol of the crown or were governed under the royal char- 
ters subject to the controlling power of the crown as pro- 
vided by the royal grants. 

After 1689 Parliament came more and more to exercise 
its power over the colonies. This interest in colonization 
is largely accounted for by the increasing influence of the 
mercantile classes and a consequent growing attachment 
to the principles of the laws of trade. It was the influence 
of the merchants acting through Parliament which secured 
the passage of the act of 1696 and which sought to obtain 
control of colonial management by the creation of a Parlia- 
mentary council of trade. In an administrative way Par- 
liament exercised some control over the colonies. It re- 
peatedly called upon the Board of Trade to submit re- 
ports on the questions of colonial administration, finance, 
trade, defense, manufactures and other interests. ^^ Par- 
liament appointed committees from its own members to 
investigate colonial conditions. In a positive way its ad- 
ministrative power is exemplified in addresses to the 
crown directing the execution of certain orders. By such 
means two laws of South Carolina were vetoed, the gov- 
ernors of the charter colonies were required to give bond 
for the proper performance of their duties in execution of 
the acts of trade, and governors were directed not to as- 

86 Mcllwain, The High Court of Parliament and its Supremacy, 
chap. V, gives an admirable and clear account of the political history 
of parliamentary supremacy. 

87 For a list of the reports to Parliament, consult Andrews and 
Davenport, Guide to the Mss. Materials for Hist, of U. 8. in English 
Archives, 192 ff. See the reports of 1702 and 1703 in the Bulletins 
of the N. Y. Public Lib., X, no. 5; XI, no. 10. 



CENTRAL INSTITUTIONS OF COLONIAL CONTROL 37 

sent to laws creating a paper currency without the sus- 
pending clause. In the sphere of actual legislation Par- 
liament passed about sixty acts directly affecting the colo- 
nies in the period 1689 to 1765. At least two-thirds of this 
number related chiefly to an extension of the principles of 
the acts of trade and navigation. A few concerned more 
intimately internal affairs, such as the post-office laws, the 
acts concerning specie and paper currency, and the acts 
restricting colonial manufactures. On the whole Parlia- 
ment confined itself mainly to the regulation of external 
trade and matters which concerned the interests of the Em- 
pire at large, and left direct taxation and distinctly in- 
ternal affairs to be regulated by the colonial governments. 
But this legislation stands as positive evidence of the 
right of the imperial legislature to make laws for the 
colonies in every way whatever. Moreover, that it was 
within the competence of Parliament to alter or abolish 
the colonial charters is evidenced by the act of 1696, was 
shown conclusively by the several bills intended either to 
vacate or modify them, and was repeatedly stated in the 
opinions of the crown lawyers. In the minds of English- 
men at home there was no doubt of the legal supremacy 
of Parliament over the colonies. In point of law and pre- 
cedent this view was absolutely unassailable.®^ 

The supremacy of Parliament meant the subordination 
of the colonial governments. In law the colonial corpora- 
tions and the provinces were on the same plane respectively 
as corporate municipalities and provinces in England. 
This was the view commonly accepted by English states- 
men. As Burke said, '' at the first designation of the as- 
semblies, they were not intended as anything more, 

88 Burke wrote, " When I first came into a public trust, I found 
your parliament in possession of an unlimited legislative power 
over the colonies. I could not open the statute book without seeing 
the actual exercise of it, more or less, in all cases M^hatsoever. 
This possession passed with me for a title." Letter to the Sheriffs 
of Bristol, Works, (Bohn Lib.) II, 26. 



38 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

. . . than the municipal corporations within this Isl- 
and, to which some at present love to compare them. ' ' ^^ 
A clause of the act of 1696 expressly stated the doctrine 
of the supremacy of Parliament and the subordination of 
the colonial assemblies by declaring null and void any 
* * Lawes, By Laws, Usages and Customes ' ' which are repug- 
nant to any statute made or to be made ' ' in this Kingdome 
soe far as such Law relate to and mention the said Planta- 
tions. ' ' ^^ Considering the respective positions in law of 
Parliament and the colonial assemblies, what then was the 
ground upon which the colonists at a later period so 
stoutly resisted the right of Parliament to legislate for 
them on all questions? What was the basis of the colo- 
nial claims to legislative independence? Had the colonies 
been incorporated into the realm and had the crown and 
Parliament dealt with the colonies as directly and inten- 
sively as they did for the provinces at home, these ques- 
tions would not have arisen at a later time to vex and dis- 
rupt the Empire. But such was not the case. Parlia- 
ment never saw fit to define beyond the shadow of a doubt 
the status of the colonies in the imperial system. That 
it was within its power to do so is without doubt, but that 
it neglected definitely to ascertain the nature of the con- 
stitution of the Empire is equally true. This constitution 
was left to develop along normal lines and according to a 
natural growth. The colonists were left to fashion their 
own institutions and governments free from parliamentary 
interference and vigorous control of the crown due to the 
cumbersome and weak administrative system. 

89 Bladen, a member of the Board of Trade, wrote, " we are to 
consider them as so many Corporations at a distance, invested with 
an ability to make temporary By Laws for themselves agreeable 
to their respective Scituations and Climates, but no ways inter- 
fering with the legal Prerogative of the Crown, or the true Legis- 
lative Power of the Mother State." No. Car. Col. Recs., II, 629-630. 
Cf. Burke, Works, II, 33; Andrews, The Connecticut Intestacy Law, 
(Yale Review, Nov., 1894, 281-287). 

90 7 and 8 Wm. Ill, c. 22, sec. 8. 



CENTRAL INSTITUTIONS OF COLONIAL CONTROL 39 

From the fact that the colonies were never made a part 
of the realm there developed a distinction between the do- 
minions and realm. This principle is best stated in the 
words of Attorney-General Yorke in 1729 that statutes 
of Parliament passed since the settlement of a colony ^' and 
are not, by express words, located to the Plantations in 
general, or to the Province in particular, are not in force 
there, unless they have been introduced and declared to 
be laws, by some acts of the Assembly of the Prov- 
ince. ' ' ^^ This principle was supported by actual prac- 
tice and commonly accepted in the colonies.^^ The fact 
that Parliament passed very few acts which expressly men- 
tioned the colonies and did not interfere with the internal 
polity of the colonies to any great extent, left the bulk of 
legislation to the colonial assemblies. In Rhode Island 
and Connecticut the government under the royal charters 
was democratically organized and these two corporate colo- 
nies possessed all the organs of representative government 
necessary to independent political existence. In the prov- 
inces, both royal and proprietary, the source of political 
power was not in the people; the political and govern- 
mental privileges shared by them depended to a large ex- 
tent upon the will of the crown or proprietor. In the 
royal province, the predominant type of colony in the 
eighteenth century, the old prerogatives of the crown found 
expression in the commissions to the royal governors.^^ 
Since Parliament devised no government for them they re- 
mained subject to the controlling power of the crown. 
The royal power in this respect was in no way limited by 
the Revolution of 1689. The fundamental statutes which 
limited the royal prerogative and gave greater emphasis 

91 Chalmers, Opinions of Eminent Lawyers, (ed. 1858), 208, also 
209-232. 

92 Osgood, American Cols, in 17th. Cent., Ill, 8-9. See the pre- 
amble to the Pennsylvania law of 1718, Pa. Statutes at Large, 
III, 199. 

93 Greene, Provincial Governor, 93-95. 



40 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

to the rights of Englishmen at home, made no mention 
of the colonies and consequently were of no force there. 
But the crown had already recognized the triumph of the 
representative principle in government and granted the 
colonists the right to elect deputies to make laws for the 
colony in conjunction with the royal governor and council. 
In Pennsylvania, the people from the very first were 
granted large powers of self-government. William Penn 
was a fond believer in popular government. After two 
decades of constitution making, there was evolved the 
Charter of Privileges of 1701 which stood as the embodi- 
ment of the organic law of the province till 1776. This 
written constitution granted the people a representative 
assembly with power to choose its own speaker and officers, 
to judge of the qualifications of its own members, prepare 
bills to be passed into laws, redress grievances and to 
" have all the Powers and Privileges of an Assemby, ac- 
cording to the Eights of the Free-born Subjects of Eng- 
land." ^* In 1706 these powers were formally enacted into 
law which was passed upon by the crown and confirmed.^^ 
Thus the incipient parliament of the province received the 
legal sanction of the home government. Still the provin- 
cial assembly was not the dominant factor in politics. 
The extent of its power and its position in government 
was still to be determined. The relation of the repre- 
sentative bodies in the provinces to the crown or pro- 
prietor was in many ways analogous to that of Parlia- 
ment to the crown prior to 1688. In the eighteenth cen- 
tury not only did Parliament become the sovereign power 
in the English state, but the House of Commons arro- 
gated to itself more and more the political supremacy in 
government at the expense both of the Lords and crown. 
There was a steady advance toward the modem system of 

s^ For Charter of Privileges, see Pa. Col. Recs., II, 56-60; Poore, 
Charters and Constitutions, II ; Thorpe, Amer. Charters, Consts., 
etc., V, 3076-3081. 

Q^Pa. Statutes at Large, II, 218. 



CENTRAL INSTITUTIONS OF COLONIAL CONTROL 41 

responsible government by which the crown acts only on 
the advice of ministers chosen from the ruling party in 
the Commons. The means by which this was effected was 
the control of the purse strings by the Commons. By a 
course of development remarkably like that in England, 
the colonial assemblies became the dominant organs in 
provincial politics. To obtain this position, the repre- 
sentative branch of the assembly, like the Commons in 
England, used the effective whip of the money power. 
The position which the assembly of Pennsylvania sought 
to attain was that of the assemblies in the corporate colo- 
nies of New England or that of the House of Commons 
in England. In 1707 Robert Quary wrote to the Board 
of Trade of the bitter struggle in Pennsylvania between 
the governor and assembly in which the latter '' resolved 
to have all the Government and powers into their own 
hands, they insist to have the sole regulation of all Courts, 
and the nomination of all officers, to sett when and as 
often and as long as they please on their own adjourn- 
ments, they have filled a volume with Votes and Privileges 
so that they have banished all Prerogative & Government 
but what is lodged in the Assembly. " ^^ In 1741 Governor 
Thomas wrote that the assembly was '' vested ^vith Powers 
of Government so ample as to render the Governor a Cypher 
or no more than nominal. ' ' ^^ What is said here of the as- 
sembly of Pennsylvania is equally true of all the prov- 
inces, and shows unmistakably that the constitutional de- 
velopment of the colonies was in the direction of respon- 
sible government. The lower house in the provinces, like 
the Commons in England, eventually became the control- 
ling factor in the colonial governments. 

»6 N. Y. Col. Docs., IV, 105L Wrote Logan to Penn, " Ours here 
(i. e. the assembly) contend for the whole power and leave the 
Governour only a name; and they aver 'tis their right from thy 
first charter granted them in England, which is obligatory upon 
them." Penn-Logan Gorres., II, 182. 

»7 Governor Thomas to John Penn, May 14, 1741, Penn. Mss., 
Official Corres., III. 



42 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 109G-17G5 

Owing to the fact that Parliament confined itself chiefly 
to the regulation of external affairs and left to the colonial 
assemblies the greater part of legislation and regulation 
of internal affairs, it is not to be wondered that the people 
looked upon their assemblies as having the same powers 
and authority as the English Parliament. In these legis- 
latures the people were represented and through their dele- 
gates expressed their desires and sentiments. Naturally 
enough they became attached to their own representative 
bodies and deemed them more important than Parliament in 
which they were only virtually represented. It was from 
such a course of development that was evolved the theory 
of '^ actual representation." Since the colonists had no 
voice in the election of members to the English Parlia- 
ment, they denied the right of that body to tax them or to 
regulate their internal affairs. In 1754 Franklin opposed 
a plan to raise a fund by act of Parliament to support 
the charges of defense in the colonies on the ground that 
the colonists were unrepresented in that body.^^ Of such 
evidence there is not a little,^^ but this view did not become 
wide-spread till after the passage of the Stamp Act. 

This tendency toward political independence was thor- 
oughly realized by royal and proprietary officials and they 
persistently urged the home government to take measures 
to check it. In 1703, Robert Quary wrote of Virginia, 
'' The Assembly concludes it is entitled to all the rights 
and Privileges of an English Parliament; and search into 
the records of that house for precedents; These false and 
pernicious notions, if not timely prevented, will have a 
very ill consequence. " ^^^ Or as Governor Hamilton of 

98 Franklin, Works, (Smyth ed.), Ill, 209, 231, 232-241. 

99 Chalmers, Intro, to Revolt of Cols., 1, 284, 285 ; N. Y. Col. Docs., 
IV, 71; Beer, British Col. Pol, 1754-1165, 41; Greene, Prov. Amer., 
186. 

100 ^V". Y. Col. Docs., IV, 1051. Belcher, governor of Mass., wrote, 
" our Assemblies are sometimes made to think by their leaders 
that they are as big as the Parliament of Great Britain, but surely 



CENTRAL INSTITUTIONS OF COLONIAL CONTROL 43 

Pennsylvania wrote, in 1761, that the assembly claimed 
''to be entitled to all the priveledges of a House of 
Comons, (tho' I am expressly advised to the Contrary by 
his Majesty's Attorney-General of England)." ^^^ Time 
and time again the assembly of Pennsylvania based its 
claim to powers and privileges upon parliamentary prece- 
dents which is good evidence that it looked upon itself 
as clothed with the same authority as the Parliament at 
home/°- Prior to 1765 there was apparently no friction 
between the colonial assemblies and Parliament, although 
they exercised the same functions. That they did not 
clash was due to the fact that they confined themselves 
to different spheres of activity; the one mainly to the 
general interests of the Empire, and the other to internal 
affairs.^^^ 

From these facts we are able to point out the nature 
of the imperial constitution as it stood in 1765. The col- 
onies had advanced from the legal position of provinces 
with power to make by-laws to the actual position of au- 
tonomous governments with parliaments of their own co- 
ordinate with the English Parliament. Great Britain, as 
far as the colonies were concerned, was moving in the di- 
rection not of a consolidated and centralized empire, but 
of a federal empire. It was composed of a number of in- 

as occasions require, I can't help thinking we shall always to our 
loss & cost find otherwise." Letters, II, 388, (Mass. Hist Soc, 
Coll., sixth ser.). For like opinions see, 'N . Y. Col. Docs., TV, 1059, 
1121; V, 255-256. 

101 Kimball, Corres. of Pitt with Col. Govs., II, 433. 

102 Pa. Col. Recs., VI, 581, 708, 717; VII, 752; VIII, 74, 106. 

103 Burke wrote, "... neither part felt any inconvenience from 
this double legislature, to which they had been formed by imper- 
ceptible habits, and old custom, the great support of all the govern- 
ments in the world. Though these legislatures were sometimes 
found perhaps performing the very same functions, they did not 
very grossly or systematically clash. In all likelihood this arose 
from mere neglect; possibly from the natural operation of things, 
which, left to themselves, generally fall into their proper order." 
Works, (Bohn Lib.), II, 33. 



44 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

dependent political units bound together into a loose con- 
federation, owing allegiance to the same king, and con- 
trolled as to their external affairs by the imperial legisla- 
ture. The permanence of the Empire depended upon a 
recognition of this historic growth. 



CHAPTER THREE 

ADMINISTRATION OF THE ACTS OF TRADE 

In treating of the administrative relations between the 
colonies and England it is essential to bear in mind that 
the basis of the English colonial system was economic 
rather than political. The creation of a commercial rather 
than a political empire was the chief consideration. Col- 
OHization was looked upon as a means of lessening the 
economic dependence of the metropolis upon foreign coun- 
tries and of developing national power and prestige.^ 
This policy took definite shape with the passage of the 
acts of trade and navigation in the Restoration period, 
whereby the economic life of the colonies was regulated 
and controlled in the interest of a self-sufficient com- 
mercial empire.^ Two principles lay at the basis of this 
system; that of confining all colosial shipping to national 
bottoms, and that of restricting colonial export and im- 
port trade to England as the staple. The laws provided 
that all ships trading to or from the colonies should be 
owned and built in England or the colonies, and that the 
master and three-fourths of the crew should be English 
or colonial born. As to the staple it was stipulated that 
colonial importations from Europe should first be landed 
in England before shipment to America, and that the ex- 
portation of certain colonial products, specified by law, 
should be shipped in the first instance to England. The 
carrying into effect of these laws called for an adminis- 

1 Callender, Selections from Economic Hist, of U. S., 85-120; 
Beer, British Col. Policy, 1154-1765, 193-205, 209-210; Andrews, 
Colonial Self-Gov't., 3-21; Osgood, Amer. Cols., Ill, 193-239. 

2 12 Clias. II., c. 18; 14 Chas. II., c. 11; 15 Chas. II., c. 7; 25 
Chas. II., c. 7; 7 and 8 Wm. III., c. 22. 

45 



46 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

trative machinery of some sort. In this chapter it is the 
purpose to deal with the customs service, and in the next 
with the vice-admiralty courts established in the colonies 
under the act of 1696. 

At the head of the customs service was the Lords of the 
Treasury and its subordinate board, the Commissioners of 
the Customs. By the act of 1696 they were authorized to 
designate all ports in the colonies and to appoint all need- 
ful officials thereto.^ The Customs Board exercised a gen- 
eral superintendence over the customs officials both in the 
colonies and in England. This board commissioned of- 
ficers on warrant from the Lords of the Treasury, issued 
instructions to the customs officials, and carried on a cor- 
respondence with them relative to the execution of the 
acts of trade.* There was also an auditor-general of the 
colonial revenues, whose duty it was to audit and inspect 
all accounts of rents, revenues, and duties payable to the 
royal exchequer. He was empowered to appoint deputies 
for the colonies and to make proposals to the treasury 
board concerning the better management of the revenues. 
The office carried with it a yearly compensation of £500, 
payable out of the revenues arising in several of the col- 
onies. This office was created in 1680 with William Blath- 
wayt as the first incumbent, succeeded in 1718 by Horatio 
Walpole.^ At the head of the American service was a 
surveyor-general, an office first established in 1683. Of 
the work of the first incumbents, William Dyer and Patrick 
Mean, there is little knowledge at hand.^ But with the 
appointment of Edward Randolph to that post in 1691, 
the office stands out in clear relief."^ The surveyor-general 

3 7 and 8 Wm. III., c. 22, sec. 10. 

4 Customs Books, Public Record Office, London, contain the entries 
of commissions issued, warrants for salaries, etc. 

5 Commission to Blathwayt, B. T. Paps., PI. Gen., VIII, I 55; 
to Walpole, iUd., IX, K 108. 

6 Osgood, Amer. Cols., Ill, 236; Andrews, Col. Self -Gov't., 34. 

7 Customs Books, XI, 353. 



ADMINISTRATION OF THE ACTS OF TRADE 47 

was empowered to inspect and control the management 
of all inferior customs officers in the colonies, to suspend 
from office for good cause, to appoint to vacancies, but 
in either case to report the matter at once to the Customs 
Board. A yearly salary of £365 attached to the office, 
together with £50 a year for a clerk and £80 for the hire 
of a boat and boatmen.^ For twenty-five years the duties 
of the office extended over all the continental colonies and 
the Bermuda Islands. In 1709 the Customs Board re- 
ported to the Lords of the Treasury that recent informa- 
tion had brought to light gross frauds in the service, due 
to the fact that it was practically impossible for one man 
to control and inspect the offices and keep them to a proper 
performance of their duties over such a wide-extended 
territory.^ As a result of this report the office was divided 
in 1709 and two surveys created; one embracing the col- 
onies of Newfoundland, New England, New York and 
New Jersey ; the other included Pennsylvania, the mainland 
colonies south, Jamaica and the Bermudas, each under a 
surveyor-general receiving the same salary and allowances 
as allowed the former surveyor.^^ Of these officials none was 
more active and zealous in the discharge of his duties than 
Edward Randolph. At first he was surveyor for New Eng- 
land where he was unweary in his efforts to enforce the 
laws of trade.^^ When his powers were given a wider scope 
in 1691, the colonies to the south felt the rigors of his tire- 
less efforts to bring offenders to justice. In his surveys of 
1691-1695, he placed forfeited bonds in suit, brought action 
against illegal traders, dismissed delinquent and corrupt 
customs officials, and infused new vigor into the service.^^ 

8 Customs Bks., XII, 268, 371. At first Randolph received only £200 
a year, but in 1696 he petitioned for and was granted the salary 
of £365, which had been allowed his predecessors. Ihid., 268. 

slhid., XIV, 179. 

loiUd., XIV, 181. 

11 Osgood, Amer. Cols., Ill, 228-235. 

12 Cal State Paps., Col., 1689-1692, 656-660. 



48 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

In 1695 he was in England bending his energy 
to secure the passage of the act of 1696. In 1698 
he was again in the colonies and during his surveys 
of the next two years he installed the new customs officials, 
visited all the colonies once, and in some cases twice, from 
New Hampshire to the Bermudas. ^^ In the latter part of 
1700 he was again in England actively engaged in support 
of the bill in Parliament to vacate the colonial charters in 
the interest of more efficient colonial administration. His 
correspondence with the Customs Board and the Board of 
Trade was frequent and voluminous, and it was accepted at 
home with implicit faith. ^^ On his death in 1703, he was 
succeeded by Robert Quary who stood high in the estima- 
tion of the boards of trade and customs.^^ At the time of 
his appointment he was judge of the vice-admiralty court 
and surveyor of the customs for Pennsylvania and New 
Jersey. Quary was continued surveyor-general for the 
southern district when the office was divided in 1709. He 
was an official of much the same type as Randolph, although 
he lacked his predecessor's ability. Quary was succeeded 
b}^ Sir William Keith, afterwards governor of Pennsyl- 
vania.^^ Keith served for the short space of a year and 
a half, but he has left a record of his work which throws 
some light on the administration of his office.^^ He left 
England in June, 1714, and landed in Virginia, where he 
visited and inspected all the customs offices; in January, 
1715, he sailed for Jamaica where he recovered £8000 in 
revenue due the crown for nine years and in grave danger 
of being lost; thence he sailed in June to South Carolina, 
where he put the customs offices on a good footing. Keith 's 

13 B. T. Paps., PL Gen., V, pt. 2, D 49. 

14 For the letters and papers of Randolph see the 7 vols, in the 
publications of the Prince Society. 

15 Customs Books, XIII, 296; Toppan, Edward Randolph, V, 291, 
292-293. Quary's commission is printed in the Mass. Hist. See, 
Proceedings, 2d. ser., IV, 148. 

16 Customs Books, XV, 58, 81. 

17 B. T. Paps., Props., X, pt. 1, Q 87. 



ADMINISTRATION OF THE ACTS OF TRADE 49 

report not only reveals the character of the work performed 
b}'' the surveyor-general, but illustrates the looseness which 
characterized much of the custom's service. 

Before taking up the work of the officials directly under 
the control of the Customs Board and surveyor-general, it 
will be well to describe the duties of the governor and the 
naval officer as administrators of the laws of trade. As we 
have alread}^ pointed out, the act of 1696 contained pro- 
visions intended to draw the governor and naval officers 
in the chartered colonies more directly under royal in- 
fluence.^^ The governor was required to give bond and 
take the oath binding him to a faithful performance of his 
duties with regard to the trade laws; failure to do either 
was made punishable by removal from office and a fine of 
£1000. The naval officer, appointed by the governor, was 
also required to give bond to the Customs Board, and until 
this obligation was absolved, the governor was held liable 
for the neglects of his appointee. By far the most effective 
hold on the governor possessed by the crown was contained 
in the clause, that ^' All governors nominated by pro- 
prietors entitled to make such nominations should be ap- 
proved by his majesty." Randolph busied himself at once 
in efforts to see the provisions carried into effect. A draft 
of a commission to administer the oath was drawn up by the 
attorney-general at Randolph's request.^^ The Board of 
Trade advised the Privy Council of the necessity of issuing 
these commissions.^^ This report was approved by the 
council in August, 1696, commissions were drawn up and 
placed in the hands of Randolph, soon to depart for the col- 
onies, to see that they were put into force.^^ The com- 

18 See page 7. 

19 5. T. Jour., IX, 28-29; B. T. Paps., PI. Gen., Entry Bk. A, 
25-26. 

20 B. T. Jour., IX, 23, 43, 45; B. T. Paps., PI. Gen., IV, pt. 1, 
A 4; Entry Bk. A, 19. 

21 B. T. Paps., PI. Gen., IV, pt. 1, A 63; C 41; Entry Bk. A, 27; 
House of Lords Mss., n.s., II, 426. 



50 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

mission for Pennsylvania empowered three of the provin- 
cial council together with the collector at Philadelphia, 
or three of the persons named therein to administer the 
oath to the governor. 2- The matter of the royal approba- 
tion of the governors was not pressed at the time, but 
meanwhile steps were taken to bind the proprietors and 
governors by restrictions which formed no part of the act 
of 1696. 

In February, 1697, a committee of the House of Lords 
intimated to William Penn that in view of the gross ir- 
regularities committed in the chartered colonies it may be 
found necessary to place such colonies under direct royal 
control.^^ To meet this threat Penn suggested that his 
governor should give security for good behavior.^* In con- 
sequence the Lords addressed the crown directing that the 
proprietors should give bond in England obliging their 
governors to '' observe and obey all Instructions that shall 
be sent to them from Your Majesty, or any acting under 
Your Authority, pursuant to the several Acts of Trade re- 
lating to the Plantations. ' ' ^^ This measure went further 
than Penn contemplated, for he only proposed that the 
governors appointed by the proprietors, and not the pro- 
prietors themselves, should enter into security. The Board 
of Trade acted promptly on the address. The attorney- 
general was called upon to draw up a suitable bond and the 
Customs Board was asked to fix the sum.^*^ Early in May, 
1697, the proprietors and colonial agents were directed to 
appear before the board and fulfill the obligation.-^ At 

225. T. Paps., Props., IV, D 31; PI. Gen., IV, pt. 2, B 42. 

23 House of Lords Jour., XVI, 94; House of Lords Mss., n.s., 
II, 410. 

24 House of Lords Mss., n.s., II, 413, 414. 

2^ House of Lords Jour., XVI, 125-126, 127-128, 131. 

26 B. T. Paps., Props., Entry Bk. A, 62, 64, 68, 79 ; B. T. Jour., 
X, 64-65, 66, 69, 94. For draft of bond see Props., Entry Bk. D, 
165. The Customs Board reported that the amount of the bond 
should be from £2000 to £5000, according to the importance of the 
trade of the colony. 

27 B. T. Paps., Props., Entry Bk. A, 74-75. Earl of Bellomout, 



ADMINISTRATION OF THE ACTS OF TRADE 51 

once they protested. Thornburgh, agent for the Carolina 
proprietors, answered that the patentees could not be ex- 
pected to give security for persons approved by the crown, 
neither was there any law which required it.-^ Penn took 
the same stand. He thought '' it hard that the Pro- 
prietarys should give security for the Deputys of the King's 
approbation; Since it is the same thing for therefore we 
should be excused because the King approves or disap- 
proves our Nomination. " ^^ He held that if the appoint- 
ment was entirely in the hands of the proprietor there was 
reasonable grounds for requiring him to give security for 
his governor. The matter was not pressed again till 1700 in 
connection with the appointment of a governor for the Ba- 
hamas. At this time the Board of Trade took further 
ground, insisting that both the proprietor and his governor 
should enter into a bond.^^ The legality of the question 
was referred to the attorney-general who held that there 
was no law which required the proprietors to enter into 
such obligation.^^ With this the effort to include the pro- 
prietors was dropped, but deputy-governors upon confir- 
mation by the crown w^ere required to give security. 

Considerable difficulty was experienced by the Board of 
Trade in enforcing the provisions requiring the royal con- 
firmation of the governor of chartered colonies. There 
were two serious defects in the act of 1696 in this respect, 
pointed out by Randolph.^- No penalty was provided for 
patentees who refused or neglected to present their nomi- 
nees for royal approval, and, after the royal will had once 
been expressed, the crown had no power to remove a gov- 

governor of N. Y., was instructed to execute bonds for the gov- 
ernors of Rhode Island and Connecticut. Ibid., 108, 112. 

28 5. T. Paps., Props., Entry Bk. A., 80; B. T. Jour., X, 103-104. 

29 i?. T. Paps., Props., II, B 8; Entry Bk. A, 189, 194; B. T. Jour., 
X, 117, 119, 385. 

30 B. T. Paps., Props., Entry Bk. B, 213, 214. 216. 
si/Md., 243. 

32 House of Lords Mss., n.s., II, 488-490. 



52 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

ernor and insist upon the nomination of another. On the 
other hand the crown lawyers on several occasions gave the 
opinion that the crown had a right to appoint a royal gov- 
ernor in a chartered colony, a right which was exercised sev- 
eral times.^^ In February, 1698, the Board of Trade re- 
ported to the Privy Council that because of the irregulari- 
ties committed in the chartered colonies and because the 
proprietors had not presented their governors for royal ap- 
probation nor given security, the charters should be vacated 
by legislative action.'^* Meanwhile Randolph complained 
that none of the governors had secured the royal sanction. ^^ 
In October, 1699, the board wrote to the proprietors asking 
what steps they had taken to absolve the obligation. ^^ The 
Privy Council directed the attorney-general to report on a 
measure to enforce this obligation on the proprietors.^^ It 
was proposed to remedy the matter by a clause in the piracy 
act of 1700, but it was omitted. In January, 1701, the at- 
torney-general advised the passage of a special act,^^ but 
again no such law found its way to the statute books. 
The only solution of the problem was the vacation of the 
charters and the establishment of direct control by the 
crown. A bill to this effect was introduced into the House 
of Lords in March, 1701, but it never passed beyond the 
second reading.^^ 

Even before this the crown assumed a power to remove 
a governor by requiring Penn in 1699 to dismiss Governor 
Markham and nominate another in his stead. Markham 
was charged with countenancing piracy and smuggling, with 
opposition to the admiralty court, and with not having the 
royal confirmation. Penn went to the province and took 

33 See pages 338, 339. 

34 B. T. Jour., X, 444. 

35 Ihid., XII, 98 ; B. T. Paps., PL Gen., IV, pt. 2, B 40. 

36 J5. T. Jour., XII, 221, 240-241. 

37 B. T. Paps., Props., IV, D 18; PL Gen., IV, pt. 1, D 3. 

38 B. T. Jour., XIII, 293, 315; B. T. Paps., Props., V, F 56. 
30 Sfee page 344. 



ADMINISTRATION OF THE ACTS OF TRADE 53 

upon himself the duties of governor. In 1701 he returned 
hastily to England to defend his charter against parlia- 
mentary attacks, and appointed Andrew Hamilton gov- 
ernor. Robert Quary, then in England, charged that 
Hamilton was unqualified to act, not having the royal ap- 
proval nor given security.**^ In answer Penn said that he 
had directed his son in England to secure a royal order 
confirming Hamilton, but it was not done because of the 
doubtful issue of the bill against the charters.*^ In justi- 
fication of Hamilton's appointment Penn held that it was 
necessary to leave someone to care for the interests of the 
crown and proprietor until royal sanction could be secured, 
and in support of this contention he produced the opinion 
of Chief Justice Atwoqd of New York that the appointment 
was good until the royal will was expressed. Penn then 
petitioned the crown to approve Hamilton.^- His name 
was also under consideration as governor of the new royal 
province of New Jersey. Quary and Randolph both op- 
posed the nomination on the ground that Hamilton had con- 
nived at violations of the acts of trade opposed the admi- 
ralty court, and had shown great favoritism to the Quak- 
ers.^^ On this evidence the Board of Trade reported against 
Hamilton and in July, 1702, the Privy Council sustained 
the report.^* Penn appealed to members of the ministry 
asking that Hamilton be confirmed for one year as neces- 
sary to the security of English and colonial interests.*^ 
The crown was disposed to grant the request, and the board 
seized the occasion to fasten upon Penn two conditions; 
that his governor should provide security in the sum of 
£2000, and that the royal confirmation should in no way 

40 5. T. Paps., Props., VI, pt. 2, I 28; VII, M 21. 

4i/6id., VI, pt. 2, I 1«, K 8. 

42/6icZ., VI, pt. 2, K 13; B. T. Jour., XV, 111. 

43 5. T. Paps., Props., VI, pt. 2,KQ,7,N. J. Archives, II, 479, 
481. 

44 B. T. Paps., Props., VI, pt. 2, K 49; Entry Bk. D, 102, 220. 

45 5. T. Paps., Props., VI, pt. 2, K 51; Entry Bk. D, 233; Penn- 
Logan Corres., I, 136. 



54 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

prejudice the right and title of the crown to the soil and 
government of Delaware.^® Penn fulfilled the conditions. 
He signed a statement with regard to Delaware according 
to the wishes of the board and left with the Lords of the 
Treasury the names of Hamilton 's bondsmen. In January, 
1703, a certificate was issued from the office of the Remem- 
brancer of the Exchequer showing that the bond had been 
executed.*^ Thereupon Hamilton was approved by order 
in council as governor of Delaware at the pleasure of the 
crown and of Pennsylvania for one year.*^ This in general 
was the procedure which obtained in the case of all gov- 
ernors nominated by Penn or his heirs for their dominions. 
The attempts to enforce the obligations of the bond and 
royal confirmation upon the governors of the corporate 
colonies of Ehode Island and Connecticut illustrate the 
imperfections of the law in 1696. In these colonies the 
charters called for yearly elections of the governors and the 
short tenure and great distance from England practically 
nullified any attempts to enforce the provisions. This 
fact was repeatedly urged in support of the policy to va- 
cate the charters.^^ The whole situation revealed the seri- 
ous difficulties in the way of administering colonies gov- 
erned under charters in the interests of the Empire. 
At first the Board of Trade inquired very carefully into 

46 5. T. Jour., XV, 259; B. T. Paps., Props., Entry Bk. D, 237, 
239-240. 

47 5. T. Jour., XV, 296, 297, 310, 315, 316; B. T. Paps., Props., 
Entry Bk. D, 262, 267, 277, 278; Projis., VII, L 6, 10-12, 17. 

4 8 J5. T. Paps., Props., VI, pt. 2, K 53; B. T. Jour., XV, 279. 

49 2V^. Y. Col. Docs., V, 599-600. In 1723, the agent for Rhode 
Island objected to the royal order sent to the governor of Massa- 
chusetts to demand a bond and to require an oath of the governor 
of the colony on the ground that they were " inconsistent with the 
Priviledges granted them in their Charter " and " would be at- 
tended with very Great Inconveniences." Acts of Privy Council, 
Col, III, 45. In 1730 and 1734, the Board of Trade complained 
that the corporate colonies had not obeyed these requirements and 
recommended action against the charters. Andrews, Conn. Intes- 
tacy Laio, Yale Review, Nov., 1894, 291; Talcott Papers, II, 446, 
in Conn. Hist. Soc, Collections. 



ADMINISTRATION OF THE ACTS OF TRADE 55 

the qualifications of Penn's nominees. We have already 
noticed the case of Hamilton. In 1703, when the name of 
John Evans was presented for confirmation, the board 
asked Penn to give some account of a person wholly un- 
known to its members. Not until Penn and his agent, 
Lawton, had testified to the good character of Evans was 
his name proposed to the crown for approval.^^ In the 
case of Charles Gookin nominated in 1708, Penn and Gen- 
eral Erie, in whose regiment Gookin had served, wrote 
in words of commendation of the nominee.^^ Keith, who 
was proposed in 1716, found it necessary to justify his dis- 
missal from the surveyor-generalship by giving an account 
of the zeal he displayed in that office.^- But after this the 
records show that the board apparently made no effort to 
inquire into the merits of the persons proposed by the sons 
of William Penn. By the time of George I this bureau 
had entered upon a period of decline and consequently de- 
cidedly less interest was shown in colonial administration. 
The duties of the governor as administrator of the acts 
of trade were set forth in a list of instructions issued to 
him at the time of his confirmation.^^ It was simply a col- 
lection and exposition of the duties which devolved upon 
him by the acts of trade. The bond stipulated that if he 
refused to obey all instructions issued by the crown or its 
agents pursuant to the laws, the security was to be for- 
feited.^* One article of the instructions required the gov- 
ernor to enter into a bond of £500 forbidding him during 
his administration to act as a merchant or factor in any 

50 J?. T. Paps., Props., VII, L 39-44; Entry Bk. D, 345, 350; 
B. T. Jour., XVI, 177. 

51 B. T. Paps., Props., IX, P 32-34, 39, 44-46; Entry Bk., F, 44, 
45, 46; B. T. Jour., XX, 164. 

52 B. T. Paps., Props., X, pt. 1, Q 87. 

53 For the instructions to Gookin, 1709, see B. T. Paps., Props., 
Entry Bk. F, 100-127; to Gordon, 1726, ihid., Entry Bk. G, 363-395;' 
to Hamilton, 1748, ihid.. Entry Bk. H, 285-350. 

54 For the bond given by Governor Hamilton, see B. T. Paps., 
Props., Entry Bk. H, 267-281. 



56 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

mercantile pursuit or as owner of any trading vessel. 
This precaution was taken to place him above the tempta- 
tions of using his office for personal advantage. This obli- 
gation was apparently not fulfilled for many years. In 
1726 the Board of Trade complained that the governors 
had paid no attention to it, and for the future it was in- 
serted as part of the larger bond given by the governors.^^ 
The principal duties of the governor were three. He was 
to see that all vessels trading to or from the colonies were 
English or colonial built and owned, whereof the master 
and three-fourths of the crew were English or colonial 
born, and that no ship shall be deemed qualified to trade 
unless the persons claiming property in the same had duly 
registered the vessel. As to the colonial export trade the 
governor was not to permit a vessel to lade the enumerated 
articles unless the master had given bond to discharge his 
cargo in the realm. In case of vessels coming from the 
realm a certificate showing that a bond had been given to 
the chief officer of the port whence the vessel sailed was 
sufficient, but if from any other port the governor was to 
demand a bond and was required to return a list of them 
semi-annually to the Customs Board. To provide against 
false or suspicious papers, the governor was directed to 
examine with great care all certificates of discharge andl 
of security given in England, and in case he felt doubtful 
as to their validity, he was to demand a new bond in the 
former case and not to cancel the bond in the latter case 
until he had notified the Customs Board and received di- 
rections. If a certificate of discharge of cargo in the realm 
was not produced within eighteen months from date of 
bond, the governor was to sue for the security. He was to 
take care that all bondsmen were persons of residence 
and of property sufficient to meet the obligations of the 
bond. As to the colonial import trade, no vessel was al- 
lowed to discharge her cargo until the master had notified 

55 B. T. Paps., Props., Entry Bk. G, 352-353. 



ADMINISTRATION OF THE ACTS OF TRADE 57 

the governor or the naval officer of the arrival of the ship, 
her name and his own, and had produced a true invoice 
of the goods, where laden, and proof that the ship was 
legally qualified. Furthermore, the governor was to see 
that before discharge of cargo the master had first pro- 
duced to the collector of the customs a certificate under 
the seal of the customs house where the goods were re- 
shipped, and that no goods should be unladed except by 
permit of the collector and in the presence of an officer 
by him appointed. In addition the instructions included 
a long list of statutes which imposed various duties upon 
the governor. He was instructed to aid the customs offi- 
cials in the discharge of their duties, to correspond with 
the Customs Board, advising it of mismanagement in the 
service or giving information of value. He was empowered 
to fill vacancies in the custom house in the province pending 
action by the surveyor-general or the Customs Board. He 
was to exempt all customs officials from jury or militia 
duty, except in extreme cases, or from service in any pro- 
vincial office likely to hinder them in a discharge of their 
duties. As compensation the governor was allowed by 
law one-third of all fines and forfeitures arising from vio- 
lations of the acts of trade, w^hich was augmented by cer- 
tain fees fixed by colonial law for the registry of vessels, 
inspecting invoices, granting clearance papers, and taking 
bonds.^^ Governor Evans, (1703-1709), estimated that his 
income amounted yearly to £250 from fines and forfeitures, 
and £50 from fees.^^ 

The governor's agent w^as the naval officer. It is evident 
that the obligation of giving bond to the Customs Board, 
imposed on the governor's appointee by the statute of 
1696, w^as not highly regarded. In 1725 the Customs 
Board informed Governor Gordon that several naval offi- 
cers, appointed by him, had not given bond, and he was 

56 Pa. statutes at Large, II, 347; III, 110. 

57 B. T. Paps., Props., X, pt. 1, Q 53. 



58 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

instructed to execute the bonds and submit a list of the 
officers to the surveyor-general to be sent to England for 
approval.^^ This order was not obeyed, for in 1733 Gordon 
was again directed to send home the names and qualifica- 
tions of the naval officers, and to require the latter to name 
bondsmen in England to give security for them.^^ "Whether 
this order was obeyed is a matter of conjecture, but these 
instances illustrate the laxity of management in the cus- 
toms service prior to 1763. The duty of the naval officer 
was to make an entry and keep an account of all exports 
and imports, of all vessels with tonnage and guns, whence 
they came, whither bound, and to submit his accounts 
quarterly to the Customs Board.^^ As compensation he 
was allowed certain fees by colonial law. 

In 1696 the Customs Board urged upon the Privy Coun- 
cil and the Lords of the Treasury the necessity of appoint- 
ing many new customs officers for the colonies and of 
granting them fit compensation in order to obviate the 
temptation to connive at illegal trade.^^ On November 20, 
1696, the Lords of the Treasury approved the list of nomi- 
nees and salaries, submitted to it by the Customs Board, 
and ordered the persons named to be commissioned.®^ 
This act marked the beginning of an orderly customs serv- 
ice for the colonies. Nearly thirty officials, including a 
surveyor-general, local surveyors, collectors, and comptrol- 
lers, were appointed at a yearly outlay of £1605. By 1724 
the staff had increased to forty and the charges to £3540, 
and in 1760 the establishment cost £4000.^^ Three col- 

58 Pa. Archives, 1, 1st ser., 185-186. 

5Q lUd., 395. 

eoCal. State Paps., Col, 1677-1680, 1590; British Museum Ad- 
ditional Mss., 22617, ff. 143-144, (Lib. of Cong. Transcripts). For 
an account of the duties of this office, see Talcott Papers, I, 229- 
330, in Conn. Hist. Soc, Collections. 

615. T. Paps., PL Gen., IV, pt. 1, A 9, 10; House of Lords Mss., 
n.s., II, 451-454; Cal. State Paps., Col, 1693-1696, 640. 

62 Customs Books, XII, 301-302. 

Q^IUd., XVII, 488-490; XVIII, 49, 



ADMINISTRATION OF THE ACTS OF TRADE 59 

lectors were appointed for Penn's territories: one each for 
the ports of Philadelphia, Newcastle, and Lewes.*^^ As the 
power to establish ports was vested by the act of 1696 in 
the Customs Board, these places became the official ports 
for the entrance and clearance of all ships. There was 
also a local surveyor. In 1698 Randolph appointed John 
Jewell to be surveyor and searcher of the customs for 
Pennsylvania and Delaware.^^ In 1701 Robert Quary was 
commissioned by the Customs Board as surveyor-general 
for Pennsylvania and New Jersey at a yearly salary of 
£200.«« This office was discontinued in 1703 when Quary 
became surveyor-general for all the colonies. In 1703 
Quary appointed a ^' riding surveyor " for Delaware Bay, 
and three years later the office was placed upon the perma- 
nent establishment at a salary of £50 a year.^^ In 1721 
the Customs Board commissioned a comptroller of the cus- 
toms with headquarters at Philadelphia at a yearly salary 
of £40. His duty was to '' keep the journal, & assist the 
Colics sign the Acco^s & dispatches with him & goe quar- 
terly to Newcastle and Lewis & examine & sign those Colics 
Accots. "68 j^-^ ^i^Q j-jj^g q£ appointment the collector was 
given a commission and a set of instructions, the former 
delegating to him power and authority in general terms, 
the latter setting forth in great detail the duties of his 
office.*^^ The navigation act of 1696 extended to the col- 

<54 List of collectors at Philadelphia: John Bewley, 1696; John 
Moore, 1704; W. E. Fox, 1728; Grosvenor Bedford, 1732. At New- 
castle: Matthew Birch, 1696; Francis Birchfield, 1701; Samuel 
Lowman; Daniel Moore, 1726; Alexander Keith, 1729; Thomas 
Graeme; William Till, 1748. At Lewes: William Massey, 1696; 
Samuel Lowman, 1698; Henry Brooke, 1700; Thomas Forbes, 1737; 
Richard Metcalfe, 1738. 

65 Pa. Col. Recs., I, 538. 

66 Customs Books, XIII, 126. 
ei Ibid., 432. 

68 lUd., XVI, 429-430. This office was held by William Alexander, 
1721; William Bully, 1727; Alexander Barclay, 1749. 

69 Commission to Matthew Birch, collector at Newcastle, Pa. Col. 
Recs., I, 534. Copy of instructions in House of Lords Mss., n.s., 



60 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

onies the force of the act of 14 Chas.II.,c.21, whereby the: 
customs officials were given the same powers and placed I 
under the same penalties for maladministration provided 
for the customs officers in England. By this act and his 
commission the collector was authorized to visit and search 
all vessels, take their entries, seize and bring ashore all 
uncustomed goods, or to search any house, store or other 
place for contraband goods. To bind him to a faithful 
discharge of his office the collector was obliged to take an 
oath before the governor of the colony and to give bond 
to him in the king's name in the sum of £500. The col- 
lector was empowered to appoint deputies for such places as 
he deemed necessary and to send home promptly a list of 
places and officers appointed. The deputies were required to 
take the oath before the governor, but the collector was held 
answerable for the neglect of his agents. The collector was 
instructed to keep an exact account of all duties collected, 
specifying the name of ship and master, contents of cargo, 
and whither bound. At the end of every twelve months he 
was to send to the Customs Board a general account of the 
management of his office and the revenues collected, attested 
by the comptroller or surveyor. As far as possible all 
duties were to be collected in specie and not in kind. 
Duties paid in specie or bills of exchange were to be re- 
mitted to the receiver-general of customs at London, and 
all goods accepted in lieu of money, if not sold to ad- 
vantage in the colony, were to be forwarded to the ware- 
house keeper at London. It is evident that the collector 
acted as a check upon the governor and naval officer. His 
instructions directed him to see that these officers enforced 
the provisions of the laws with regard to the qualifications 
of vessels, the taking of bonds, the inspection of bonds, 
ship registries, certificates of discharge and security, in- 
voices, and other papers. The collector was directed to make 

II, 472-481; British Museum Additional Mss., 28089, ff. 71-79, 
(Lib. of Cong. Transcripts). 



ADMINISTRATION OF THE ACTS OF TRADE 61 

a duplicate of all bonds taken by the governor and send 
them to the Customs Board by separate passage. The lo- 
cal surveyor was empowered to act as a check upon the col- 
lector and his deputies."^*^ He was authorized to inspect 
the entries of all collectors and deputies within his survey, 
examine and sign the collectors' accounts before they were 
transmitted to the Customs Board, to make a duplicate of 
all entries, to see that no vessel laded a greater quantity 
of goods than the collector's permit warranted, to compare 
the ship's cargo with the collector's entry, to visit fre- 
quently all ships in order to prevent and discover illegal 
trading. William Penn wrote of the system, that where 
the ''King has approved of a Deputy Governor no more 
than if he named him, especially if he is obliged to give 
security for the faithful discharge of his duties to the laws 
of trade, . . . besides the King has already his Vice- 
Admirals, Judges of the Admiralty, Advocates, Collectors, 
Surveyors, and Auditors in each proprietary government 
. . . I must think so many spies cannot be but a secur- 
ity. "^^ 

In any attempt to pass in review the actual enforcement 
of the acts of trade it is essential to bear in mind that the 
English commercial system was based on abstract and gen- 
eral principles. The whole system was framed to meet the 
economic needs of the mother country ; it was not a system 
of the colonists' own choosing nor the outgrowth of their 
own economic needs. Hence in the execution of laws which 
regulated the trade of the colonies in artificial channels, it 
was possible that the customs officials would come into con- 
flict with the colonists who sought to evade laws which ran 
counter to their economic welfare. This is evidenced by 
the illegal trade which thrived between Penn's colonies and 
Scotland on the one side, and the Dutch West Indian pos- 

70 Instructions to a local surveyor, British Museum Add. Mss., 
28089, flf. 83-85, (Lib. of Cong. Transcripts). 

71 Duke of Portland Mss., IV, 19, Hist. Mss Com., Report, 15, pt. 4. 



62 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

sessions of Surinam and Curagoa on the other/^ There is 
little doubt that the restrictive character of the mercantile 
system was responsible for these evasions. It is a matter 
of extreme difficulty to estimate the amount of this unlaw- 
ful commerce, but one cannot read the records of the period 
following the Revolution of 1688 without being forcibly 
impressed with the extent of the illegal traffic directly with 
Scotland/^ The reasons for this are clear. The restric- 
tions of the English laws and the liberal concessions 
granted to Scotch industry enabled the Scotch merchant 
to undersell the fair English or colonial trader. On the 
other hand the colonists found a more profitable market 
for their tobacco in Scotland."^* This trade was also fur- 
thered by a goodly number of Scotch merchants and factors 
resident in Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, 
and Carolina.'^^ The Scots were excluded from colonial 
trade by the requirement that the owners, master, and 
three-fourths of the crew must be English or colonial born. 
But from the letters of Quary, Randolph, and other customs 
officials, the Scotch and Dutch trade persisted in spite of the 
reorganized customs service. ^"^ On the other hand the 
right of the Scots to participate in the colonial trade was 
sanctioned by opinions of the crown lawyers. On several 
occasions they held that in law Scotsmen were natural-born 
subjects of England.'^^ These opinions opened the colonial 
trade to the Scots and tended to nullify the provisions de- 
signed to exclude them. As a result, wrote Quary in Au- 

72 0ai. State Paps., Col., 1693-169t6, 511, 520. 

73 House of Lords Mss., n.s., II, 462-466. 

74 Keith, Economic Causes for the Scottish Union, English Hist. 
Rev., XXIV, Jan., 1909, 44-60; also Scottish Trade with the Plan- 
tations, Scottish Hist. Rev., Oct., 1908, 32-48. 

^5Cal. State Paps., Col., 1685-1688, 353-354; 1689-1692, 656-660; 
N. Y. Col. Docs., IV, 1055; N. J. Archives, II, 288. 

76 B. T. Paps., Props., Ill, C 26, no. 2. 

^^ Cal. State Paps., Col., 1697-1698, 293-294, 516; N. /. Archives, 
II, 251. 



ADMINISTRATION OF THE ACTS OF TRADE 63 

gust, 16S'8, the Scots grow more mimeroiis than ever/® He 
also instanced another difficulty in the enforcement of the 
law. This arose from the practice of the governors grant- 
ing letters of denization to foreigners. Quary expressed the 
fear that by the ease with which Scotch, Dutch, and French 
were able to secure such qualifications it would soon be 
impossible to man colonial shipping with properly quali- 
fied mariners. In one case the admiralty court rejected 
a letter of denization and decreed the ship forfeited accord- 
ing to law.'^^ Quary also cited two cases of illegal trade 
between Pennsylvania and Curagoa. The statements of 
Randolph and Quary must be taken at a discount because 
of their enmity to the colonial charters, but on the other 
hand it is true that the failure of the English government 
to deal successfully with the Scotch trade was a prominent 
factor in promoting the union of England and Scotland 
in 1707.®^ With this the question of illegal trade with 
Scotland came to an end. 

There was also an illegal trade of a more lawless and de- 
fiant sort. The records of the period of King William's 
War likewise impress one with the prevalence of piracy.®^ 
It was a temporary phenomenon, the outcome of a condition 
of war. Piracy was closely connected with privateering. 
Ships were equipped and manned in colonial ports and 
cleared away under privateering commissions granted by 
the governors authorizing them to prey upon the commerce 
of the enemy. A number of such vessels sailed away, not 
bent upon legitimate prize, but to prey upon the commerce 
of any nation irrespective of flag. The granting of com- 
missions for corrupt purposes implied collusion on the part 
of colonial governors. Especially singled out for this of- 
fense were Fletcher of New York and Trott of the Baha- 

78 B. T. Paps., Props., II, B 29, 30. 

79 See page 101. 

80 Keith, Economic Causes of the Scottish Union, as cited. 

81 Cal. State Paps., Col, vols, for 1693-1698, see the prefaces and 
the indexes at Piracy. 



64 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

mas.^^' It was not the restrictive character of the trade 
laws which led to piracy under color of law, but purely 
greed and corruption. It was charged that the governors 
of the chartered colonies connived at piracy, allowed ships 
for this purpose to be fitted out in their ports, and per- 
mitted the freebooters to return to the colonies to enjoy 
their ill-gotten gains in peace. ^^ These privateersmen 
turned pirates were known as Eed Seamen or Madagascar 
pirates, because the scene of their operations lay in the east- 
ern waters where the rich commerce of the orient offered 
the most attractive prize.^^ In 1698 Parliament passed 
an act against piracy and an English squadron, on com- 
plaint of the East India Company, was dispatched to the 
east to check the nefarious trade. *^ Governor Markham 
and the officials of Pennsylvania were accused of ignoring 
the royal proclamation to apprehend the pirates then living 
in security in the province and Delaware. Such was the 
charge of Robert Snead, a local justice, in a letter sub- 
mitted to the Board of Trade in IGDS.^*^ He said that 
Markham 's daughter had married James Brown, a member 
of the notorious pirate crew of Every, and that when sev- 
eral old-time pirates were seized, justices Shippen and Mor- 
ris released them on bail, allowing one pirate to give secur- 
ity for another. Thomas Robinson charged the governor 
and magistrates with undue leniency to these old offend- 
ers.^^ Randolph and Quary substantiated the charge, the 
former accused Markham of taking protection money from 
one Miller, a quondam pirate, the other claimed that the 
governor kept in his possession the goods of a pirate al- 
lowed to escape.^^ In 1699 Quary wrote home that resi- 

82CaL St. Paps., Col., 1696-1697, 259-264; 1697-1698, 108, 224-229, 
279-288, 506. 

ssiUd., 1693-1696, 519; 1696-1697, 20, 44, 379, 557. 

silbid., 1697-1698, 97, 106-108, 112-113. 

S5lhid., 1697-1698, 126, 139, 407, 410, 418, etc. 

SQB. T. Paps., Props., II, B 14; PI. Gen., IV, pt. 2, 114; B. T. 
Jour., X, 268. 

87 B. T. Paps., Props., II, B 35. 

&8lbid., PL Gen., IV, pt. 2, B 40, 42. 



ADMINISTRATION OF THE ACTS OF TRADE 65 

dents of Delaware had given assistance to a pirate crew 
under the famous Captain Kidd and had resisted the efforts 
of the customs officials to apprehend the pirates and their 
booty.^^ On the other hand, IMarkham and the members 
of the provincial council and assembly in 1698 united in an 
address to the crown in vindication of the government 
against the accusations ^' our enemies have maliciously 
charged against us. ' ' ^^ An absolute disclaimer was made 
that they countenanced illegal trade with the Scotch and 
Dutch, or that they ever sheltered any pirates except those 
allowed to settle there under Fletcher when the province 
was under royal administration, who were seized and con- 
fined to jail as soon as the royal proclamation was made 
public. In conclusion serious charges were brought against 
Randolph. He was accused of accepting money from the 
pirates by holding out offers of pardon, and of acting in a 
most abusive manner to the governor and magistrates. 
In submitting this memorial, Penn also denied the 
charges of illegal trade and piracy made against his 
colony, and characterized Randolph's insinuations as 
malicious.^^ 

Aroused by these complaints royal orders were issued 
to the colonial governors in 1699 directing them to send 
to England for trial all pirates, their effects, and the evi- 
dence against them, also to see that the laws of trade were 
properly executed and that the customs and admiralty 
officials were supported in the discharge of their func- 

80 B. T. Paps., Props., Ill, C 30, 31; 5. T. Jour., XII, 138; House 
of Lords Mss., n.s., IV, 342-345. 

90 Pa. Votes of Assembly, I, 107; B. T. Paps., Props., II, B 18. 
For Markham's letters of vindication, B. T. Paps., Props., II, B 3, 
nos. 11, 12; V, F 40. Francis Jones of the province, in a letter 
to Penn characterized Snead as a person of " hot temper, unworthy 
of your notice, being of little or no reputation, ... a fellow that 
has little or no credit given to his words." Penn wrote of Snead, 
that he " ran away in my debt, and I suppose in other people's." 
Penn-Logan Corres., 1, 12. 

91 B. T. Paps., Props., II, B 38. 



66 PENKSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

tions.^^ As we have seen summary action was taken against 
Markham. The Privy Council approved the report of the 
Board of Trade which recommended the dismissal of the 
governor and two other officials accused of opposition to 
the admiralty court.^^ Penn fully aware of the hostility 
of the home government to the charters, hastened to his 
province, took upon himself the office of governor, dis- 
missed Morris and Lloyd, the offenders against the ad- 
miralty court, and turned out of office a sheriff who allowed 
a pirate to escape. Penn impressed his provincial council 
with the necessity of calling a special session of the assem- 
bly to enact measures against illegal trade and piracy.®* 
In January, 1700, Penn met the assembly, submitted the 
royal orders, and fully related " the Odium cast upon the 
Government in that Case ; also how earnestly these Things 
were urged by our Superiours at home." ®^ In response the 
assembly expressed an abhorrence of piracy and a willing- 
ness to proceed against it and illegal trade. Two laws 
were passed, the one to suppress piracy and the other to 
prevent unlawful commerce.®*^ The house also expelled 
James Brown, returned from Kent county, because charged 
with piracy.®^ Those who aided Captain Kidd's crew in 
1699 were apprehended and forced to give bond awaiting 
instructions from England as to their disposal.^® In the 
spring of 1700 Quary wrote home in warm praise of the 
proprietor's zeal for the royal interests.*^® 

Quary 's praise soon turned to words of condemnation. 
In November, 1700, he informed the home government that 
Penn had invaded the proper jurisdiction of the admiralty 
court and that the government continued to countenance 

62 5. T. Paps., Props., IV, D 4; Entry Bk. A, 471; PL Gen., V, pt. 
1, C 45, 46, 52. 

93 Ibid., Props., Entry Bk. B, 20-32, 98-102, 102-104. 

94 Pa. Col. Recs., I, 572, 573-574, 591. 

95 Pa. Votes of AssemUy, 1, 112-117. 

96 B. T. Paps., Props., Ill, F 25 ; Pa. Col. Recs., I, 594. 

97 Pa. Votes of Assembly, 1, 114-115. 

98 B. T. Paps., Props., V, F 23-27. 

99 Ibid., V, F 5, 34; House of Lords Mss., n.s., IV, 345-346. 



ADMINISTRATION OF THE ACTS OF TRADE 67 

piracy and illegal trade. ^"^ Randolph alleged that an il- 
licit trade overland from one colony to another caused 
great loss to the royal revenue.^^^ He estimated that 370 
hogshead of tobacco were carried illegally from Pennsyl- 
vania to other colonies and that the greater part of Dela- 
ware's crop was sent directly to Scotland. On the basis 
of these complaints a bill was introduced into the House 
of Lords in 1701 to vacate the charters.^^^ Penn in August, 
1701, from his colony, wrote in refutation of the unjust 
charges made against his province. ^^^ He said that doubt- 
less there were faults committed in an infant colony, but 
held that for the most part the colonists and the govern- 
ment could not be held responsible for them. He said that 
he had brought to justice the pirates allowed to settle in 
the province in Fletcher's time and denied that any il- 
legal trade was carried on during his presence there ex- 
cept two small vessels from Curacoa, which were seized 
and duly condemned. Penn felt very bitter, and justly 
so, against those officials who were ^' unnecessarily busy 
for the King, taking his name in vain to serve every turn 
of advantage or revenge . . . that by overacting their 
parts, unreasonably and unjustly, they may recommend 
their zeal as meritorious to the Commissioners of the Cus- 
toms, or the Lords of Trade. ' ' ^^* It seems that every 
chance irregularity, every ignorance of the law's exactness, 
was seized upon and dressed up to represent the prevalence 
of illegal trade. The purpose was to secure the overthrow 
of the charter and the establishment of royal government. 
Again in 1702, Quary in person before the Board of Trade 
made serious charges against Pennsylvania. ^°^ He claimed 

100 5. T. Paps., Props., V, F 57, 64 no. 10; House of Lords Mss., 
n.s., IV, 341-342. 

101 B. T. Paps., PI. Gen., V, pt. 2, D 48 ; Toppan, Randolph, V, 230. 

102 See page 344. 

103 B. T. Paps., Props., VI, pt. 1, G 39. 

104 Duke of Portland Mss., TV, 30, Hist. Mss. Com., Report 15, 
pt. 4. 

105 B. T. Paps., Props., VI, pt. 2, I 10. 



68 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

that an illegal trade flourished worse than ever and that 
no care was taken to execute either the laws of Parliament 
or the colony against it. He charged that sloops were em- 
ployed purposely to meet incoming vessels outside the 
capes and to land their cargoes secretly. In proof of this 
he cited several vessels which carried on a direct trade with 
Curacoa. Before the board Penn admitted the charge but 
held that it was impossible to check this trade because of 
the convenience of the coast line and refuted the charge 
that the government of the province was privy to these 
violations. ^*^^ Likewise the council of the colony replied 
to Quary's charges which were believed to be leveled 
solely against the Quaker government. ^^' Quary was 
charged to give one instance of illegal trade since 1699, 
except the two small vessels from Curacoa, or one instance 
where the provincial officials did not readily lend assist- 
ance to the royal agents. For the sake of vindicating the 
magistrates and merchants of the province, both Penn and 
the council asked for a full investigation of the charges 
on the ground. In conclusion, the council said that it was 
hard that those who had borne no share in settling a colony 
so prosperous and so profitable to the mother country, 
should, instead of acting in a just manner, shamefully 
slander and misrepresent it to the crown. 

The fact is that neither the local or royal officials were 
to blame for the ease with which illegal trade was carried 
on. A glance at a map showing the character of the colo- 
nial coast line will reveal the difficulties inherent in the 
situation. The long tide-water area, the numerous arms 
of the sea, broad harbors and navigable rivers, and the 
relative situation of the colonies all conspired to facilitate 
frequent evasions of the law. It was little trouble for a 
vessel to drop anchor in Delaware Bay out of reach of the 
customs officers, discharge a cargo of uncustomed goods 

106 j5. T. Paps., Props., VI, pt. 2, I 19; B. T. Jour., XV, 29-35. 
307 5. T. Paps., Props., VII, M 21. 



ADMINISTRATION OF THE ACTS OF TRADE 69 

or lade a cargo of prohibited goods with the aid of small 
craft, and then sail away unmolested.^^^ A few revenue 
cutters judiciously stationed would have been far more 
serviceable as sentinels of the law than a hovst of customs 
officials on land. Cruisers were stationed in Delaware and 
Chesapeake Bays for a short time in 16S'5, and again in 
1697 the admiralty ordered the frigate Swift to duty on 
the coast.^^^ The next year this vessel was lost off North 
Carolina and again the home government was implored 
to provide a revenue cutter.^^^ When Quary in 1700 com- 
plained of the prevalence of illegal trade he said that 
he did not make any charge against the provincial govern- 
ment or the royal agents, for no matter how diligent the 
officers or stringent the laws, it could not be checked with- 
out the aid of armed vessels. Finally, Quary said he would 
say nothing more since the admiralty paid no attention 
to his entreaties. 

One of the most radical defects in the customs service, 
as in the whole English administrative system in America, 
was the method by which royal officials were compensated. 
In order to render English agents independent of colonial 

108 Randolph wrote in 1692, " every vessel runs into a different 
bay, so that it is endless work for a diligent officer to keep an 
eye on them (i.e. illegal traders), and he has nothing to satisfy 
him that the master had been trading legally, but his oath." Cal. 
State Paps., Col, 1689-1692, 660. 

^09 Cal. State Paps., Col, 1693-1696, 308, 321, 399, 496, 497, 
499, 509-510; Cal. Treas. Paps., 1697-1702, 301; N. Y. Col. Docs., 
IV, 300-302; B. T. Jour., X, 198, 199, 203, 248. 

110 5. T. Paps., Props., Ill, C 26 no. 1; V, F 34; PI. Gen., V, 
pt. 1, D 41; House of Lords Mss., n. s., IV, 326-328, 345-346. In 
1700, Penn informed the Customs Board that the trade in pro- 
visions from Pennsylvania to Curagoa offered a great temptation 
to bring back Holland goods, but that there was no way to check 
it on account of the length of the bay; he asked advice. Pa. 
Archives, 1st. ser., I, 139. Spotswood of Va., in reply to the com- 
plaints of the illegal trade to Curacjoa, said that " the want of 
Guard ships so frequently has given encouragement to the carrying on 
this Trade, ... in my Opinion nothing can more effectually 
break that trade than haveing Guard ships constantly attending 
here." Spotswood, Letters, 1, 15, 29. 



70 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

influence and to place tliem above temptation, they should 
have been rewarded with adequate salaries. This very 
desirable position was never realized. The customs of- 
ficers received compensation from three sources, salaries 
allowed by the home government, certain fees provided by 
colonial acts, and one-third of fines and forfeitures granted 
to informers by the acts of trade. The collector at Phila- 
delphia received a salary of £160 a year, and the collectors 
at Newcastle each received £90.^" Out of this they were 
required to keep a boat and boatmen and to maintain 
their offices. The colonial laws of 1711 and 1715 allowed 
certain fees for granting permits to lade or unlade, cer- 
tificates of discharge, entrance and clearance papers.^^^ 
Preferential treatment was accorded vessels owned in the 
colony, in which cases the fee abated one-fourth. The law 
required that the table of fees should be publicly posted 
and provided penalties for those demanding a fee greater 
than fixed by law. The government found it necessary to 
take this precaution to prevent the extortion of exorbitant 
fees. The low amount of the fees and the meager salary 
left little over for compensation when the expenses of of- 
fice had been deducted. Under such circumstances it was 
possible that customs officials would resort either to the 
exaction of unwarranted fees, to collusion with illegal 
traders, or else to unjust and rigorous action against fair 
traders in order to supply the lack of a proper reward or to 
satisfy unscrupulous greed. In 1701 Penn voiced the evils 
of this system when he wrote that " It were to be wished 
. . . that both governors and inferior officers were 
men of good estates, good morals, and character at home, 
or they are a punishment in lieu of a benefit, and to en- 
courage them to go so far, let them have double pay, and 

111 At first the collector at Philadelphia received £200 a year, 
and the collectors at Newcastle and Lewes each £80, but in 1700 
the salaries were fixed at the figures named in the text. Customs 
Books, XII, 301-302; XIII, 89. 

112 Pa. Statutes at Large, II, 346; III, 109-110; V, 174. 



ADMINISTRATION OF THE ACTS OF TRADE 71 

make all gratuities and perquisites punishable. ' ' ^^® In 
fact Penn held that '' the notion men had at an office or 
two is in disfavor of proprietary governments," thereby 
implying that the motive which impelled Quary and others 
to attack the charters was the desire for more lucrative of- 
fices under royal control.^^* In August, 1701, Penn wrote 
to the Board of Trade in complaint of those who " think- 
ing themselves Secure under the awful Language of Serv- 
ing the King's Interest have stopt at no piece of Rigour, 
that would turn a penny their own way, of which In- 
stances may be given that would be tolerated I must be- 
lieve by no King's Govern^ in America. "^^^ In 1702 he 
laid before the Privy Council charges of bribery, corrup- 
tion, and rigorous conduct against the admiralty and cus- 
toms officials in Pennsylvania. This matter will be treated 
at length in the following chapter,^^*^ but suffice it to say 
here the whole situation illustrated well the evils of the 
fee system. Much complaint was made against John 
Moore, royal customs collector at Philadelphia for twenty- 
four years. ^^^ In 1705 the merchants complained to the 
Board of Trade and Customs Board of the unjust conduct 
of Moore and other collectors.^^^ On several occasions 
masters of vessels appealed to the provincial council or 

iT-sDuke of Portland Mss., IV, 30; Hist. Mss. Com., Report 15 
pt. 4. 

114 Penn wrote, " I think the commission of the Customs is not 
changed upon every trick a merchant plays in trade." Ibid., 19. 
Jeremiah Dummer wrote, " If it were true that some persons did 
now and then concern themselves in an illegal trade, can it be 
thought just or reasonable that the whole community should suffer 
for their private fault? Nobody will say that the acts of trade 
are perfectly observed in the provinces immediately under the 
Crown, or in Great Britain itself." Almon Tracts, I, 56. 

115 B. T. Paps., Props., VI, pt. 1, G 39. 

116 See page 112. 

in Customs Books, XIII, 331; XVIII, 264. Moore secured the 
collectorship through the influence of the bishop of London. B. T. 
Paps., Props., VII, M 46; B. T. Jour., XVII, 164. 

lis Penn-Logan Corres., I, 322, 360, 371; II, 90, 314. 



72 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

assembly for relief from the arbitrary conduct of IMoore^ 
and Quary.^^^ Moore's rigorous conduct is seen especially 
in the case of the Bichard and William, bound from Ports- - 
mouth, England, with freight for Philadelphia/^*^ The? 
master, ignorant of the American trade and not informed! 
by the collector of the port of sailing, failed to take outt 
a ship's registry, and consequently his ship was promptly 
seized by Moore. Although the master and consignees of-- 
fered ample security to produce a registry within eighteen i 
months, Moore would not allow the ship to proceed oni 
her voyage, but detained her and instituted condemnation i 
proceedings. The case was appealed to the Board of Trade; 
and Customs Board and Moore's action was not sus- 
tained.^^^ Whether his conduct was due to a high regard I 
for the letter of the law or to a desire to enhance his in- 
come by an unjust vexation of a fair trader is hard toi 
say. But it is evident that he had no regard for the equity ' 
of the case. We know also that Governor Keith in 17241 
wrote to the Board of Trade and the Duke of Newcastle' 
saying that Moore had shown himself to be a " negligent, ,' 
collusive and insufficient officer " who should be dismissed 1 
from office. ^^^ 

Another factor which conduced to inefficiency and cor- 
ruption in the customs service was the practice of making; 
the principal collectorships sinecures. In 1728 Moore wasi 
superseded by W. E. Fox, and in the next year Pox wasi 
granted the place by royal patent.^^^ In 1732 Grosvenor 
Bedford was appointed to the post by royal patent.^^*' 
Bedford was secretary to Horace Walpole, son of the great ; 

119 Pa. Col. Recs., II, 240; III, 240; Pa. Votes o/ AssemUy, 
II, 110. 

120 B. T. Paps., Props., XII, R 93. 
i2ilhid., Entry Bk. H, 2. 

1^-2 Hid,, Paps., XI, R 52; Pa. Bundle, Am. and W. I. 28, XXIV,, 
9, (Public Record Office). 

123 Customs Books, XVIII, 264, 373. 

■^2^ Ibid., XIX, 310; Walpole, Letters, (Cunningham ed.), IV, 113. 



ADMINISTRATION OF THE ACTS OF TRADE 73 

premier, and it was doubtless through these connections 
that he secured the collectorship. The actual appointees 
remained in England and farmed the office out for what 
it would bear. Bedford let the office to a deputy for £130 
a year, thus receiving not only a salary of .£160 but the 
rental in addition for performing no services.^^'^ Such a 
system simply placed a premium on vexatious dealings with 
fair traders and collusion with illegal traders. This is 
evidenced by the petition of the merchants of Philadelphia 
to the assembly in 1736 setting forth that several vessels 
had left the port for other colonies rather than suffer the 
annoyances put upon them by the deputy-collector.^^^ 
This vexation, said the petitioners, was due to the fact that 
the chief collector resided in England and farmed his of- 
fice to a deputy for a greater sum than the place would 
bear. Peter Razer, surveyor and searcher for Delaware 
Bay, has left us a good description of the lax manner in 
which the office at Philadelphia was administered.^-^ Im 
October, 1755, he wrote, " illicit trade is much encreased 
and carried on in a most barefaced and Shamefull man- 
ner." He said that although the collector was required 
to maintain a boat and boatmen, yet this had not been 
done since the year 1741. He asked, '' what can a Col- 
lector and Comptroller do or know in so large a trading 
City as this whose business is at home in their proper 
offices without an Assistant at the water side to see what 
Ships arrive and examine their Cargo, which they might 
compare with the Master's report and see if they agree; 
for want of such an officer Ships have unloaded here before 
they have entered at the Custom house." The laxity of 
management is also evidenced by the letter of Peter Ran- 
dolph, surveyor-general for the southern district, to the 

1^5 British Museum Add. Mss., 34728, f. 36, (Lib. of Cong. 
Transcripts). 

126 Pa. Votes of AssemUy, III, 287. 

i27 British Museum Add. Mss., 34728, ff. 21, 36, 52, 54, (Lib. of 
Cong. Transcripts). 



74 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

deputy collector at Philadelphia stating that the Customs 
Board has made complaint that no accounts had been re- 
ceived from that port for 1739-1750, except for several 
quarters.^^^ Randolph was ordered to instruct the of- 
ficials that unless the accounts were submitted regularly 
in the future the salaries would be withheld. Thus it is 
evident to what an extent the corrupt patronage system 
in England of this period cast its baneful influence upon 
efficient colonial administration. 

The lack of evidence makes it hard to come to any con- 
clusion as to what extent the colonists evaded that part 
of the system which confined their export and import trade 
to the mother country. It may be fair to conclude from 
the yearly increase in the purchase of English manufac- 
tures that the colonists found their best market at home 
and had no reason to violate the law forbidding direct 
trade in European commodities.^^^ As the northern col- 
onies produced practically none of the enumerated articles 
for exportation the opportunity for illegal trade in this 
respect was slight. It is fair to assume that had the col- 
onists found these measures contrary to their economic 
welfare they would have evaded them as they did the 
Molasses Act of 1733. There seems to be little doubt that 
this law was responsible for much illegal trade. 

By reason of similarity of climate and soil the mother 
country and the northern colonies produced like commodi- 
ties. Under these conditions the northern colonies became 
competitors of the mother country instead of supplement- 

^^s Customs Hous^ Paps., I, (Mss. in Lib. of Hist. Soc. of Pa.). 
129 Value of exports from England to Pennsylvania. 

1 

I B. T. Paps., Props., VIII, pt. 
2, O 99, 100. 
Franklin, Works, (Smyth 
ed.), IV, 68. Cf. Dickin- 
son, Writings, I, 218. 



1698-1704 


£ 57,573 


1723 


15,992 


1730 


48,592 


1737 


56,690 


1742 


75,295 


1747 


82,404 


1752 


201,666 


1757 


268,426 



ADMINISTRATION OF THE ACTS OF TRADE 75 

ing her economic needs. Hence the colonists were compelled 
to find other markets where in turn they would be able to 
exchange their products for other commodities and a cash 
balance to carry to England in a second exchange for man- 
ufactured goods. This market was found in the West 
Indies and to a less extent in Southern Europe and the 
islands of the Atlantic. ^^'^ A considerable trade was built 
up between the northern colonies and the foreign West 
Indies. The rapid growth of population and expansion 
of settlement in the northern colonies created a surplus 
of products w^hich more than supplied the need of the 
British sugar islands. The slow growth of the latter re- 
sulted in a failure to meet the demands of the northern 
colonies for rum, sugar, and molasses. The inability of 
the British sugar planters to compete successfully with 
their foreign rivals in the West Indies led to complaints 
which were satisfied by the passage of the Molasses Act 
of 1733.^^^ This statute laid a prohibitive duty on the 
importation of foreign rum, sugar, and molasses into the 
colonies. A rigid enforcement of this law would prac- 
tically have deprived the colonies of a market sufficient 
to their needs. It would have worked injury to British 
industry and commerce by closing the channels through 
which the colonists were enabled to take off British manu- 
factures. Hence the colonists would be forced either to 
manufacture for themselves, unprofitable in new communi- 
ties and contrary to the mercantile system, or else to evade 
the law. The latter method was utilized and the Molasses 
Act remained a dead letter. Of course it is well-nigh im- 
possible to find tangible evidence of a trade which was 
purposely and successfully concealed, but it is generally 
recognized that this statute was treated with scant cour- 

130 Callender, Selections from Econ. Hist, of U. S., 51-56; B. T. 
Paps., Props., XI, R 7, 42, 47, 78; XIII, S 34. 

131 Beer, British Col. Pol, 1754-1765, 33-34, 292-293 ; Beer, Com- 
mercial Policy of England toward the Cols., 107-122, (Columbia 
College Studies, III). 



76 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

tesy.^^^ Moreover, the lack of adequate salaries, the 
vicious fee system, the sinecures, the want of revenue cut- 
ters, and the convenience of the coast line all lent them- 
selves readily to evasions of the law.^^^ The very fact that 
the law was not enforced implies great laxity in the cus- 
toms service. Even if an official was faithful, his efforts 
could not overcome the difficulties of enforcing a law so 
contrary to colonial interest. In many cases the royal of- 
ficials found it far more profitable, and indeed at times 
more conducive to personal safety, to connive at the trade 
than to insist upon a due obedience to the law. The thriv- 
ing of this trade during the last French war brought very 
clearly to light the disregard for the law and the venality 
of the customs officials. 

As a result of a condition of war all commercial rela- 
tions with the enemy should have ceased. But in spite 
of this the evidence shows that the colonists, especially in 
the north, carried on a reprehensible trade with the 
French. Such a trade flourished to a remarkable degree 
in the final struggle between England and France for 
supremacy in America. In 1755 Governor Dinwiddle 
wrote that the French were able to carry on their invasion 
of the Ohio Valley by means of provisions supplied from 

132 Mr. Beer shows that the revenue collected under the Molasses 
Act during the twenty- two years from 1734 to 1755 averaged only 
£259 a year, but when especial efforts were made to stop the 
illegal trade in 1760 and 1761, the receipts arose to £1170 and 
£1189 respectively. Beer, British Col. Pol, 1754-1765, 115-116. 

133 Hutchinson of Mass. wrote in 1763, "The real cause of the 
illicit trade in this province has been the indulgence of the of- 
ficers of the customs, and we are told that the cause of their in- 
dulgence has been that they are quartered upon for more than their 
legal fees, and that without bribery and corruption they must 
starve." Quincy, Mass. Reports, 430.. James Otis said, " it has 
been observed, that a very small office in the customs in America 
has raised a mavi a fortune sooner than a Government. The truth 
is, the acts of trade have been too often evaded; but by whom? 
Not by the American merchants in general, but by some former 
custom-house officers, their friends and partisans." The Rights of 
the British Cols. Asserted, Alnion Tracts, I. 



ADMINISTRATION OF THE ACTS OF TRADE 77 

Philadelphia and New York.^^* In the same year Com- 
modore Keppel informed Governor Morris of Pennsyl- 
vania that ' ' From the Accounts that I have received I find 
the carrying Stores and Provisions to the French con- 
stantly practised by the Gentlemen of the Colony in your 
Government. ' ' ^^^ It was realized by imperial officials that 
to a great extent the success of the French in the final 
struggle depended upon their ability to secure food sup- 
plies from the English colonies.^^^ The superiority of the 
British sea power checked the dispatch of provisions and 
stores of war from France to her troops and fleet in Amer- 
ica; and the failure of the French colonies to produce 
food-stuffs made the enemy dependent upon the English 
colonies. Formal war against France was not declared 
till May, 1756, and during the two years previous, al- 
though the two nations were at sword's points in America, 
trade with the enemy was not illegal, but reprehensible 
and unpatriotic. In order to check the trade in this time 
of nominal peace it was necessary for the colonial or Eng- 
lish governments to declare it prohibited. 

Commodore Keppel, acting under royal orders, directed 
his captains to seize vessels bound for French ports.^^^ 

^3^ Dinwiddie Papers, I, 473, 476. 

135 Pa. Col. Recs., VI, 323. In March, 1755, Gov. Morris of Pa. 
wrote to DeLancey of N. Y., " I am told there were, last summer, 
no less than forty English vessels at one time in the harbour of 
Louisburg, that had carry'd Provisions there. The great supply, 
I am afraid, will last them all the next summer, and enable them 
to maintain an Army on the back of us, which they could not 
otherwise have done." Pa. Archives, 1st. ser., II, 261-262. 

136 Dinwiddie wrote, " This is a very pernicious Trade, as they 
c'd not conduct their unjust Invas's on His M'y's Lands with't 
this Supply." Dinwiddie Papers, I, 473. Shirley said, "nothing 
we can do seems likely to tend more, by the blessing of God, to 
defeat the schemes of the French to swallow up all his Majesty's 
Dominions on the continent of America than that all governments 
should agree in the most effectual means for stopping all supplies 
of provisions and warlike stores being sent out of any of these 
colonies " to the enemy. Pa. Col. Recs., VI, 309. 

137 Pa. Col. Recs., VI, 323. 



78 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

General Braddock was instructed to take measures to pre-- 
vent " the continuance of all such dangerous Practices." ^^^- 
Governor Dinwiddle by executive action laid an embargo) 
on the exportation of provisions to the French as a prece-- 
dent for other colonies.^^^ Shirley of Massachusetts se-- 
cured the passage of an act of three months' duration i 
requiring masters to give bond to carry provisions to Brit-- 
ish ports only.^*^ The efficacy of such measures depended I 
on a general concurrence by all the colonies. Shirley 
wrote to the other governors soliciting the passage of ai 
similar law. In March, 1755, the governor of Pennsyl- 
vania, with the advice of his council, instructed the col- 
lectors and naval officers at Philadelphia, Newcastle, and I 
Lewes to require masters of vessels laden with provisions; 
to give bond obliging them to discharge their cargoes im 
British ports or in countries in amity with England.^*^' 
In April, the assembly sanctioned the executive action by 
a law to continue for three months, and on expiration i 
it was continued for a year.^*^ In June, 1755, Shirley 
notified the governors that his assembly had laid a general 
embargo for three months provided the other colonies; 
passed similar measures.^*^ The purpose of a general em- 
bargo was to distress the French fleet at Louisburg, " for' 
there is great reason to think, ' ' wrote Shirley, ' ' that the ; 
French there as well as at Canada are but scantily supplied 
with provisions." The assembly of Pennsylvania claimed 
that the law just passed was sufficient, and since this pro- 
hibition was only partial, the governor instructed the col- 
lectors and naval officers to enforce a general embargo 
until further notified.^** 

138 Pa. Archives, 1st. ser., II, 206. 

139 Dintviddie Papers, 1, 526-527. 

140 Pa. Col. Recs., VI, 309; Sharpe Corres., 1, 169. 

141 Pa. CoL Recs., VI, 319-320. 

ii2lUd., 321; Pa. Statutes at Large, V, 184, 188. 

143 Pa. Col. Recs., VI, 439. 

144 /6tU, 450-451, 453, 511, 555, 587, 601. 



ADMINISTRATION OF THE ACTS OF TRADE 79 

The prohibition upon the exportation to French ports 
only did not suffice. The enemy was able to secure pro- 
visions from the English colonies indirectly through the 
neutral ports in the Spanish and Dutch West 
Indies. ^*^ Governor Hardy of New York prevailed upon 
his assembly to pass a law to check this indirect trade, but 
with the proviso that it should not become operative until 
Pennsylvania and New Jersey enacted similar measures.^^^ 
In May, 1756, the assembly of Pennsylvania passed a sim:i- 
lar law, to be of force when New Jersey and Delaware 
enacted such measures.^*^ New Jersey responded, Dela- 
ware passed an act to continue for one month only, thus 
invalidating the laws of the other colonies."^ In May, 
1756, formal war was declared against France whereby 
all commercial relations with the enemy became treason- 
able. In October, 1756, the Board of Trade instructed 
the colonial governors to lay an embargo on all vessels 
clearing out with supplies except those bound for some 
British port, in which case the master was to give bond 
to the collector at the port of sailing to discharge his 
cargo in a British port and to produce within twelve 
months of the date of bond a certificate of discharge.^** 
Governor Denny of Pennsylvania promptly transmitted 
the order to the collectors within his jurisdiction and then 
called upon the assembly to enact the order into law.^^'' 
In February, 1757, the assembly presented the governor 
with a bill which differed from the order. The order 

145 N, Y. Col. Docs., VII, 81-82, 117, 163-164, 225, 226, 272, 273. 

ii^IUd., 81-82, 117; Pa. Col. Recs., VII, 122, 130. 

147 Pa. Col. Recs., VII, 125-126; 129. 

i48 76tU, 183, 197-198. 

i49 7&if7., 386-387; N. Y. Col. Docs., VII, 162; Sharpe Corres., 
1, 529-530. In March, 1756, Henry Fox, secretary of state, wrote 
the colonial governors that, " The King would have you recommend 
it in the Strongest manner to your Council and assembly to pass 
Effectual Laws for prohibiting all trade and Commerce with the 
French." Pa. Col. Recs., VII, 179-180. 

150 Pa. Col. Recs., VII, 388. 



80 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

restricted the exportation of provisions to British ports 
only, the bill left open the trade to neutral Europe. The 
assembly held that the purpose of the order was answered 
by preventing the French from securing supplies indi- 
rectly through neutral ports in America, and declared 
that it was unreasonable to check the trade of the prov- 
ince to neutral Europe and thereby ruin colonial com- 
merce and lessen the financial resources in this time of 
crisis. The difference was not compromised and the law 
did not find its way to the statute book/^^ 

What could not be done by concert of action among the 
disunited and jealous colonies was effected by an act of 
the imperial legislature. Early in 1757 Parliament passed 
a law to prohibit during war the exportation of provisions 
from the colonies " unless to Great Britain or Ireland or 
to some of the said Plantations and Colonies. ' ' ^^- Also on 
several occasions the governors laid a general embargo for 
the purposes of securing transports and supplies for par- 
ticular enterprises.^^^ But the act of 1757, like the Molasses 
Act, ran counter to the economic interests of the colonies. 
The activity of the British fleet in American waters was 
sufficient to check a direct trade with the enemy, but the 
vigilance of the fleet was neutralized by the ingenuity of 
the colonists. Two methods were utilized to circumvent 
the act of 1757. Trade was carried on directly with the 
French under commissions known as '' flags of truce." 
These were issued by the governors to masters of ships 
to effect an exchange of prisoners. These commissions, 
like the privateering commissions issued in King Wil- 
liam's War, were turned to illegitimate uses. Instead of 

151 Pa. Col, Recs., VII, 408, 409, 418-420, 444. 

152 30 Geo. II., c. 9; Pa. Archives, 1st. ser., Ill, 97. 

153 In 1756-1757, Lord Loudoun ordered a temporary general em- 
bargo; in March, 1757, General Abererombie, and in 1762, General 
Amherst issued similar orders. Pa. Col. Recs., VII, 235, 270, 429- 
430, 606, 608; VIII, 38-39, 713-714; Pa. Archives, 1st. ser., Ill, 
364; IV, 79. 



ADMINISTRATION OF THE ACTS OF TRADE 81 

carrying prisoners to the French islands, the masters car- 
ried provisions to the enemy. Such a use implied crass 
negligence or corruption on the part of the governors. 
Governors Wentworth of New Hampshire and Fauquier 
of Virginia disdained to accept large bribes for flags of 
truce to be used improperly, but Denny of Pennsylvania 
was not of such stuff of which honest men are made.^^* 
Of his venal conduct, Hamilton, his successor, has left a 
good account. In a letter to Pitt, November, 1760, he 
wrote that the practice began in 1759 when Denny sold 
flags of truce in small numbers under the pretense of ex- 
changing French prisoners " of whom 'tis well known we 
have not had more during the whole War than might have 
been conveniently embarked in one, or at most, two small 
ships; yet M'". Denny or his agents received for each flag 
so granted, a Sum not less than three to four hundred 
pistolen, and once having relished the sweets of this Traf- 
fick, • he became more undisguised, and as it were open 'd 
shop at lower prices to all Customers as well of our own 
as of the neighboring Provinces, to which they came and 
purchas'd freely: But toward the end of his administra- 
tion, the matter was carried to such a pitch, that he scru- 
pled not to set his name to & dispose of blank flags of 
Truce, at the low price of twenty pounds sterling or under ; 
some of which were selling from hand to hand at ad- 
vanced prices, several months after my arrival. ' ' ^^^ 

By the second device, a master cleared his vessel laden 
with provisions by properly giving bond to carry the cargo 
to some British port, but when the high seas were reached 

154 Fauquier said that he refused to grant flags of truce for 
fraudulent purposes, although " I was given to understand I might 
have 400 Guineas if I would license a Flag of Truce." Wentworth 
wrote that he was offered " Considerable Sums of Money, yet I 
ever treated the Applications with the greatest Contempt and dis- 
dain." Kimball, Pitt Corres., II, 349-351, 362-363. 

155 7&1U, II, 351-352. Gov. Hopkins of R. I. granted about thirty 
flags of truce, and confessed that some of the masters used these 
commissions for illegitimate purposes. Ihid., II, 375. 



82 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

the course of the ship was altered toward a neutral port 
in the West Indies, such as IMonte Christi in Spanish 
Santo Domingo, or to the Dutch possessions of Curagoa, 
St. Thomas, and Eustatia. These vessels brought a re- 
turn cargo of foreign rum, sugar, and molasses. By this 
course of commerce the enemy was supplied with pro- 
visions and found a market for their products. This trade 
was carried on under color of law. Masters were able to 
produce not only proper certificates of discharge, but also 
certificates of lading and clearance papers from some Brit- 
ish port, although there was every indication that the ves- 
sel had not touched at the designated ports. Hamilton 
of Pennsylvania said with regard to entries inward that 
masters brought " certificates and Clearances from some 
other English Port, such as Jamaica, Providence, New 
York, Port of Newcastle or Lewes. ' ' ^^^ Such was also the 
evidence of Governor Golden of New York.^^' Hamilton 
said that '' it is next to impossible that the Glearances & 
Certificates above-mentioned could have been obtained but 
by the most shocking Perjury and Corruption. ' ' ^^^ It 
is clear evidence of the prevalence of gross corruption and 
rottenness in the customs service. This treasonable trade 
was confined chiefly to the northern colonies, especially 
Rhode Island, New York, and Pennsylvania. Hamilton 
said that he found a ' ' very great part of the principal mer- 
chants of the city (Philadelphia) engaged in a trade with 
the French Islands in the West Indies. ' ' ^^^ Golden wrote 
that he was persuaded that the " New York Merchants 
have been too generally concerned in this illegal trade, and 

156 Kimball, Pitt Corres., II, 354. 

157 Ihicl, II, 348-349, 358-359. 
i58 76td., II, 354. 

T-59 Ihicl, II, 352. In 1759, Thos. Penn informed Pitt, that the 
Delaware River at Phila. swarmed " with shallops unloading illegal 
cargoes, brought at their return, and cheating the King of his 
dutys, besides carrying provisions and ready money to the Enemy." 
Quoted in Beer, British Col. Pol, 1754-1765, 91. 



ADMINISTRATION OF THE ACTS OF TRADE 83 

the Philadelphia Merchants more so. ' ' ^^^ The fact is that 
the corrupt customs service, for which the home govern- 
ment was wholly responsible, facilitated the continuance 
of this most reprehensible traffic. 

This trade worked injury to English arms. In August, 
1760, Pitt wrote to the governors sharply rebuking the 
colonists for carrying on " an Illegal and most pernicious 
Trade ' ' whereby the French were supplied with provisions 
which enabled them " principally, if not alone, . . . 
to sustain this long and expensive War. ' ' ^^^ While the 
trade succored the enemy and protracted the w^ar on one 
side, it hurt the English cause by enhancing the price and 
creating a scarcity of provisions for the English forces.^^^ 
Furthermore, the need of using British cruisers to break 
up the trade tended to weaken the naval power in Amer- 
ica. ^^^ If loyalty implies the element of sacrifice, then it 
may be said that there existed little sentiment of loyalty 
to the Empire among a considerable number of colonial 
merchants and traders.^^* 

In order to check the trade Pitt ordered the governors 
to detect the guilty parties and bring them to justice. 
The navy was instrumental in breaking up the illegal in- 
tercourse.^®^ But under the conditions by which the trade 

160 Kimball, Pitt Corres., II, 348. 

161 /&id, II, 320-321; Pa. Archives, 1st. ser., Ill, 753. In Dec, 
1759, General Crump wrote from the West Indies to Pitt, " it is 
very certain that the French Islands have entirely subsisted " by 
the treasonable trade carried on from the English islands. Kimhall, 
Pitt Corres., II, 228-229. Cf. the evidence of Commodore Moore, ihid., 
207-208. 

162 Beer, British Col. Pol., 115Jt-1165, 112-113. 

163 Kimball, Pitt Corres., II, 55. In 1758 the armed sloop, Charm- 
ing Polly, was stationed in Delaware River to enforce the embargo. 
Pa. Col. Recs., VIII, 58. 

164 Colden of N. Y. said that the merchants engaged in this il- 
legal trade "consider nothing but their private profit"; and Gov. 
Bull of S. C. wrote that the trade was " so lucrative as to attempt 
many to engage in it." Kimball, Pitt Corres., II, 395; N. Y. Col. 
Docs., VII, 499. 

165 For the activity of British cruisers and privateers in breaking 



84 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

was carried on it was hard to suppress it. It was difficult 
to secure convictions because the trade was effected under 
such plausible pretenses of law. If a master was able to se- 
cure proper papers in every case, whether on exportation or 
importation, he was practically beyond the reach of the 
courts. For this reason, wrote the governor of South Caro- 
lina, the admiralty court has dismissed vessels coming from 
Spanish ports with French products. ^^^ In Pennsylvania 
the court dismissed two such cases, and the captors, ready 
with other vessels suspected of illegal trade, grew dis- 
couraged and released them.^^^ From the letters of Gen- 
eral Amherst in 1762 it appears that the trade had not 
been checked in the chartered colonies of Rhode Island 
and Pennsylvania.^^^ In the royal provinces of Massa- 
chusetts and New York the activity of the royal officials 
was sufficient to stop the trade. The Boston merchants 
laid plans to annihilate the powers of the customs and ad- 
miralty officials, and the New York merchants complained 
bitterly that the same care was not shown in Delaware Bay 
with the result that the Philadelphia merchants were able 
to undersell them.^^^ 

The return to a condition of peace in 1763 saw the re- 
vival of an imperial sentiment in England, not unlike that 
which followed the Revolution of 1688. In both eases the 
events of the war made clear the looseness which char- 
acterized th-e colonial administrative ^sylstem. Questions 
of trade, defense, and administration became of prime im- 
portance. The close of King William's "War witnessed 
the reorganization of the colonial system by the act of 1696, 
and the termination of the last French war was to see a 

up the trade, consult Kimball, Pitt Corres., II, 344, 353, 340, 584- 
585; N. Y. Col. Docs., VII, 273. 

166 Kimball, Pitt Corres., II, 394-395. 

iQT Ibid., II, 352. 

168 Pa. Col. Recs., VIII, 713, 714; Pa. Archives, 1st. ser., IV, 
79; R. I. Col. Recs., VI, 311-312. 

icoBeer, British Col. Pol., 1^54-1765, 116-125; Kimball, Pitt Car- 
res., II, 584-585. 



ADMINISTRATION OF THE ACTS OF TRADE 85 

further strengthening of the administrative system. The 
acquisition of new dominions to the Empire required a 
modification of the laws of trade, the prevalence of il- 
legal trade and the defects in the customs service and vice- 
admiralty courts demanded a reformation of the adminis- 
trative system, and the failure of the requisition system 
called for a standing army in the colonies supported 
in part by a colonial revenue. The whole fabric of the co- 
lonial system needed reenf orcement ; efficiency demanded 
imperial cohesion and centralization. 

The colonial system was reconstructed on both the ad- 
ministrative and economic sides. In 1763 Parliament au- 
thorized the use of the navy in American waters to enforce 
the laws of trade. ^'^ The good service rendered by the 
naval commanders in breaking up illegal trade during the 
war no doubt formed the basis of this law. In July, 1763, 
the Earl of Egremont, secretary of state, directed the gov- 
ernors to cooperate with the naval commanders, at the 
same time forwarding a list of ships stationed on the 
American coast with commissions from the Customs Board 
and instructions from the Lords of the Admiralty. ^^^ 
Thus at last the English government was forced to adopt 
a measure which had been urged long before by royal 
agents in the colonies. In the same year the vicious prac- 
tice of absenteeism in the customs service was terminated. 
The statesman responsible for this reform as well as others 
was George Grenville, Prime Minister and First Lord of 
the Treasury. Parliament had made heavy complaints 
that the cost of maintaining the customs establishment 
in America was four times greater than the receipt of reve- 
nues. " This, it was urged, arose from the practice of 
making all these offices sinecures in England." The Cus- 
toms Board made the same charge and Grenville at once 
ordered all officials to their posts and directed the Cus- 

170 3 Geo. III., c. 22. 

niSJiarpe Corres., Ill, 102-103; R. I. Col. Recs., VI, 376. 



86 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

toms Board to appoint others in place of those who refused 
to comply.^^2 Horace Walpole interceded for Grosvenor 
Bedford, who held the collectorship at Philadelphia since 
1732, but Grenville saw no reason to waive the order in 
this case.i'^ In October, 1763, the Board of Trade in- 
structed the governors " in the strictest manner " to sup- 
press illegal trade, to lend all possible assistance to the 
customs officials, and finally to report on the state of trade 
and the conduct of persons empowered to execute the laws 
so that abuses might be corrected and delinquent officials 
punished.^^* This order was the outcome of a report of 
the Lords of the Treasury to the crown declaring that the 
revenues collected in the colonies was not sufficient " to 
defray a fourth part of the expense necessary for collect- 
ing it; and that through neglect, connivance and fraud, 
not only the revenue is impaired, but the commerce of the 
colonies is directed from its natural course, and the salu- 
tary provisions of many wise laws are in great measure 
defeated." Furthermore, the officials of the customs serv- 
ice and admiralty courts were strengthened in position 
and power. By act of Parliament the colonies were for- 
bidden to lower the fees of customs officials and provision 
was made against subjecting them to damage suits in cases 
where the court saw fit to release a vessel seized for illegal 
trading.^'^^ 

The extension of colonial territory as a result of con- 
quest made necessary some changes in the laws of trade in 
order to bring the new dominions within the scope of the 
mercantile system. The statute which embodied the prin- 
cipal economic reform was the Sugar Act of 1764. Its 
purpose was two-fold; the creation of a colonial revenue 

172 Grenville Corres., II, 113-114; Kimball, Corres. of Govs, of 
R. /., II, 355. 

it^ Grenville Corres., II, 113; Walpole Letters, (Cunningham ed.), 
IV, 113. 

174 R. I. Col. Recs., VI, 375. 

176 4 Geo. Ill, c. 15; 5 Geo. III., c. 45. 



ADMINISTRATION OF THE ACTS OF TRADE 87 

to support an army in America, and a reform in the ad- 
ministrative and economic features of the colonial system. 
Certain products peculiar to the conquered area were added 
to the enumerated list.^^^ But that part of the law which 
concerned the northern colonies most vitally was the ex- 
tension of the principles of the Molasses Act. The im- 
portation of foreign rum was now prohibited, the duty on 
sugar was increased, the impost on molasses was lowered 
from six to three pence per gallon, and in addition colo- 
nial lumber and iron were placed on the enumerated list. 
The reorganized and strengthened customs service would 
no longer allow for evasions of the law as occurred in the 
case of the Molasses Act under the former ill-organized 
and venal customs establishment. 

The reformations in the colonial system, which tended 
toward imperial centralization, at once came into collision 
with the trend of colonial life toward complete self-con- 
trol. The immediate effect was to crystallize colonial dis- 
content into unity of action. In May, 1764, on receipt 
of the news of the passage of the Sugar Act and the in- 
tention to levy a stamp tax on the colonists, the assembly of 
Massachusetts instructed its London agent to secure the 
repeal of the one and to remonstrate against the passage 
of the other, and appointed a committee of correspondence 
to solicit the cooperation of other colonies in the pro- 
test.^" Rhode Island adopted a similar course. ^^^ The 
solicitations from these colonies spurred the assembly of 
Pennsylvania to action. Richard Jackson, the London 
agent, was ordered to unite with other colonial agents in 
opposing the measure. ^^^ Not only a majority of the colo- 
nial assemblies passed resolutions of protest, but memorials 
of public meetings and the pamphlets of colonial leaders, 
such as John Dickinson, Stephen Hopldns, and James Otis, 

176 Beer, British Col. Pol, 1154-1765, ch. x. 

iTTMinot, Hist, of Mass., II, 146-149. 

178 22. /. Col. Recs., VI, 403, 414-416. 

179 Pa. Votes of AssemUy, V. 355-356, 363-364, 376, 377-378. 



88 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

joined in the common opposition.^^^ The basis of opposi- 
tion was two-fold, constitutional and economic. The 
avowed object of the Sugar Act and the proposed stamp 
tax was to create a colonial revenue to support in part an 
army to protect the new dominions. Heretofore the col- 
onies had enjoyed by long continued usage the power of 
self-taxation, hence the creation of a colonial revenue by 
act of Parliament struck a decidedly new note in the colo- 
nial policy. The violation of a well established custom 
created great alarm in the colonies, for it threatened the 
very basis of colonial self-government. It drew into dis- 
cussion the very nature of the constitution of the Empire 
and led to the colonial theory of legislative independence 
in the matter of taxation. The colonists also protested 
against the extension of the powers of the vice-admiralty 
courts which threatened to deprive them of the right to 
the benefits of the common law and jury trial, rights dear 
to the hearts of Englishmen. But the main objection to 
the Sugar Act was economic. 

The opposition to the Sugar Act came chiefly from the 
northern colonies and wag similar in character to that made 
against the Molasses Act, upon which the new statute was 
based. We have seen how necessary was the trade of the 
colonies to the foreign West Indies. The very prosperity 
and wealth of the northern colonies depended upon the 
trade to foreign ports. Although the duty on foreign mo- 
lasses, the chief article demanded of the sugar islands, 
was lowered one-half, yet the colonists contended that it 
amounted to a prohibition. ^^^ Furthermore lumber, a chief 
item in the West Indian trade, was now restricted to the 
English market. The colonial remonstrances placed em- 

iso John Dickinson, TJie Late Regulations, Writings, 1, 209-245; 
Stephen Hopkins, The Rights of the Cols. Exam., R. I. Col. Recs., 
VI, 416-427; Jas. Otis, The Rights of the British Cols. Asserted, 
Aim on Tracts, I, 

181 i?. 7. Col. Recs., VI, 415, 421; Callender, Econ. Hist, of U. S., 
135. 



ADMINISTRATION OF THE ACTS OF TRADE 89 

phasis on two points. They declared that closing the chan- 
nels of trade to the foreign markets not only undermined 
the prosperity of the northern colonies but also worked seri- 
ous injury to the mother country herself. The economic in- 
terests of metropolis and dependencies were so intimately 
associated in the development of a commercial Empire that 
to contract the trade of the colonies was to prejudice Eng- 
lish industrial and mercantile interests.^*- For example, 
the assembly of Pennsylvania declared that the consump- 
tion of British manufactures in the province exceeded the 
exportation of colonial products to England by £400,000 a 
year, which balance against the colony was liquidated only 
by means of the foreign trade. ^^^ Therefore, contended 
the colonists, any legislation which restricted this trade de- 
prived them of the means to pay the debts then due at 
home and to continue the consumption of British wares. 
This appeal to the industrial interests of the mother coun- 
try had its effect at a later time. The Sugar Act was 
simply a piece of class legislation in favor of the British 
sugar islands. As Dickinson said, '' The statutes made 
to restrain the trade of this continent in favour of the 
islands, seemed to tend toward promoting partial rather 
than general interests." The fact that the interests of a 
group of West Indian planters was allowed to outweigh 
those of the mainland colonies created an intense feeling 
of dissatisfaction with the English system of control. The 
whole procedure clearly illustrates one of the most funda- 
mental defects in the imperial system. Instead of inquir- 
ing into the actual conditions of colonial economic life, 
or of heeding the opinions of the colonists, English states- 
men built up a system on artificial principles. The fact 
that Parliament estimated so lightly colonial interests was 

182 Callender, Econ. Hist., 133-137; R. I. Col. Recs., VI, 415, 421; 
N. Y. Col. Docs., VII, 612; Conn. Col. Recs., XII, 651; No. Car. 
Col. Recs., VI, 1034, 1261; Kimball, Pitt Corres., II, 376-381; Dick- 
inson, The Late Regulations, Writings, I, 213-218. 

183 Pa. Votes of Assembly, V, 377-378. 



90 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

without doubt one of the prominent factors in provoking 
opposition to its power.^^* It was felt, and justly so. that 
Parliament by reason of a lack of an intimate knowledge 
of colonial life was not fitted to legislate for the colonies. 
Discontent revealed itself not only in the constitutional 
method of petition for redress of grievances, but in acts 
of violence. Acts of Parliament could be resisted and nul- 
lified only by popular resistance. The economic distress 
caused by the late war,^^^ the enforcement of restrictions 
upon their trade and industry by a reorganized customs 
service, and the dangers which threatened their rights as 
Englishmen provoked the colonists to acts of violence. In 
Rhode Island they attacked the British cruisers and the 
customs officers who dared to enforce the law, forcing the 
latter to flee to the decks of the former for protection.^^*^ 
In Massachusetts the customs officials were subject to simi- 
lar treatment and in Maryland a collector was forced to 
go armed in fear of violence.^^^ John Dickinson wrote 
that the unwise measures of the mother country taught the 
colonies " to make a distinction between her interests and 
our own." The conflict between imperial and provincial 
economic and political interests revealed a defiant and 
united America. 

184 Hopkins of R. I. wrote, " The colonies are at so great a dis- 
tance from England, that the members of Parliament can generally 
have but little knoAvledge of their business, connections and in- 
terest, but what is gained from people who have been there; the 
most of these have so slight a knowledge themselves, that the in- 
formation they can give, is very little to be depended on, though 
they may pretend to determine with confidence, on matters far 
above their reach." R. I. Col. Recs., VI, 420-421. 

185 Dickinson, Late Regulations, Writings, I, 227-228. 

186 R, 7. Col. Recs., VI, 427-430, 453-459. 

187 Beer, British Col. Pol., 1754-1165, 288-290, 301-302. 



J! 



CHAPTER FOUR 

THE COURT OF VICE-ADMIRALTY 

Experience had proven beyond the shadow of doubt that 
little dependence could be placed upon the common law 
courts of the colonies to administer justice where the im- 
perial laws were concerned, Randolph wrote in 1695 
*' that the illegal trade of the plantations was supported 
and encouraged by the Generall partiality of Courts and 
Jurys (byassed by private Interest) in causes relating to 
the Crown. ' ' ^ This condition of affairs called for a sys- 
tem of maritime courts under the direct control of the 
crown. With this purpose in view a clause was inserted 
in the act of 1696 providing that certain forfeitures and 
penalties under the acts of trade should *' bee recovered 
in any of His Majesties Courts at Westminster, or in the 
Kingdom of Ireland, or in the Court of Admiralty held in 
His Majesties plantations."- The words employed here 
seem to indicate that admiralty courts were already in 
operation in the colonies contrary to fact. Randolph at 
once cooperated with the Board of Trade and Customs 
Commissioners to secure the institution of such tribunals.^ 
In July, 1696, the Customs Board recommended to the 
Lords of the Treasury the advisability of erecting such 
courts for the good of the plantation trade.* This report 
reached the Privy Council which in turn referred it to the 

IS. T. Paps., PL Gen., IV, pt. 1, A 7, 10, 12; Cal. State Paps., 
Col., 1G93-1696, 509-510, 511, 654; Osgood, III, 230-234. 

2 7 and 8 Wm. Ill, c. 22, sec. 6. 

3 B. T. Paps., PL Gen., IV, pt. 1, A 7, 9 ; B. T. Jour., IX, 269. 
*CaL State Paps., Col, 1693-1696, 639-640; B. T. Paps., PL Gen., 

IV, pt. 1, A 5. 

91 



92 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

Board of Trade. ^ The board consulted Randolph in the 
matter.*' He gave it as his opinion, based upon personal 
experience, that where the laws of trade were concerned 
the colonial courts denied justice. The judges and jurors 
were implicated in illegal trade and that he had been un- 
able to carry a conviction in a single case. Randolph in- 
sisted that the only remedy was the establishment of ad- 
miralty courts, each with a full complement of officers com- 
missioned from England.'^ Convinced of the needs of this 
measure, the Board of Trade in its report to the Privy 
Council expressed full concurrence in the recommenda- 
tions of the Customs Board. ^ 

On November 19, the Lords of the Admiralty made a 
report to the Privy Council in the matter. This body 
seemed to look unfavorably upon the establishment of 
special courts by the home government. They held that 
the governor's commission as vice-admiral was sufficient.^ 
A vice-admiralty commission empowered the governor to 
punish all offenders against the maritime laws and for that 
purpose to maintain admiraltj^ courts and to appoint the 
requisite officials.^'^ It was found that no such commissions 
had been granted to the governors of chartered colonies. 
The Board of Trade was then directed to consider 
to what other colonies such commissions should be 
issued for the better execution of the acts of trade. ^^ 
The board evidently did not consider a vice-admiralty 
commission in these jurisdictions as an adequate remedy 
and asked the attorney- general to examine the charters 

5 B. T. Jour., IX, 24. 
6/6kZ., 25. 

7 Hid., 25, 26, 28; Paps., PI. Gen., IV, pt. 1, A 7, 9. 

8 5. T. Jour., IX, 49, 50; Paps., PI. Gen., Entry Bk. A, fif. 27-28; 
House of Lords Mss., n.s., II, 427. 

9 B. T. Paps., PI. Gen., IV, pt. 1, A 25. 

10 For a copy of a vice-admiralty commission, see Benedict, Amer- 
ican Admiralty, ch. 9, (3d. ed.) ; N. J. Archives, IX, 195. Cf. 
Greene, Provincial Governor, 105-106. 

11 B. T. Paps., PI. Gen., IV, pt. 1, A 25. 



THE COURT OF VICE-ADMIRALTY 93 

and give an opinion whether the crown had the right to 
constitute admiralty courts in the chartered colonies.^^ 
On December 4, Attorney-General Trevor replied that upon 
an examination of the charters he found nothing therein, 
Massachusetts excepted, that debarred the crown from this 
right.^^ The authority to establish courts and to appoint 
all judicial officers delegated by the charters carried with 
it no limitation in either respect and in this light it is 
hard to understand upon what ground the crown lawyer 
based his opinion. The act of 1696 no doubt gave the 
crown this right, but to say that the charters did not re- 
strain the crown is an assumption rather unwarranted. 
William Penn, Fitz-John Winthrop, and other representa- 
tives of colonial charters appeared before the Board of 
Trade and during several hearings insisted that to estab- 
lish admiralty courts by royal prerogative was to infringe 
the patents by which the crown had invested the grantees 
with power both '* by land and by sea." They held that 
this covered maritime jurisdiction. In order to protect 
their powers they offered to establish admiralty courts by 
their authority, if such tribunals were deemed necessary.^* 
In a formal paper embodying these statements, they further 
declared that since the laws of trade provided for the trial 
of breaches of the law in the common law courts, maritime 
courts had not been thought necessary, except for the trial 
of prize cases, of which there were few or none, or else to 
occasion additional heavy expenses. Again they expressed 
themselves willing to erect these courts, to appoint efficient 
officers, and zealously endeavor to force an obedience to 
the acts of trade. ^^ This defense left the Board of Trade 
doubtful as to the extent of the admiralty jurisdiction of 

12 B. T. Jour., IX, 241. 

■i^^Ihid., 263; Props., Entry Bk. A, ff. 13, 14; House of Lords 
Mss. n. s., II, 428. 

14 B. T. Jour., IX, 269, 271, 275, 279-280. 

15 B. T. Paps., Props., Entry Bk. A, f. 15, House of Lords Mss., n. 
s., II, 428-429. 



94 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

England, and unwilling to make a decision in the matter, 
submitted the question to the determination of the Privy 
Council. ^^ The proprietors and agents of the chartered 
colonies then petitioned the king to grant their governors 
vice-admiralty commissions/^ Such a procedure was 
hardly calculated to meet the needs of the situation. To 
leave the organization of these courts to the colonial au- 
thorities by virtue of the charters or to their governors 
by virtue of vice-admiralty commissions w^as not an ade- 
quate remedy. The chief difficulty lay in the fact that the 
chartered governments were not sufficiently subject to the 
will of the crown. A due administration of the law re- 
quired special courts and officers immediately under the 
royal will. It seems likely that this was the view of the 
Privy Council for on February 24, 1697, it directed the 
Board of Trade and the Customs Commissioners to prepare 
a list of persons properly qualified for employment in the 
vice-admiralty courts.^^ Eandolph was at once consulted 
and it was his list of nominees which was accepted.^^ On 
April 27, the Lords of the Admiralty issued warrants to 
Sir Charles Hedges, judge of the High Court of Admiralty, 
to grant letters patent under the seal of his court to the 
list of persons proposed.-^ Seven vice-admiralty jurisdic- 
tions were created for the mainland colonies. Pennsyl- 
vania, Delaware and West Jersey formed one district.^^ 
For this area the following officers were commissioned, 

16 5. T. Paps., Props., Entry Bk. A, ff. 16, 17; Jour., IX, 285; 
House of Lords Mss., n. s., II, 427-428. 

17 B. T. Paps., Props., Entry Bk. A, f. 31. 

18 B. T. Jour., X, 6. 

19 Ibid., X, 9, 11, 14; Paps., PL Gen., IV, pt. 1, A 46, 49; Props., 
Entry Bk. A, ff. 109, 111-116. 

20 Admiralty Books (Public Record Office), III, 101; Pa. Col. 
Recs., I, 353. 

21 Pa. and West Jersey were made one district, and Del. was 
made part of the Maryland district. Penn opposed this division 
of his dominion and his request that Del. be included in the former 
district was granted. B. T. Jour., X, 38, 44; Paps., PI. Gen., IV, 
pt. 1, A 54. 



THE COURT OF VICE-ADMIRALTY 95 

Robery Quary, judge ; Edward Chilton, advocate ; William 
Rodney, register; and Robert Webb, marshal. 

In the resolution of the home government to secure 
obedience to the laws of trade the opposition of those who 
stood for chartered rights was overborne, the charters were 
abridged and the colonists were to become acquainted for 
the first time with courts not of their own making officered 
by persons not of their own selection. From the stand- 
point of imperial interests such courts were a capital ne- 
cessity. A review of the power and jurisdiction vested in 
these courts is necessary to an understanding of their sub- 
sequent history. 

The terms of the commission -- to the judge invested 
the court with a jurisdiction as wide and with powers as 
liberal as ever claimed by the admiralty in England in the 
heighth of its vigor. Territorially considered it was very 
broad, drawing within its competence all causes or offenses 
committed upon or by the high seas, arms of the sea, navi- 
gable rivers and all ports, harbors and creeks within the 
ebbing and flowing of the tide below the first bridges. Its 
jurisdiction embraced all causes, civil or maritime, such 
as charter parties, bills of lading, policies of assurance, 
debts, exchanges, complaints, all matters relating in any 
way to freight, transport money, maritime loans, and bot- 
tomry. In fine, it was comprehensive enough to include 
all classes of persons in any way connected with maritime 
transactions. The act of 1606 provided no definition of 
the limits of these courts either in point of territory or 
jurisdiction, but simply gave them competence over certain 
violations of the laws of trade. In the absence of statutory 
definition of limits, the judges' commissions contained the 
source, extent, and definition of vice-admiralty jurisdiction 
in America. Moreover, it is essential to bear in mind that 

22 Benedict, American Admiralty, cli. 9 (3d. ed.), contains a 
translation of the commissions to the judges of the district of 
New ¥ork, Conn., and East Jersey. 



96 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

the admiralty oourt was a prerogative court which em- 
ployed the civil law, a code of foreign origin.^^ 

The business of the admiralty court at home was limited. 
It consisted chiefly of piracy, salvage, collision, wages and 
bottomry under certain limitations."* This is in striking 
contrast with the powers and jurisdiction of the similiar 
courts in America by statute and commission. Further- 
more, in England causes growing out of the revenue or 
customs came before the Court of Exchequer which prac- 
tised the common law and employed juries. In the col- 
onies similiar cases could be tried in the civil courts. The 
decline of the admiralty at home was due to the powerful 
attacks upon it as well as other courts of special jurisdic- 
tion employing foreign codes of law by the common law 
courts.-^ The judges of the latter court considered them- 
selves the proper guardians of the lives, liberty, and prop- 
erty of Englishmen. On the other hand the people de- 
manded the right to be tried by the common law of the 
country and before juries, — rights dear to the hearts of 
Englishmen. When the expansion of the jurisdiction of 
the civil courts threatened to curtail the powers of the 
common law courts, the antagonism of the latter was thor- 
oughly aroused. The peculiar instrument by which the 
admiralty court was attacked was the *' prerogative 
writ " of prohibition issuing out of the superior Court of 
King's Bench.-® This writ was designed to correct t^e im- 
proper assumption of jurisdiction by inferior courts. The 
contest between the opposing courts went on with vary- 
ing success till the time of the Eestoration when the ad- 
miralty yielded in an unequal struggle and its business 



23 Holdsworth, History of EngUsh Law, I, 313-332. 

z^Ihid., 325-326; Marsden, Select Pleas in the Court of Ad- 
miralty, I, Ixxix in Selden Society, Publications; Benedict, Amer- \ 
ican Admiralty, (3d. ed.) ch. 7, sees. 111-113. 

25 HoldsAVorth, op. cit., I, 321-325. 

2Qlhid., 92-93. 



THE COURT OF VICE-ADMIRALTY 97 

rapidly declined.^^ In America a similiar contest was 
waged. The basis of colonial opposition was well stated 
by Penn in 1701. " Our settlements are upon the freshes 
of navigable rivers and creeks, where the river may be 
from two to three miles over, to a stone 's cast over, and 100 
miles from the ocean, and the Court of Admiralty by 
virtue of the seventh and eighth of the king, pretends not 
only to try cases that relate to the King's revenue as to 
unlawful trade or piracy, but whatever is done in the 
rivers or creeks other ways, as debts for victuals, beer, 
sails or anything relating to the building of small craft; 
so that they have swallowed up a great part of the Govern- 
ment here, because our commerce, by reason of the nature 
of our settlements, is so much upon the river and small 
creeks of it ; and determining these causes without a jury, 
gives our people the greatest discontent, loolring upon them- 
selves as less free here than at home, instead of greater 
privileges, which were promised. ' ' ^^ 

From the outset the admiralty courts met with the stur- 
diest sort of opposition in the chartered colonies. In Rhode 
Island, the governor rendered the commission of the new 
judge ineffectual by refusing to administer to him the oath 
of office.^^ The governor of Connecticut refused to recog- 
nize the commission, holding it to be an infringement of 
the charter. ^"^ The judge in South Carolina complained 
of great discouragement offered him by the government.^^ 
The governor and council in the Bahamas openly de- 
nounced the commission, and the judge in fear of his life 
was forced to flee.^- In no colony was the opposition more 
general or persistent than in Pennsylvania. No sooner had 

27 Holdsworth, op. cit., 321-325; Marsden, Select Pleas, II, xli-lvii, 
Ixxix; Benedict, op. cit., 3-4. 

28 Duke of Portland Mss., IV, 31, Hist. Mss. Com., Report 15, 
pt. 4. 

29 B. T. Jour., XI, 256-257. 

30 B. T. Paps., Props., Entry Bk. A, ff. 201, 203. 
3i/6icZ., Entry Bk. C, f. 335; Props., TV, pt. 1, H 5, 6, 7. 
32 7&id., Entry Bk. C, f. 292; Props., IV, pt. 1, G 42. 



98 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

Quary arrived Math his commission than there developed a| 
bitter hostility to his power. In 1698 the assembly en-'- 
acted a law providing that all actions involving breaches 
of the trade laws should be judged according to the com- 
mon law and before juries returned from the district where 
the offense was committed.^^ Such a measure of course 
nullified Quary 's commission. But there was some justi- j 
fication for it. Section ten of the statute of 1696 states 
that upon all suits where the acts of trade were concerned 
'' there shall not bee any jury but of such only as are Na- 
tives of England, or Ireland or are borne in His Majesties 
said Plantations. " The object of this clause was to exclude 
the Scots in the colonies from jury duty. But the words 
justify the contention of the colonists that the admiralty 
courts were to employ the common law and juries. In 
August, 1699, Penn secured the opinion of Roger Mom- 
pesson, an English lawyer, that this clause meant that the 
admiralty courts were to employ juries.^^ It is probably 
nearer the truth, as Sir John Cook, advocate-general, 
pointed out in 1702 that the clause meant that where an 
action was brought before a common law court the jurors 
must be so qualified and not that the civil court should 
try by jury.^^ This was undoubtedly the intention of the 
framers, but the act was carelessly drawn. According to I 
Penn it could not be otherwise when only *' Com. Chad- 
dock and Ed. Eandol were the framers of it.''^^ In fact 
the very reason for the creation of admiralty courts in the 
colonies was to do away with the prejudices of juries. 
Randolph sent home the colonial law of 1698 saying ' * that 
it damns the Admiralty," and Quary asked for directions 
how to proceed in the face of it.^^ The law was vetoed 

33 B. T. Paps., Props., Ill, C. 26, no. 8; Charter and Laws of Pa., 
268-274. 

34 B. T. Paps., Props., VII, M 15. 

35 Ibid., VI, pt. 2, K 32. 

36 Duke of Portland Mss., IV, 31 ; Hist. Mss. Com., Report 15, pt. 4. 

37 5. T. Paps., PL Gen., IV, pt. 2, C 18; ihid., Props., II, B 22; 
Jour., XI, 259. 



THE COURT OF VICE-ADMIRALTY 99 

in August, 1699.^^ But the veto availed little where the 
interests of the colonists were concerned. The law of 
1700 provided that no freemen should be tried or con- 
demned in any case whatever but by the " lawful judg- 
ment of his equals or by the laws of the province." This 
too was disallowed as contrary to the statute of 1696.^^ 

Quary was unable on his arrival to put his commission 
into practice. This was due to the absence of the advo- 
cate, Edward Chilton, in England.*^ Meanwhile, in June, 

1698, Matthew Birch, collector of the customs at New- 
castle, seized some European goods on board the sloop 
Jacob, alleging the lack of certificate of reshipment in 
England. The goods were turned over to the custody of 
Robert AVebb, marshal of the court. John Adams, claim- 
ant, secured the promise of the collector to recover his 
goods on appraisement until the court met. Shortly after 
this Adams received from New York the lacldng certifi- 
cate, but Quary refused to recognize it, saying that a thou- 
sand certificates would avail nothing and that the goods 
could only be recovered by suit. Adams offered to give 
security to the amount of appraisement set by Quary to 
make answer at court, but this the judge also arbitrarily 
refused. The claimant then appealed to Governor Mark- 
ham for redress, but the latter wisely refused to meddle in 
the concerns of the new court.*^ Taking advantage of 
Quary 's absence, Adams applied to the county court of 
Philadelphia for a writ of replevin to recover the goods 
out of the hands of the marshal. The marshal was haled 
before the court and ordered to show on what authority 
he held the goods. He replied by producing his com- 

38 B. T. Jour., XII, 156-157; Props., Entry Bk. B, f. 82. 
5Q Penn'a. Statutes at Large, II, 18, 451. Laws of New York 
and Mass. were vetoed for similar reasons. Cal. State Paps., Col., 

1699, 38; Acts and Resolves of Mass. Bay, 1, 287, 307. 

40 B. T. Paps., Props., II, B 22. 

41 Pa. Col. Recs., I, 541 et seq. 



100 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

mission. *2 David Lloyd, leader of the democracy in the 
province, took the document, held it aloft, and pointing 
to the king's picture on it, exclaimed scornfully " here is 
a fine baby, a pretty baby, but we are not to be frightened 
with babies. ' ' *^ These words afford a good illustration of 
the scant respect shown by the colonists for the royal au- 
thority. Anthony ]\Iorris, one of the justices of the court, 
at Lloyd's instigation issued a writ of replevin and the 
sheriff by virtue thereof seized the goods out of the mar- 
shal's custody.** According to Quary, the court was 
pleased with Lloyd's sarcasm. He was also charged with 
saying that all who gave countenance to this court " were 
greater enemies to the Liberties & properties of the people 
than those that sett up Shipp Money in King Charles the 
firsts time . . ." Governor Markham was charged 
with refusing to restore the goods when an appeal was 
made to him. In fact, said Quary, the entire government 
was privy to the whole affair. " Their dependance " 
wrote he, '' is so great on Mr. Penn's Interest at Courte 
that they conclude that they may do anything. ' ' He char- 
acterized the Quakers as a '' perverse, obstinate and turbu- 
lent People " who will submit to no laws but of their own 
making nor acknowledge any of England but such as par- 
ticularly mention the province.*^ There is no doubt that 
Quary 's statements were colored by a feeling of intense re- 
sentment, yet they may be taken as a good indication of 
the colonial sentiment toward the new court. The charge 
that the whole government connived at the opposition is 
manifestly unfair. The governor not only refused to re- 
store the goods to Adams, but the governor and council, 
on Quary 's complaint, held that the procedure of Morris 
was not an act of the government and censured the court 

42 B. T. Paps., Props., II, B 34. 

43 7&t(Z., B 40; III, C 17, no. 1. 

44 House of Lords Mss., n. s., IV, 318-319. 

45 B. T, Paps., Props., II, B 30, 34. 



THE COURT OF VICE- ADMIRALTY 101 

for allowing Lloyd's words to pass without reprimand.*® 
It was rather the expression of resentment felt by the com- 
mon law courts against a new and extensive jurisdiction 
which threatened the very jurisdiction of the former. 

The first session of the court was held at Newcastle, No- 
vember 10-12, 1699.*' The sloop Jacob was libeled by 
collector Birch for importing uncustomed goods. The case 
was continued by the court on the plea of David Lloyd, 
counsel for the claimant, that his client was absent. But 
the matter was reached another way. John Bewley, col- 
lector at Philadelphia, exhibited information against Jacob 
Basset, master of the said sloop, alleging that he as a 
Frenchman was not qualified to navigate the ship according 
to the laws of trade. The law required that the master and 
three-fourths of the crew must be English or colonial born. 
Moorehead, owner of the vessel, tried to block the proceed- 
ings by insisting upon a jury trial as provided by the act 
of 1696 and the law of the colony. The court properly 
rejected this claim. He then presented a certificate of 
Basset's denization, but this too the court refused as con- 
trary to law. The court decreed the ship and cargo con- 
demned. Moorehead moved for an appeal to the High 
Court of Admiralty, but refusing to give security, the court 
ordered the decree to be executed. At the same session 
the prize case, the St. Louis, came up for adjudication.*^ 
David Lloyd, by order of the governor, claimed that the 
vessel was a castaway and therefore by charter became for- 
feited to the proprietor. The claim was overruled, the 
ship was judged lawful prize and ordered delivered into 
the hands of John Moore, deputy prize-agent. Quary 
charged that the sheriff of Newcastle, acting under the 
governor's orders, refused to deliver up the ship. Such 
were the devices of the local authorities to thwart and nul- 
lify the powers of the admiralty court. After making 

4GPa. Col. Recs., 1, 544, 545-546; B. T. Paps., Props., V, F 40. 

47 B. T. Paps., Props., Ill, C 17, no. 4. 

48 lUd. 



102 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

due allowance for the ex parte character of Quary 's 
charges, it seems clear from a general survey of the evi- 
dence in this and other colonies that the colonial govern- 
ments were bitterly opposed to the exercise of admiralty 
jurisdiction and used every means to reduce it to a cipher. 
Quary wrote home that attempts were made to persuade 
the grand jury to represent the admiralty officers as ene- 
mies to the government and that he was afraid of taking 
fees for fear of imprisonment.*^ 

In May, 1699, Quary held another session of the court.'^*' 
When Morris was ordered to restore the goods seized out 
of the hands of the marshal, it is alleged that he replied 
that the court of common pleas had custody of the goods 
and that no action would be taken until directions were 
received from England. "When the marshal, on the order 
of Quary, requested the governor to deliver the prize ^S'^. 
Louis, Markham is charged with the reply that " when he 
sees any power to call him to account he will give answer 
to it." At this sitting was tried the case of the ship 
Provide7ice, libeled by John Moore, advocate of the ad- 
miralty court, as not duly registered according to law.^^ 
It appears that the crew, bound from England to Mary- 
land, was forced by stress of weather to put in at the 
nearest haven, Newcastle on the Delaware. The king's 
collector demanded sight of the certificate of the ship's 
registry. Unfortunately the paper was either mislaid 
or lost and the vessel was seized. Shortly after this, 
Lumby the master, secured from the governor of Maryland 
a list of vessels duly registered, which included the Provi- 
dence. The collector accepted this evidence and released 
the ship. Not so Quary, who ordered the vessel seized and 
libeled in his court as unregistered. The evidence in the 

49 B. T. Paps., Props., Ill, C 16, 28. 

50 lUd., C 28. 

51 House of Lords Mss., n. s., IV, 338-340 ; B. T. Paps., Props., 
Ill, C 28, no. 2; VI, pt. 1, H 15. 



THE COURT OF VICE-ADMIRALTY 103 

case is conflicting and hardly allows of impartial judgment. 
The master and several of the crew testified that the ship 
was properly registered in England and produced the 
Maryland list in evidence. On the other hand several of 
the crew testified that they knew nothing of the ship's 
registry. Quary held the Maryland list irrelevant and 
ordered the ship and cargo condemned according to law.^^ 
Quary charged that the Quaker magistrates supported 
Lumby in this case '' not out of kindness to the man or 
his cause, but prejudice to the jurisdiction of the ad- 
miralty. ' ' ^^ The decree was strictly according to law, 
but out of regard for the equity in the case Quary left 
the ship to the master's care and ordered the cargo into 
the king's store in order to allow the master and owners 
to secure redress in England. When it became evident 
that there was no hope of recovery at home, Quary ordered 
the cargo sold, but at the solicitation of the master, the 
sale of the vessel was deferred until word could be re- 
ceived from the owners. Later, at the master's request, 
Quary proceeded to the sale of the ship and tried to effect 
a plan by which the former could buy up the vessel on 
easy terms.^* Quary accused the Quakers of persuading 
the master not to agree to this plan on the promise to get 
the ship for him without cost. 

The frequent complaints from Quary convinced the 
Board of Trade that stern measures were necessary. In 
August, 1699, the board advised the Privy Council to 
order that Governor Markham be dismissed from office for 
lack of royal confirmation and opposition to the admiralty 

52 Thomas Smith, supercargo, made affidavit that the ship did not 
break bulk, but only put into Newcastle by stress of weather; on 
the other hand, Jeremiah Basse, royal agent in West Jersey, made 
affidavit that the vessel did break bulk. B. T. Paps., Props., VI, 
pt. 1, H 15; Jour. XIV, 337, 341, 351. 

53 House of Lords Mss., n. s., IV, 332. 

5*Ihid., 333, B. T. Paps., Props., V, F 58; VI, pt. 1, G 4, H 15; 
Pa. Archives, 1st. ser., I, 136. 



104 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

court; that David Lloyd, for ridiculing the king's com- 
mission, should not be allowed to continue in any office 
whatever; and that Anthony Morris, the justice, who of- 
fended , by issuing the writ of replevin, should be ex- 
pelled from his office. As Penn was about to repair to 
the province he should be directed to obey the instruc- 
tions, redress the wrongs suffered by the admiralty court, 
and see to it that the admiralty and customs officials were 
supported in their duties.^^ The council approved the 
recommendations and on September 12 Penn received in- 
structions.^^ The execution of these orders depended 
solely upon the determination of the proprietor. By the 
royal charter he enjoyed the power to nominate all officers 
within his province. But the ceaseless hostility of the 
home government to colonial charters was a cogent reason 
why Penn should obey. Then again Penn probably ap- 
preciated the justification for the measures. Penn set 
foot in his colony late in 1699 and promptly fulfilled the 
instructions. Before the provincial council Morris sur- 
rendered his commission as magistrate and his action was 
rebuked by Penn as '' rash and unwarrantable "and be- 
yond justification. Morris acknowledged his error, Penn 
promised to restore the appraised value of the goods, and 
Quary seemed satisfied.^'^ Lloyd was suspended as coun- 
cilor until he cleared himself of the charges made against 
him.°^ Penn showed a willingness to uphold the new 
court and to protect imperial interests in other respects. 
In March, 1700, Quary wrote home approvingly of Penn's 
zeal.^^ But it proved to be only a truce. In November, 
Quary wrote both to the Board of Trade and the Lords of 

55 5. T. Jour., XII, 137; Paps., Props., II, B 20; En^try Bk. B, 
flf. 20-32. 

^Glhid., Props., IV, D 3; Entry Bk. B, ff. 84, 98-102; Jour., XII, 
156-157. 

5TPa. Col. Recs., I, 565-566, 576. 

5s Hid., 602; B. T. Paps., Props., V, F 23, 26. 

!fo B. T. Paps., Props., V, F 5; House of Lords Mss., n. s.; IV, 323- 
326. 



THE COURT OF VICE-ADMIRALTY 105 

the Admiralty that the court never labored under worse 
difficulties and that Penn's sincerity had proven a de- 
lusion.^^ The basis of the complaint was that the pro- 
prietor had granted commissions to the high-sheriffs in- 
vesting them with the powers of '* water-bailiffs " whereby 
the proper jurisdiction of the admiralty was invaded. 
At the same time there arrived in the province two writs 
from the High Court of Admiralty inhibiting the execu- 
tion of Quary's decrees in the cases of the Jacol) and 
Providence. Quary claimed that these orders were se- 
cured through the efforts of Penn and the Quakers In 
order to thwart the detested court. The granting of the 
water-bailiff commissions and the issuing of the inhibi- 
tions raises two questions ; the respective limits of the com- 
mon and civil law jurisdiction in the colony, and the re- 
lations between the admiralty court in the colony and the 
High Court of Admiralty at home. 

It appears that the owners of the Jacob and the Provi- 
dence carried their causes on appeal to the High Court of 
Admiralty. The owners in the first case were able to se- 
cure an order forbidding Quary from executing the de- 
cree of condemnation and a commission empowering the 
appellants themselves to carry it out. In the second case 
the decree of the court was ordered suspended till the 
matter could be heard and determined by the admiralty 
at home.^' The question arises, did the High Court of 
Admiralty possess an appellate jurisdiction where the acts 
of trade were concerned? The commission to the colonial 
admiralty judge makes reservation for appeals home but 
that instrument does not cover the acts of trade in ex- 
press terms. Furthermore, since the act of 1696 gives the 
admiralty at home no original jurisdiction over breaches 



60 5. T. Paps., Props., Y, F 57, 58, 64, no. 10; House of Lords 
Mss., n. s., IV, 331-336. 

Gi House of Lords Mss., n. s., IV, 334-346; B. T. Paps., Props., 

V, F 58. 



106 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

of the law, could it claim a right to entertain cases on ap- 
peal? In fact, the act of 1696 was very carelessly drawn 
in several particulars. Was it that the maritime 
court in the colonies should employ juries? Was it 
the purpose that these courts should have jurisdiction 
solely over breaches of the laws of trade or to the fullest 
extent of the commission? Was the High Court of Ad- 
miralty to enjoy appellate jurisdiction over the laws of 
trade ? Of the question of juries we have already treated. 
Quary, in his perplexity, sought from English counsel an 
interpretation of the law of 1696 with regard to juries and 
appeals.^^ They gave the opinion that according to the 
law juries w^ere to be employed in the colonial admiralty 
courts, and since the admiralty in England was given no 
original jurisdiction over the acts of trade it possessed no 
jurisdiction on appeal. This opinion was justified by a 
strict interpretation of the law of 1696 and in the light 
of these facts the procedure of the court at home in the 
cases of the Jacol) and Providence may be considered il- 
legal. Sir Charles Hedges, judge of the High Court of 
Admiralty, gave Quary the opposite opinion as to ap- 
peals.^^ Quary wrote to the Lords of the Admiralty ex- 
pressing the hope that Parliament would '' explain that 
dark, contradictory act, not only in that particular, but in 
several other points, and that the authority of the Ad- 
miralty will be asserted beyond all objections and con- 
tradictions."^* The admiralty in England asserted the 
right to hear cases on appeal for in October, 1701, it af- 
firmed Quary 's decree in re Providence and the owners 
were cast for costs.^^ In 1715 Advocate-General Lloyd 
gave the opinion that in common maritime cases appeals 
from the colonial admiralty courts lay in the High Court of 

62 House of Lords Mss., n. s., IV, 332. 

63 IMd., 332. 
Q^Ibid., 326. 

65 B. T. Paps., Props., Y, F 26. 



THE COURT OF VICE-ADMIRALTY 107 

Admiralty.^'^ But the practice was not uniform, for we 
note that the Privy Council heard and determined cases 
on appeal from the courts of admiralty in the colonies.^^ 

These inhibitions no doubt caused great joy to the ene- 
mies of the admiralty court. Quary claimed that they 
were secured by Penn and the Quakers for the sole pur- 
pose of working injury to the court. He said, " All this 
clamor and intrigue is carried on in masquerade by the in- 
veterate enemies of the Admiralty Jurisdiction '■ and 
" they have already raised all the reflections and affronts 
on the King's advocate and myself, giving out that we are 
sent for to England and there to be found to our ruin and 
that whatever we have or shall do will be made void at 
home. "^^ On the other hand Penn declared that because 
the colonists saw fit to protect the owners of the Providence 
from the rigorous decree of the court it is imputed to 
them as opposition.*'^ There is little reason to doubt that 
the granting of these inhibitions had the effect of lessen- 
ing the influence of the court. 

With regard to the water-bailiffs' commissions it appears 
that Quary was absent from the province for five months 
by reason of illness and private business and that during 
this time some offenses were committed on the river at 
Philadelphia.^^ According to his commission the ad- 
miralty judge had jurisdiction here. But in order to pre- 
serve peace the high-sheriff of Philadelphia county was 
commissioned water-bailiff, which empowered him to exe- 
cute all processes on the waters of the county. On his re- 



66 Chalmers, Opinions of Eminent Lawyers (ed. 1858), 531, 532. 

QT Acts of the Privy Council, Col, II, 356, 378; III, 84, 87, 127, 
252, 270, 459, 485. 

G8 House of Lords Mss., n. s., IV, 333-335; B. T. Paps., Props., 
V, F 58, 64, no. 10. 

Q9 House of Lords Mss., n. s., IV, 348; B. T. Paps., Props., VI, 
pt. 1, G 4. 

70 House of Lords Mss., n. s., IV, 349, 337-338 ; B. T. Paps., Props., 
V, F 58, 57, 60, 64, no. 10; V, pt. 2, I 19; Jour., XV, 54-56. 



108 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1 7G5 

turn Quary at once complained that the commission was 
a serious infringement of the jurisdiction of the admiralty 
court. He declared that the effect of this commission was 
to restrict the jurisdiction of his court to the high seas be- 
yond the capes of the Delaware, thereby nullifying the 
power of the court. Penn issued the commission, claimed 
Quary, in violation of his promise not to invade the rights 
of the admiralty court until the respective limits of the 
common and civil law jurisdictions were determined at 
home, but was forced to break his pledge by a Quaker as- 
sembly which threatened to withhold all supplies till the 
obnoxious court was banished from the province. To sat- 
isfy Quary, Penn revoked the offending commission al- 
though scarcely four warrants had been issued. Penn justi- 
fied his granting of it on the ground that if Quary had been 
home or deputed one to serve in his stead it never would 
have been issued. Indeed Penn's action appears in a most 
defensible light. If writs issuing out of the common law 
courts could not be executed on the Delaware, criminals 
or debtors fleeing before the law would be able to bid defi- 
ance to the civil powers merely by stepping off a wharf on 
board a vessel. This would be extremely serious if the 
admiralty judge was absent and left none to exercise the 
powers of the court. Penn expressed bitter feelings to- 
ward a court which claimed a jurisdiction so wide as to 
threaten the very existence of the common law courts and 
which deprived his people of the benefits of the ancient com- 
mon law and jury trial. He wrote to the Admiralty Board 
in 1700 saying that he did not conceive that the civil courts 
set up in the colonies for the trial of breaches of the acts 
of trade '' were ever designed to extend so far that noth- 
ing should be done a foot off shore in any creek or river 
but by its power," and asked that '' the just boundaries 
of the civil and maritime powers, where they border upon 
one another " should be determined.^^ To his agent Law- 

71 House of Lords Mss., n. s., IV, 349-350. 



THE COURT OF VICE-ADMIRALTY 109 

ton, Penn wrote expressing the hope that he would live to 
see these men who cast away other men's estates without 
a jury punished '' though not so rigorously as Empson 
and Dudley. " ^- It was the old conflict over again in the 
new world, — a conflict between a court exercising the com- 
mon law so dear to the hearts of Englishmen and a court 
bitterly hated because it employed a foreign code and de- 
nied jury trial. The dispute was now carried to Eng- 
land. 

In 1702 both Penn and Quary were in England. In 
April of this year Quary submitted to the Board of Trade 
a bill of charges against the province."^^ This list included 
the complaint that the admiralty jurisdiction had been in- 
vaded by the common law courts, which assumed the right 
to try breaches of the trade laws, and by the issuance of 
the water-bailiff's commission. Penn answered the charges 
in writing^* and both sides were given a hearing before 
the board."^^ Edward Randolph and Jeremiah Basse, both 
royal agents, appeared to substantiate Quary 's statements. 
The dispute was referred to the crown lawyers who were 
asked to submit an opinion on the following queries."^^ Do 
the common law courts enjoy concurrent jurisdiction with 
the civil courts over the acts of trade? May any other 
court judge a case after the admiralty has once taken 
cognizance of it? Does a water-bailiff's commission in- 
fringe the admiralty jurisdiction? The joint opinion of 
Sir John Cook, advocate-general, and Sir Edward Northey, 
attorney-general, was favorable to Penn's contentions.'''^ 
It held that the indefinite wording of the act of 1696 

72 Pa. Archives, 1st. ser., I, 139-141; B. T. Paps., Props., V, F 26. 

73 5. T. Paps., Props., VI, pt. 2, I 17, 28; VII, M 21. 

74 Ihid., VI, pt. 2, I 20. 

75 5. T. Jour., XV, 54-56, 75-76. 

i^Ihid., XV, 82, 87; Props., VI, pt. 2, K 4. 

77 B. T. Paps., Props., VI, pt. 2, K 24 gives both queries and 
answers. Sir John Cook was also called into consultation by the 
board. Jour., X, 128, 131. 



110 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

seemed to give both the common and civil law courts jur- 
isdiction over forfeitures under that statute and that the 
informer was not restricted to the admiralty court. But 
when once the latter court had taken cognizance of a case, 
pending action, no other court might interfere. A water- 
bailiff's commission did not infringe the admiralty juris- 
diction since such officers were simply sheriffs whom Penn 
had the right by charter to appoint. In conclusion, they 
held that although Penn had no right to erect an ad- 
miralty court, he had the right to constitute judges to try 
causes arising within the body of the province but not on 
the high seas. If the latter held good then the territorial 
limit of the admiralty court was restricted to the high 
seas beyond the Delaware Capes. This practically meant 
that ships seized within the Delaware bay and river for 
violating the laws of trade could be tried solely in the 
common law courts. This fact drew from the board fur- 
ther pertinent questions. Do the colonial admiralty courts 
enjoy greater powers than the High Court of Admiralty? 
In a case of a violation of the laws of trade may the ad- 
miralty take cognizance of it? In case a ship sails up 
the river with uncustomed goods consigned to the colony, 
or in case of illegal exportation of goods from the colony, 
does the action lie in the civil or in the common law 
courts, or may the informer choose his court? The opin- 
ions of Cook and Northey were delivered separately ; ' ^ the 
former showing himself to be a true exponent of the civil 
law and the latter a zealous advocate of the common law. 
Northey held that none of the acts of trade prior to 1696 
gave the admiralty courts in the colonies any power over 
those laws for the terms used therein applied solely to 
*' courts of record " which excluded the admiralty. As 
to the High Court of Admiralty, the navigation act of 1660 

78 B. T. Paps., Props., VI, pt. 2, K 32 for queries and answer of 
Cook; K 48 for answer of Northey. See also Chalmers, Opinions, 
(ed. 1858), 499-502, 504-507. 



THE COURT OF VICE- ADMIRALTY 111 

gave it competence over a vessel seized on the high seas, 
the act of 1663 gave it no jurisdiction whatever, and the 
act of 1670 power only over offenses against that particular 
law. On the other hand Cook held that " courts of rec- 
ord " included the civil courts and that therefore by the 
laws of trade both the admiralty at home and in the domin- 
ions enjoyed competence over all of the acts of trade. As 
to the act of 1696 it was the opinion of Northey that of- 
fenses against this law were triable only in the common 
law courts in England, but in the colonies the jurisdiction 
was divided. The admiralty court had sole jurisdiction 
over all offenses except in cases of ships not legally owned, 
built, manned and commanded, in which cases the com- 
mon and civil law courts possessed concurrent jurisdiction. 
Cook upheld the right of the admiralty at home and in the 
colonies to hear and determine cases of illegal exportation 
or importation as established by the laws of 1670 and 1696, 
but seemed inclined to the opinion that the common law 
courts shared concurrent jurisdiction in such cases. These 
opinions are diametrically opposed to each other. When 
crown lawyers disagreed over the interpretation of the 
acts of trade so loosely worded and were unable to meet 
on common ground as to the respective limits of the op- 
posing courts, it may be appreciated what an ill-effect 
this would have upon the standing of the admiralty courts 
in the colonies. What directions were given as a result 
of these opinions the records do not lay bare. Evidence 
shows that the common law courts in Pennsylvania as- 
sumed the right to hear and determine not only causes in- 
volving violations of the navigation law proper but also 
breaches of the acts of trade in other respects.'^^ 

As a result of the dispute Penn was able to secure 
Quary's dismissal from the post of admiralty judge by 
exhibiting charges of a most serious character against him. 

79 5. T. Paps., Props., XI, R 52; XII, R 19 no. 8; R 93; VI, pt. 
2, I 20. 



112 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

These accusations disclose the loose lines along which Eng- 
land administered her colonies. To put the admiralty 
court upon a footing of independence and efficiency called 
for several requisites of high necessity. The administra- 
tion of justice ever demands men of the highest integrity, 
of knowledge and experience in the law, and free from 
those private interests which are liable to sway their opin- 
ions as judges. In the case of an admiralty judge these 
qualifications were especially to be desired. It was a grave 
and serious matter to put the property of a litigant at the 
mercy of a single judge who, according to the civil law, 
decided both the law and the facts in the case, unrestrained 
by the rules of the common law and juries. Under this 
system a court composed of inferior officials might use its 
power for personal and mercenary ends. Then again the 
admiralty officers should have been rewarded by salaries 
paid from the English exchequer equal to the dignity of 
the post in order to free them from temptation and de- 
pendence upon the colonial governments. Lastly, the 
limits and powers of the civil courts should have been fixed 
with certainty by act of Parliament in order to prevent a 
recurrence of the conflict between the common and civil 
law courts. These ideals were in no ways approximated 
and a review of the charges against Quary reveal these 
facts. In June, 1702, Penn presented to the Privy Coun- 
cil a series of charges against Quary.^'' He alleged that 
Quary 's ignorance of the civil law and his lack of educa- 
tion rendered him unfit for a trust wherein the property 
of the people was so deeply concerned. He charged him 
with stretching the powers of his court to include causes 
properly cognizable at common law; with being the great- 
est merchant and factor in the colony although holding 
the offices of admiralty judge and surveyor of the customs; 
and finally, with using his power for mercenary ends. In 

SOB. T. Paps., Props., VI, pt. 2, K 9; VI, pt. 1, G 4; House of 
Lords Mss,, n. s., IV, 348-349. 



THE COURT OF VICE-ADMIRALTY 113 

support of the last charge Penn instanced several cases in 
which he held Quary guilty of corrupt practices. Quary 
entered a flat denial of corruption and brought counter- 
charges of a similiar character against Penn.^^ Both state- 
ments were undoubtedly colored by a feeling of resent- 
ment, and in the absence of other evidence nothing can be 
proved one way or another. But the fact remains that no 
definite salaries were allowed the admiralty officers by the 
English government. They were made dependent for com- 
pensation upon a percentage of the proceeds of vessels and 
cargos condemned and sold. Men of little honor and de- 
pendent upon the pickings of office for support would 
not be loath to promote litigation and pronounce unjust 
decrees for lucre 's sake. As Burke said of this system many 
years later, '' a court partaking of its own condemnation 
is a robber. ' ' But Quary himself made several confessions 
of a damaging character. He acknowledged his ignorance 
of the civil law and did not deny that he acted as a mer- 
chant and factor in the colony; and he declared that he 
would have continued as such had he not been discouraged 
by ' ' an infamous illegal trade. ' ' ^- There is a strange 
incongruity in permitting a judge of the admiralty court 
to serve also as a customs official, as in Quary 's case, for 
it allowed him to sit in judgment on his own seizures. 
Neither was it proper that a judge should pursue the call- 
ing of a trader, for the charge that the colonial judges 
were partial because implicated in illegal trade is of equal 
force in Quary 's case. John Moore, the advocate, likewise 
confessed to an ignorance of the civil law and was equally 
guilty of being both an officer of the court and customs 
collector for Philadelphia.^^ Quary wrote to the Lords 
of the Admiralty in 1700 to request that some person be 

81 B. T. Paps., Props., VI, pt. 2, K 10. 

82 Pa. Col. Recs., I, 562; Cal. Treas. Paps., 1697-1702, 91. 

8s House of Lords Mss., n. s., IV, 337; B. T. Paps., Props., V, 
F 61. 



114 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

sent from England *' that is well read in the law and in 
all respects duly qualified for the discharge of this difficult 
place. " ^* Of the marshal and register, Quary wrote in 
condemning terms. '' One lives more than a 100 miles 
from this place, and the other is a perfect sot. I am 
forced in some cases to be Marshal and Eegister, else all 
things must be in confusion. ' ' ^^ These men were the 
nominees of Randolph, and apparently no effort was made 
to inquire into their qualifications.^*^ It may hardly be said 
that such officials were of the proper sort to be en- 
trusted with administering the imperial system or to win 
the allegiance of the colonists to a system imposed from 
without. 

Penn succeeded in having Quary deposed from the office 
of judge and secured the appointment of Roger Mompes- 
son in March, 1703.^^ Quary wrote to the Board of Trade 
that he was glad to be relieved, yet he thought it very 
strange that one should be preferred who gave an opinion 
unfavorable to the admiralty court.^^ Perhaps with a view 
to inciting the board to anger, Quary wrote that the 
Quakers declared Penn would be able to carry his designs 
in spite of the board's hostility to him because of his 
greater influence at court. At once the board wrote to 
the secretary of state and the Lords of the Admiralty in 
Quary 's favor, and at the same time submitted the offend- 
ing opinion of Mompesson.^^ The outcome of the whole 

Si House of Lords Mss., IV, 335, 

85 Ihid., 326 ; B. T. Paps., Props., II, B 22. 

80 Wrote Penn, " So miserable are the Queen's poor Industrious 
Subjects in Pennsilvania under such Officers; And for that Reason, 
They and I beg to be delivered from 'em; unless a Colony, and 
they that made it, are of less Importance to the Crown, than an 
Insolent & Vexatious, as well as Uncapable Officer." B. T. Paps., 
Props., VI, pt. 2, K 34. 

87 Admiralty Book, V, 141 ; Penn-Logan Corres., 1, 163. 

88 B. T. Paps., Props., VII, L 51. 

89 Ihid., Props., Entry Bk. D, ff. 384-386 ; Penn-Logan Corres., I, 
376. 



THE COURT OF VICE-ADMIRALTY 115 

affair was that Quary was restored as judge in November, 
1703.^^ Indeed, further favors were heaped upon him by 
his appointment in the same month to succeed Randolph 
as surveyor-general of the customs.^ ^ Quary continued to 
cause uneasiness in the colony. In May, 1704, Penn ap- 
peared before the board to request that Quary should be 
directed to live peaceably with the colonial authorities 
and not cause unnecessary trouble.^^ The board granted 
the request and wrote the meddlesome official to this end.^^ 
Again in 1709, Penn received a letter from Logan, his 
secretary in the province, asking that Quary and the other 
royal officials be requested to cease their annoyance.^* 
In 1713 Quary died and for some years all went smoothly 
as far as the court was concerned. This is perhaps ac- 
counted for by the fact that there was no judge till 1718. 
In that year William Asheton was appointed, to be suc- 
ceeded by Josiah Rolfe in 1724.^^ As both of these men 
were colonists of high character and members of the pro- 
vincial council, little friction was likely to ensue. On the 
death of Rolfe in 1724, one Joseph Browne, an outsider, 
w^as appointed and again there was trouble. This friction 
is not only a further illustration of the iniquitous fee sys- 
tem but also clearly exhibits the means by which the colo- 
nial courts were able to attack the admiralty and subject 
it to humiliating correction. 

In 1717-8 John Menzies, judge, and James Smith, ad- 
vocate, of the admiralty court in New England, made 
complaint to the home authorities that the provincial 
judges encroached on the powers of the admiralty court 
by releasing prisoners connnitted to jail by the latter court 
and by setting aside appeals to the High Court of Ad- 

QO Admiralty Books, V, 189, 193. 

91 Customs Books, XIII, 296. 

82 5. T. Jour., XVII, 34. 

QslUd., 3G; Props., Entry Bk. D, f. 31. 

94 Penn-Logan Corres., II, 309. 

95 Admiralty Books, VIII, 82, 371. 



IIG PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

miralty.''^ For example; two men, committed to jail by 
the admiralty for insulting the court by public placard, 
were released by writ of prohibition, and the proceedings 
against a ship libeled in the admiralty for illegal expor- 
tation of wool were stopped by a similiar writ. As al- 
ready stated this was the familiar weapon which the Court 
of King's Bench in England used with such telling effect 
against the admiralty at home. By a similiar process the 
colonists attacked the admiralty in America, Indeed the 
granting of writs of prohibition was not at all confined 
to chartered colonies. In the royal provinces they were 
issued as well, which is good proof that royal control was 
not a panacea for the ills of chartered jurisdictions. Fun- 
damentally it was a struggle of the forces of democracy 
against centralization and imperialism. The Lords of the 
Admiralty complained of "these encroachments to the Privy 
Council, saying that there was '' little or no regard had 
to the authority and jurisdiction of the admiralty abroad," 
and praying that the colonial governors should be directed 
to restrain the provincial judges. The report was referred 
to the Board of Trade which in turn passed it on to Rich- 
ard West, counsel to the board, for his opinion. ^^ West 
shared all the prejudices of the adherents of the common 
law and his opinion is especial hostile to the admiralty 
courts. In his report of 1720 ^^ West declared that a con- 
sideration of the complaints of Menzies and Smith plainly 
show that the basis of the dispute is nothing but the desire 
of the civil court to extend its jurisdiction by denying the 
right of the provincial courts to issue writs of prohibition 
and in holding that the only redress against a decree of 
the admiralty court was by appeal to the High Court of 
Admiralty. Said West, this position is untenable, for the 
right of the courts of the colonies to issue writs of 

96 i?. T. Paps., PI. Gen., IX, K 146; X, L 29. 

97 Acts of Privy Council, Col, 111, 38, 57. 

98 5. T. Paps., PI Gen., X, L 10; Chalmers, Opinions, (ed. 1858), 
510-521. 



THE COURT OF VICE- ADMIRALTY 117 

prohibition was founded on the common law, which is the 
heritage of Englishmen wherever they go. Furthermore, 
continued West, the admiralty courts in America enjoy 
not a whit more power than the admiralty in England, 
for the statutes of Parliament Avhich affirm the common 
law and restrict the admiralty courts in England, passed 
prior to the settlement of a colony, extend thither unless 
there exists a colonial law to the contrary. Therefore, the 
laws of 13 and 15 Richard II restricting the admiralty 
solely to the high seas and other acts defining the limits 
of the civil and common law West declared to be in force 
in the colonies.^'' And the fact of the matter is that the 
colonial courts did not hesitate to avail themselves of the 
force of these statutes.^*^^ The right of the superior courts 
of common law to issue writs of prohibition was further 
guaranteed by colonial statutes confirmed by the crown. 
Moreover, as West pointed out, should the admiralty in the 
colonies assume to itself the power to decide cases cog- 
nizable only at common law, what remedy had the col- 
onist to vindicate his right to the common law if writs of 
prohibition were not allowed? Therefore, said West, to 
direct the governors to restrain the judges from issuing 
these writs was improper. But if it should be found, as 
was probably the case, that the colonists have used this 
power improperly to banish the admiralty from the colony 
then the remedy to apply is an act of Parliament reducing 
the admiralty jurisdiction to a certainty. The remedy 
proposed was never applied and the admiralty court was 

99 Holdsworth, Hist, of English Law, 1, 317. 

100 In 1739 the supreme court of New York issued a writ of pro- 
hibition restraining the admiralty court in the case of the ship 
Margaret and Mary, seized for illegal importation of goods. The 
writ was based on the statutes of 13 and 15 Richard II, which 
limited the admiralty jurisdiction to the high seas. Such action 
practically nullified the competence of the maritime courts over 
breaches of the acts of trade^ since all seizures were made " infra 
corpus comitatus." N. Y. Col. Docs., VI, 154-155. Cf. No. Car. 
Col. Rccs., Ill, 224; Acts of Privy Council, Col, III, 703, 704, 720. 



118 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

left to work out its own salvation in the face of a keen op- 
position. The colonists felt bitterly toward a court which 
deprived them of the common law and jury trial and which 
tended to draw unto itself causes which arose within the 
body of the country.^^^ The danger was still greater, as 
Jeremiah Dummer pointed out in 1721, ^' where neither 
the Judge nor any of the Inferior officers of the Admiralty 
have Salaries, or perhaps other Dependance than upon 
what they get by their Fees, and therefore must be 
strongly tempted to receive all Business that comes before 
them, however improper for their Cognizance." ^^^ 

John Moore, collector at Philadelphia, seized some un- 
customed goods which were libeled in the admiralty court 
in the session of February, 1726.^^^ When no claimant 
appeared, Judge Browne decreed the goods to be sold and 
the proceeds distributed, one-third each to the informer, 
governor, and king, according to law. Governor Gordon 
and Moore, the informer, objected to this method of dis- 
tributing the proceeds and insisted on having their share 
in kind. The court overruled the objection and ordered 
the decree executed. Gordon thereupon, on the advice of 

101 Jeremiah Dummer wrote, in his Defense of the New England 
Charters, (London, 1721), "It had bin ever boasted as the pe- 
culiar Privelege of an Englishman, & the grand Security of his 
Property to be try'd by his County and the Laws of the Land; 
whereas this Admiralty Method of Tryal deprives him of both, 
as it puts his Estate in the Disposal of a single Person, and makes 
the Civil Law the Rule of Judgment; which though it may not 
perhaps be call'd Foreign, being the Law of Nature, yet 'tis what 
he has not consented to himself, or his Representative for him. A 
Jurisdiction therefore so founded ought not to extend beyond what 
Necessity requires, that is, to nothing but what is really transacted 
on the High Seas, which not being infra Corpus Comitatus, is not 
triable at Common Law. If some Bounds are not set to this Juris- 
diction of the Admiralty, beyond which it shall not pass, it may in 
Time, like the Element to which it ought to be confin'd, grow 
outrageous & overflow the Banks of all the other Courts of Jus- 
tice." 30-31. Cf. No. Car. Col. Recs., Ill, 224-225. 

102 Dummer, op. cit., 31. 

103 5. T. Paps., Props., XII, R 112. 



THE COURT OF VICE- ADMIRALTY 119 

Moore, appointed a commission to distribute the goods ac- 
cording to their desires. ^^* Likewise, Gordon, as chancel- 
lor, issued out of the court of chancery, a writ of injunc- 
tion restraining the admiralty officers from executing the 
decree of that court under penalty of £2000 fine.^*'^ Gor- 
don defended his action on the ground that he knew of 
no law which forced him to take his share in money if he 
wished it in kind. Furthermore, Browne was accused of 
exacting extortionate fees.^^^ He claimed as a fee five per 
cent, on the sale and seven and one-half per cent, on con- 
demnation, which on an appraisement of £591 on the goods 
would net him about £74. Browne was also charged with 
delaying proceedings in his court without pretense, with 
vexatious procedure, and with being obliged to quit the 
providence on suspicion of debt. Gordon's commission 
proceeded to carry out the decree and Browne was allowed 
only a three and one half per cent. fee. There is little 
doubt but that Gordon assumed unwarranted powers. He 
did not question the jurisdiction of the court or the legality 
of the decree of condemnation and it is hard to see upon 
what ground he could base his authority to carry out the 
decree in his own fashion or to regulate the fees. On the 
other hand, a twelve and one half per cent, fee on con- 
demnation and sale was extortion. Browne produced evi- 
dence to show that in the neighboring colonies a seven and 
one half per cent, was allowed on condemnation, but to 
exact a further fee of five per cent, on sale was unreason- 
able. It is a clear illustration of the evils likely to be at- 
tendant where the officers of the court were dependent 
upon fees for support and where such fees were regulated 
by custom and not by authority of the home government. 
In 1727, Gordon again exercised his powers as chancellor 
to obstruct the admiralty court. In July, Daniel Moore, 

104 B. T. Paps., Props., XII, R 115. 
i06lbid., R 113. 
i06/6i(Z., R 116, 117, 118. 



120 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

collector at Newcastle, seized the Sai^ah for irregular trad- 
Ijjg 107 rpj^g g|-^-p ^^.^^ ^j,g^ libeled before Isaac Miranda, 

acting as judge under deputation from Browne. The lat- 
ter found it necessary to revoke his commission to IMiranda 
on a charge of gross proceedings. Peter Baynton, claim- 
ant, requested Browne to proceed in the case. Moore then 
appealed to Governor Gordon to issue a wTit to stay the 
proceedings of that court. Gordon acquiesced and issued 
the desired injunction to restrain the admiralty court 
under penalty of £500 until the case was fully heard in the 
chancery court.^*'^ This action was based on Moore's com- 
plaint that Browne had shown favoritism to the claimant, 
and had put the informer to needless charges in prose- 
cuting the case, whereby the judge was rendered unfit to 
try the cause.^^^ Later Gordon dissolved the injunction 
and requested Browne to proceed, but he refused. The 
case was then heard in the court of common pleas and the 
ship was acquitted.^^*^ Again in September, 1727, David 
Lloyd, chief justice of the supreme court, issued a wTit of 
prohibition to restrain the admiralty from hearing a case 
of seamen's wages on the ground that the contract was 
made on shore and therefore cognizable only at common 
law."^ This was in accordance with English practice in 
similiar cases.^^^ This Lloyd, wrote Browne, is the same 
one who created opposition to the court in 16S'9.^^^ In 
1727 both Browne and Gordon sent home their respective 
versions of the whole dispute. Later Browne went to 

107 B. T. Paps., Props., XII, R 119. 
loslMcL, R 120, 121, 122; XIII, S 27, 28. 

109 Gordon also brought civil action against Browne for slander 
and the latter was held on bail to the exorbitant sum of £2000, but 
the case never materialized. Ihid., XII, R 111. 

110 Ihid., R 122. 
iii7&trf., R 126. 

112 Salkeld, Reports of Cases adjudged in the Court of King's 
Bench . . . from 1 William and Mary to 10 Queene Anne, I, 
32, 33, III, 24. 

113 B. T. Paps., Props., XII, R 126. 



THE COURT OF VICE-ADMIRALTY 121 

England, armed with affidavits, to urge his complaints in 
person.^^* In June, 1730, Sir Henry Penrice, judge of 
the High Court of Admiralty, made a long report in the 
matter. He characterized Gordon's conduct as high- 
handed and complained that the colonial courts by various 
methods infringed the admiralty jurisdiction as often as 
they pleased. He advised that the offending persons 
should be removed from office and that the " Penn fam- 
ily " should be instructed to see that the admiralty court 
was protected against attacks by the common law courts.^ ^^ 
The report was referred to the Board of Trade. Browne 
submitted his case in writing to this bureau and was also 
granted a hearing.^^*^ The board reported to the Privy 
Council that as the evidence before it was ex parte in char- 
acter, Gordon should be directed to submit his statements 
of the matter supported by proofs and affidavits and mean- 
while should not interfere with the admiralty court. ^^^ 
The report was approved. Browne returned to the prov- 
ince and both sides prepared statements in defense of 
their actions.^^^ In May and June, 1732, these papers were 
considered by the Privy Council and further than this 
there is no evidence that positive action was taken.^^^ No 
colonial officials were removed, the admiralty court was 
given no support from home, all of which is in striking 
contrast with the vigorous measures taken in 1699. 

This whole situation makes still clearer, what the events 
of Quary's incumbency have already shown, the serious 
defects in the organization of the system of admiralty 
courts. Of the merits of the controversy between Browne 

^i'i Admiralty Books, IX, 7. 

115 5. T. Paps., Props., XII, R 111; Acts of Privy Council, Col, 
III, 251, 272. 

116 5. T. Jour., XL, 193, 209-210; Props., XII, R 131; PI. Gen., 
XI, M 12. 

ii-r Ibid., Props., Entry Bk. H, ff. 12-15; Acts of Privy Council, 
Col., Ill, 287. 

118 5. T. Paps., Props., Entry Bk. H, ff. 15-18; Props., XIII, S 2. 

119 Ibid., Entry Bk. H, ff. 48*-53, 55-56. 



122 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

and Gordon it is hard to pass judgment. Browne was 
charged with showing favoritism to a litigant, with creat- 
ing needless delay in the trial of causes, with vexatious 
proceedings, and with claiming extortionate fees. If such 
charges were well founded they illustrate both the poor 
character of appointments to the colonial service and the 
evils of the fee system. On the other hand Browne sub- 
mitted to the home authorities a certificate of good be- 
havior signed by seventy-five men of prominence in the 
colony declaring that he was a man of integrity and free 
from private interest in the execution of his office, and 
that his conduct was commensurate with the duties of a 
judge. ^-*^ Whatever may be the merits of the controversy, 
the whole situation laid bare two great defects in the sys- 
tem of imperial courts ; the evils of the fee system, and the 
failure to define with certainty the jurisdiction of the ad- 
miralty courts by act of Parliament. The former sub- 
jected the officials to unscrupulous methods, the latter 
made it possible for the colonial courts to nullify the pow- 
ers of the hated civil courts. 

From 1728, when Browne left for England, down to the 
time of the last French war, no further trouble over the 
admiralty court was experienced. The reasons for this 
are simple. From 1728 to 1734 no admiralty court ex- 
isted in the province.^^^ After 1734 the admiralty posts 
were filled by colonists of ability and eminence. It became 
the custom for the Lords of the Admiralty, when vacan- 
cies in the court occurred, to consult the proprietors or 
governor and appoint their nominees ^2- To the judge- 
ship were appointed such men as Charles Reade, 1734; 

120 B. T. Paps., Props., XII, R 124. 

121 Gordon refused to recognize Browne's commission as judge 
when the latter returned to the province. B. T. Paps., Props., 
XIII, S 24. 

122 Penw Mss., Official Corres., Ill, Wm. Allen to John Penn, 
March 26, 1737; ibid., V, Thos. Penn to Gov. Hamilton, March 9, 
1752, 



THE COURT OF VICE-ADMIRALTY 123 

Andrew Hamilton, 1737; Thomas Hopkinson, 1743; and 
Edward Shippen, 1752. ^^^ All of them were men of wide 
interests, of great experience in the law, and of prominence 
in the councils of the provincial government. Likewise 
the inferior posts were filled with colonists of ability and 
worth. The choice of such men, colonists themselves and 
therefore in hearty sympathy with colonial aspirations, 
precluded the probability of a clash between the admiralty 
and common law courts. Their predilections would lead 
them to adapt official action to the needs and desires of 
the colonists. 

During the French and Indian war the latent hostility 
of the colonists toward the court as well as the defects 
in the court itself came clearly to light again. ^-* In for- 
mer pages we have seen by what means the colonists car- 
ried on an illegal and treasonable trade with the French 
West Indies. It was charged that the admiralty courts 
of South Carolina, New York, the Bahamas and Pennsyl- 
vania were prejudiced in favor of this trade.^^^ On No- 
vember 1, 1760, Governor Hamilton of the latter province 
wrote to Pitt^-^ that he found the most eminent lawyers 
of Philadelphia '' retained in favor of this Trade," and 
that on technical grounds " the Judge of the Court of 
Vice Admiralty had also decreed in its favor, in the only 
two instances that have been brought before him ■' and 
had cast the costs of the suit on the captors. As a result, 
wrote Hamilton, several ships carrying flags of truce and 
laden with French provisions were seized by English cruis- 
ers and brought to the port of Philadelphia for condem- 
nation, but were released without prosecution because of 
the attitude of the court and the lack of good lawyers tq 
engage in the prosecution. Similar complaints came from 

■i^^s Admiralty Books, IX, 254, 347; X, 160. 
124 Beer, British Col. Policy, 1754-1165, 117-123. 
i25/6t(Z., 126-127. 

126 Kimball, Corres. of Wm. Pitt with Col. Govs., etc., II, 352- 
353. 



124 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

other colonies. In fact, the judge of the admiralty court 
in the Bahamas was under a retainer from the Philadel- 
phia merchants to release any vessels of the colony brought 
there for condemnation, ^^^ The efforts of Pitt to check 
the trade aroused the merchants of Massachusetts and 
Ehode Island to a bitter hatred of the customs officials 
and admiralty courts. They therefore concerted measures 
calculated to nullify and destroy the powers of these royal 
agents. To accomplish this design they relied on the | 
common law courts and the prejudice of colonial juries. 
In Rhode Island the execution of a decree of the admiralty 
was stopped by a writ of prohibition issuing out of the 
superior court of the colony and suit was instituted in 
the inferior court to recover money awarded by a decree 
of the admiralty. Judge Andrews wrote that ^' all pro- | 
ceedings of said vice-admiralty court, not only in this but 
in all other causes, have been stopped; although there are 
now causes of great consequence pending before the said I 
vice-admiralty court, unfinished. ' ' ^-^ In Massachusetts 
at least five actions were instituted in the admiralty court 
designed to cripple the customs and admiralty officials in 
the performance of their duties. The latter cases, how- 
ever, were finally settled in a fashion tending to uphold 
the court and customs officials.^-^ The basis of this op- 
position may be gleaned from a letter of Governor Bernard. 
He wrote that this conduct was a part of a preconceived 
plan of the Boston merchants '' to destroy the Court of 
Admiralty and with it the Custom House which cannot 
subsist without that Court," and that it was the avowed 
intention to discourage '' a Court immediately subject to 
the King, and independent of the Province and which 
determined property without a jury." ^^^ 

On the return of peace the whole administrative system 

127 Beer, op. cit., 127. 

128 i2. /. Col. Recs., VI, 371-372. 

120 Quincy, Massachusetts Reports, 541-547, 557. 
130 /6id., '555. 



THE COUKT OF VICE-ADMIRALTY 125 

was strengthened. October 4, 1763, the Lords of the 
Treasury reported to the Privy Council that it was highly 
necessary to establish by law a better method for the con- 
demnation of seizures in the colonies. As the acts of trade 
varied so much as to the mode and place of trial, the 
prosecutor or informer was at times in great doubt as to 
the method of procedure, it was advised that a uniform 
S3^stem for the trials of breaches of the law should be es- 
tablished.^^^ Accordingly the act of 1764 provided that 
all violations of the laws of trade may be tried in any 
common law or admiralty court in the colonies, or in any 
court of admiralty which may be established with juris- 
diction over all America, at the option of the informer.^^^ 
Pursuant to this act the Lords of the Admiralty ordered 
the api^ointment of a vice-admiral for America and of a 
judge of a general vice-admiralty court with jurisdiction 
over all the colonies. 

The extension of admiralty jurisdiction and powers as 
well as the intention of the English government to tax the 
colonies directly created widespread alarm and aroused 
profound discontent in the colonies. The pamphlet lit- 
erature, resolves, and petitions of the numerous colonial 
assemblies were of one accord in protesting against meas- 
ures which were designed to deprive Englishmen in Amer- 
ica of the two most precious rights of all Englishmen; 
the right to grant money by their own consent and the 
right to the benefits of the common law and jury trial."^ 
The petition of Rhode Island to the king in 1764 well sums 
up the colonial contention. ^^* " The extensive powers 
given ... to the courts of admiralty in America 
have a tendency in a great measure, to deprive the col- 

131 B. T. Paps., PL Gen., XVIII, Q 74. 

132 4 George III, c. 15, sec. xli. 

133 Plopkins, Rights of the Cols. Examined, in R. I. Col. Recs., 
VI, 422; John Dickinson, Writings, 1, 175, 195. Cf. Beer, British 
Col. Policy, 1754-1765, 289-290. 

134 R. I. Col. Recs., VI, 415. 



126 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

onists of that darling privilege, trial by juries, the in- 
alienable right of every Englishman; and subjects the in- 
habitants to other great hardships and intolerable expen- 
ses; as the seizor may take the goods of any person, 
though ever so legally exported and carry the trial to a 
distant province." These protests also voiced the evils 
of the fee system. ^"-^ There was in fact much justification 
for the opposition on this ground. As Edmund Burke 
put it " courts incommodiously situated, in effect^ deny 
justice ; and a court partaking in the fruits of its own con- 
demnation is a robber. The Congress complain, and com- 
plain justly of this grievance." On the other hand, it is 
evident in the light of past events that the English gov- 
ernment was forced to widen the powers and strengthen 
the position of the admiralty courts for the security of 
the acts of trade. These courts were a necessity because of 
the intense prejudice of colonial common law courts and 
juries.^"*' The continual opposition of the colonists to 
these courts, like the struggle of the colonial assemblies 
against the powers of the royal and proprietary governors, 

135 Gov. Bernard of Mass. wrote in 1764, "... the objec- 
tion to the Judge of the Admiralty being paid by the poundage of 
condemnation is very forcible; for thereby it is his interest to con- 
demn, rather than to acquit. The present Judge of this Province 
is, I Believe, as uncorrupt as any one the King has; but he has 
frequently complained to me of his office being supported by such 
means" Bernard, fielect Letters on Trade, etc., (London, 1774), 
16-17. Wm. Allen wrote to John Penn, that an honest admiralty 
judge cannot make £5 a year out of the office, but one of a different 
turn will hold court every day and annoy the masters of vessels 
in every petty dispute with the sailors. Penn Mss., Official Corres., 
Ill, March 26, 1737. Cf. John Adams, Works, III, 466; James Otis, 
Rights of the British Cols., (Boston, 1764) 53. 

136 Gov. Bernard wrote in 1764, " the reason for putting these 
causes into a course of trial without jury, undoubtedly arose from 
an apprehension that the juries in these causes were not to be 
trusted. The force of this reason may have abated, but I cannot 
think that it is wholly destroyed: no candid man, I believe, will 
take upon him to declare, that an American jury is impartial and 
indifferent enough, to determine equally upon frauds of trade." 
Select Letters, 16. Cf. N. Y. Col. Docs., VI, 155. 



THE COURT OF VICE-AD^HRALTY 127 

simply illustrates the determination of the colonists not 
to submit to any outside jurisdiction whatever. Their 
hearts were embittered against courts not of their own 
making, to officials not of their own choice, and to a code 
of law which put their property at the hazard of a single 
judge and deprived them of a trial at common law. The 
opposition to the admiralty courts was simply one mani- 
festation of the general movement toward home rule and 
independence. 



CHAPTER FIVE 

THE ROYAL DISALLOWANCE 

In taking up the subject of the royal disallowance, I 
propose to describe the attitude of the central government 
toward the colonial laws submitted to it for examina- 
tion; to consider the number of laws disallowed and the 
reasons for this action; and to come to some conclusion 
as to the effectiveness of the crown's check on colonial 
legislation. Subsequent chapters will take up the atti- 
tude of the province toward the royal disallowance and in- 
structions in regard to laws which affected particular in- 
terests of the colony ; such as the judicial system, the ques- 
tions of coinage and currency, and the tender subject 
of the Quaker religious principles. 

First a few words as to the extent and na^ture of the 
power over legislation possessed by the province and crown. 
By the charter the proprietor and the freemen of the prov- 
ince were empowered to make laws *' for the raising of 
money for the publick use of the said province, or for any 
other End apperteyning unto the publick state, peace or 
safety of the said Countrey, or unto the private utility 
of perticular persons." It was stipulated that these laws 
should be consonant to reason, and not contrary, but as 
near as may be agreeable, to the statutes and rights of the 
realm. All laws were to go into operation when pub- 
lished under the seal of the proprietor. On the other 
hand, the crown's check on these laws was provided for 
by the clause which made it incumbent upon the pro- 
prietor and his heirs to send all acts to the Privy Council 
within five years after passage, and if the said laws were 
not disallowed under the privy seal within six months 

128 



THE ROYAL DISALLOWANCE 129 

after delivery to the council they were to stand in full 
force.^ It is obvious that this power was not a veto in the 
sense that all laws required the royal sanction before be- 
coming operative, neither was it a repeal because the laws 
were not regularly annulled by the legislature. The king 
and council sat rather as a supreme court with power to 
judge and interpret the colonial enactments, and in this 
capacity disallowed or annulled laws contrary to English 
statutes or imperial interests. 

A review of the process through which the laws passed 
in England will throw some light on the methods of colo- 
nial administration. Prior to 1696 little effort was made 
to enforce obedience to the obligation to send the laws to 
the council. In that year new vigor was infused into colo- 
nial management by the creation of the Board of Trade. 
One of its specified duties was to ' ' examin into, and weigh 
such Acts of the Assemblies of the Plantations respectively 
as shall from time to time be sent over or transmitted for 
Our Approbation." The king in council reserved to it- 
self the power of final action, and to the board was dele- 
gated power only to examine the laws and make report.^ 
The consideration of colonial laws constituted a large part 
of the board's work as evidenced by the journals and the 
great collection of laws stowed away in the Public Record 
Office.^ The new board acted promptly in the days of its 
youth. In December, 1696, Penn was called to attend the 
board and directed to submit the laws of his province as 
soon as possible.* A year later, when no laws were forth- 
coming, Penn, as well as the agents of the Jerseys and 
Carolinas, were directed by letter to lay before the board 

1 Poore, Charters and Consts., II, 1512; Thorpe, Amer. Charters 
Consts., etc., V., 3039. 

2 Acts of Privy Council, Col., II, III, Appendix. 

3 For a list of journals and acts of the thirteen original colonies, 
preserved in the Public Record Office, London, edited by C. M. 
Andrews, see Amer. His. Asso., Report, 1908, I, 399-509. 

4 B. T. Jour., IX, 275. 



130 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

at once a collection of the laws of their respective colonies.^ 
In the same month Penn responded by delivering a full 
collection of the laws.® It does not appear that any posi- 
tive action was taken at the time on this body of laws. 
Two years later, December, 1702, Penn again laid before 
the board a body of one hundred and five laws passed in 
the latter part of the year 1700."^ Final action on them 
was not taken till February, 1706, after a lapse of a little 
over three years after delivery and five years and two 
months after enactment.^ This long delay was no doubt 
occasioned by the pending negotiations between Penn and 
the crown looking to a surrender of his powers of govern- 
ment. But with this exception the board acted with a 
fair measure of promptness on the laws which came before 
it. For example, fifty laws submitted in April, 1709, had 
received final action in October of the same year, and 
twenty-nine laid before the board in July, 1713, had been 
either confirmed or disallowed by the order in council of 
February, 1714; and in fact, rarely more than seven 
months on an average intervened from the time of sub- 
mission to the time of final action.^ 

The board did not presume to pass upon the laAvs in 
point of legal accuracy and expediency, but passed them 
on to the crown lawyers, and after 1718, to the standing 
counsel to the board. The opinions of the counsel show 
much care and thought in their consideration of the laws 
and it was usually upon the basis of their opinions that 
the board framed its report to the Privy Council. ^^ Thus 
it may be said that the fate of colonial laws rested really 

8 B. T. Jour., X, 373, 377. 

«Ihid., 386; XI, 438; XII, 78, 115; B. T. Paps., Props., II, B 6, 7. 

7 5. T. Jour., XIV, 289; XV, 327. 

8 Pa. Statutes at Large, II, 449. 

Ihid., II, 524-534; 541-556; II — V, Appendices, passim. 

10 For the reports of the crown lawyers and counsel to the board 
on the laws of Pa. see the Pa. Statutes at Large, II — ^V, appendices; 
also Chalmers, Opinions of Eminent Lawyers, (ed. 1858). 



THE ROYAL DISALLOWANCE 131 

in the hands of the counsel. Not all the laws were sent to 
the counsel, as for example, twenty out of over a hundred 
considered 1705 were reported for disallowance on the 
sole examination of the board ; ^^ and in 1709 only five 
out of fifty were referred to the attorney-general.^^ These 
were the exceptions rather than the rule. After the re- 
port of the counsel was at hand, the board took up the 
laws for consideration in point of practical expediency. 
Were they prejudicial to the mercantile system, were they 
contrary to English statute, or did they inft-inge upon the 
power of the crown over the colonies. The board treated 
the laws with a fair degree of attention, took them up at 
various sittings for examination, and laid hold of every 
available opportunity to secure the information requisite 
to rational action. ^^ The board showed a desire to con- 
sider the interests of all concerned in the laws. To se- 
cure information the colonial agents and proprietors were 
frequently called to attend the board.^* In fact, the work 
of supporting the laws formed the chief burden of the ac- 
tivities of the colonial agents. William Penn during his 
active life frequently appeared before the board in sup- 
port of the laws of his province, ^^ and after his incapaci- 
tation in 1712, two of the mortgagees of the province, 
Joshua Gee and Simon Clement, performed this duty.^^ 
Not till 1731 did the colony appoint a permanent agent 
to reside in London to look after its interests. ^^ Prior 
to this special agents were employed as occasion demanded 

" Pa. Statutes at Large, II, 464-467. 
i^Ihid., 527-528. 

13 In 1717, in order to facilitate the dispatch of business, the 
board fixed upon the following routine: Mondays for reading let- 
ters and papers from the colonies; Tues. and Weds, for planta- 
tion business; Thurs. for trade; and Fridays for colonial legisla- 
tion. B. T. Jour., XXVI, 438. 

14 Pa. Statutes at Large, II — ^V, appendices; B. T. Jours, passim. 

15 Pa. Statutes at Large, II, appendix, passim. 

16 Ibid., Ill, appendix, passim. 

^T Pa. Votes of Assembly, III, 150, 151. 



132 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

to secure the royal sanction of favorite laws.^^ The board 
consulted other interests as well. Merchants trading to 
the colonies were consulted on laws likely to effect their 
interests ; ^^ the bishop of London was called upon for ad- 
vice on laws which touched Anglican interests in Amer- 
ica ; -^ laws which concerned the colonial post-office, the vice- 
admiralty courts and the customs service were sent re- 
spectively to the Postmaster-general, the Lords of the Ad- 
miralty and the Customs Board for examination.-^ At 
times it was necessary for the colonial agents or proprie- 
tors to employ counsel to support particular laws attacked 
by special interest. In 1731 the Penns engaged special 
counsel to defend a law to establish the colonial judiciary 
which had been attacked by the customs officials in the 
colony,-- and in 1760 both the proprietors and assembly em- 
ploj^ed eminent counsel to argue before the board on several 
laws which concerned conflicting interests in the province. ^^ 
On the whole the board did not act in a summary or arbi- 
trary manner, but showed a desire to deal fairly and to se- 
cure all needful information before acting, and usually 
gave the colonial agent or the proprietors fair oppor- 
tunity to answer objections and to clear away misconcep- 
tions. 

When the board's examination had reached an end, the 
result was embodied in a report, drawn up by the secretary 
and signed by the members, to be submitted to the Privy 
Council. It was customary for the council to accept fully 
the board's report. In two cases the colonial agent ap- 
pealed from the report of the board to the Privy Council, 

18 See pages 193, 194, 252. 

19 Pa. Statutes at Large, IV, 481 : B. T. Jour., XLIX, 26, 30. 

20 S. T. Jour., XV, 17, 71; XI, 48, 57; XXXXIV, 243; Pa. 
Statutes at Large, II, 458, 461, 512. 

21 Pa. Stat, at Large, II, 475-476, V, 508-509 ; Acts and Resolves of 
Mass., I, 304; II, 67-68. 

22 Pa. Statutes at Large, IV, 448. 

23 Ihid., V, 691-692. 



THE ROYAL DISALLOWANCE 133 

which granted a hearing to both sides concerned.-* In one 
case the report of the board was upheld and in the other 
a compromise was reached. Final action was taken by 
means of " orders in council "; the usual method of ex- 
pressing the royal will, confirming some and annulling 
others. The charter does not specify that laws should be 
confirmed by positive action, but that all laws not vetoed 
within six months after their delivery to the Privy Coun- 
cil should stand in full force. In some cases laws reported 
favorably were confirmed by order in council, and in others 
no action was taken and they stood confirmed by lapse of 
the six months. 

It appears that there was considerable expense connected 
with the negotiation of colonial affairs at home. AVe have 
already stated that English subordinate officials received 
meager salaries and their chief dependence for support 
was upon fees. It seemed well-nigh impossible to secure 
the passage of reports and other papers through the colo- 
nial office without a large outlay of fees. In 1732, the 
agent of Ehode Island advised the colony to oppose a bill 
in Parliament to oblige the colony to send home the laws 
on the ground that it would entail a great expenditure of 
money yearly " at the Council office and the Board of 
Trade to get Acts through here, in fees for Petitions, 
Reports, References and Royal Orders, besides the tedious 
delays that may happen."-^ Indeed, the board informed 
the governor of New Jersey that several laws " will lye 
forever in their hands for want of an agent to pay their 
fees." -^ Penn wrote to the colony in 1704 for '' 50 guin- 
eas, if not 100, to get a favorable report on the laws "; 
and later wrote that the report of the attorney-general 
was held up for want of a large fee to him.^^ It was by 

24 Pa. Stat, at Large, V, 654 ; Penn Mss., Letter Blc, 1, 82, Thos. 
Penn to Gov. Gordon, July 23, 173 L 

25 Kimball, Corres. of Govs, of R. I., 55-56. 

26 2V. Y. Col. Docs. V, 361, 473. 

27 Penn-Logan Corres., 1, 297, 342; Pa. Col. Recs., II, 193. 



i 



134 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

such a low order of affairs at home that colonial concerns, 
which called for prompt attention by reason of the great 
distance of the colonies from the center of government, 
were delayed. It illustrates to what an extent efficient 
control was affected by the arbitrary and cumbersome sys- 
tem of administration at home. The organization of gov- 
ernment in England was ill-adapted to the ordering of a 
great empire. 

In several respects this procedure on the laws of Penn- 
sylvania was not strictly according to the charter. The 
disallowance by means of the order in council was irregu- 
lar as the charter required that it should be done under 
the privy seal. This fact came to light in 1733 in the case 
of Hamilton vs. Uichardson, argued before the English 
court of chancery, where the plaintiff held that none of 
the laws had been legally vetoed. The court did not de- 
cide the question.-^ The error had crept in through care- 
less copying of the original charter. The charter called 
for annulment under the privy seal, the transcripts by 
order in council. The consequence was that there were 
many laws, once disallowed, likely to be in force because of 
this error to the possible creation of much confusion and 
litigation. Lord Wilmington, president of the council, 
suggested to the Penns that the matter be remedied by 
an act of Parliament. To such a measure the proprietors 
promptly dissented. They said, *' we Cannot tell but they 
[Parliament] may think Severall other clauses want Ex- 
planation, when once they have gott it into the house; 
and it is also a very 111 Precident for any matter relating 
to the Plantations to be considered by Parliament. ' ' ^^ 
Fully aware of the hostility expressed in Parliament to 
the colonial charters, the Penns had no wish to jeopardize 
their interests by such a false move. The discrepancy was 

28PCMM Mss., Letter Bk., 1, 90-91, John Penn to Thos. Penn, 
August 3, 1733. 
29 ihid. 



THE ROYAL DISALLOWANCE 135 

remedied by act of the provincial assembly which confirmed 
the disallowance of all laws by order in council. ^^ But in 
spite of this irregularity, the order in council continued 
to be the method of expressing the veto.^^ This error 
brought to light another. It became the custom to lay the 
laws in the first instance before the Board of Trade, al- 
though the charter specifies that they should first be de- 
livered to the Privy Council. Hence the laws did not come 
to the notice of the council until it received them together 
with the board's report thereon. After 1735 we note that 
the laws were regularly laid before the Privy Council and 
then referred by it to the Board of Trade.^- In fact, the 
board sought to take advantage of the irregularity in order 
to secure the disallowance of several laws of long standing. 
In 1746 several laws dating back to 1722 and 1729, which 
were considered prejudicial to the act of Parliament per- 
mitting the transportation of convicts to the colonies, were 
reported for disallowance on the ground that they had 
been delivered originally to the board and not to the coun- 
cil. The proprietors, aware of the dangerous consequences 
of establishing such a precedent, petitioned against such 
action. Upon their promise to see that the assembly 
passed a new law clear of the objections and repealed the 
old ones, the matter was allowed to drop.^^ 

The six months clause was a serious limitation upon the 
effectiveness of the veto power. In the first place, this nar- 
row period hardly offered sufficient time for a careful 
scrutiny and a proper judgment of a large collection of 
laws. The situation is well stated by the board in its re- 

30 Pa. Stat, at Large, IV, 257-260, 452, 453; Votes of Assembly, 
III, 205-206; B. T. Jour., XLV, 20; Props., XIII, S 46, 

31 In 1735, West gave the opinion that no veto was valid, ac- 
cording to the charter, except under the privy seal. B. T. Paps., 
Props., XIII, S 59. 

32 Pa. Statutes at Large, IV, V, Appendices, passim. 

&sPa. Archives, Ist. ser., I, 716-723; Pa. Col. Recs., V, 499-501; 
Pa. Statutes at Large, III, 505-513; Penn Mss., Letter Bk., II, 179, 
Thos. Penn to Gov. Gordon, March 5, 1747. 



136 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

port of 1714, that '' it may so happen as in the collection 
of laws passed in Pennsylvania in 1705, that so great a 
number of laws may at one time be transmitted that it 
will be difficult if not impossible considering the other 
business that may intervene to examine the same as they 
ought to be."^* During the period when the laws were 
first submitted to the Board of Trade, the legal adviser 
held that the time during which the laws were in that office 
formed no part of the six months, which only began when 
they were sent with the report of the Privy Council. ^^ 
Under such circumstances a longer period was allowed 
for examination. After 1735 the laws were regularly sub- 
mitted to the council in the first instance, hence the time 
allowed the Board of Trade for examination of the acts 
counted as part of the six months so that prompt action 
was necessary to prevent the confirmation of objectionable 
laws by lapse of time. By 1735 the Plantation Committee 
of the Council became active in colonial affairs. The coun- 
cil first referred the laws to the committee, which in turn 
by ^' order of reference " submitted them to the board 
for consideration and report. The committee received the 
board's report, considered it with care, and at times con- 
sulted the crown lawyers, and finally the report reached 
the council. This additional check was probably demanded 
by the necessity of obtaining an adequate examination of 
the laws within the unreasonably short time allowed. In 
the second place, the charter allowed the crown no oppor- 
tunity to veto laws which at a later time might prove to 
be harmful to British interests. If no action was taken 
within the six months the laws stood confirmed and laws 
which later might prove objectionable could not be re- 
pealed or altered except by action of Parliament or the 
provincial assembly. In either case redress was likely to 

34 Pa. Statutes at Large, II, 555 ; B. T. Paps., Props., IX, 35. 

35 Chalmers, Opinions, 336-337; B. T. Paps., Props., X, pt. 2, Q 
171; Pa. Statute at Large, II, 473-474. 



THE ROYAL DISALLOWANCE 137 

be secured only with considerable difficulty. In the royal 
province this condition did not obtain, for after a law was 
once examined by the board and its counsel, no further 
action was taken if not found immediately objectionable 
or unless disallowance or confirmation was necessary. 
The general method was to order the laws '' to lye by 
probationary " which gave the crown an opportunity to 
use the veto power at any future time on laws which had 
been found harmful in their operations.^^ In fact, it was 
not uncommon for the crown to veto laws dating back over 
a considerable period.^" The charter of Pennsylvania pre- 
cluded the crown from any such hold on the laws of this 
province. 

Having pictured the method of procedure, our attention 
will be directed to the inquiry of how far the charter gave 
the home government the desired effectual check on colo- 
nial legislation. This question involves the attitude of 
the colonists toward the veto and the measure of obedience 
paid by the proprietor or colonists to the obligation to send 
home their laws within five years after enactment. In 
the first few years after its organization, the board re- 
quired of Penn prompt compliance in the submission of 
the laws, but after this it was not quite so insistent and 
the laws were not transmitted so promptly. Still the laws 
were delivered within the five-year limit, for example, fifty 
laws passed in 1705 came to the board in 1709, and twenty- 
nine enacted in 1708-1712 were submitted in 1713.^^ Dur- 
ing Penn's activity he acted as agent for the province and 
saw to it that the laws were duly laid before the board. 
But in 1712 Penn was rendered incapable of further busi- 
ness by reason of a paralytic stroke and the year of his 
misfortune coincides roughly with a decadence in the pow- 
ers of the Board of Trade. In 1716 Governor Keith sent 

36 For example, see B. T. Jour., XXXIX, 255, XXXVII, 6. 
S7 Ibid., LXII, 141, 253, XLIII, 262; No. Car. Col. Recs., V, vi, 
vii, 155, 166. 

38 Pa. Statutes at Large, II, 525-526, 544-545. 



138 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

to England a body of laws passed in 1713-1715 which did 
not reach the board till 1718.^^ In fact, the neglect to 
submit the laws would doubtless have been passed un- 
■'noticed had not the attention of the languishing board 
been directed to it by an anonymous letter of April, 1718, 
charging the colonial authorities with improper motives 
^n withholding the laws.^*^ Joshua Gee was called upon 
for an explanation. He replied with a disavowal of any 
such motives as imputed, and excused the tardiness on the 
ground of Penn's illness and the mortgagee's unacquaint- 
ance with the colonial business.^^ Three of the belated 
collection had by this time passed beyond the five years 
and were presumably in full force in spite of any action 
of the crown to the contrary.*- In general, it may be said 
that all the laws of the period of 1696 to 1715 were regu- 
larly sent home and received careful attention. 

The two decades from 1715 to 1735 tell quite a different 
story. Of the one hundred and fifteen laws enacted dur- 
ing this period but fourteen were properly considered 
by the home government. Here is evidence both of colonial 
disregard for the obligation of the charter and of gross lax- 
ity in colonial administration at home. Conformity to the 
requirement depended upon the disposition of the colonists 
or the proprietor on one hand, and upon the vigor of the 
home government on the other. The colonists, separatistic 
in their tendencies, were little disposed to allow their laws 
to come before the Board of Trade or Privy Council for 
examination. English control was disliked for several rea- 
sons. The cost involved in the payment of fees, the labor, 
the ignorance of colonial conditions at home, the long- 

39 Pa. Votes of AssemUy, III, 189, 190. 

40 B. T, Paps., Props., X, pt. 2, Q 150; Pa. Statutes at Large, III, 
441-442. 

41 B. T. Paps., Props., X, pt. 2, Q 155; Pa. Statutes at Large, III, 
443-445. 

42 S. T. Paps., Props., X, pt. 2, Q 160, 161; Pa. Statutes at Large, 
III, 445-454. 



THE ROYAL DISALLOWANCE 139 

drawn out delay in acting upon the laws which left the 
colonies in a state of uncertainty, all contributed to make 
the colonists reluctant to submit their laws to the will 
of the crown. The assembly, moreover, felt that the ob- 
ligation to transmit the laws rested upon the proprietor 
and not itself. This was the reply made in 1726 when 
Governor Gordon asked the house to appoint an agent 
to look after the laws.*^ This view of the matter was 
in accordance with the provision of the charter, but the 
sons of William Penn, unlike their father, were unwilling 
to bear the expense and seemed to be interested in the 
affairs of the province only so far as their interests as 
lords of the soil were involved. Furthermore, the laxity 
and inertia which characterized the work of the Board 
of Trade during the era of Walpole and Newcastle stands 
out in striking contrast with the vigor displayed in the 
earlier period. Hence, shielded by the charter, and 
favored by the neglect shown by the proprietors and the 
Board of Trade, the assembly ran its own course unchecked 
by the exercise of the crown's power of disallowance. In 
1730 the board took notice that only a few laws of the 
province came before it and brought the neglect to the 
attention of the proprietors.** Thereupon John Penn in- 
structed Governor Gordon to transmit promptly to Eng- 
land a collection of the laws passed during his adminis- 
tration, and for the future to send over two copies of the 
enactments of each assembly, one for the Board of Trade 
and the other for the proprietors.*^ In response the as- 
sembly appointed P. J. Paris London agent for the colony 
and dispatched a number of laws.*^ The decadence of the 
board is well illustrated by the treatment accorded this 
collection. Twenty-six laws passed during the years 1729- 

*3 Pa. Votes of Assemlly, II, 486, 488. 

44 Penn Mss., Letter Bk., 1, 8, John Penn to Gov. Gordon, May 3, 
1730. 

45 Ihid. 

46 Pa. Votes of Assemlly, III, 150, 151. 



140 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

1733 were found in 1739 after a tedious search by the 
colonial agent '' laid up in a by-corner of the Board of 
Trade and covered very thick with dust. ' ' ^^ Under such 
a regime the veto was of no effect whatever. The prov- 
ince was left to pursue its own course and consult its own 
desires, unhampered by restraint from England. The 
whole situation is a good illustration of the difficult problem 
of administering colonies governed under charters. The 
royal governors were instructed to transmit the laws of 
the respective provinces within three months after enact- 
ment and the journals of the board show that the laws 
were sent home in most cases with a fair degree of prompt- 
ness, were examined by the board and its counsel, and 
objectionable acts were disallowed.*^ Over the officials of 
the chartered colonies the crown enjoyed no such control 
and the royal disallowance proved of force only when 
the administration at home acted with vigor. In 1739 a 
long list of acts dating back to 1717, except such as had 
been repealed by the assembly or temporary acts which 
had expired by limitation of time, were sent to Francis 
Fane, the board's counsel, for examination. In Novem- 
ber, 1740, Fane submitted his report, but beyond this no 
action was taken.*^ In fact, no further action was pos- 
sible. The charter is silent on the point whether those 
acts which have not been submitted within the five-year 
period should be on that account null and void, and it 
seems safe to assume that all laws once having passed this 
allotted time must be regarded as confirmed in spite of 
the irregularity. The charter lacked completeness in this 
as well as in other respects. A proper enforcement of 
the requirement to transmit the laws called for a provision 
in the charter making void all laws not prompth^ sent 
home or else laying a heavy penalty for disobedience. 

47 Pa. statutes at Large, III, 493. 

48 For chances instances see B. T. Jour., XXXII, 156, XXXIII, 142, 
150; XXXIV, 283; XXXVI, 210, 251, 252. 

49 Pa. Statutes at Large, III, 488-493, 495-505. 



THE ROYAL DISALLOWANCE 141 

Increased administrative efficiency demanded the vacation 
of the colonial charters. 

After 1740 the Board of Trade as well as the colonial 
authorities showed a greater interest in the obligation 
to send home the laws. From this date down to the close 
of our period all the laws, with very few exceptions, were 
regularly laid before the Privy Council. Rarely more 
than three years elapsed from the time of enactment till 
delivery to the council was made,^*^ and especially after 
1748, when the board was under the efficient presidency 
of the Earl of Halifax, seldom more than a year inter- 
vened. In 1758, and again in 1766, the board complained 
that certain laws had not been presented till three years 
after their passage, which shows that a watchful eye was 
kept on colonial legislation.^^ But the charter afforded 
other loop-holes for an evasion of the veto. 

It is hard to see where the provisions of the charter 
gave the crown an adequate control over law-making in 
the colony. It lacked those elements of completeness and 
positiveness requisite for an effectual control. This is true 
as we have seen in the case of the transmission of the 
laws and with regard to the six months clause. It is also 
true in two other respects. The long five-year limit al- 
lowed for transmission afforded the assembly a good oc- 
casion to enact temporary measures within the period 
and by a process of reenactment keep within the letter of 
the law and ward off the veto. Then again, even though 
a law should be vetoed at home, there was nothing in the 
charter which forbade the reenactment of the very same 
offending law. The case was different in the royal prov- 
ince. Here the governor was bound by royal instructions 
not to assent to certain laws of an objectionable char- 
acter, or to confirm temporary measures save in times 
of necessity, or to give his assent to laws of an extraor- 

50 Pa. Statutes at Large, IV, V, Appendices, passim. 
5iIUd., V, 592, VI, 608; B. T. Jour., LXXIV, 178. 



142 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

dinary nature without the insertion therein of a clause 
suspending the operation of the law till the royal pleasure 
was signified. In fact, the royal instructions were very 
detailed and explicit and by the crowTi's hold on the gov- 
ernor obedience to the royal orders could be exacted.^^ 
Thus the crown enjoyed in such colonies what may be 
called the anticipatory veto. Moreover, the interests of 
the Empire were further safe-guarded by the royal coun- 
cil which formed the upper house of the legislature.^^ 
In the chartered colony royal instructions requiring the 
suspending clause or forbidding the governor to assent to 
certain laws were always resisted by the assembly as con- 
trary to the charter which was interpreted as giving the 
freemen full legislative independence. The assembly 
showed no hesitation in taking advantage of the protection 
afforded by the charter to elude the veto power. No com- 
plaint was made of such evasions till 1714. Twenty-nine 
laws enacted 1709-1712 reached the board in July, 1713. 
Among them were discovered several temporary measures 
near expiration and several reenactments of laws once dis- 
allowed. The Board of Trade in its report to the council 
complained of these facts and cited a law which placed a 
heavy tonnage duty on all ships trading to the colony, 
except those owned or built in Pennsylvania, Delaware or 
"West Jersey. This law, said the board, was objectionable 
as placing a burden on English shipping, and since it was 
near expiration it might be reenacted before the colony 
received notice of the veto.^* The report was considered 
by a committee of the whole council which advised that 
the agreement pending between Penn and the crown for 
the purchase of the powers of government granted away 
by the charter should be perfected by act of Parliament 

52 Greene, Provincial Governor, 162-165, Appendix A gives in full 
the royal instructions to Governor Bernard of N. J., 1758. 

53/&id., 72-90. 

54 Pa. Statutes at Large, II, 554-555; B. T. Paps., PI. Gen., IX, K 
35. 



THE ROYAL DISALLOWANCE 143 

and that provision should be made '* for inconveniences 
complained of in passing and transmitting the laws by- 
present tenor." The report was approved by order in 
council and the Lord Treasurer was directed to perfect 
the agreement to be laid before Parliaments^ The Board 
of Trade was also instructed to report on the best ways 
and means to check similar practices in other colonies. 
The attorney-general was consulted and he replied that it 
could be prevented in the royal colonies by insisting on 
the governor's obedience to his instructions but in the 
charter colonies only by act of Parliament. He held that 
the latter colonies by their charters had a right to make 
their own laws which could not be put under any re- 
straint other than the charter specified, except by action 
of the imperial legislatures'^ The board advised the Privy 
Council to secure the passage of an act of Parliament 
obliging those colonies not required by charter to submit 
their laws to do so hereafter.^"^ The agreement between 
Penn and the crown never found its way into law because 
of the unsettled differences between the Penn family and 
the mortgagees of the province. Neither was a bill intro- 
duced to force all colonies under charters to send home 
their laws, probably due to the reorganization of govern- 
ment consequent upon the death of Queen Anne in 1714. 
Other irregularities came to light a few years later. 
Twenty-four laws passed 1713-1715 were not delivered to 
the board till 1718 when it was found that three were 
temporary measures, several were reenactments of laws 
once vetoed, and several had passed beyond the five-year 
period.ss Aroused by the violations of the spirit of the 
charter, if not the letter, the board, in March, 1719, sent 
the charter to Richard West, its counsel, with the request 

55 5. T. Paps., PI. Gen., IX, K 30; Props., IX, Q 43. 
^alUd., PI. Gen., IX, K 35; Jour., XXIV, 228, 270, 308. 
57 Ihid., PI. Gen., Entry Bk. F, ff. 418-421; Jour., XXIV, 309, 314. 
58/6id., Props., X, pt. 2, Q 160; Pa. Statutes at Large, III, 445- 
455. 



144 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

for an opinion on the question whether the assembly could 
by charter reenact laws which the crown had once disal- 
lowed.^^ West answered a week later that the charter 
contained no provision which barred the assembly from 
reenacting the substance of any laws disallowed by the 
king. This dictum at once completely nullified the force 
of the veto power.^^ The only remedy, and one which 
the interests of the Empire demanded, was the vacation 
of the colonial charters and the substitution of royal gov- 
ernment. This conclusion had been reached many times 
before by imperial administrators but it was not put into 
practice. In July, 1719, the board in its report to the 
council pictured the ill-effects of temporary laws and re- 
enactments '' which is a practice they are guilty of in 
the very worst degree," and offered the opinion that the 
''plantations will never be upon a right footing till the 
dominions of proprietary colonies shall be resumed to the 
Crown. "^1 

It was thoroughly recognized by the board itself and 
royal officials closely connected with colonial affairs that 
the charter colony was an anomaly in the imperial system. 
Again in 1721 the board called attention to the loose pro- 
visions of the Pennsylvania charter in regard to the laws 
and urged that the agreement for the purchase of Penn's 
powers of government be consummated.^^ Time and time 
again Parliament and the ministry were called upon to 
vacate the charters or curtail their powers of government 
for the sake of stricter royal control, but just as often 

59 7?. T. Paps., Props., Entry Bk. G, f. 164; Jour., XXVIII, 167. 

GOlMd., Entry Bk. G, f. 165; X, pt. 2, Q 171; Jour., XXVIII, 181. 

61 Ihid., Entry Bk. G, ff. 214-216; Statutes at Large, III, 467. In 
1722 Gov. Keith, in a message to the assembly, expressed the hope 
that the house would no longer offend the crown by passing laws 
once vetoed, " a Practice too much in use in this Province hereto- 
fore, tho' never attempted in my Time and I hope never will be 
hereafter." Pa. Votes of Assemhly, II, 300. Cf. Acts and Resolves 
of Mass., 1, 308. 

02 2V. Y. Col. Docs., V, 603-604. 



THE ROYAL DISALLOWANCE 145 

these appeals remained unanswered. For some years no 
further complaint was made. It was the period in which 
the board had fallen into a state of inertia and few laws 
of the colony reached England. But early in 1732 the 
board laid before the House of Commons a statement of 
colonial affairs, which pointed out the defects of the char- 
ters with respect to royal supervision of colonial legisla- 
tion. " Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Maryland, being 
under no obligation to transmit their laws . . . it is not 
surprising that governments like these should be guilty 
of many irregularities. Pennsylvania has evaded her char- 
ter, having transmitted since the year 1715, no acts for 
the royal supervision, except occasionally an act or two " 
and that even royal governors neglected to transmit laws 
passed contrary to their instructions.*'^ In April, 1734, 
the following resolutions were offered in the House of 
Lords designed to correct these evils. The laws of all 
colonies, both royal and chartered, should be sent home 
within a year after passage, that no law should be in force 
till approved by the crown, except such as were demanded 
by the exigencies of war, and that the crown should be 
empowered to veto any former laws, if found detrimental 
to imperial interests, except such as were already con- 
firmed. Such a measure was a capital necessity for the 
security of the ideals of the Empire.^* The resolutions 
were adopted and ordered to be framed into a bill to be 
considered at the next session of Parliament. When this 
news reached the ears of the colonists through the ever 
watchful colonial agents, there was great alarm. The pas- 
sage of this bill meant a serious limitation upon their 
freedom of action enjoyed under the charters and a 
greater subjection to a foreign control. The agents of 
Rhode Island and Connecticut were instructed to spare 
no pains or costs to oppose this measure which endangered 

63 Chalmers, hitrod. to Revolt of Cols., II, 118-119. 
^^ Journals of House of Lords, XXIV, 411. 



146 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1 690-1765 

colonial charters and privileges.^^ In Pennsjlvania a 
committee of the assembly was appointed to represent to 
Parliament and the king " in the most lively Terms " 
the hardships the bill would place upon the colony and 
that it would be a violation of the royal charter. The 
addresses were drawn up and sent to Paris, the colonial 
agent, together with instructions to oppose the bill vig- 
oreusly.®*^ Lewis Morris, late chief -justice of New York, 
then on his way to England, w^as solicited by the assembly 
to join with Paris in opposing the bill.^^ The measure 
never found its way into law and it is fair to assume 
that the efforts and influence of the colonial agents was at 
least partly responsible for its failure. 

The evasion of the veto by reenactment will be brought 
out more clearly in subsequent pages. Suffice it to say 
here that in the case of their religious beliefs the Quakers 
remained true to conscience and reenacted oft vetoed laws. 
Determined to fashion their judicial system as they saw 
fit the royal veto had no power which the assembly felt 
bound to respect. In the matter of regulating coin cur- 
rent in the colony the assembly did not scruple to set at 
variance the rate fixed by royal proclamation or act of 
Parliament in spite of the veto. Yet in many of these 
cases the constant exercise of the veto had its effect, for 
the assembly finally either partly acquiesced or else failed 
to reenact the objectionable laws. The same is true in 
other cases. The law of 1700 granted the freemen of 
the colony the benefit of the common law and jury trial 
in all cases whatsoever, and nowhere were the privileges 
and liberties of Englishmen more dearly cherished than 
in the Quaker province. The law was vetoed as inter- 
fering with the vice-admiralty court which employed the 

65 Kimball, Corrcs. of Oovs. of R. I., 1, 63; Talcott Papers, Conn. 
Hist. Soc, Coll., IV, 296-298. 

66 Pa. Votes of Assembly, III, 214, 215, 217. 
QT Ibid., 227. 



THE ROYAL DISALLOWANCE 147 

civil law and denied juries:^^ The law was reenacted with 
a proviso that nothing contained therein should act as a 
bar to the trial of causes properly cognizable by the ad- 
miralty court. Still the crown vetoed this law as liable 
to interfere with the maritime court.^^ The assembly re- 
enacted the very same law only to have it disallowed again 
and this time the royal will was effective/^ A law of 1700 
gave preference to colonial creditors over others but was 
disallowed as unjust to the people of England.'^^ The law 
was repassed in 1711, modified to some extent but yet to 
the same general purpose, but was again disallowed on 
the same grounds."^^ In this case the veto was at last ef- 
fective for the law was not put upon the statute book 
again. These cases might be multiplied, but these few in- 
stances suffice to show that the power of the English gov- 
ernment, like that of the potter, was limited by the sort 
of material it had to deal with. When bent on subserving 
their own interests, the colonists showed no hesitation in 
disobeying the will of a far distant authority and were 
abetted in this conduct by the loose and incomplete pro- 
visions of the charter. But in the long run it is true that 
the veto did have the effect of checking legislation unde- 
sirable from the point of view of English interests. 

As to temporary laws many such were passed which con- 
cerned chiefly matters of internal economy and polity and 
which in no ways interfered with English interests. Of 
such laws no complaint was made. They had to do with 
the regulation of Indian affairs, or internal taxation for 
the sake of defraying the charges of government,^^ and 
in the last French war many laws of a military character 
demanded by the exigencies of the occasion were passed 

68 Pa. Statutes at Large, II, 18, 451, 467. 

69 Ibid., II, 359, 543, 550. 
^olhid., Ill, 31, 439, 463. 

71 Ibid., II, 63, 494. 

72 Ibid., II, 364, 550. 

73 Ibid., II-V, passim. 



148 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-17C5 

for a year or for a shorter period.'^* But on the other 
hand various short-time laws were passed which were con- 
sidered at home detrimental to English commercial inter- 
ests and these called forth much complaint. This is illus- 
trated in the case of the law of 1711, designed to run 
for three years, imposing a duty on the importation of 
mne, rum, and other spirits, except when imported by 
vessels owned or built in Pennsylvania, Delaware, and 
West Jersey; a tonnage duty on all vessels with similar 
exceptions ; and a duty on - the importation of negroes. "^^ 
The law was vetoed in 1714 as burdensome to English 
trade and as unjust in its discrimination.'^'^ The veto was 
of no avail since the act was near expiration and before 
notice of the disallowance could be received in the colony, 
the law was revived for another three years with the ex- 
ception of the tonnage duty."^^ It was again vetoed but 
only after the act had run its course. '^^ In fact similar 
measures were passed subsequently, but apparently they 
were never submitted to the consideration of the crown. '^^ 
The merchants began to complain of the discriminations 
and burdens placed on trade. In 1731 and 1732 the crown 
instructed the governor not to assent, under any pretense 
whatever, to laws putting the inhabitants of the colony 
upon a more advantageous footing than those of England, 
or which imposed a duty on the importation or exporta- 
tion of negroes, or in any case where the trade and naviga- 
tion of the kingdom might be affected.^^ After this no 
laws of this objectionable character appear. 

"What proportion of the laws were vetoed and what were 

74 Pa. Statutes at Large, V, passim. 

75 Ibid., II, 382. 
i^IUd., II, 555. 

fT lUd., Ill, 112, 117. 
7slhid., II, 459, 465. 
-J^IUd., Ill, 150, 159, 165, 238, 268, 275. 

80 Pa. ArcUves, 1st ser., I, 306, 325; B. T. Paps., PI. Gen., X, L 
45, 53. 



THE ROYAL DISALLOWANCE 149 

the reasons for so doing? The years 1700-1765 may be 
divided for this purpose into three periods, corresponding 
roughly to the measure of vigor shown by the Board of 
Trade. From 1700 to 1715, a period which coincides with 
the youthful vigor of the board, eighty-nine, out of two 
hundred and twenty laws passed, were vetoed; approxi- 
mately forty per cent. From 1715 to 1735, during which 
time the board had grown lax and careless in administra- 
tion, only three out of one hundred and fifteen were vetoed. 
From 1735 to 1765, a period of marked activity in colonial 
administration, eleven out of about two hundred laws were 
disallowed. Of the large number vetoed in the first period 
fully one-half were disallowed, not on the ground that 
they were essentially bad in principle, but because the 
phraseology was loose and defective, or else the penalties 
imposed were considered too heavy, or the common law 
was not properly observed. The colonists lacked training 
in the nicer points of law-making and the keen eye of a 
skilled lawyer was needed to detect the loose wording and 
defective drafting of colonial bills. The law officers of 
the crown and the counsel to the Board of Trade pointed 
out the confusion and litigation likely to follow from the 
uncertain wording and lack of completeness in the laws 
relating to the recording of deeds, descent of property, 
wills, and other statutes affecting property interests. ^^ 
Some of the criminal laws were so defectively drawn as to 
allow the court too broad a latitude for interpretation, 
as for example, in the act against assault and battery the 
words ^'menace, write or speak slightingly, or carry them- 
selves abusively " were considered " too general and un- 
certain and liable to be construed according to the humor 
of the courts. " ^^ It was also held unreasonable to sell 
a man into servitude if unable to pay a four-fold satisfac- 

81 Pa. Statutes at Large, II, 489-497. For a criticism of the 
Conn, laws by Francis Fane, see Andrews, Conn. Intestacy Law, 
Yale Review, Nov., 1894, 286-287. 

82 Pa. Statutes at Large, II, 464, 479-481. 



150 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

tion for house-breaking or incendiarism, and besides ' ' sell- 
ing a man is a punishment not allowed by the law of 
England. ' ' ^^ Laws of this class were altered by the as- 
sembly to obviate the objections and were subsequently ^ 
confirmed at home.^* To the exercise of the veto in this 
way the colonists had no objections. It is obvious that 
in these cases the veto power had the effect of clearing 
away errors and defects in colonial laws and of making 
them more conformable to English common law. To the 
large bulk of laws which strictly concerned internal affairs 
the home government made no objections. But when the 
assembly passed laws which were contrary to the com- 
mercial policy of the Empire or to statutes in regulation 
thereof; or were prejudicial to the interests of English 
merchants, or curtailed royal control in matters of finance, 
trade, war, and justice ; or were detrimental to the welfare 
of the Churchmen in the colony, then the royal veto was 
exercised to uphold imperial as well as special interests. 
Acts imposing a duty on the importation of convicts, 
negroes, European goods, or a tonnage duty on vessels 
trading to the colony, were vetoed as burdensome to the 
shipping and navigation of the kingdom.^^ Several laws 
of the earlier period regulating the rate of coin current 
in the province were disallowed as contrary to the rate 
fixed by royal proclamation or act of Parliament.^^ An 
act of 1700 to prevent the sale of ill-tanned leather and 
working it into foot-gear was disallowed '' for it cannot 
be expected that encouragement should be given to the 
making any manufactures in the plantations, it being 
against the advantage of England. ' ' ^^ The royal check 

83 Pa. Statutes at Large, II, 491. 

84 In 1709 Penn was informed that various acts had been dis- 
allowed because of objectionable clauses while the acts themselves 
were good and profitable. B. T. Paps., Props., IX, P 80. 

85 See page 142. 

86 Pa. Statutes at Large, II, 445-446, 525, 530, 548. 
BllUd., II, 481. 



THE ROYAL DISALLOWANCE 151 

was exercised to safe-^ard the interests of Englishmen 
at home. The attachment law which condemned the goods 
and lands only of non-residents was considered unjust to 
owners of land and traders living in England ; ^^ the law 
which gave preference to creditors of the colony before 
all others was unfair to English merchants ; ^^ the law 
which subjected a man to servitude for debt, where there 
was no visible estate, was likely to work hardship to mas- 
ters of vessels and others trading to the colony ; "^ the 
law which required masters of vessels to give bond not 
to carry out of the province any person without a pass- 
port was held to abridge the right of the people of England 
to trade to the colony freely.^^ The prerogatives of the 
crown were upheld by annulling several acts granting free- 
men the right of jury trial because the authority of the 
admiralty court was thereby infringed ; ^- a law making 
Newcastle a port of entry because it abridged the right of 
the Customs Board to establish all ports ; ^^ and a law 
giving executive powers to the council upon the death or 
resignation of the governor because it made possible an 
evasion of the crown's right to confirm the nomination 
of a governor.®^ During the French and Indian war two 
acts which hampered the military service v/ere vetoed; one 
which extended to the colony a statute of Parliament 
regulating the quartering of soldiers in time of peace and 
not of war, the other because it did not require compulsory 
enlistment and placed restrictions on the employment of 
the troops.^^ 

The proprietors also resorted to an appeal to the crown's 
power of final assent or dissent to uphold their rights as 

88 Pa. Statutes at Large, II, 492. 

89 Ibid., II, 494, 550. 

90 lUd., II, 496. 
9i/6td., II, 495. 

92 Ibid., II, 479, 550. 
9^ Ibid., II, 480-481. 
9^ Ibid., II, 529. 
95 Ibid., V, 532, 536, 537. 



152 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

lords of the soil and governors of the province bestowed 
upon them by royal charter. They enjoyed no actual veto 
on colonial legislation. Up to 1704 Penn reserved to him- 
self, according to his commissions to Governors Hamilton 
and Evans, " Our final Assent to all Such Bills as thou 
shalt pass into Law in the said Government. ' ' ^^ There 
was thus the possibility of a triple veto ; by governor, pro- 
prietor, and crown.^^ In this year the council and assem- 
bly protested against the proprietor's claim to a negative 
power. They came to the resolution that the above clause 
in the governor's commission was void and that all bills 
which the governor saw fit to pass into law under the 
great seal of the proprietor could not be annulled by the 
latter without the consent of the assembly.^^ In 1705 the 
Board of Trade sought from the attorney-general an opin- 
ion on the same point. He replied that all acts passed by 
the legislature and governor were absolute in law till 
vetoed by the crown and that the reservation of a veto 
power to the proprietor was contrary to the charter. It 
was held that under this instrument the power of law 
making must be exercised by the proprietor himself or 
by his deputy.^^ Although deprived of this essential 
power the same end was reached in an indirect way. The 
proprietors enjoyed what may be called an anticipatory 
veto. The governor was placed under a bond to obey all 
instructions from the proprietors.^"*^ By such means they 
were able to forbid the governor to assent to laws which 
in any way encroached upon their powers of government 
or prejudiced their landed interests. By force of instruc- 
tions and by appeal to the royal veto, the Penns were in 
possession of two methods of controlling legislation. They 
lacked a third effective check which the crown possessed 

9c B. T. Paps., Props., VIII, pt. 1, N 45. 
7 Pcnn-Logan Corres., I, 268. 
08 Pa. Col. Recs., II, 146 

99 Pa. Statutes at Large, II, 373-374. 

100 Shepherd, Proprietary Gov't- in Pa., 474-475, 



THE ROYAL DISALLOWANCE 153 

in the royal provinces. In Pennsylvania the provincial 
council, appointed by the proprietors, enjoyed no legisla- 
tive powers, as did the royal council in the crown colonies. 
The Charter of Privileges of 1701, granted by Penn as the 
fundamental law of the province, made no provision for 
a bicameral legislature. All law making powers were 
vested in the representative assembly and the governor.^^^ 
The only hold the council had on legislation was by way of 
influence on the governor and assembly. Then again, pro- 
prietary instructions did not afford an effective check for 
the simple reason that the assembly was in possession of 
the power over the purse. The charges of government and 
the support of the governor were thrown upon the people. 
The money power was an effective whip in the hands of the 
assembly and that body show^ed no hesitation in apply- 
ing it with severity in order to force the governor to 
acquiesce in the wishes of the peoples' representatives. 
Governor Thomas well stated the situation when he wrote 
'^ as the governor of this province is and always had been 
dependent upon the assembly for a support every six 
months, he is not at liberty to exercise his own judgment 
upon any bills the assembly shall think fit to present to 
him, or even to assert His Majesty's just prerogative in 
any case whatsoever. Starve him into compliance or into 
silence is the common language both of the assembly and 
the people here when the governor refuses his assent to 
a bill or presses what they dislike, let the honor of His 
Majesty or the security of his dominions be ever so much 
concerned. " ^^^ Thomas knew whereof he spoke for his 
salary was then badly in arrears because of a quarrel with 
the Quaker assembly over royal orders. Such was the 
means by which the governors were forced to acquiesce in 
laws contrary to royal or proprietary orders. Such was 

101 Shepherd, op. cit., 292-293; Osgood, Amer. Cols, in I7th. 
Cent., II, 275-276. 

102 Pa. Statutes at Large, IV, 475; Greene, Provincial Governor, 
ch. 9, especially p. 174. 



154 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

the means by which the assembly was able to make itself 
the dominant and controlling power in the provincial gov- 
ernment. This course of development was facilitated 
by a lack of interest in colonial administration both on the 
part of the sons of William Penn and the Board of Trade. 
Penn's incapacity from business from 1712 to his death 
in 1718 by reason of a serious illness, the minority of his 
heirs and their subsequent inattention to colonial affairs as 
long as their landed interests were not attacked, together 
with the inefficiency of the Board of Trade after 1714 were 
the factors which suffered the assembly to absorb most of 
the powers of government. To a less extent the same is true 
of the royal provinces. ^^^ Said the Board of Trade with 
regard to Massachusetts in 1757, " Almost every act of ex- 
ecutive and legislative power, whether it be political, judi- 
cial or military, is ordered and directed by Votes and Re- 
solves of the General Court, in most cases originating in 
the House of Representatives. ' ' ^^* This statement is ap- 
plicable to all the colonies. It is unmistakable evidence of 
the strong tendencies toward home rule and responsible 
government. 

Under such conditions royal and proprietary instructions 
availed little. The proprietors enjoyed but one check upon 
colonial legislation, an appeal to the crown's power of 
veto. During the French and Indian war the assembly 
took advantage of the demand for large supplies to carry 
on military operations to secure the assent of Governor 
Denny to a number of laws contrary to the instructions 
of the Penns. Even the proprietors' hold on the governor 
was rendered nugatory. When Denny informed the house 
of his bond to the proprietors, it resolved to indemnify 
him in case the proprietors brought suit to recover the se- 
curity. ^^^ The Penns were now thoroughly aroused to ac- 

103 Greene, op. cit., chs. 9, 10. 

104 /6«7., 187, 193-194. 

105 Pa. Votes of Assembly, V, 68. 



THE ROYAL DISALLOWANCE 155 

tion because their landed interests were endangered. In 
March, 1760, they laid before the king a memorial protest- 
ing against the confirmation of eleven laws which * ' greatly 
affect your Majesty's prerogative, the powers and privi- 
leges vested in your petitioners by virtue of the royal 
charter and the properties of your petitioners in the said 
province. ' ' ^^^ Five concerned their interests as land-lords 
and six were considered serious encroachments upon their 
governmental powers. Several which had to do with the 
taxation of the proprietary estates and one which concerned 
the tenure of office of the provincial judges will be treated 
subsequently. Against three laws the Penns offered no 
objections in point of utility and expediency but opposed 
them solely on the ground that the assembly by naming 
therein the officers to carry the acts into execution had en- 
croached upon the power of appointment vested in the pro- 
prietors by charter. Up to this time the proprietors had 
made no objection to this unwarranted assumption of 
power by the legislature, but it was thought " that now 
when the assembly are grasping at all power, it behooves 
the proprietors to be more watchful of every encroach- 
ment. ' ' ^^'' On June 24 the board sent its report on the 
laws to the Privy Council.^^^ It is a long and able docu- 
ment, probably the work of Halifax, the efficient president 
of the board. It is eminently favorable to the contentions 
of the proprietors. The objections to seven of the laws 
were sustained and they were reported for disallowance. 
The board said that not a single law had been offered to 
the crown for disapproval, nor even one for confirmation, 
which did not encroach in some way either on the terri- 
torial or governmental rights of the Penns. ^^^ The board 
lamented the fact that the proprietors ' ' instead of support- 
ing the constitution of the colony and their own dignity as 

106 Pa. Statutes at Large, V. 661-663. 

107 Ihid., 665, 729. 

■^08 lUd., V, 697-734; Pa. Col. Recs., VIII, 524-552. 

109 Pa. Statutes at Large, V, 731; Pa. Col. Recs., VIII, 549-550. 



156 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

a very material part of the legislature, they seem to have 
considered themselves only in the narrow and contracted 
view of landholders in the province and to have been re- 
gardless of their prerogatives as long as their property re- 
mained secure and never to have felt for their privileges 
as proprietaries till by a diminution of those privileges 
their interests were affected as individuals. " ^^^ There is 
little doubt as to the justice of this censure, but may it not 
be said that it is equally applicable to the English govern- 
ment itself. The repeated warnings of officials of the 
colonial tendencies toward political independence fell upon 
deaf ears at home. The repeated measures urged by the 
Board of Trade designed to check these tendencies and to 
strengthen royal authority in the colonies proved of no 
avail. In conclusion, the board reported that it was neces- 
sary for the crown to interpose to restrain the assembly 
'' from becoming exorbitant beyond measure by its en- 
croachments ' ' and to protect the royal prerogative ' ' which 
must always be invaded while the prerogatives of royalty 
are placed in the feeble hands of individuals. ' ' ^^^ But 
here again may it not be said that the assemblies of the 
royal provinces had absorbed the powers of the crown 
placed in the hands of the governors to almost the same 
extent as was true of Pennsylvania? As a result of this 
report six laws were disallowed by order in council of Sep- 
tember, 1760.^^2 On the seventh reported for disallowance, 
a compromise was reached between the agents of the as- 
sembly and the Privy Council. It is clear that the only 
check the proprietors possessed over legislation was by ap- 
peal to the crown. 

In conclusion of the whole matter of the veto, it may be 
asked how far this power in the hands of the crown was 
effective. In the long run the crown was able to accom- 

110 Pa. statutes at Large, V, 732; Pa. Col. Recs., VIII, 550. 

111 Pa. Statutes at Large, V, 734 ; Pa. Col. Recs., VIII, 552. 

112 Pa. Statutes at Large, V, 653-659; Pa. Col. Recs., VIII, 552- 
554. 



THE ROYAL DISALLOWANCE 157 

plish what it desired. The chief difficulty lay in the fact 
that it lacked immediate effectiveness. It was only after 
repeated applications of the veto that the assembly ac- 
quiesced. This was due in ^eat part to the incomplete 
provisions of the charter. The crown enjoyed no author- 
ity to instruct the governor with regard to legislation. 
Short-time laws and reenactments of laws once vetoed were 
made possible under the loose requirements of the charter. 
The inefficient administration of the Board of Trade after 
1714 was another factor favorable to the freedom of the as- 
sembly in legislation. The whole situation reveals the ex- 
tent to which the colonies disregarded the authority of the 
crown. Little respect was shown for the veto when the 
representative body was bent on carrying out its own pro- 
gramme. The jealousy of all outside interference led the 
assembly to judge of the propriety of all laws regardless 
of the interests of the proprietor or Empire and in spite of 
the royal veto. These facts stand out more clearly in the 
relations between the crown and assembly over questions of 
religion, finance, and the provincial judiciary. 



CHAPTER SIX 

THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND THE ROYAL DISALLOWANCE 

During the first century of colonization the settlers were 
to a large extent allowed to fashion their own institutions 
without pressure from the central government. The royal 
disallowance was not exercised and a system of appeals to 
the Privy Council was not definitely fixed till the latter 
part of the seventeenth century.^ But with the establish- 
ment of a more definite control over the colonies in the 
years following the Revolution of 1689, and the evincing 
of a greater interest in colonial administration at home, 
the legislative and judicial powers of the king and council 
came to be exercised. Through the operation of these 
powers and the instructions to the governors of the royal 
provinces, the central government was able to mould and 
develop colonial institutions. Pennsylvania was not a 
royal province, but the express reservation of the veto 
power and appellate jurisdiction by charter to the Privy 
Council afforded the home government a good opportunity 
to check any radical departures of the colonists from Eng- 
lish institutions. It was principally through the exercise 
of the crown's power of disallowance that it was able to 
control the judicial establishment of the province. 

The charter bestowed on the proprietor or his deputy 
full power and authority to appoint all judicial officers and 
*' to do all and everything and things, which unto the com- 
pleate establishment of Justice, unto Courts and Tribunalls, 
formes of Judicature, and manner of Proceedings doe be- 
long. " The power to create courts, define their jurisdic- 
tions, and to fix their forms and procedure was delegated 

1 Osgood, Ainer. Cols., II, 277-308. 

158 



JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND ROYAL DISALLOWANCE 159 

to the patentees without any limitations whatsoever.^ 
Whatever privileges, therefore, the assembly enjoyed with 
respect to the regulation of courts depended entirely upon 
the determination of the proprietor. But William Penn, 
in accordance with his liberal attitude toward popular lib- 
erties, early granted the freemen a large share in the regu- 
lation of the judiciary. Penn declared that one of the 
three fundamental rights of Englishmen was '' An influ- 
ence upon, and a real share in, the judicatory, in the exe- 
cution and application thereof. " ^ At an early date the 
assembly began to establish the courts by law, while the 
appointment of judicial officers, properly an executive 
function, was retained in the hands of the proprietor. For 
two decades after the founding of the colony the crown did 
not interfere in the regulation of the courts. But this de- 
sirable condition came to an end with the establishment of 
the Board of Trade in 1696, which insisted upon obedience 
to the requirements to send home the laws and for three dec- 
ades thereafter the colony knew no peace by reason of the 
constant exercise of the veto on their laws to establish and 
regulate their courts. 

It was not till the passage of the law of 1701 that the 
colonial judiciary received a definite form.^ By this law 
there was created for each county a court of quarter ses- 
sions with justices appointed and commissioned by the 
governor. These were the courts of all work for the colony 
by virtue of their wide jurisdiction. Within the com- 
petence of these courts was brought all criminal causes, 
except the graver crimes, all civil suits, equity proceedings, 
orphan's court business, and all suits between merchants 
and seamen which according to the laws and usages of 
England were not properly cognizable by the admiralty 
court. There was also established a central or supreme 

2 Poore, Charters and Consts., (2d ed.) II, 1511; Thorpe, Amer. 
Charters, Consts., etc., V, 3038. 

3 Penn, Works, III, 218. 

4 Pa. Statutes at Large, II, 148. 



160 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

court, composed of five judges commissioned by the gov- 
ernor, of which three were empowered to hold court twice 
a year at Philadelphia.. It was also required that twice a 
year two of the judges should go on circuit into each 
county, according to the well known practice in England. 
By such means the administration of justice was facili- 
tated and the complaints of the people of the expense, de- 
lay and inconvenience entailed by the journey up to the 
capital to transact judicial business were eliminated. It 
is interesting to note the position occupied by the provin- 
cial court. It enjoyed no original jurisdiction whatever, 
except the exclusive power over capital offenses; its chief 
function was to sit as a court to hear and determine causes 
brought before it from the county courts by appeal or writ 
of error. The governor and council were given no judicial j 
powers except the authority to issue writs of error and 
other remedial writs. Thus very early in this province 
judicial functions became differentiated from the executive 
and were placed in the keeping of a separate and distinct 
court. The people were little disposed to leave any judicial 
powers in the hands of the proprietary agents over whom 
they exercised slight control.^ In this respect Pennsjd- 
vania differs from the royal province where the governor 
and council enjoyed appellate jurisdiction in all civil suits 
involving more than a certain sum. The whole system was 
capped by the allowance of appeals to the Privy Council 
from the decisions of the supreme court as provided by 
charter. The law prescribed no limitation as to the amount 
involved to be appealed, but required that the appellant 
should give bond in double sum adjudged to be recovered 
against him to prosecute his cause with effect in England 
within twelve months. Such was the judicial system in- 
stituted by the colonists to meet their own ideas and the 
conditions of life in a newly settled community. Natur- 
ally they had recourse to the institutions under which 
B Pa. Col. Recs., II, 38. 



JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND ROYAL DISALLOWANCE 161 

they lived in England, they did not break entirely with 
the past, but in many essentials they did depart widely 
from the judicial system of the mother country and the 
royal provinces. In the latter it was usual to invest the 
supreme court with all the powers and jurisdiction of the 
courts of King's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer at 
Westminster, thereby giving them both original and appel- 
late jurisdiction. In Pennsylvania the county courts and 
not the provincial court had the powers of the central tri- 
bunal in other colonies. The supreme court was simply 
empowered to rectify proceedings of the lower courts by 
appeal or writ of error. This fact is undoubtedly due to 
the desires of the people of the colony to have justice ad- 
ministered in the first instance by the county courts and 
under local justices who were thought to be best fitted to 
judge of the actions. Moreover, competent county courts 
of first instance would obviate the expense and delay cre- 
ated in carrying judicial business to a central court sitting 
so far away. Then again, since the assembly was averse 
to investing the governor and council with appellate juris- 
diction, a litigant had no recourse for redress except to 
the Privy Council if the supreme court was given original 
jurisdiction. It was considered a hardship to force an ag- 
grieved person to incur the heavy expense of an appeal to 
England because he could not appeal to a higher court in 
the province. These attempts to modify the English sys- 
tem in order to meet their own conditions received a de- 
cided check by the controlling power of the veto. 

In his report of 1705 on a collection of provincial laws, 
the attorney-general made no observations on the judiciary 
act. Not so the Board of Trade. In its report to the 
Privy Council the opinion was offered that '* This act [is] 
so far from expediting the determination of laws suits that 
we conceive it will impede the same. "^ It was no doubt 
felt that the supreme court was not of sufficient utility. 

Q Statutes at Large, II, 482-483. 



162 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

To give it only jurisdiction in error and appeal without 
any limitation as to the amount involved simply paved the 
way for the multiplication of law suits and the creation of 
delay and expense in judicial business. Had the county 
courts been granted authority to hear and end all ordinary 
suits without appeal, the objection of the board would 
probably have been met. Thus for the first time the crown 
interfered in the regulation of the judicial institutions and 
inaugurated thereby a period of bitter dispute and great 
annoyance.^ 

The problem of establishing courts which now confronted 
the governor and assembly led to a violent controversy. 
The dispute engendered a bitter factional strife between 
the proprietary and anti-proprietary parties and occasioned 
a deadlock for six months to the detriment of a proper ad- 
ministration of justice. It was the desire of the governor 
and council to make the supreme court more useful by 
widening its jurisdiction and giving it greater power. 
With this purpose in view several bills were presented to 
the assembly.^ In general the system devised was as fol- 
lows: a system of county courts in which all causes, civil 
and criminal, should be tried, except graver crimes which 
should be heard and determined by special courts of oyer 
and terminer; a provincial court, which should go on cir- 
cuit twice a year into the several counties and exercise a 
concurrent jurisdiction with the county courts in all civil 
suits involving over ten pounds ; the removal of civil causes 
involving over this amount to the supreme court by writ 
of habeas corpus or certiorari before trial and by writ of 
error after trial in the lower courts; and conferring upon 
the governor and council a complete equity jurisdiction. 
This scheme in no ways conformed to the ideals of the 
assembly. Their standard was the system devised by the 
law which the crown had vetoed making the county courts 

7 Pa. Statutes at Large, II, 452. 

8 Pa. Col. Recs., II, 254-255, 259, 262-266. 



JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND ROYAL DISALLOWANCE 163 

the chief tribunals.^ The representatives were not in- 
clined to give the supreme court any power further than 
to sit on causes which had first been heard in the county 
courts. The people wished justice administered in the 
first instance by local courts and judges.^^ Should the 
provincial court be invested with original jurisdiction 
it would necessitate the transaction of some judicial busi- 
ness in Philadelphia, would involve expense, delays and 
annoyance, and would deny redress on appeal except to the 
Privy Council. The assembly would not listen to any plan 
whereby the supreme court should be empowered to hear 
a cause before trial in the lower courts or to remove a cause 
to any other jurisdiction. Neither would it hearken to any 
scheme to vest complete equity jurisdiction in the governor 
and council, because it feared that this would afford that 
body an opportunity to " Intermeddle in Civil Causes." 
The governor thought it unreasonable and inconsistent that 
the same judges should sit in law and in equity on the same 
case." After much bitter debate these differences in point 
of jurisdiction were in a fair way to be compromised, but 
on several other points the two sides remained obdurate. 
The assembly sought to give the judges the power to grant 
tavern licenses, to appropriate to the justices fines and 
forfeitures, and to make the tenure of office of judges de- 
pend upon good behavior. To these proposals the gov- 
ernor turned a deaf ear, holding that assent to them would 
be a serious infringement of the proprietary powers.^- 
For six months the two branches of government wrangled 
on, often indulging in bitter recrimination and exhibiting 

9 Pa. Col. Recs., II, 253-254. 

10 A member of the assembly from Phila. informed the j^overnor 
that " the chief difficulty among them was, that the members of the 
other Counties could not be induced to agree that business should 
be brought from these Counties and generally fixt in Philadelphia." 
Ihid., II, 257. 

11 Hid., II, 266-276. 

i2 Ihid., 277-279, 282-283, 302-314, 328-335; Penn-Logan Corres., 
II, 180. 



164 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

a spirit of malice. Robert Quary wrote to the Board of 
Trade that ^' the war is hot . . . for here is the As- 
sembly against Mr. Penn and his deputy, and they them, 
the Deputy Governor has strangely incensed and disobliged 
all sorts of people, on the other hand the assembly do carry 
their resentment against him and the Proprietor to that 
height, that they are resolved to have all the Government 
into their own hands, they insist to have the sole regula- 
tion of all Courts, and the nomination of all officers, 
. . . So that they have banished all Prerogative & Gov- 
ernment but what is lodged in the Assembly. ' ' ^^ Gov- 
ernor Evans accused the house of a project to '' take very 
near the whole power, both in property and Govmt. out of 
the hands of the Proprietr. and Govr. and lodge it in the 
People. '^^* The ideal of the assembly in this as in many 
other matters was the complete independence of the peo- 
ple's representatives at the expense of the powers of both 
proprietors and crown. 

The whole dispute was set at rest for a while by the 
ordinance of February, 1707, issued by the governor, set- 
tling the judicial system.^^ The assembly strongly pro- 
tested against the exercise of this power, declaring that 
under the charter the proprietor had power merely to ap- 
point judges and outline the forms of the courts and left 
the " jurisdictions and proceedings to be supported and 
directed by law. ' ' ^® But according to the charter, Gov- 
ernor Evans was clearly within his legal powers for the 
proprietors were granted plenary powers in all matters 
with respect to the constitution of courts. No compromise 
seemed possible, though order demanded that the channels 
of justice should be kept open and the governor under the 
circumstances had acted with propriety. By this ordi- 
nance there was established a supreme court to be held in 

13 N. Y. Col. Docs., V. 17-18, 19-20. 

14 Pa. Col. Recs., II, 325. 

15 Pa. Statutes at Large, II, 500-506. 

16 Pa. Col. Recs., II, 272, 291, 296, 327, 336, 351. 



JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND ROYAL DISALLOWANCE 165 

each county twice a year having not only a jurisdiction 
in error and appeal but in general authorized to admin- 
ister justice in all cases as fully as the " justices of the 
Court of Queen's Bench, common pleas and Exchequer, at 
Westminster, may or can do." In each county there was 
established a court of quarter sessions and common pleas 
to adminster justice according to the course and procedure 
of similiar courts in England. The same county justices 
were to exercise an equity jurisdiction as near as possible 
to the " practice and proceedings of the high court of 
Chancery in England." For the trial of capital offenses 
special courts of oyer and terminer and jail delivery were 
to be commissioned. Thus it is clear that through the 
exercise of the veto and ordinance power the tendencies 
of the assembly to follow its own bent were given a decided 
check. By this action the judiciary w^as made to conform 
more closely to English forms of jurisdiction and pro- 
cedure. The supreme court was made more useful by giv- 
ing it an original as well as an appellate jurisdiction. 

Governor Gookin proved a more pliable tool in the hands 
of the assembly and the law of 1711, which again placed the 
judiciary on a basis of law, was a decided victory for the 
representatives.^' In general the courts were organized 
along much the same lines as had been laid down by the 
law of 1701. The supreme court was authorized to issue 
writs of error and all remedial writs, but was restrained 
from issuing original writs or processes and from remov- 
ing any indictment or presentment from the county courts 
before trial there except under serious limitations. The 
county courts of quarter sessions and common pleas were 
given the same powers as these same courts enjoyed in 
England but ^ith due regard to the laws and constitution 
of the province. The common pleas courts were also given 
equity jurisdiction, '' observing, as near as may be, the 
rules and practice of the high court of chancery in Great 

17 Pa. Statutes at Large, II, 301 



166 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

Britain. '^ Appeals in equity cases involving over ten 
pounds lay to the supreme court, but it was not allowed 
to deal in equity business whenever remedy was possible 
in any other court. Moreover, if any cause in equity 
should come before the supreme court which was determin- 
able at common law, the parties were to be referred to that 
law, or if matters of fact should arise the court was to 
send the case to trial in the county court where the facts 
occurred before proceeding to decree in equity. It is very 
evident that the assembly was able to carry out its pro- 
gramme in spite of the royal disallowance or the governor's 
ordinance power. This law was also vetoed by the crown. 
In 1713 Solicitor-General Raymond reported that he 
thought there were '' several things not proper to be es- 
tablished as law. "^^ In the first place he objected to the 
law on the same ground the Board of Trade took in 1705, 
namely, that the supreme court's only business seemed to 
be to draw from the inferior courts by various writs what 
causes it thought proper. Raymond declared that since 
justice could be obtained in all particulars mentioned in 
the law in the county courts, the central court was de- 
signed only '^ to multiply suits or make proceedings at 
law more dilatory and expensive." He also reported that 
the law was objectionable because it forbade the supreme 
court to decree anything in equity which could be deter- 
mined at common law, and he further declared that the 
inability of the court to try any fact arising on hearing 
the case but to send it to an issue at law, would make ' ' pro- 
ceedings in equity insufferably dilatory and multiply trials 
at law in the plain cases to no manner of purpose." Fi- 
nally, he reported that the loose wording of certain clauses 
had a tendency to leave too much to the discretion of the 
judges, as for example, the extension to the colony of an 
English statute '^ as far as circumstances will admit." 
The home government seemed unable to realize that what 

18 Pa. Statutes at Large, II, 548-549. 



JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND ROYAL DISALLOWANCE 167 

the colonists wished was a supreme court with power simply 
to act in an appellate capacity, and to leave to the county 
courts original jurisdiction in all cases, except the graver 
crimes. By such an establishment the people would have 
the benefit of trial by local judges, obviate the expense and 
delay in carrying their business to Philadelphia, and se- 
cure a hearing on appeal in the colony before carrying a 
case to the Privy Council. The ignorance of colonial con- 
ditions at home made the people unwilling to submit their 
laws to the crown for review. On the basis of Eaymond's 
report the law was vetoed by order in council of February, 
1714.19 

For the second time the course of justice was stopped 
by the exertion of the royal check. Again the governor 
resorted to the ordinance power to reestablish the judicial 
system along the same lines as organized by the earlier ordi- 
nance.-^ But in 1715 the courts were again placed upon 
a statutory footing.-^ The various courts, their practice 
and proceedings, were now embodied in separate laws. 
The advantage of this method over the former plan of 
grouping all in one law, lay in the hope that if one or an- 
other escaped the royal disallowance, the others would re- 
main in force and an entire cessation of justice would not 
ensue. But this hope was not realized. By the laws of 
1715 the objection as to equity cases was now obviated. 
Equity jurisdiction was withdrawn from the county courts 
and vested in the supreme court. Furthermore, the veto 
and ordinance powers had further effect, for the supreme 
court was now given an original jurisdiction. In general, 
it was authorized to administer justice as fully as the com- 
mon law courts at Westminster. Richard West, the 
board's counsel, offered no objection to the laws. But the 
board itself, after sitting four days in consideration of the 

19 Pa. statutes at Large, II, 543. 

20lhid., 556-561. 

21 Ibid., Ill, 32, 33, 65, 69, 73. 



168 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

laws, came to a different conclusion. In its report of July, 
1719, to the Privy Council, it made the same objections as 
offered by Raymond against the former law.-^ The law 
to establish the supreme court was considered liable to the 
same defects. The same objection was made to the phrase 
'' as far as circumstances admit," because such wording 
' ' may upon some occasions be made use of to serve an ill 
purpose." Six laws to regulate the judicial system were 
vetoed in July and August, 1719.-^ For the third time a 
cessation of justice resulted and again the executive power 
was used to keep the channels of justice open. Governor 
Keith had regard for the wishes of the assembly in not 
resorting to the ordinance power, but simply continued 
the work of the courts by issuing new commissions em- 
powering the justices to hold court and determine pending 
actions on the days specified by the late laws.^* 

The act of May, 1722, revived the judicial system.-^"^ All 
loose wording such as the board objected to was now elimi- 
nated. In spite of the veto the jurisdiction of the supreme 
court was made the same as prescribed by the former act. 
The assembly was able to consummate its wishes despite 
the power of the crown. This law, liable to the same ob- 
jections as the previous law in this respect, by good fortune 
escaped the veto, probably because it was one of the large 
body of laws which was not delivered to the board in its 
days of decadence and languor. But the worry and per- 
plexity over the judiciary question was not yet ended. In 
the latter part of 1724 Governor Keith and John ]\Ioore, 
royal customs collector at Philadelphia, came to a dispute 
over the seizure and trial of the ship Fame. This vessel 
was seized by Moore for the illegal importation of Euro- 
pean goods.^*' Under cover of night a band of armed men 

22 Pa. statutes at Large, III, 459, 461, 462, 463-468. 

23 lUd., Ill, 439-440. 

24 Pa. Col. Recs., Ill, 90. 

25 Pa. Statutes at Large, III, 298. 

26 B. T. Paps., Props., XI, R 53. 



JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND ROYAL DISALLOWANCE 169 

seized the ship out of the hands of the customs officers and 
anchored her down the river where the goods were secretly 
landed. The collector did not think it safe with the aid 
at hand to effect a reseizure but sent to New York for the 
help of an armed vessel. Keith took matters into his own 
hands, seized the ship and brought her back to port. Af- 
ter censuring Moore for a lack of courage, Keith ordered 
him to prosecute the ship before the court of common pleas 
in the absence of an admiralty court. Moore refused to 
do so on the ground that an inferior court was not a proper 
tribunal to hold pleas of the crown. -^ Keith thought dif- 
ferently and the ship was tried and condemned by special 
court of common pleas in November, 1724.^^ Moore car- 
ried the matter to the Privy Council which issued an order 
that he should be allowed to prosecute the seizure in the 
proper court. The collector consulted the crown lawyers 
who advised him that the supreme court of the province 
Was the proper court for an action against both the ship 
and the offenders. Armed with this order and advice 
Moore proceeded against the vessel in the supreme court and 
condemnation was decreed in September, 1726.-^ Moore 
then instituted suit in the same court against Lawrence and 
others charged with running and concealing the goods. 
Thereupon the defendants petitioned the assembly assert- 
ing that the supreme court by law had no power to issue 
original processes. Moore presented a counter-petition 
justifying his proceedings in that court. After a careful 
consideration of the matter the house came to a unanimous 
resolution that the law of 1722 should be amended to de- 
prive the supreme court of the power to issue original proc- 
esses in civil causes.^*^ Moore requested of the assembly 
that this court be given original jurisdiction in all pleas 

27 B. T. Paps., Props., XI, R 53. 
28lhid., XI, R 52. 

29 Pa. Statutes at Large, IV, 429-431; Acts of Privy Council, Col., 
Ill, 120-121. 

30 Pa. Votes of Assembly, III, 8, 11. 



170 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

of the crown. To this proposal the house would not listen. 
He then besought the governor not to assent to the act 
without the insertion of a suspending clause in order to 
allow the crown a chance to be heard before the law went 
into operation. Again the house refused to acquiesce. ^^ 
In 1727 the law of 1722 was amended according to the reso- 
lution, but in order not to prejudice suits then pending in 
the supreme court the law was not made retroactive.^- It 
is clear that the assembly had no mind to give the supreme 
court any original jurisdiction but was driven to it only 
by the constant application of the veto and ordinance 
power. Moreover, the amended law took from the supreme 
court all exchequer jurisdiction and vested it in the county 
courts so that all revenue cases were required to be brought 
in the inferior courts in the first instance. At once Rich- 
ard Fitzwilliam, surveyor-general of the customs, wrote to 
the Board of Trade in strong protestation against the con- 
firmation of the law.^'^ He held that it was unreasonable 
to limit the customs officials to the inferior courts in cases 
which concerned the crown. These courts were not con- 
sidered fit to hold pleas of the crown for the reason that 
the judges were men of inferior ability and small means 
and the jurors were inclined to favor transgressors of the 
acts of trade. On the other hand the supreme court jus- 
tices were held to be men of ability and fortune and able 
to influence the juries against prejudiced verdicts. Fitz- 
william also asserted that the law was contrary to the act 
of 1696 which gave the informer the privilege of choosing 
the court of the colony in which to lay his action. Hence, 
if the assembly was allowed to legislate one court out of 
competence over the acts of trade the same means might 
be used to check all prosecutions of the crown and thereby 
render ineffectual English law. No action was taken at 

31 B. T. Paps., Props., XII, R 84, 87. 

32 Pa. Statutes at Large, IV, 84. 

33 5. T. Paps., Props., XII, R 84; Jour., XXXVIII, 135, 145; Pa. 
Statutes at Large, IV, 422-427, 428. 



JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND ROYAL DISALLOWANCE 171 

home till the law was presented to the board in the regular 
way in 1730. At once Moore laid before the Privy Coun- 
cil a petition reciting the history of the case and praying 
for the disapproval of the law.^"^ The petition was referred 
to the Council Committee on Appeals before which the pro- 
prietors, in response to an order of that body, presented 
a counter-petition.^'^ The respondents denied the charge 
that the law was passed by undue influence upon the gov- 
ernor and assembly in order to prejudice the action of 
Moore and pointed out that provision was made for pend- 
ing cases. It was declared that the law was passed simply 
as a necessary and reasonable settlement of the several 
judicial jurisdictions in the province. The chief design 
was to divest the supreme court of an original jurisdiction 
since it was the intention that that court should sit simply 
to rectify the proceedings of inferior courts. The reasons 
given in support of this plan were the same as already al- 
luded to. If an original jurisdiction was vested in the 
supreme court it would work to the prejudice of the people 
by forcing them to come a great distance to Philadelphia 
upon every action no matter how small. Then again, if a 
case was tried in the supreme court in the first instance, 
there was no appeal except to the Privy Council. This 
would not only cause great annoyance to the council since 
the law allowed an appeal in all cases, but would also work 
great injustice to a poor litigant since it would be in the 
power only of the wealthy to bear the expense of an appeal 
to England. 

In May, 1730, the council committee considered both peti- 
tions but resolved not to make a final report until the Board 
of Trade had examined the matter.^*' The board sent the 
law to its counsel, Francis Pane, for examination.^^ Be- 

^i Statutes at Large, IV, 429-431; B. T. Paps., Props., XII, R 110. 

35 Pa.. Statutes at Large, IV, 431-440; B. T. Paps., Props,, XII, R 
110; Acts of Privy Council, Col., Ill, 257-258. 

36 Pa. Statutes at Large, IV, 441; B. T. Paps., Props., XII, R 110. 

37 5. T. Paps., Props., Entry Bk. H, ff. 8, 11; Jour., XL, 89, 159. 



172 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

fore him appeared Sharpe, solicitor for Moore, and Paris, 
the colonial agent.^^ At this hearing practically the same 
points were argued pro and con as already set forth in the 
petitions. Fane censured the assembly for rejecting the 
clause offered by Moore designed to give the supreme court 
an original jurisdiction in all pleas of the crown. He de- 
clared that this was a reasonable request because the judges 
of this court were men usually bred to the law and likely 
to be above the temptations that beset the judges of the 
lower courts, who were generally interested in mercantile 
pursuits and thus liable to be partial to the illegal trader. 
Moreover, he held it to be unreasonable to require an officer 
to lay his action in the county where the seizure was made 
and before a court whose jurisdiction was limited by the 
bounds of the county. In England an officer was at lib- 
erty to bring his action to Middlesex, though the seizure 
was made in another county. This liberty was found to be 
beneficial because of the partiality too often shown to 
transgressors in their own localities. This same incon- 
venience, declared Fane, was apt to arise in the colonies 
and it would have been prudent for the assembly to follow 
the English practice. To the argument that it was inconsis- 
tent to have the same judges sit as a court of first instance 
and a court of error, Fane replied that the law before them 
was open to that very objection and that it was an incon- 
sistency never complained of in the court of King's Bench. 
Finally, Fane said that if the clause offered by Moore had 
been accepted he would have made no objections to the law, 
but under the conditions he reported it for disapproval. 
The matter was then argued before the Board of Trade but 
to no avail.^^ The board reported it for the veto as prej- 
udicial to the customs service and as contrary to the act 

38 j?. T. Paps., Props., XIII, S 3; Pa. Statutes at Large, IV, 442- 
447. 

39 B. T. Jour., XLI, 159, 164-165; Pa. Statutes at Large, IV, 
448-449. 



JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND ROYAL DISALLOWANCE 173 

of 1696 which allowed the informer a choice of courts.**^ 
The Penns then appealed the case to the Privy Council and 
in spite of all the arguments made by Paris and two law- 
yers, the law was vetoed in August, 1731.*^ For the fourth 
time the veto checked the smooth course of justice in the 
province. When the governor notified the assembly of the 
veto, it drew up resolutions expressing regret that the 
Board of Trade had been so ill-informed as to the purpose 
of the act. It was resolved that the sole purpose was to 
give the supreme court only an appellate jurisdiction, for 
otherwise there would be no appeal possible except to Eng- 
land. It characterized the insinuation that the county 
courts were partial and that the law was passed by undue 
influence on the governor and assembly as '' false and 
scandalous. " ^- A law was passed to revive the law of 
1722 which vested exchequer jurisdiction in the supreme 
court and the course of justice suffered no harm. This 
law was confirmed and at last the troubles over the judi- 
ciary question were at an end.*^ In several respects the 
disallowing power was effective. Under the repeated ap- 
plication of this power the supreme court was given a 
wider field of usefulness by investing it with original as 
well as appellate jurisdiction, but the chief contention of 
the Board of Trade and crown lawyers was not realized. 
Thrice the veto had been exercised because it was con- 
sidered that the only business of the supreme court was 
to draw unto itself cases which could be finally decided 
in the county courts. But in spite of the veto the assem- 
bly succeeded in passing a law which allowed an appeal to 

40 Pa. Statutes at Large, IV, 449-450; B. T. Paps., Props., Entry 
Bk. H. ff. 31, 32. 

415. T. Paps., Props., XIII, S 7; Pa. Statutes at Large, IV, 421; 
Penn Mss., Letter Book, I, 32, Thos. Penn to Gov. Gordon, July 23, 
1731. 

42 Pa. Votes of Assembly, III, 168. 

43 Pa. Statutes at Large, IV, 229. 



174 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

the supreme court in all eases whatever no matter how 
small a sum was involved. 

One other aspect of the judicial question deserves our 
attention. One of the most important changes which 
flowed from the constitutional struggle in England in the 
seventeenth century was the raising of the judiciary to a 
position of independence. The Act of Settlement made 
the tenure of office of the judges quam diu se bene gesserint 
and provided fixed and certain salaries. Such a change 
made for the purity of the bench, free from undue in- 
fluence either on the part of the crown or Parliament. 
This was a course highly desirable in view of the arbitrary 
and corrupt means used by the Stuarts, especially James 
II, to make the judiciary entirely subservient to their 
wishes. The colonists reaped no benefit from the salutary 
operation of this act since it made no mention of the do- 
minions. In the provinces the judges were usually com- 
missioned by the governors to hold at the pleasure of the 
crown or proprietor while their salaries were granted for 
a short period by the assemblies. Such a course rendered 
the bench subject to the influence of both the governor and 
the assembly. Very early the colonists sought to give the 
courts the position of independence held by the English 
courts. Englishmen in America claimed the same rights 
and privileges as enjoyed by their brethren in England. 
In no province was this movement more strongly urged 
than in Pennsylvania. We have already stated that in 
1706-1707 the tenure of the judges' office was one of the 
points involved in the conflict between Governor Evans 
and the assembly. The latter desired that judges should 
hold during good behavior and should be removed by the 
governor only on an address from the house. The assem- 
bly declared that such was the practice in England, and 
although the statute did not extend to the colonies, yet 
'' the People of this Province had a right to claim if 
The assembly pointed to the arbitrary conduct of James II 



JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND ROYAL DISALLOWANCE 175 

with regard to the courts which forced Parliament to put 
it out of the power of the crown to displace any judge 
except for official misbehavior. Such circumstances, 
argued the house, were likely to occur in this province, 
as for example in a dispute which involved the proprietor 
or governor, therefore, ^' it was fitt that Judges of the 
Difference should be under no awe or fear of loosing their 
places. ' ' ** The governor firmly refused to yield to the 
wishes of the house, insisting that the conditions which 
gave rise to the practice at home did not hold in the col- 
onies. He contended that since the assembly made no 
provisions for fixed and permanent salaries for the judges 
and vested in itself the power to remove them at pleasure, 
the judiciary was thereby rendered subservient to the 
legislature. Such a course, declared the governor, would 
allow a judge to proceed to the '^ greatest insolencys and 
plead Privileges or Law for it, and perhaps make a suffi- 
cient number of Representatives who may be acquainted 
with both, believe that he is really in the right, and then 
he stands secure." For two other reasons Evans refused 
his assent. In England there was a sufficient number of 
persons bred to the law from which to make a choice, but 
in the colony the lack of trained lawyers made it necessary 
that the removal of a judge should be as easy as possible 
in order to allow for the substitution of one better quali- 
fied when found. Then again, provincial judges by reason 
of the small salaries attached to the office, were dependent 
upon other pursuits for a livelihood, and an occasion might 
arise when a judge, because of outside business, w^ould be 
unable to serve on a case, a full bench could not be se- 
cured, and a failure or delay of justice would follow. If, 
argued Evans, the judges could be removed only by judi- 
cial process it would be impossible for the governor to ap- 
point others. For these reasons he refused his assent to 

44 Pa. Col. Recs., II, 267, 277, 294, 310, 313. 



176 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

any bill which provided a tenure of office other than at 
the pleasure of the governor or proprietor.*^ 

But the movement did not abate with the failure of the 
assembly in this instance. In 1743 Thomas Penn wrote 
to the governor that it would be unwise " to make any 
statement in council concerning judges holding during 
good behaviour."**^ In 1751 the proprietors expressed a 
willingness to commission judges for good behavior pro- 
vided the assembly granted them permanent salaries.*^ 
In this year the assembly of Jamaica enacted a law which 
provided a permanent tenure for judges. This law was 
disallowed by the crown on the opinion of the attorney- 
general that the change '^ effects the royal prerogative in 
point of great moment," and that the circumstances in 
the colony were not such as to make a permanent tenure 
for judges advisable either for the crown or colony.*^ In- 
structions were then issued to the royal governors direct- 
ing that judges should be commissioned only to hold at 
the royal will and pleasure.*^ But the desire for an in- 
dependent judiciary was wide-spread and the order was 
frequently violated. In New York an act to provide a 
permanent tenure was defeated only by the opposition of 
the governor. North Carolina succeeded in passing a simi- 
lar law but it was disallowed by the crown.^° In Penn- 
sylvania through a judicious bribe, the assembly was able 
to secure the assent of Governor Denny to the law of 1759 
making the tenure of office of the judges of the supreme 
and common pleas for good behavior and providing fixed 
salaries.^^ The proprietors at once petitioned the crown 

45 Po. Col. Recs., II, 264, 273, 288, 311, 313. 

*Q Penn Mss., Letter Bk. II, Thos. Penn to Gov. Thomas, Aug. 21, 
1743. 

^1 lUd., Ill, Thos. Penn to Richard Peters, Feb. 24, 1751. 

48 Chalmers, Opinions, (ed. 1858), 433. 

4sBeer, British Col Pol., 1754-1765, 189; Greene, Prov. Gov., 135. 

50 Beer, 188-192; Greene, 134-136. 

51 Pa. Statutes at Large, V, 462. 



JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND ROYAL DISALLOWANCE 177 

against the confirmation of this law as a serious encroach- 
ment on their powers of government granted by the char- 
ter.^2 In its report the Board of Trade said that this sub- 
ject was agitated " not only in the province of Pennsyl- 
vania but in every other colony of North America and the 
West Indies " and reminded the council of the decision 
taken on the Jamaica law.^^ On the supposition that the 
same opinion held good this law was offered for royal dis- 
allowance. In addition, this law was held to be an in- 
fringement of the proprietary powers, and it was not con- 
sidered just to permit a law to be passed by the exercise 
of undue influence upon the governor and against the 
consent of the proprietors. In answer to the argument 
that the law was in conformity with English practice, the 
board replied that the cases of the colonies and England 
were not analogous. The board in support of this con- 
tention reverted to the same arguments as used by Gov- 
ernor Evans in 1707. In England the tenure of the judges 
was made permanent because of the arbitrary conduct of 
the crown toward the courts, but this condition was not 
likely to arise in the colonies. Upon what ground such 
an argument was based it is hard to see. The contention 
of the colonists that the " judges being subject to the in- 
fluence and direction of the proprietaries and their gov- 
ernors, their favorites and creatures, the laws may not be 
duely administered and executed, but often wrested from 
their true sense, to serve particular purposes " was of the 
same validity in America as it was in England in the 
time of James 11.^* The board also employed the argu- 
ment that the removal of a judge should be made as easy 
as possible in order to make way for the appointment of 
a man of greater ability when found. This principle held 

52 Pa. Statutes at Large, Y, 661-663; B. T. Paps., Props., XX, W 
40. 

53^. Y. Col. Docs., IV, 474; Pa. Statutes at Large, V, 722-724; 
Pa. Col. Recs., VIII, 543. 

54 Franklin, Works, (Smyth ed.) Ill, 374-375. 



178 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 169G-1765 

good in the early days of the colonies when there was a 
dearth of men trained to the profession of the law but 
it was no longer true at a time when the colonies could 
boast of skilled lawyers, many of whom had been trained 
in the Inns of Court in England. The real purpose of 
the crown appears in the statement made by the Board of 
Trade in 1761 that the appointing of judges for good be- 
havior was " subversive of the Interest of the Crown and 
People, and tending to lessen that just Dependance which 
the Colonies ought to have upon the Government of the 
Mother Country. ' ' ^^ This is perhaps the view taken by 
the proprietors with regard to their powers. Finally, the 
board held that if the practice was allowed in Pennsyl- 
vania it would create jealousy in the other provinces 
where the principle was denied. The law was vetoed in 
September, 1760.5« 

After the passage of the law Governor Denny issued 
new patents, under the great seal of the province and in 
the name of the king, to five persons constituting them 
justices of the court of common pleas of the county of 
Philadelphia during good behavior.^'^ "When the governor 
was notified of the veto he held that it worked an annul- 
ment of the patents. He thereupon issued writs of super- 
sedeas to vacate the patents issued under the law and 
granted commissions to five others to hold at the will and 
pleasure of the proprietors. The patent judges refused 
to recognize the writs on the ground that their patents 
were not based on the law just vetoed, but were good at 
common law and hence could not be vacated except for 
misbehavior in office. The governor held that they were 
based on the law of 1759 and its disallowance invalidated 
the patents. Furthermore, he was of the opinion that 
even though they were good at common law, all judicial 

55 B. T. Jour., LXIX, Nov. 5, 1761. 

56 Pa. Statutes at Large, V, 655. 

57 Ibid., VI, 566-570. 



JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND ROYAL DISALLOWANCE 179 

offices terminated on the demise of the king. George 
II died in 1760 and since the patents were issued in his 
name, his death terminated the patents. Unable to carry 
his point in the colony, he laid the case before Attorney- 
General Pratt. The latter 's opinion was asked on these 
points; were not the patents, issued after the passage of 
the law of 1759, vacated by its disallowance? was not the 
governor restrained from commissioning judges for good 
behavior as contrary to proprietary instructions? and were 
not the patents rendered void by the death of the king? 
In June, 1761, Pratt replied that the patents became void 
ipso facto on the veto of the act, but if granted before 
the law was passed they were good although passed con- 
trary to the governor's instructions, and lastly he could 
not comprehend how these judges could be commissioned 
in the king's name since they were not king's judges and 
did not depend upon the king's life.^^ Through the ex- 
ercise of the royal veto and the opinion of the crown law- 
yer the rights of the proprietor were upheld and the 
schemes of the assembly were checked. It was undoubt- 
edly one of the factors which created great discontent, not 
only with the proprietary government, but also with the 
royal governments.^^ The same problem confronted the 
home government in the royal provinces, but there the col- 
onists were forced to yield owing to the determined stand 
taken by the crown.^*' The ideal of the provincial assem- 
blies was complete political independence. 

58 Pa. Statutes at Large, VI, 570-57L 

59 One clause of the Declaration of Independence runs : " He has 
made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their 
offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries." 

60 Greene, Prov. Gov., 134-136; Beer, British Col. Policy, 1754- 
1165, 188-192. 



CHAPTER SEVEN 

FINANCE AND POLITICS 

Few questions stood out more conspicuously in the eco- 
nomic and political history of the Empire or have been more 
prolific of vexation and trouble than the financial relations 
between the colonies and the mother country. With the 
economic aspect of the monetary problem we are not pri- 
marily interested except as it throws light on the political 
relations. The two aspects of the situation are so closely 
interwoven that one cannot be properly understood with- 
out the other. 

The lack of a sufficient supply of specie as a medium of 
exchange is a prominent characteristic of all newly set- 
tled areas. The abundance of land, the lack of capital, 
and the scarcity and scattered condition of labor renders 
manufacturing in such a community simply a make-shift. 
It is evident that under such conditions the settlers are 
forced to turn to the development of their natural re- 
sources and to the production of staple commodities in order 
to achieve wealth and prosperity. This in turn requires 
foreign markets where colonial products may be exchanged 
either for manufactured articles or for bullion with 
which to secure the needed finished products in other mar- 
kets.^ Not blessed with mines of precious metals, specie 
can only be secured by this round of exchange. But it 
must be borne in mind that the economic development of 
the colonies was not allowed to pursue its natural course; 
it was controlled by the principles of the English com- 
mercial laws in the interest of a self-sufficing commercial 
empire. England required that all commodities of the 

1 Callender, Economic History of the United States, 6-9. 

180 



FINANCE AND POLITICS 181 

production or growth of the colonies which supplemented 
the needs of the metropolis should be first brought to Eng- 
lish ports. These became known as the *' enumerated 
commodities." The colonies were obliged to laden and 
ship all European commodities in England. Thus Eng- 
land became the staple for colonial exports and imports. 
To safeguard the colonies as a market for home manufac- 
tures restrictions were placed on such industries in the col- 
onies as in any way competed with those of England.^ 
With this resume of the mercantile system in mind one is 
able to understand its relation to the monetary problem. 
Pennsylvania and the northern colonies had few of the 
enumerated articles to carry to England in exchange for 
manufactured products. Because of the similarity of cli- 
mate and soil between England and the northern colonies 
the two sections produced like commodities. The result 
was that the northern colonies did not supplement the 
needs of the metropolis and were therefore forced by a 
tedious roundabout course of commerce to exchange their 
products in foreign markets and in other English colonies 
in order to secure the specie and cargo necessary to re- 
turn to England in a second exchange for manufactured 
goods.^ The bulk of the commerce of Pennsylvania as 
well as that of her northern neighbors found a vent in the 
Bntish and foreign West Indies and to a less extent in 
southern Europe and the Madeiras.* Because of these in- 
direct commercial relations the balance of trade was al- 
ways against the colony. For the six years ending in 
1704 Pennsylvania was indebted to English merchants in 
the sum of £34,350 and in 1765 this balance had reached 
the high figure of at least £300,000.^ To secure a bal- 

2 Beer, British Colonial Policy, 175Jf-iy65, 193-205, 209-210; Cal- 
lender, Economic Hist, of U. 8., 85-121. 

3 Callender, op. cit., 9-20, 51-63. 

* B. T. Paps., Props., XI, R 7, 42 ; XIII, S 34 ; Anderson, Origin 
of Commerce, III, 155, 171; N. Y. Col. Docs., V, 616. 

6B. T. Paps., Props., VIII, pt. 1, N 51, 52, 53; pt. 2, 100; 



182 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

ance of trade in its favor was one of the vital principles of 
the English mercantile system. According to the theories 
of the English mercantilists and economists of that age a 
nation's wealth and power were measured in terms of gold 
and silver and hence every precaution was taken to secure 
a monopoly of them for the mother country and to guard 
the source of supply. England, not blessed with the rich 
mines in America which Spain possessed, found it neces- 
sary to effect this end by means of trade. Such was one of 
the cardinal objects of the acts of trade. But in this fact 
lay the root of much of the financial distress of the col- 
onies. The prompt remittance to England of specie and 
bills of exchange acquired in the foreign markets to liqui- 
date the balance against the colony caused a chronic lack 
of a sufficient currency of coin for domestic economy. 
The serious nature of the financial problem may be gath- 
ered from a letter of William Penn to the Board of Trade 
in 1701. *' The whole continent labors under the want of 
money to circulate trade in the respective governments 
which has put Boston herself upon thinking of Tickets to 
supply the want of coin, and New York as well as this 
Province are following. ' ' ^ 

The growing demands of a foreign market for colonial 
productions demanded a greater capital to aid in their de- 
velopment and exchange; a rapidly increasing population 
and the growing expenses of government requiring a cir- 
culating medium of some sort. Several courses were open 
to the colonists. To forbid the exportation of bullion se- 
cured in foreign markets and to employ it in domestic 
manufactures at once called forth the exercise of the royal 



Franklin declared before the bar of the Commons in 1766 that the 
imports from Great Britain amounted to £500,000 a year while the 
exports from the colony in exchange for British goods did not ex- 
ceed £40,000. These figures were without much question placed too 
high. Works, (Smyth ed.) IV, 416-417. 
Q B. T. Paps., Props., VI, pt. 1, G 12. 



FINANCE AND POLITICS 183 

veto as contrary to the mercantile system.'^ Another course 
was to supply the want of coin by currency in other forms, 
such as a system of barter or the use of paper money. 
Payment in kind was a device practiced by all the colonies 
in the earlier period. Massachusetts had her *' country 
pay," Virginia and Maryland had their tobacco certifi- 
cates, and Pennsylvania by the laws of 1683 and 1693 
made hemp, flax, grain, pork, beef, and tobacco current 
pay in lieu of money.^ Paper currency was an expedient 
resorted to by Pennsylvania long after the other colonies 
had been forced to it. But like her neighbors, Pennsyl- 
vania practiced another familiar expedient; that of in- 
viting specie into the province by accepting it at a rate 
fixed by law higher than that set by other governments. 
A law of 1683 provided that English money should pass 
current at an advance of twenty-five per cent.. New Eng- 
land money at par and the Spanish piece of eight at six 
shillings.® The Spanish piece of eight, minted sparingly 
in the mother country but in great numbers in Mexico 
and Peru, was the coin of almost universal circulation in 
the colonies. In 1693 the rate of Spanish money was ad- 
vanced and again still further in 1700 with the avowed 
object of '' bringing in of money to promote trade and 
make payments more easy. ' ' ^^ By the latter law a piece 
of eight of full weight was rated at seven shillings, ten 
pence, and punishment was provided for mutilation. The 
lack of a fixed and uniform standard for foreign money 
was highly prejudicial to intercolonial trade. In 1700 
Penn met in conference with Governors Nicholson of Vir- 
ginia and Bellomont of New York and it was agreed, 

7 Mass. in 1697 passed a law prohibiting the exportation of specie 
or bullion on the plea of scarcity of money and the hea\'y expenses 
of war. This was vetoed at home because of the lack of a clause 
permitting exportation to England. Acts and Resolves of Mass., 
I, 306, 308. 

8 Charter and Laws, 162, 229. 
QlUd., 145. 

io/&id., 275; Pa. Statutes at Large, II, 87. 



184 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

among other things, that measures should be secured to 
provide for a fixed and uniform standard.^^ It was a 
plan warranted by the situation but it required the force 
of an act of Parliament to secure its adoption. The end 
might have been attained in the royal provinces by means 
of the instructions from the crown to the governors, but 
over the chartered colonies the crown enjoyed no such 
control. Penn submitted the report of the conference 
to the Board of Trade but no immediate action was taken.^^ 
Again in 1703 Penn urged upon the board the necessity 
of taking action. ^^ It was also urged in strong terms by 
Governor Cornbury and Robert Quary.^* Quary asserted 
that the high rate of specie in Pennsylvania caused the 
people of neighboring colonies to migrate thither in hopes 
of greater wages. Cornbury complained of the injury to 
the trade of New York by the flow of coin into Pennsyl- 
vania. The board was now aroused to action and directed 
the attorney-general to give an opinion if the crown by 
force of its prerogative had power to settle the rate of coin 
for the colonies. In July, 1703, he replied in the affirma- 
tive, so far as the rate fixed did not infringe a colonial 
statute already confirmed.^^ The board then reported to 
the council the advisability of fixing the rate by proclama- 
tion and recommended that the Pennsylvania law of 1700 
should be disallowed.^® The report was acted upon and 

11 B. T. Paps., Props, VI, pt. 1, G 7, 8 ; N. Y. Col. Docs., IV, 757. 
This shows that a Spanish piece of eight was current in Boston at 
6s., New York at 6s. 9d., Jersey and Pa., at 7s. 8d., Maryland at 
4s. 6d., Va.. and Car. at 5s. 

12 B. T. Paps., Props., Entry Bk. C, ff. 40-42. 

13 Ihid., Props., VII, L 27. 

14 N. Y. Col. Docs., IV, 1047, 1059. Says a report from Virginia 
in 1697, " It will be well for a common standard of money to be 
established over all English colonies in America." Cal. State Paps., 
Col, 1696-1697, 645. 

15 Pa. Statutes at Large, II, 446-447; B. T. Jour., XVI, 143, 174. 

16 B. T. Paps., Props., Entry Bk. D, ff. 345, 361; Props., VII, L 
46; Bulletin N. Y. Public Lib., Oct., 1907, 491-492; Pa. Statutes at 
Large, II, 445. 



FINANCE AND POLITICS 185 

Isaac Newton, master of the mint, was directed to draw 
up a table fixing the rates of the various foreign coins cur- 
rent in the colonies. In July, 1704, this was proclaimed 
by the crown to be the standard. ^^ The basis of the table 
was the Massachusetts law, already confirmed by the 
crown, which rated the piece of eight at six shillings. By 
the table, Mexico, Seville and Pillar pieces of eight of full 
weight (17% pwt.), were to pass current at six shillings, 
Peru pieces of eight of full weight at five shillings, ten 
and one-half pence. Other coin of foreign origin, such as 
the Crusadoes of Portugal, the Rix dollars of the Empire 
and the Ducatoons of Flanders were also rated. The proc- 
lamation was very unskillfully adapted to actual condi- 
tions. No provision was made for contracts at old rates 
or for punishment of the mutilation of coin, so commonly 
practiced. Moreover, the table gave to coin an artificial 
value and arbitrary denomination not warranted by its 
commercial value as governed by the market price. ^^ In 
the face of these facts there is little wonder that the proc- 
lamation was accorded scant respect. In October, 1704, 
James Logan wrote from the colony to Penn that the proc- 
lamation was at hand '' but will answer no one good end 
I know of, it is so very confused and perplexing," and in 

IT 5. T. Paps., PL Gen., VII, G, 9, 10. 

18 Pownall, at one time gov. of Mass., wrote, "... I could 
never comprehend to what general uses, or to what purposes of 
government, the proclamation which Queen Ann issued, . . . 
could be supposed to extend, while it endeavored to rate the foreign 
coins current in the Colonies by an artificial standard. It would 
seem just as wise, and answering to just as good purpose, if gov- 
ernment should now issue a proclamation, directing, that for the 
future, all black horses in the Colonies should be called white, and 
all brindled cows red. The making even a law to alter the names 
of things, will never alter the nature of those things; and will 
never have any other effect, than that of introducing confusion, 
and of giving an opportunity to bad men of profiting by that con- 
fusion." Administration of Cols., (ed. 1768) 181. Cf. Sumner, 
Spanish Dollar and Colonial Shilling, in Amer. Hist. Rev., Ill, 
607-619. 



186 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

the next year he wrote that money passed at the old rate 
and no one obeyed the royal proclamation.^® In similiar 
terms wrote Governor Evans, saying that the disobedience 
was not due to any slackness in putting the proclamation 
into force, but to the '^ liberty trading men will take in 
their own bargains. ' ' ^^ That it was not obeyed is evi- 
denced by the fact that the merchants of New York com- 
plained to the home government of the injury to their 
trade caused by the flow of specie to other colonies, es- 
pecially to Pennsylvania, where it passed current at a 
higher rate.'^ The royal orders of a distant government 
availed little. In fact they were held in such slight es- 
teem that the assembly of Pennsylvania had the temerity 
to pass a law in 1706 providing for a uniform rate for the 
province approximately one-third in advance of that set 
by the Queen's table.^- The excuse, as expressed in the 
law, was that it was unjust for this colony to obey the royal 
mandate when other colonies older in settlement and more 
considerable in trade did not conform to it. On similiar 
grounds Governor Evans justified his assent to the law.^^ 
The prevalent disobedience to the proclamation now forced 
the Board of Trade to further action. In June, 1706, the 
attorney-general was asked for an opinion as to the best 
method to be taken to exact obedience in the chartered 
colonies.^* He responded that the proclamation imposed 
no legal obligations in private transactions, but that an act 
of an assembly contrary to the royal order made the gov- 
ernment guilty of high misdemeanor and the charter lia- 
ble to forfeiture.^^ The remedy suggested was an act of 
Parliament giving the proclamation the force of law as 

iQ Penn-Logan Corres., I, 325, II, 26. 

20 B. T. Paps., Props., VIII, pt. 1, N 36. 

21 A^. y. Col. Docs., IV, 1131-1135. 

22 Pa. Statutes at Large, II, 276. 

z^Ihid., II, 510-511; B. T. Paps., Props., VIII, pt. 2, O 66. 

24 B. T. Paps., PI. Gen., VII, H 20. 

25 lUd, 



FINANCE AND POLITICS 187 

was done in England under like conditions in 1694. No 
action to this end was taken at the time because the board 
was busy supporting the bill then in Parliament pro- 
viding for the vacation of the charters. Upon the failure 
of this bill the board took up the monetary question. 
This action was occasioned by a complaint from Barbadoes 
that the island colonies were drained of coin by those on 
the mainland, especially the chartered colonies, ^^ This 
agitation resulted in the act of 1708 giving the proclama- 
tion the force of law and providing penalties for viola- 
tions.-^ Acts of Parliament seemed to have no greater 
fears for the colonies than royal commands. Not only 
the chartered colony of Pennsylvania but the royal prov- 
ince of New York set at naught the law by rating money 
contrary to it.^^ The law of Pennsylvania of 1706 rated 
a piece of eight at eight shillings while the English statute 
fixed it at six shillings. The theory of the assembly was 
that the worth of specie depended upon its commercial 
value and not upon any arbitrary denomination and that 
a piece of eight called six shillings was of no less value 
then one denominated eight and should purchase the same 
amount of goods. On this principle the assembly did not 
change the denomination of the coin but enacted in 1709 
that since coin fell one-fourth in value by English law, 
all prices, wages, and fees should abate in the same pro- 
portion.^^ This unique device to countervail the English 
statute did not deceive the home authorities. The solici- 
tor-general held that it rendered ineffectual the law of 
Parliament " because the lowering the price of goods in 
consequence in respect to other colonies, the coin will be 
raised to the old value. ' ' ^^ The act was vetoed by the 



26 B. T, Paps., PI. Gen., Entry Bk. D, f, 143. 
^Tllid., PI. Gen., VIII, I 48, 50; 6 Anne, c. 30. 
28N. T, Col. Docs., V, 66, 67-68, 71. 

29 Pa. Statutes at Large, II, 294-297. 

30 I6id., II, 547-548; Pa. Archives, 1st. ser., I, 156. 



188 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-17G5 

crown in 1714.^^ Again in 1722 the assembly sent to the 
governor a bill which provided a rating contrary to law 
but he refused his assent.^- One is strikingly impressed 
with the disregard shown by the colonists to royal orders 
and acts of Parliament which ran counter to their economic 
interests. Like the evasion of the Molasses Act of 1733, 
the coinage problem shows conclusively the utter futility 
of trying to order the affairs of a community by artificial 
measures which did not conform to the economic advan- 
tages of its members. These methods also clearly exhibit 
the means by which the colony of Pennsylvania nullified 
the royal veto. By a process of reenactment the colony 
for a period of ten years was able to evade the will of the 
English government. 

To supply the lack of specie there seemed to be left but 
one expedient, — paper currency. From such a course the 
colony had long held aloof. Perhaps the loss caused by 
the depreciation of notes in other colonies served to warn 
this province against such ills. It may be too that the 
sound judgment of the Quaker business men prevented 
any yielding to a cheap currency. Then again Pennsyl- 
vania was not driven to it by the exigencies of war. Her 
happy situation geographically and her kindly policy to- 
ward the savages freed the province from the evils as well 
as the expenses which followed in the wake of war. The 
border colonies on the north and south were forced to an 
early issue of paper currency to erect forts, provide stores 
of war, and equip troops to guard their dominions against 
the French and Spanish and their savage allies. But if 
not forced to it by reason of war, the great increase in 
population caused by the coming of the Scotch-Irish and 
Germans in large numbers and a rapidly growing com- 

31 Pa. Statutes at Large, II, 543. 

82 In 1755 Gov. Morris declared that the act of parliament " was 
shamefully slighted and disregarded in this Province," and that 
for years a piece of eight passed current at 7s. 6d. while the Eng- 
lish rated it at 6s. only. Pa. Col. Bees., VI, 239. 



FINANCE AND POLITICS 189 

merce demanded a circulating medium of some sort. By 
1719 depression fell upon the province. To ease the situa- 
tion the assembly proposed various remedies: to stay the 
execution of debt, to prohibit the exportation of bullion, 
to advance specie one-fourth contrary to law, to make prod- 
uce a legal tender and to lower the rate of interest.^^ In 
1722 Governor Keith wrote to the Board of Trade pictur- 
ing the economic distress, saying that the farmer brought 
his produce to market but there was no money to give for 
it, the export trade had decreased, ship-builders were idle, 
law suits multiplied, and the jails crowded with debtors.^* 
As a result the question of a paper currency was agitated 
in 1721, but as is usual the movement was resisted by the 
more conservative classes.^^ In 1723 the assembly yielded 
to the petitions from the counties for paper currency and 
passed a law to create £15,000 in bills of credit.^^ These 
bills were to be loaned out for eight years at five per cent, 
interest and secured by mortgages on estates in fee simple, 
lands, houses and ground rents at double or treble value. 
Thus ample provision was made for funding and securing 
the same. Trade promptly revived and the results were 
apparently so beneficial that an immediate demand came 
for more of this balm of all economic ills. In December 
of the same year the assembly complied with a further issue 
of £30,000 on the same terms and restrictions.^^ It was 
inevitable that the question of paper currency should find 
its way into politics. 

In 1722 Governor Keith wrote that the lawyers and a 
few rich usurers were opposed to paper currency but that 

33 Pa. Col. Recs., Ill, 173; Pa. Votes of Assembly, II, 313, 314, 
335. In 1723 two laws were passed to relieve the suffering; the 
one to reduce the rate of interest from eight to six per cent., the 
other to stay the execution of debts. Pa. Statutes at Large, III, 
338, 343. 

34 5. T. Paps., Props, XI, R 42. 

35 Pa. Votes of Assembly, II, 337; Proud, Hist, of Pa., II, 150-172. 

36 Pa. Statutes at Large, III, 324. 

37 Ibid., Ill, 389. 



190 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

the farmers and merchants clamored for it.^^ Thus from 
the time when the colony launched out upon the sea of 
paper currency to the end of our period party lines were 
closely drawn on this issue. Around this question re- 
volved much of the bitter struggle between the assembly 
and proprietors. It was also a matter which caused fric- 
tion with the home government and created great opposi- 
tion to royal authority. It created public disturbance, 
it bred factional strife, and brought forth prolonged dead- 
locks between the governors and assemblies in many of 
the colonies. The colonial party which was opposed to the 
unqualified issue of paper currency was composed of the 
proprietors, heirs to the wide dominions of Pennsylvania, 
other large property holders, and in general the wealthy 
and more conservative classes. This party was not op- 
posed to a paper currency in general, and probably ap- 
preciated the need of a circulating medium, but it was 
stoutly opposed to all efforts to force a paper currency 
in payment of sterling obligations. xThe law required that 
the currency should be received in payment of all debts 
on the same basis as sterling money.^^ The currency had 
a strong tendency to depreciate in value and to give it a 
compulsory value in effect impaired the obligation of con- 
tracts. In 1723 this party petitioned the assembly, point- 
ing out the rapid depreciation of such a currency in other 
colonies, and praying that provision be made to exempt 
all debts due the crown, to the English merchants, to the 
proprietors for rents and lands, and to guardians and trust- 
ees for orphans, widows and minors, and that such debts 
should be paid in sterling money or if in paper currency 
with the addition of so much exchange current at the time 

38 B. T. Paps., Props., XI, R 42. 

39 Section eight of the act of 1723 stipulates that any one refusing 
to accept the bills of credit in discharge of debts, dues or demands, 
" according to their values and rates, . . . shall lose the said 
debt or debts, sum or sums of money so refused." Pa. Statutes 
at Large, III, 330. 



FINANCE AND POLITICS 191 

between paper and sterling money .*° But the petition 
was unanswered and the laws of 1723 made the bills of 
credit a legal tender in full payment of all debts and con- 
tracts calling for sterling money or Spanish coin. The 
paper money party was composed of the democratic 
classes, the farmers, the wage earners, and the debtor classes 
in general. It is a characteristic feature of colonial life 
that the tiller of the soil, the rent payer, and the wage- 
earner, destitute of specie and poor in this world's goods, 
usually stand for a cheap currency to supply the lack of 
specie. A cheap currency takes the place of stay and exe- 
cution laws and affords the easiest method of alleviating 
economic distress. There was perhaps no intent to be 
fraudulent or dishonest, but the demand was simply a re- 
sult of their economic situation. To them it seemed arbi- 
trary and unjust to make a distinction between the debtor 
and creditor classes in money transactions. Moreover, to 
the paper currency party it appeared that to make any 
distinction in value between sterling money and bills of 
credit would at once have an ill-effect on the latter and 
conduce to depreciation. On these grounds any attempt 
to exempt sterling debts from payment in the legal tender 
paper currency was steadfastly resisted. On the other 
hand the proprietary party just as firmly refused to accept 
a depreciated currency in discharge of debts and rents 
due them unless some provision was made for the difference 
between currency and specie. The fiat money party had 
control of the assembly, the proprietary party of the gov- 
ernor and council. The governors were under instruc- 
tions from the proprietors and were under bond to render 
obedience to them. Thus it was that the whole financial 
problem led to a bitter struggle between the people as 
represented in the assembly and the proprietors over ques- 
tions of " Proprietary Interest and Power, and Popular 

40 B. T. Paps., Props., XI, R 67. 



192 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

Liberty. ' ' *^ Still another element entered into this con- 
tention. The whole weight of the home government, act- 
ing under the influence of the English merchants, was 
thrown into the balance on the side of the proprietary 
party. 

English merchants in general were hostile to colonial 
bills of credit on the same grounds as the proprietors. 
In 1720 the merchants trading to New York protested 
against a paper currency in that province as pernicious to 
the trade of England.^- They had no mind to receive 
an unsound money in payment of sterling debts contracted 
in England. As a result the crown instructed the royal 
governors not to assent to any further emissions of paper 
currency.*^ In 1723 two laws of South Carolina and one 
of Barbadoes were vetoed by the crown on the protest of 
English merchants.'*^ Pennsylvania's obligation to send 
her laws home gave the crown an opportunity to check 
paper currency projects in this colony. Thus it may be 
seen that the question involved also the relations between 
the colony and home government. In May, 1725, the legal 
adviser to the board reported on the two currency laws 
of the province and recommended them for disapproval 
since the policy of the board was hostile to paper cur- 
rency.*^ The board consulted Joshua Gee, the eminent 
economist, v*^ho advised against the veto on the ground that 
the bills were already in circulation but that the governor 
should be directed to oppose further issues.*® The board 
wrote to Governor Gordon in 1726 pointing out the ill- 
effects of rapid depreciation in other colonies, especially 
the Carolinas, and warned him that any future laws from 

41 Franklin, Works, (Smyth ed.) IV, 227. 

42 N. Y. Col. Docs., V, 539. 

43 IMd. 

44 i?. T. Jour., XXXIV, 145, XXXIII, 96, 161, 245; Smith, So. Car. 
as a Royal Prov. 240; Chalmers, Introd. to Revolt of Cols., II, 96-97; 
Acts of Privy Council, Col., Ill, 55-56. 

45 Pa. Statutes at Large, II, 518. 
46^. T. Jour., XXXVI, 177-178. 



FINANCE AND POLITICS 193 

his government would be vetoed,^^ Before the reception 
of this letter the assembly had passed a law to reissue and 
continue the sum created by the laws of 1723. This ac- 
tion contrary to the board's letter demanded some justi- 
fication. A memorial was addressed to the board describ- 
ing the good effects produced by the former issues, whereby 
labor was again employed, commerce was revived and colo- 
nial purchases from England were increased and that the 
colony was able to supply the mother country with greater 
quantities of iron ore than was otherwise possible and 
prayed that the law be confirmed.*^ Micajah Perry, a 
merchant of London and a large trader to the colonies, 
particularly Virginia, was employed to solicit the royal 
confirmation.*^ In spite of the board's former declaration 
the law was not vetoed. 

Again in 1729 the currency problem created disturbance 
in the province. The bills of credit had gradually been 
withdrawn from circulation by the process of funding and 
destroying, and economic depression fell upon the colony. 
James Logan wrote that a greater cry for money was 
scarcely ever heard.^^ In 1728 David Barclay wrote that 
the people ^' seem to be mad " about paper money.^^ The 
question precipitated a keen fight between the assembly 
and governor, in which the latter was placed in an uncom- 
fortable position. He was instructed by the proprietor 
and bound by a bond to assent to no paper money bill un- 
less due provision was made for exempting sterling debts, 
and he was also bound by the board's letter of 1726. He 
refused his assent at first to a new issue. The situation 
was well described by James Logan, when he wrote that 

47 B. T. Paps., Props., Entry Bk. G, flf. 399-400; Pa. Statutes at 
Large, III, 520-521. 

48 B. T. Paps., Props., XI, K 78. 

49 Pa. Votes of Assembly, III, 12. 

50 Penn Mss., Official Corres., II, James Logan to proprietors, 
Apr. 30, 1729. 

51 Ibid., David Barclay to Thomas Penn, Oct. 27, 1728. 



194 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

while the governor was *' pinched on one hand by his In- 
structions, unsupportably clamour 'd at on the other, and 
not one person will advise him agst. another emission, he 
has a very unpleasant time of it. ' ' ^^ Gordon expressed 
a willingness to assent to an issue on two conditions, that 
provision should be made for sterling debts and proprie- 
tary quit-rents and that a clause be inserted in the law 
suspending its operation till the will of the king was 
known. The assembly would listen to no conditions or 
compromises and the governor was forced to yield.^^ The 
act together with an address to the king praying for royal 
confirmation was again forwarded to Mica j ah Perry and 
again no action was taken against the law.^* In 1731 the 
assembly renewed the issue of £45,000 put in circulation 
in 1723.^^ Gordon again asked for the insertion of the 
suspending clause but to no avail and he yielded. This 
act was sent home but with many others passed in this 
period of the board's inertia was not considered and the 
colony profited thereby. If the central government took 
no action the proprietors did. In 1733 the governor was 
instructed not to assent to any future emissions of bills 
of credit without the suspending clause, giving as their 
reason the hostility of English merchants to this form of 
currency.^*^ But that the Penns were more solicitous of 
their interests as lords of the soil than of the welfare of 
English merchants is evidenced by the fact that the in- 
structions to Governor Thomas in 1739 said naught about 
the suspending clause but ordered him to assent to no bill 
unless provision was made for proprietary quit-rents ac- 
cording to the rate of exchange between London and Phila- 

52 Penn Mss.. Off. Corres., James Logan to proprietors, Apr. 30, 
1729. 

53 Ibid., II, Gov. Gordon to Penns, May 2, 16, 1729. 

54 Pa. Statutes at Large, IV, 98; Votes of Assembly, III, 88. 

55 Pa. Statutes at Large, IV, 197. 

56 Penn Mss., Letter Bk., Instructions to Gov. Gordon, Jan. 28, 
1733. 



FINANCE AND POLITICS 195 

delphia.^^ Therefore, when in 1739 a law was passed to 
continue the outstanding notes and to create an additional 
issue sufficient to bring the amount in circulation up to 
£80,000, provision was made to compensate the proprie- 
tors for the loss resulting from the acceptance of their 
rents in the paper currency. ^^ The Board of Trade con- 
sulted several merchants trading to the colony concerning 
the new issue and "they rather thought them absolutely 
necessary for the carrying on of commerce. "^^ The law 
was accordingly confirmed.^^ 

The full force of the enmity of the English merchants 
was yet to be felt.^^ In 1739 they began to agitate the 
question in Parliament. In March, the Board of Trade 
submitted to the Commons, in response to an order of that 
bod}^, a statement of colonial currency.^- This report was 
incomplete and the house directed the crown to submit 
to it at the next session a full account of colonial currency 
since 1700, its equivalent in sterling money and the proc- 
ess provided for funding it. The board instructed the 
governors to this effect^* and in April, 1740, a full state- 
ment was laid before Parliament.*'^ It exhibited a wide 
discrepancy between sterling money and fiat currency. 
The ratio between a pound sterling and paper money was 
one to fifty in North Carolina, one to five in New York, 
Rhode Island and Connecticut, while in Pennsylvania it 
stood in the very favorable proportion of about one to two. 
In order to check depreciation the Commons directed the 

57 Pa. Col. Recs., IV, 318. 

58 Pa. Statutes at Large, IV, 322, 344. 

59 B. T. Jour., XLIX, 26, 30; Pa. Statutes at Large, IV, 481. 

60 Pa. Statutes at Large, IV, 479. 

61 See the complaint of 153 merchants of Liverpool, London and 
Bristol in 1736. B. T. Paps., PI. Gen., XII, N 14. 

G^Jour. House of Commons, XXIII, 512, 517. 

64 5. T. Paps., PI. Gen., Entry Bk. G, ff. 255-256; Pa. Col. Recs., 
IV, 356, 359; Pa. Votes of Assembly, III, 355. 

65 B. T. Paps., PI. Gen., XII, N 40. Cf. Proud, Hist, of Pa., II, 172. 
For reports of Pa. currency see Col. Recs., IV, 363-364; Votes,, III, 
357-358; B, T. Paps., Props., XIV, T 25; XV, T 47. 



196 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

crown to instruct the governors not to assent to any fur- 
ther bills without the suspending clause.^^ This was ac- 
cordingly done, but to little effect.^^ In the next year the 
board again reported to Parliament on the subject and 
suggested that the instructions to the royal governors 
should be repeated. Such orders will suffice in the royal 
provinces, said the board, but not in those colonies ^' who 
think themselves by their charters little dependent upon 
the crown and seldom pay obedience to royal orders. ' ' ^^ 
The only action taken in that year was to place a quietus 
on the Massachusetts " land bank " which a recent in- 
vestigator asserts was of greater influence in creating op- 
position to parliamentary power in that colony than the 
Stamp Act.*'^ In 1744 the English merchants complained 
to the Commons that no obedience had been paid to the 
royal orders concerning paper currency."^^ The evidence 
on this point well warrants the complaint."^^ By the use 
of the money power the assemblies were able to starve the 
governors into compliance with the will of the people con- 
trary to royal orders. To remedy the mischief a bill was 
brought into Parliament designed to prohibit the issue of 
bills of credit with the legal tender quality. But of far 
more serious portent was the insertion therein of a clause 
intended to give to royal instructions the force of law.'^^ 
The passage of such a measure would in effect have em- 
powered the crown to legislate for the colonies. This 
practically meant an annihilation of the legislative inde- 
pendence enjoyed by the colonial legislatures. It would 

^^Jour. House of Commons, XXIII, 518, 528. 

67 J5. T. Paps., Props., XV, T 34, 40, 48; Pa. Col. Recs., IV, 471- 
472; Votes, III, 426. 

68 B. T. Paps., PI. Gen., Entry Bk. G, ff. 269-273. 

69 Davis, Currency and Banking in Mass. Bay, pt. 2, Pub. Amer. 
Econ. Asso., vol. II, 3d. ser., 256-261. 

^(iJour. House of Commons, XXIV, 658, 681; Penn Mss., Letter 
Bk., II, 89, Thos. Penn to Gov. Thomas, May 5, 1744. 

71 Greene, Provincial Governor, 164-165. 

72 Pa. Col. Recs., IV, 750. 



FINANCE AND POLITICS 197 

have come into direct opposition to the strong movement 
of the colonies toward complete autonomy and produced 
disturbances not unlike those which followed in the wake 
of the Stamp Act. The colonies were quick to take alarm. 
The assembly of Pennsylvania resolved that the passage 
of this measure would be " destructive of all their Liber- 
ties, and likely to be attended with the most dangerous 
consequences to all the King's Subjects in America. "^^ 
The colonial agent was ordered to oppose the bill with 
vigor and £100 was remitted to him for that service. 
Other chartered colonies took similiar action.'^* It was 
probably due to the activity of the colonial agents that the 
bill failed of passage. 

This hostile attitude of the mother country nowise 
checked the demand for more paper currency in the prov- 
ince. In 1746 Governor Thomas gave his assent to two 
bills, the one to reissue the £80,000 put in circulation by 
law of 1739, and the other to create a further sum of 
£5000 to finance the raising of troops for the expedition 
against Canada. Neither contained the suspending clause 
although the governor urged it. The fact that Governor 
Thomas yielded in violation of the royal order created a 
precedent which the assembly used to advantage. Both 
laws were confirmed at home, the one because it did not 
augment the amount in circulation, the other because it 
was demanded by the stress of war and continued the bills 
only for five years. "^^ In 1749 a bill similiar to that of 
1744 was introduced into the Commons. Through the in- 
fluence of Thomas Penn and Lord Baltimore the clause 
designed to give royal orders the force of law was elimi- 
nated.'^^ Thomas Penn promised the Board of Trade and 

73 Pa. Votes of Assembly, TV, 3-4. 

74 Kimball, Corres. of Govs, of R. I., I, 255, 285-287, 311; R. I. 
Col. Recs., V, 97. 

75 Pa. Statutes at Large, IV, 469-470, 474-475. 

76 Penn Mss., Letter Bk., II, 268-270, Thos. Penn to Gov. Hamil- 
ton, June 6, 1749. 



198 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

a few members of the Commons that no further issues of 
paper money would be made in the province before the 
whole question was considered at the next session of Par- 
liament/^ This was the argument used by Governor Ham- 
ilton when the assembly presented to him a bill to create 
a further issue."^^ As a result of the agitation in England 
the statute of 1751 forbade the New England colonies to 
create bills of credit with a compulsory value, but allowed 
them to issue treasury notes, redeemable in a short period 
and without a forced circulation.'^^ Thomas Penn wrote 
that Pennsylvania was not included in the law because of 
the caution exercised in keeping within the bounds of mod- 
eration in amount and providing a firm foundation for 
securing the currency.^^ But the cry for more money in- 
creased. During the war of the Austrian Succession the 
trade to the West Indies declined, the markets in Europe 
were closed to the merchants of the province, and depres- 
sion fell upon the people. In 1752 the assembly passed 
a bill to reissue the £85,000 created by the laws of 1746 
and to increase it by £40,000. At first Governor Ham- 
ilton refused his assent on the ground that the province 
had been left out of the statute of 1751 with difficulty and 
the crown would certainly veto any further issues. ^^ When 
the assembly persisted in its demands, he expressed his 
willingness to assent to the bill provided the suspending 
clause demanded by the royal order of 1740 was inserted 
in the act.^^ The assembly would not listen to this, the 
governor refused to recede from his position and a bitter 
debate ensued. 



77 Penn Mss., Sup. Proceedings, 35, Thos. Penn to Richard Peters, 
August 2, 1749. 

78 Pa. Votes of Assembly, IV, 108, 116-117. 

79 24 George II, c. 53. 

»o Penn Mss., Sup. Proc., 85, Thos. Penn to Gov. Morris, May 10, 
1755. 

81 Pa. Votes of AssemUy, IV, 218, 240. 

82 lUd., 251, 252. 



FINANCE AND POLITICS 199 

It has been shown that on the question of paper currency 
the interests of the proprietors and the English merchants 
were identical. This identity of interests afforded the 
Penns a splendid occasion to cloak their enmity to paper 
currency under cover of imperial interests and authority. 
By directing the governor to uphold the royal order the 
proprietors were able to protect their interests while at 
the same time make royal instructions the issue in con- 
troversy between the governor and assembly. The assem- 
bly without a dissenting voice resolved that the insertion 
of the suspending clause was '' destructive of the Liber- 
ties granted to the People of the Province by the Royal 
and Provincial Charters, Injurious to the Rights of the 
Proprietaries," and without precedent in the law of the 
province.®^ The representatives claimed that the order of 
1740 was simply a temporary expedient pending the ac- 
tion of Parliament which body, after a due consideration 
of the state of currency in the colony, did not include it 
in the act of 1751. All this was sufficient indication to 
the house that Parliament was satisfied with the currency 
of the colony, the instruction of 1740 had served its pur- 
pose, and the government was left in full possession of its 
power to issue bills of credit. The governor held that the 
order was not temporary but was still in force and insisted 
that he was guided by it.^* The two branches of the gov- 
ernment remained obdurate in their respective interpre- 
tations of the order of 1740 and no law to create paper 
currency was enacted. 

In 1753 a new and vital element entered into the situa- 
tion. It was the element of necessity attendant upon the 
outbreak of the French and Indian war. The province 
at last found itself heir to all the evils of foreign invasion 
and savage warfare which had befallen the border colonies 
to the north and south long since. The needs of defenses 

83 Pa. Votes of Assembly, IV, 254-256, 257-259, 262-264. 
B*Ihid., 260-262, 284, 287-291. 



200 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

entailed additional heavy expenses which could only be 
met by the creation of paper currency. The serious situa- 
tion of affairs called for the sinking of all disputes and the 
uniting of all interests in order to protect the lives and 
homes of the people from the horrors of Indian warfare. 
But such was not to be the case. In February, 1754, the 
governor urged upon the house the necessity of voting sup- 
plies to enable the colonj^ to oppose the invasion of the : 
French and Indians. In order to obviate the difficulty of 
the royal order, Hamilton was willing to assent to a law 
creating bills of credit without the suspending clause pro- 
vided the assembly would strike a sum sufficient simply 
for the occasion and established a fund to sink the notes 
within five years. ^^ This was done by Governor Thomas 
in 1746 and permitted by the English statute of 1751. 
The assembly, opposed to war, left the request unanswered 
till 'May. It then presented a bill to create £30,000 based 
on an extension of the excise tax for ten years and grant- 
ing but one-third of the amount to the king's use.^^ The 
governor amended the bill by cutting down the time of 
the excise tax to four years. The house promptly rejected 
the amendment and informed the governor that '' the 
Representatives of the People have an Undoubted Right 
to judge and determine not only the sum to be raised for 
the Use of the Crown but of the manner of raising it.'' 
Hamilton, worn in health and weary with the endless 
bickerings, resigned his post. He was succeeded by Rob- 
ert H. Morris. 

The same controversy waged on and nothing was done 
by the province as a principal or in conjunction with Vir- 
ginia to drive the invaders from the soil of Pennsjdvania. 
In December, 1754, Governor Morris refused his assent to 
a bill of £20,000 for the king's use on the ground that it 
did not contain the suspending clause. To show that he 

85 Pa. Votes of AssemUy, IV, 284. 
&QlMd., 311, 312. 



FINANCE AND POLITICS 201 

did not rely on his own discretion, he laid before the as- 
sembly the opinion of Sir Dudley Ryder, late attorney- 
general and the present chief justice of England. This 
opinion was in answer to a query whether the governor 
could legally or safely, without a breach of his bond and 
duty to the crown, pass a currency bill without the sus- 
pending clause. Ryder offered the opinion that '' it is by 
no means safe, advisable, or Consistent with his Duty to 
pass such bills without a Suspending Clause. ' ' ^^ The 
house refused to recognize this opinion as valid, insisting 
that the royal charter gave the freemen of the colony leg- 
islative independence in all cases whatever and that the 
crown, even upon an address of Parliament, could not 
resume this power or add further limitations than what 
the charter provided. Therefore, said the assembly, al- 
though the crown may issue instructions to royal gov- 
ernors, in Pennsylvania such orders have no force.*^ 
Pownall, ex-governor of Massachusetts, wrote, 'Hhe sus- 
pending clause is universally rejected in principle because 
such suspension disfranchises the inherent full power of 
legislation which they claim by their rights to the British 
liberties or by the special declarations of such in their 
charters. ' ' ^® This is a clear statement of the situation. 
Complete political independence was the ideal of the colo- 
nial representative bodies and they had no mind to be 
limited either by royal or proprietary instructions which 
hedged about their legislative independence. In the char- 
tered colonies there was no doubt of the right of the crown 

87 Pa. Yotes of Assemhhj, IV, 343-347. 

sslhicL, 350-352. 

89 Pownall, Adm. of Cols., (ed. 1768), 73-74. William Bollan, 
agent for Mass., declared before the Board of Trade in 1761, "that 
the Government of Massachusetts Bay, having by their Charter 
a free and unrestrained Power of Legislation, they would never 
consent to the inserting suspending Clauses in any Acts to be 
passed by them and had never done it in any one Instance ..." 
B. T. Jour., LXIX, 250. Cf. Chalmers, Introd. to Revolt of Cols., 
II, 135-138. 



202 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

to issue instructions to the governors for putting into 
execution the acts of trade. The governors were made the 
administrators of the acts of trade and they took the 
oaths and gave security to bind them to a faithful per- 
formance of the instructions of the crown pursuant to 
those acts. The question arises, could the crown once hav- 
ing granted away full legislative powers by charter, in- 
struct the governors on matters not provided for by Eng- 
lish law? In 1752, the Board of Trade, doubtful on this 
point, submitted the question to the crown lawyers, but 
the records reveal no response.®^ The opinion of Ryder 
seems to indicate that the crown had this right, but it 
must be remembered that the order of 1740 was based on 
an address of the House of Commons and there was no 
doubt of the legal supremacy of Parliament in all cases 
over both the realm and colonies. In spite of this fact the 
assembly even denied the force of a royal order so based 
because it was contrary to the charter. 

Looking at the question solely from the point of view 
of expediency, and waiving the question of legality, it 
would appear that the royal instruction of 1740 placed 
peculiar hardships on the colony. The critical posture 
of affairs in the colony absolutely demanded the prompt 
raising of supplies for the sake of defense, yet a strict ad- 
herence to the order meant that the only form of money, 
bills of credit, would not be available till the law was ap- 
proved by a far distant government. The law of 1751, l( 
which pertained only to New England, made provision ji 
for such sudden emergencies by permitting the issue of 
treasury notes to be redeemed at the end of a short period. 
Recognizing the serious situation. Governor Morris, like 
his predecessor, expressed a willingness to assent to an 
issue of currency on the basis of this law.^^ In December, 

90 5. T. Paps., Props., XVIII, V 101; Entry Bk. I, flF. 2-12; Jour., 
LX, 105. 

01 Pa. Votes of Assemlly, IV, 354-356; Pa. Col. Recs., VI, 39-44, 
192. 



FINANCE AND POLITICS 203 

1754, the house presented to him a bill to issue £20,000 
for the " king's use " and to continue in circulation for 
twelve years. Morris cut the time down to five years, as 
provided by the law of 1751.»- The assembly refused to 
allow any amendment, the governor refused to recede 

• from his position and the frontier of the province was left 
defenseless. The house then became thoroughly convinced 
that the governor was hindered by proprietary instruc- 
tions. The contention then centered upon the right of the 

j proprietors to instruct their governor. The house de- 
clared that proprietary orders were *' void in themselves " 

' and an " Infringement upon the Privileges granted by 
charter to the People of the Province. ' ' ^^ The assembly 
not only denied the right of the proprietors to veto laws 
of the colony, but also the right to instruct their governor. 
Seeing no way out of the difficulty the assembly resolved 
to appeal to the crown in protest against proprietary 
orders. In January, 1755, an address was drawn up and 
sent to the colonial agent to lay before the king.^* It was 
stated that the repeated efforts of the assembly to vote 
money for defenses had been thwarted by the action of 
the governor acting under proprietary instructions and 
prayed that if the crown on consideration found such 
orders dangerous to the interests of the Empire and con- 
trary to the charter, relief should be afforded. The Board 
of Trade granted a hearing on this memorial to the Penns 
and the agent of the assembly with their respective coun- 
sel. Counsel for the proprietors denied that the governor 
was limited in this matter by instructions and in justifica- 
tion of the governor's conduct submitted the royal order 
of 1740, the opinion of Sir Dudley Kyder, and the Eng- 
lish statute of 1751. The board reported to the Privy 

92 Pa. Col. Recs., VI, 206, 210, 212. 

»3/5td., VI, 221, 228, 230, 236. 

94 Pa. Votes of Assembly, IV, 379; B. T. Paps., Props., XIX, 
V 137, 144, 145, 146; Penn Mss., Official Corres., VII, Board of 
Trade to Thos. Penn, Apr. 25, 1755. 



204 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

Council that there was no proof nor the least foundation 
for the suggestion that the governor was hindered by pro- 
prietary orders and recommended that the address of the 
assembly should be rejected.^^ Although the Penns were 
victors in this matter, the end of the struggle was not yet. 
One fact is certain, that the proprietors, deprived of the 
right of final assent to colonial laws and denied the power 
to instruct their governor, could rely upon the support 
of the English government to safeguard their landed and 
governmental interests against the hostile action of the as- 
sembly. 

Meanwhile during the years 1754-1755 the government 
did little indeed to protect the province against the inva- 
sion of the French. Because of the dead-lock nothing was 
done to aid Virginia check French encroachments and 
Washington marched on to his defeat at Fort Neces.sity in 
1754 unsupported by Pennsylvania. ^"^ Again in 1755 
Braddock's expedition against Fort Duquesne received lit- 
tle aid from this province. ^^ The assembly threw^ the 
whole blame upon the shoulders of the governor, the latter 
laid it at the door of the assembly; it was shifted from 
one side to the other with such ingenuity and under such 
plausible appearances, that it is hard to judge where the 
censure ought to rest. The fact remains that while the 
governor and assembly were wrangling on in the east free 
from the horrors of war, the defenseless inhabitants on 
the frontier were left to the fate of the tomahawk and fire- 
brand. It is fair to assume that had they laid aside their 
disputes in tlis hour of trial and energetically supported 
Washington r.nd Braddock, the French might have been 
driven from the province and the lives and property of 
the people saved the horrors of savage warfare which fol- 

95 Pa. statutes at Large, V, 513-521; B. T. Jour., LXIII, 159, 
165, 177, 178; Penn Mss., Sup. Proc, 85, Thos. Penn to Gov. Morris, 
May 10, 1755. 

90 See page 296. 

97 See page 304. 



t^lKANCi: A^D POLITICS §05 

lowed in the wake of French victory. Thomas Penn wrote 
that a member of the assembly remarked ^' that they had 
rather the French should conquer them than they should 
give up their privileges to the proprietors. ' ' ^^ Governor 
Morris wrote that the assembly " seem'd determined to 
take advantage of their Country 's distress to get the whole 
powers of Government into their own hands. ' ' ^^ And in 
fact, the assembly confessed that " Those who would give 
up essential Liberty to purchase a Little Temporary safety 
deserve neither Liberty nor safety. ' ' ^^^ The refusal of 
the assembly to accept the amendment of the governor 
limiting the £20,000 to a term of five years lends color to 
the charge that the house, made up mostly of Quaker pacif- 
icists, had no intention of providing any defenses for the 
province.^^* The ideal which the popular branch sought 
to attain was complete independence in provincial politics 
and it seemed inclined to reach this position at any sacri- 
fice. 

After the defeat of Braddock, the savages carried their 
horrible work of burning and killing over the frontier 
and forced the pioneer people to evacuate their homes for 
places of safety. The situation called urgently for prompt 
and generous aid from the government. After the event 
the assembly presented to the governor a bill to create 
£60,000 in bills of credit secured by a tax on all property, 
real and personal, for two years. The governor promptly 
amended the bill to exclude the estates of the Penns.^^^ 
With this the contest over royal and proprietary instruc- 
tions fell into abeyance and a prolonged and acrimonious 
struggle ensued over the taxation of the proprietary es- 
tates. This dispute persisted through the French war and 

98 Penn Mss., Letter Bk., IV, 63, Thos. Penn to Gov. Morris, 
Feb. 26, 1755. 

99 Pa. Col. Recs., VI, 518, 544, 564. 
loolhid., VI, 695, VII, 255. 

101 lUd., VI, 720, 739. 

102 ihid., II, 396. 



206 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

the conspiracy of Pontiac when the critical situation of 
affairs demanded the sinking of all differences and the 
uniting of all interests in the general security of the fron- 
tier. Because of the contention over this question the peo- 
ple of the west were not accorded adequate protection. 
This dispute so embittered the defenseless inhabitants of 
the frontier that it led to armed protests against the as- 
sembly. It engendered bitter feeling in the assembly 
against the proprietors and led to the effort to overthrow 
proprietary rule in the interest of royal control. It ham- 
pered and delayed the military operations of the English 
government in the south and forced the English command- 
ers to interfere in provincial politics. A similar struggle 
was in process in the neighboring province of Maryland 
to the prejudice of local and general defense. It was the 
offensive and dilatory action of these colonies which is 
largely responsible for the Stamp Act. 

Two questions are involved in this struggle between the 
governor and assembly, the one of justice and the other 
of power. The assembly was convinced that it was emi- 
nently unjust that the people alone should *' undergo the 
Weight of this Uncommon Tax, and even expose their 
Persons for the defense of his Estate, who by virtue of his 
Power only, and without even a Colour of Right, should 
refuse to bear the least share of the Burthen though to re- 
ceive so great a benefit. ^ ' It was contended that the Penns 
by " giving a part to save the whole and not only to save 
it but render it of double and treble value . . . could 
hardly be called hurting and encumbering an Estate. ' ' ^^^ 
To throw upon the people the whole burden of defending 
their own estates as well as those of the proprietors seemed 
to the assembly contrary to all the principles of justice. 
On the other hand the proprietors expressed a willingness 
to bear a share of the burden, but to them it appeared 
equally unjust to subject all their estates to taxation. 

103 Po. Col. Recs., VI, 527, 532, 695; VIII, 105. 



FINANCE AND POLITICS 207 

They were ready to have those estates which yielded an 
income taxed in common with the property of the people, 
but to impose a tax on the vast areas of unlocated and 
unsurveyed lands which were productive of no returns 
appeared to them subversive of the principles of right. 
Moreover, they held it to be unfair to deny them a share 
in the selection of the assessors of the value of their es- 
tates, a right which the smallest property holder in the 
province enjoyed.^^* In point of power it was the aim of 
the assembly, as charged by Governor Morris, to render 
itself '* independent and assume a Superiority over your 
Proprietaries and governors, a plan which you would not 
fail to carry into execution were your power equal to your 
Inclination. ' ' ^^^ The house quickly repudiated the impu- 
tation of any '' Scheme of future Independency " but in- 
sisted upon the sole right of judging the propriety and 
necessity of all laws without any direction whatever from 
either the Penns or their governor. The house denied the 
proprietors the right to instruct the governor,^^^ denied 
the governor the right to amend money bills and left him 
only the power to accept or reject them as offered accord- 
ing to the practice of the Commons in England. The 
house insisted upon the power to dispose of all public 
money, leaving the governor but scant control in this re- 
spect, and upon the power to appoint all officials in any 
way concerned with the revenue. ** In short, the Powers 
of Government are almost all taken out of the Hands of 
the Governor, and lodged in the Assembly; as to what 
little remains, scarce a bill comes up without an attempt 
to lessen them. ' ^ ^^^ These are the words of a member of 
the provincial council in 1757. It is good evidence that 
the assembly was more concerned with what its members 
considered their rights and privileges as Englishmen than 

104 Pa. Col. Recs., VII, 306 ; VIII, 73. 

105 /6id., VI, 387, 544, 564. 

lOQlhid., VI, 390; VII, 255. 

107 /6id, VII, 449, 528, 708. : •:;; 



208 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

in the question of local and imperial defense. It is un- 
mistakable indication of the development toward complete 
autonomy and responsible government. 

The controversy was laid at rest momentarily by a gift 
of £5000 from the proprietors toward the charges of de- 
fense."« The law of November, 1755, granted £60,000 to 
the king's use in bills of credit and exempted the proprie- 
tary estates from taxation. ^^'^ The gift brought but a 
temporary allayment of the trouble. The plan of the im- 
perial government to carry into operation an effective 
campaign against the French made large demands upon 
the colonies for men and money. In 1756, after a long 
debate over the taxation of proprietary estates, the matter 
was compromised by an issue of £30,000 in bills of credit 
based on an extension of the excise tax for ten years. ^^"^ 
To these laws the Board of Trade could have no objection 
since the money was demanded by the needs of the situa- 
tion and the bills were to continue in circulation for but 
a short period. They were accordingly confirmed by the 
crown. In 1757 and 1758 the assembly voted £200,000 
in bills of credit on a land tax to meet the expenses of 
military operations.^^^ But each year the old struggle 
over the taxation of the estates of the Penns rose up to 
delay the campaign, to hamper the English generals and 
to cause distress to the frontier people. In these years 
the proprietary estates were not taxed, but only after Gen- 
erals Abercromby, Amherst and Stanwix had interfered 
to allay the strife. ^^- But the assembly abated not a bit in 
its position. It was resolved to appeal to the proprietors. 

In February, 1757, Benjamin Franklin left for England, 

108 Penn Mss., Official Corres., VII, 121, Proprietors to Gov. Mor- 
ris, Oct. 5, 1755. 

109 Pa. Statutes at Large, V, 201. 
iio/&tfZ., V, 243. 

111 Ihid., V, 295, 303, 337. 

112 Pa. Col. Recs., VII, 453; VIII, 78, 331; Pa. Archives, 1st. 
ser., Ill, 118, 715; Kimball, Corres. Wm. Pitt, I, 41, II, 88, 130. 



FINANCE AND POLITICS 209 

as the agent of the assembly, to lay before the proprietors 
a statement of grievances. ^^^ In November, 1758, the 
Penns, through their counsel, replied that they were willing 
to have the income from their estates inquired into and 
stood ready to contribute, whatever the former gift lacked, 
a proportion of the tax levied by the previous laws/^* 
But it was stipulated that this tax should be imposed only 
on that part of their estate '^ that is in its nature taxable " 
and insisted upon having a voice in the choice of assessors 
of the value. In consequence the assembly submitted to 
the governor a bill to create .£100,000 in bills of credit 
for the campaign of 1759 based on a tax on all property, 
including that of the Penns.^^^ Moreover, it made pro- 
vision that the proprietors should pay a proportionate 
share of former taxes, crediting the gift of £5000. The 
governor amended the bill to exclude all estates of the 
proprietors except the quit-rents and appropriated tracts 
and to give the Penns a voice in the selection of assess- 
()j.g 116 rpj^g house would hearken to no amendments, hold- 
ing that the governor had no power to change money 
bills.^^^ The pressing need of money to set on foot the 
military operations forced General Amherst to labor with 
the assembly to yield but to no effect. Amherst then 
turned to Governor Denny and persuaded him to waive 
his instructions from the proprietors. ^^^ Under stress of 
the exigencies of the occasion and under the influence of 
Amherst, Denny yielded and was rewarded by the assem- 
bly with a vote of £1000. ^^'^ At once the cry was raised 
that the governor was bribed. If it was corruption it was 

113 Franklin, Works, (Smyth ed.) Ill, 370-377; Pa. Votes of 
Assembly, IV, 697; Pa. Col. Recs., VIII, 278. 

114 Pa. Col. Recs., VIII, 281. 
11-5 Ihid., VIII, 301. 

116 /&id., VIII, 302, 303, 319, 320, 325-329. 

1-L7 Ibid., VIII, 304, 323-325, 331. 

11-8 Ibid., VIII, 331-332; Kimball, Corres. of Wm. Pitt, II, 88. 

119 Pa. Col. Recs., VIII, 333 ; Pa. Statutes at Large, Y, 379. 



210 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1606-1765 

a charge which may be fastened upon many another pro- 
vincial governor. The position of a governor was most 
precarious. On the one hand Denny was under a bond of 
£5000 to the proprietors to obey their orders and on the 
other he was dependent upon the assembly for his support 
and the charges of government. A violation of his in- 
structions carried with it a forfeiture of his security and 
loss of office, a refusal to bend to the will of the assembly 
contrary to his orders meant no salary, no supplies, and a 
serious hindrance to military operations. Under the stress 
of circumstances the governor was no doubt justified in 
waiving his instructions, but he is open to censure for ac- 
cepting the vote of money from the house. Moreover, in 
violation of his instructions Denny assented to a bill to 
reissue for a period of sixteen years the £80,000 put in 
circulation by the law of 1746.^^^ To this law was at- 
tached a rider granting to Colonel Hunter, the financial 
agent of the crown, a loan of £50,000 for one year without 
interest to enable him to liquidate the expenses of a former 
campaign pending the arrival of funds from England. 
The only redress of the proprietors was to put Denny's 
bond in suit and to appeal to the crown to veto the laws. 
The first was rendered ineffectual by the decision of the 
assembly to indemnify Denny should the Penns take ac- 
tion against the bond.^^^ Denny was dismissed from office 
and an appeal against the laws was made to the crown. 

In March, 1760, the proprietors laid before the king a 
memorial protesting against the confirmation of eleven 
acts which in one way or another violated their territorial 
and governmental rights under the charter.^-^ The paper 
was turned over to the Board of Trade. Before it ap- 
peared the proprietors and the agents of the assembly with 

120 Kimball, Corres. of Wm. Pitt, II, 130; Pa. Col. Recs., VIII, 
358, 362; Pa. Statutes at Large, V, 427, 456. 

121 Pa. Votes of Assemlly, V, 68. 

122 Pa. Statutes at Large, V, 661-663, 689. 



FINANCE AND POLITICS 211 

their respective counsel.''^ The Penns were represented 
by the crown lawyers, Attorney- General Charles Pratt, 
and Solicitor General Charles Yorke.^^* rpj^^ £^^^ ^^isit 
they were able to secure the services of these officials seems 
to indicate the close sympathy between crown and pro- 
prietary government. Indeed, the crown faced practically 
the same problems in the royal provinces and identity of 
interests led to the support of the Penns by the crown. 
The agents of the assembly, Benjamin Franklin and 
Robert Charles, employed as counsel, Sir William de Grey, 
later attorney-general and chief justice of England, and 
Richard Jackson, later counsel to the Board of Trade.^^® 
It was to be a battle of the highest legal talent in the realm. 
Four hearings were held before the board during May and 
June.^2^ The chief law in debate was the land tax bill of 
1759. The attorney-general opened the case by stating 
*' the general Tendency and Disposition of the House of 
Assembly of the Province at all times to encroach upon the 
Rights of the Proprietaries, the Prerogative of the Crown, 
and the Sovereign Government of the Mother Country, by 
their asserting that the Lieutenant Governor was not the 
Governor of the Crown ; — by their almost rebellious Dec- 
larations with respect to the Instruction concerning Paper 
Currency founded upon an Address of Parliament ; — by 
denying the Right of the Proprietaries to instruct their 
Gov^ and other Acts of avowed Democracy." He then 
proceeded to discuss the objections to the law; the arbi- 
trary taxation of proprietary estates which yielded no 
revenue, making bills of credit a legal tender in payment 
of the proprietary quit-rents, and leaving the money 
granted to the public service to the sole disposition of a 



123 Pa. statutes at Large, V, 690. 

124 lUd., V, 692. 

125 ihid., V, 692. 

126 md., V, 691-697; B. T. Jour., LXVIII, 106, 108, 118, 129, 
133, 135, 136-143, 143-148, 148-149, 151-153. 



212 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

committee of the assembly.^^'^ Mr. de Grey characterized 
the charges against his constituents as " ornaments of 
speech unsupported by any evidence whatever " and in- 
sisted that the conduct of the assembly during the war 
was ' ' particularly meritorious. " ^-^ A very unique point 
was raised by de Grey. He contended that the laws be- 
fore them were regularly passed and laid before the crown 
in conformity with the charter and the only question then 
to be decided was whether the laws were consistent with 
the sovereignty and prerogatives of the crown. This ar- 
gument was based on the clause of the charter which re- 
served to the king the power of veto in these respects, but 
that the clause which required all laws to be consonant 
to equity and not repugnant to English statutes conferred 
no veto power on the crown. Moreover, de Grey contended 
that the interests of the proprietors could not be consid- 
ered in this matter nor had they any right to rely upon 
the crown for redress. This argument was based on the 
fact that the governors were under bond to the proprie- 
tors to obey their instructions and any violation of the ob- 
ligation was entirely a private matter. At the close of 
the hearing the board sat two days to consider the laws 
and on June 24 sent its report to the Plantation Com- 
mittee of the Council.^-^ 

The whole tenor of the report is eminently favorable to 
the proprietors. In the first place considerable space was 
given in refutation of the curious argument of de Grey.^^^ 
The board maintained the right of the crown to veto all 
laws of the province whether inconsistent with the royal 
prerogative or contrary to equity and English law and 
that such had ever been the practice. Furthermore, the 
proprietors were in no ways excluded from the right of 
all English subjects to appeal to the throne for redress, 

127 Pa. statutes at Large, V, 692-693. 

128 Ihid., V, 694-695. 

129 Ibid., V, 697. 

130 lUd,, V, 699-703; Pa. Col. Recs., VIII, 525-529. 



FINANCE AND POLITICS 213 

neither could the latter be excluded from securing all infor- 
mation necessary to the proper exercise of the veto power. 
The appeal of the Penns in this case was deemed especially 
proper because of the injury done to them by the assembly 
which used the public purse first to corrupt the governor 
and then to take away the means by which he could be pun- 
ished. The act to issue £100,000 was offered for disap- 
proval on the same objections as made by the attorney- 
general.^^^ The fact that the currency was already in 
circulation and that the veto of the law would impair 
its credit and injure innocent holders was duly con- 
sidered, but the injustice to the proprietors overshad- 
owed all else and demanded the veto. The law to reissue 
the c£80,000 for sixteen years and its supplement were re- 
ported for disapproval because the period of circulation 
was too long and the amount was not needed by reason 
of the large amount of currency put in circulation during 
the war.^^- The board held that although the act of 1751, 
which limited the issue of notes for emergencies to five 
years and those for circulation to three years, extended 
only to New England, yet the restrictions were valid for 
all colonies and that therefore Pennsylvania should be 
kept up to that standard. These laws were also open to 
the same objections as urged against the land tax act; the 
proprietors were forced to receive their rents in currency 
and the governor was allowed no voice in the disposal of 
the money. Moreover, the board objected to the blending 
in one act two totally different matters, the reissue of the 
currency and the loan to Colonel Hunter. This device 
subjected the governor and crown to the alternative of 
approving an objectionable measure or of rejecting one 
quite necessary to the public service. That this was the 
conscious intention of the assembly there is little doubt. 

131 Pa. Statutes at Large, V, 704-711; Pa. Col. Rees., VIII, 529- 
535. 

132 Pa. Statutes at Large, V, 711-716; Pa. Col. Recs., VIII, 535- 
538. 



214 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1 7G5 

This practice was forbidden in the royal provinces by 
standing instructions forbidding the governors to assent 
to riders/^^ but over the executives of the chartered col- 
onies the crown enjoyed no such control. As the money 
from the English treasury was then on its way to Colonel 
Hunter and would probably anticipate the notice of the 
veto it was thought that no harm would be done to the 
holders of the currency by reason of the disallowance of 
the law. 

The agents for the assembly were not content to allow 
the matter to rest there but carried it on appeal to the 
Plantation Committee of the Council. In the last of Au- 
gust the committee granted both sides two hearings.^^* As 
a result the law to reissue £80,000 with its supplement was 
vetoed but on the land tax law a compromise was reached. 
This was accomplished through the mediation of Lord 
Mansfield. The committee was of the opinion that the 
act was '* fundamentally unjust and wrong/' but on con- 
dition that the law be altered by the assembly to meet the 
objections, it was reported for approval. The agreement, 
solemnly subscribed to by the agents for the assembly, 
stipulated that the law should be changed to exclude from 
taxation the unsurveyed waste lands of the proprietors, 
to tax their located unimproved lands no higher than the 
lowest rate at which similiar lands of the people were 
taxed, to give the governor a voice in the disposal of the 
money raised by the law, and to make provision for the 
payment of proprietary quit-rents according to the terms 
of the contracts.^^^ The ideal condition would have been 
not to confirm the law until the assembly had seen fit to 
honor the agreement of its agents. This was not possible 
under the charter which required that all laws not acted 
upon within six months after delivery to the council stood 

133 Greene, Provincial Governor, 164. 

134 Pa. Statutes at Large, V, 654 ; Pa. Col. Recs., VIII, 553. 

135 Pa. Statutes at Large, V, 655-657; 659; Pa, Col Bees., VIII, 
554^ 555, 557. 



FINANCE AND POLITICS 215 

confirmed by the lapse of time. In a royal province the 
crown was able to suspend action on a law indefinitely but 
this was precluded by the clause of the charter. The law 
could not be altered except by trusting to the good faith 
of the assembly to fulfill the pledge or by an appeal to 
the sovereign power of Parliament. The fact of the matter 
is that the assembly showed little inclination to honor the 
agreement. 

In January, 1761, the governor called upon the assem- 
bly to alter the act of 1759 in accordance with the 
pledge. ^^^ The assembly replied that no part of the pro- 
prietors' unsurveyed waste lands was taxed, that in some 
cases their located uncultivated lands were not taxed at 
all and in others not assessed higher than similar lands of 
the inhabitants, and that there was no intention to impair 
the contracts of the Penns by obliging them to receive their 
quit-rents in currency. ^^^ Although these statements may 
have been sincere, the principles of good faith required the 
redemption of the pledge of the agents by altering the law. 
Although this was urged time and again by the governor 
the house consistently refused to do so. The conduct of the 
assembly practically amounted to a repudiation of the 
agreement. Not only did it refuse to alter the law but 
it had the temerity to offer to the governor for his assent 
other supply bills containing several of the very features 
objected to at home, such as giving the governor no share 
in the disposal of the money, making no provision for the 
payment of proprietary rents according to contract, and 
tacking on riders. The house persisted in its refusal to 
allow the governor to amend money bills and the gov- 
ernor steadfastly refused to accept the bills unless in ac- 
cordance with the agreement and the sentiments as ex- 
pressed by the Board of Trade in 1760.'^^ The deadlock 

136 Pa. Col. Recs., VIII, 559, 563, 579. 

137 Ihid., VIII, 584-585. 

^&8lbid., VIII, 606-609, 611, 693, 695-697, 716-719; IX, 10-11, 19, 
20, 21, 53. 



216 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1G96-1765 

was particularly aggravating coining at the time of the 
wide-spread Indian uprising under the leadership of Pon- 
tiac. The frontier was left open to the Indian warfare 
and the military operations of the English commanders 
were delayed. The attitude of the assembly called forth 
a severe censure from General Amherst. ^^^ Under the 
press of circumstances the assembly finally yielded to the 
demands of the governor in the supply bill of ITG-i.^**^ It 
was at this time that the Paxton Boj^s from the frontier, 
left defenseless, took matters into their own hands by killing 
the peaceful Indians seated on Conestoga Manor and with 
arms in their hands marched on Philadelphia to force the 
assembly to grant them defenses and redress their griev- 
ances. It was at this time that the assembly, embittered 
against the proprietors, petitioned the crowTi to grant the 
province royal government.^*^ 

It was no doubt with a sigh of relief that Thomas Penn 
wrote from London in December, 1763, to Governor John 
Penn, ' ' our disputes with the assembly about paper money 
will soon be at an end, as a bill is to be brought into par- 
liament to put the colonies in that respect on the same 
footing with New England. ' ' ^^^ 

During the war the merchants of London, Liverpool 
and Glasgow trading to Virginia complained of the per- 
nicious effects of a legal tender paper currency in this 
province. The vast charges of the war forced Virginia 
for the first time to resort to a paper currency."^ Like- 
wise Pennsylvania was driven to greater issues to meet the 
heavy burdens of defense. The latter province created 
between 1755 and 1760 £485,000 in bills of credit for this 
purpose,^** in addition to the £80,000 put in circulation 

139 Per. Col. Rccs., IX, 62, 114. 

i40/&i(Z., IX, 174-178, 180-188; Pa. Statutes at Large, VI, 3^4. 

141 Lincoln, Revolutionary Movement in Pa., 98-113. 

142 Penn Mss., Letter Bh., VIII, 14, Thos. Penn to John Penn, 
Dec. 10, 1763. 

143 Beer, British Col. Pol., 1754-1765, 185-188. 

144 B. T. Paps., PI. Gen., XXI, ff. 83-87. 



FINANCE AND POLITICS 217 

by the act of 1746. The colonies south of New England 
had not been included in the act of 1751 which forbade 
the issue of paper as a legal tender currency, because they 
had kept within the bounds of moderation in issuing bills 
of credit and not because the '' reasonings and princi- 
ples ' ' upon which the act of 1751 was based were not appli- 
cable to all the colonies. ^"^^ But the vast issues in Pennsyl- 
vania and Virginia brought about the same difficulties 
which English merchants had experienced before in New 
England. In 1763, at the close of the war, the English 
merchants renewed their protests. In February, 1763, 
after hearing the arguments of the merchants and agents 
for Virginia, the Board of Trade came to the conclusion 
that the issue of paper currency with the legal tender 
quality was '' destructive of the publick Credit of those 
colonies, injurious to the Commerce of Great Britain, in- 
consistent with the interest of the Crown, and contrary 
to the sense of the Parliament " as expressed in the Act 
of 1751 pertaining to New England."*^ No further action 
was taken till the beginning of the next year. In Janu- 
ar}^, 1764, the board took into consideration the condition 
of the currency in the colonies not under the law of 1751 
and notified the merchants and colonial agents to appear 
before it. Several hearings were granted to both sides 
on the question of the advisability of extending the act of 
1751 to all the colonies."^ The board then availed itself 
of the information of colonial proprietors and others con- 
versant with the actual conditions in America. At the 
meeting of February 2, there was present two governors, 
five former governors, the proprietors of Pennsylvania, as 
also the agent, Richard Jackson, and the chief justice of 
the latter province.^*^ It was agreed unanimously that 



145 N. J. Archives, IX, 409-410. 

146 B. T. Jour., LXXI, 39, 41-45. 
i^Tlhid., LXXII, 11, 16, 23. 

148 Ihid., LXXII, 42, 54. 



218 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

to check by act of Parliament all further issues of paper 
money as a legal tender and to forbid the currency in cir- 
culation to be a legal tender after the period fixed for re- 
demption was ''highly expedient and proper. "^^^ 
Thomas Penn and Kichard Jackson asked that action should 
be deferred till the next session of Parliament in order to 
allow the colonies time to express their sentiments on the 
subject. The next day the agents for six colonies asked 
the same favor. The board was impatient of delay and 
asked the agents for a categorical answer whether they 
would or would not oppose the bill.^^*^ Granted a few days 
for consultation, they replied that they could not agree 
to the bill. They gave it as their undivided opinion that 
a certain quantity of legal tender paper money was needed 
in each colony for strictly local purposes and craved time 
for the colonies to consider the matter and report the 
quantum necessary.^^^ The board was not disposed to 
hearken to the request and on February 9 reported to the 
Privy Council the necessity of an act of Parliament to 
check the issue of legal tender bills of credit.^^- 

The board claimed that "this means of declaring bills 
of Credit to be a legal Tender, was false in it's principles, 
unjust in it's foundation, and manifestly fraudulent in 
it's operation." It claimed also that paper cur- 
rency tended to drive specie, the fittest materials for a me- 
dium of exchange, out of circulation; that the quantity 
issued was all out of proportion to the actual needs, and 
that a sufficient foundation for securing the paper was 
not provided whereby the bills of credit had greatly de- 
preciated and fluctuated in value, and worked injustice 
to colonial creditors and brought loss and suffering to the 
English merchants trading to the colonies. The baneful 
influences which a depreciated currency cast upon the 

149 B. T. Jour., LXXII, 57-5^. 

1^-0 iMd., 59-60. 

151 lUd., 70-71, 80. 

152 2V. /. Archives, IX, 405-414. 



FINANCE AND POLITICS 219 

morals of the people did not escape the attention of the 
Board. The charge was brought that debtors in the colo- 
nial assemblies urged the creation of new issues with 
fraudulent intentions. Since the act of 1751 had corrected 
the evils of a paper currency as a legal tender in New Eng- 
land, the board urged that the beneficial restrictions of 
this act should be extended to all the colonies. The efforts 
of the board resulted in the passage of the statute of 1764 
which forbade the issue of bills of credit as a legal tender 
or the continuance of the bills then current beyond the 
period fixed for redemption. ^^^ In view of the facts in 
the case, there is little doubt of the necessity and propriety 
of this action. 

The passage of the currency act of 1764 was doubtless 
one of the factors which promoted in the colonies discon- 
tent with English rule. Franklin, before the bar of the 
House of Commons in 1766, specified the currency act as 
one of the five causes which tended to lessen the respect 
of the colonies for the authority of Parliament.^^* It was 
the hostility of the English government to the financial 
schemes of Virginia which caused Patrick Henry to ex- 
claim in the Parson's Cause that the king " from being 
the father of his people, degenerated into a Tyrant, and 
forfeits all rights to his Subjects' obedience." The sub- 
sequent popularity of Henry attests to the prevalence of 
a spirit of discontent with English interference.^^^ The 
currency act drew strong remonstrances from the pens of 
John Dickinson ^^^ and Benjamin Franklin ^^"^ who summed 
up the colonial side of the currency question. They con- 
tended that the chronic lack of specie was not due to the 

153 4 George III, c. 34. 

154 Franklin, Works, (Smyth ed.) IV, 420. 

155 Beer, British Col. Pol., 1754-1165, 185-186. 

156 The Late Regulations Respecting the British Colonies Con- 
sidered, 1765, Works, I, 218-221. 

157 Remarks and Facts concerning American Paper Money, 
1766, Works, (Smyth ed.) V, 1-14. 



220 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

deleterious effect of an unsound paper currency, but to 
the unfavorable balance of trade which drained the gold 
and silver to England. Franklin admitted that specie 
formed the best medium of exchange, but claimed that the 
lack of mines and the unfavorable balance of trade forced 
the colonies to the expediency of paper currency. Under 
the circumstances, he said, a paper currency, kept within 
proper bounds, was necessary. It aided settlement, in- 
creased production, and in the long run inured to the 
benefit of England by creating an increased demand for 
home manufactures.^^^ These were the arguments of the 
colonists and the truth of them cannot be easily gainsaid. 
But the fact remains that the over-issue of notes all out of 
proportion to the needs of domestic economy and the con- 
sequent depreciation undoubtedly helped to drive specie 
out of the colonies and worked injustice to English as well 
as colonial creditors. It was contended that the English 
merchants suffered no losses since their debts were paid 
according to the rate of exchange between the colony and 
London. ^^^ But the chief difficulty here lay in the fact 
that this rate fluctuated violently between the time of con- 
tract and payment. In 1723, when Pennsylvania first en- 
tered upon a paper currency policy, the exchange between 
Philadelphia and London was 50 per cent., it rose to 70 
per cent, in 1741, then fell violently to 50, and during the 
French and Indian war fluctuated between 55 and 721/2 
per cent.^®^ The rise in exchange had the effect of impair- 
ing contract obligations entered into at a time when the 
exchange was lower. Pownall said, '' Parliament very 
properly interposed, by applying the only adequate and 

158 See the opinions of Gov. Burnet of N. Y., 1724; and Gov. 
Montgomerie of N. J., N. Y. Col Docs., V, 738, 832. Also the opin- 
ions of the governors of Pa., B. T. Paps., Props., XI, R 42, 47, 78. 

159 Dickinson, Late Regulations, Works, I, 218; Franklin, Re- 
marks and Facts, Works, (Smyth ed.) V, 5; Beer, British Col. Pol., 
115\-1165, 180-182. 

ifioB. T. Paps., Props., XIV, T 25, 47, 48; PL Gen., XXI, ff. 
83-87. 



FINANCE AND POLITICS 221 

efficient remedy, namely, by prohibiting these colony legis- 
latures from being able to make the paper currency a legal 
tender. ' ' ^^^ But the colonial contention was summed up 
in the words of Franklin, " It seems hard therefore to 
draw all their real Money from them, and then refuse 
them the poor Privilege of using Paper instead of it. ' ' ^*^- 
In fact, the action of the English government in this case 
receives ample justification when one remembers the evil 
influences of a paper currency, as typified in Shay's Re- 
bellion, after the colonies had gained their independence. 
The critical situation of the period after 1776 forced the 
framers of the constitution of 1789 to provide that no 
state shall emit bills of credit, make anything but gold and 
silver a tender in payment of debts, or pass any law to 
impair the obligations of contracts. 

The refusal of the assembly to honor the royal procla- 
mation of 1704 and the act of Parliament of 1708 fixing 
the rate of foreign coin current in the colonies ; its declara- 
tion against the right of the crown to instruct the gov- 
ernor even upon an address of Parliament, and the repudi- 
ation of the agreement of 1760 entered into by its agents 
with the home government are conclusive evidence of the 
strained relations between the two parts of the Empire. 

isiPownall, Administration of Cols. (ed. 1768), 188. 
162 Franklin, Works, (Smyth ed.), V, 7. 



CHAPTER EIGHT 

THE QUAKER AND ANGLICAN 

The Quaker movement to America, like that of the Puri- 
tans, was the result of religious persecution and political 
oppression at home. Penn wrote, ''we in New England 
. . . New Jersey and Pennsylvania went thither, by 
ample grants from the crown, to make and keep ourselves 
easy and safe in our civil and religious privileges, . . . 
it was to be free of the church's power and out of her 
reach that we went so far, and not to make colonies for 
her but from her, for ourselves. ' ' ^ The Quakers and Puri- 
tans were out of sympathy with the ideas dominant in 
church and state in England and they betook themselves 
to America where they might be able to work out their 
own peculiar conceptions in religion and politics untram- 
meled by the state or church at home. It was Archbishop 
Laud's policy of Thorough in the time of Charles 1 which 
drove the Puritans to America ; it was the Clarendon Code 
of the Restoration which led the Quakers to found colonies 
in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. 

Driven to seek shelter in the settled colonies of the new 
world, the Quakers meet with the same spirit of persecu- 
tion. In Puritan New England the newcomers met with 
stripes, banishment, and even death on the gallows. In 
Anglican Virginia they were unwelcome, and in most col- 
onies they were visited with civil and religious disabilities.^ 
Without political influence in most of the colonies, lacking 
unity and cohesion of life by reason of their broadly scat- 
tered settlements, it was highly desirable that the Quakers 

1 Duke of Portland Mss., IV, 80, Hist. Mss. Com., Report 15, pt. 4. 

2 Osgood, Amer. Cols, in 11th. Cent., I, 269-287; Bruce, Insti- 
tutional Hist, of Ya., I, 222-251. 

222 



THE QUAKER AND ANGLICAN 223 

should found a colony for themselves, where, free from the 
oppression of other faiths, they would be able to establish 
a government of their own device and see the working into 
practice of their own peculiar conceptions in matters of 
religion. Such was the purpose which actuated Penn to 
secure a grant of land in America.^ 

While both the Puritans and the Quakers became col- 
onists for religious reasons, their ideas in politics and re- 
ligion were diametrically opposed to each other. The 
Puritans went to America to found a colony of their own 
faith exclusively. Penn said that he went ' ' thither to lay 
the foundation for a free colony for all mankind that 
should go thither, more especially those of my own pro- 
fession, not that I would lessen the civil liberties of others 
because of their persuasion, but screen and defend our 
own from any infringement on that account. " * In Penn 's 
religious philosophy there was no place for intolerance. 
It was in this spirit that Penn and the Quakers drew up a 
law in England before their departure, later ratified by an 
assembly of the freemen of the colony in 1682, granting 
religious liberty to '' all persons living in this province, 
who confess one almighty and eternal God, to be the crea- 
tor, upholder and ruler of the world, . . . and live 
peaceably and justly in civil society . . ."; and be- 
stowed political privileges upon all ' ' such as profess faith 
in Jesus Christ." Thus freedom of worship was granted 
to all Deists and civil liberties to all Christians.® 

The path which led to a realization of Penn's ''Holy 
Experiment" was beset with many and serious difficulties. 
It must be borne in mind that Penn's dominion was not 
an independent state invested with sovereign power, but 
was a dependency subject to the control of the English 
government. In the first place, the royal charter contained 

3 Andrews, Colonial Self-Government, 1G2-168; Sharpless, A 
Quaker Experiment in Government, 7-20. 

4 Penn-Logan Corres., 1, 373. 

5 Pa. Col. Recs., 1, 40, 41. 



224 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

provisions which made it possible for an Anglican govern- 
ment at home to interfere in the religious regulations of a 
dissenting colony. Then again, by the charter as well by 
the clause of the act of 1696, it was stipulated that the 
laws of the province should be consonant to reason and 
equity and agreeable as far as circumstances would allow 
to English law.^ But the court which decided upon these 
questions was the English government. The Quakers, ac- 
cording to English law, were dissenters and hence their 
legislation, which gave expression to their dissenting 
views, was liable to be declared null and void as contrary 
to English law. The Quaker law which granted freedom 
of worship to all believers in God was contrary to the Tol- 
eration Act of 1689 which excluded Catholics, Jews and 
Socinians.'^ The law of the colony allowed Quakers to use 
the affirmation in all cases whatsoever, but the English 
law of 16S"6 allowed the Quakers to affirm in all public 
proceedings except in giving evidence in criminal cases, 
in serving on juries, or holding a place of public trust.^ 
The position of the Friends was most uncomfortable. If 
they kept faith with their religious tenets, as men having 
the courage of their convictions will ever do, they violated 
their charter and rendered it liable to forfeiture and their 
laws to be declared null. If they kept faith with their 
charter they would prove false to their ideals. Finally, 
by the charter the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the bishop 
of London in the colony was expressly provided for in the 
clause which allowed him to appoint ministers for congre- 
gations of not less than twenty upon application to him.^ 
This provision was inserted at the instigation of Henry 
Compton, bishop of London, who watched over the interests 

6 Poore, Charters and Consts., (2d. ed.) II, 1511; 7 and 8 Wm. 
Ill, c. 22, sec. 8. 

7 I William and Mary, c. 18. 

8 7 and 8 William III, c. 34. 

s Poore, Charters and Consts., II, 1515. 



THE QUAKER AND ANGLICAN 225 

of the infant church in America with a zealous eye.^" It 
is quite probable that the refusal of the Puritan govern- 
ment in Massachusetts to open their narrow franchise to 
persons of other persuasions is responsible for this pro- 
vision in Penn's charter. Of course this stipulation ac- 
corded well with Penn's principles as to freedom of 
worship, but later we shall see that Penn had cause to re- 
gret the intense opposition of this active prelate to the 
Quaker doctrines. 

For the first decade of the life of the colony the Quakers 
experienced no difficulty in putting into effect their reli- 
gious doctrines. The two cardinal tenets of the Quakers, 
which were to cause them great anxiety and vexation, 
were the sinfulness of an oath and the wrongfulness of all 
war, whether defensive or offensive. To them the biblical 
injunctions from the Sermon on the Mount, '' Swear not 
at all; . . . But let your communication be. Yea, 
Yea; Nay, Nay," and '^ Resist not evil " formed the basis 
of the Quaker beliefs. ^^ Since the Quakers were dominant 
in the colony it was but natural that their ideas on the 
questions of the oath and war should be reflected in their 
legislation. By the law of 1682 it was specified that the 
solemn promise of the witness to speak the truth, the whole 
truth and nothing but the truth to the matter or thing in 
question was sufficient to qualify him. Had this state of 
freedom from interference persisted the oath would have 
disappeared, all Christians would have been honored with 
political privileges, all Deists with freedom of worship, 
and the colony would have played no part in wars. But 
this Utopian state was not to exist. In 1689 began the 
long series of wars between England and France which 
involved the colonies. Unfortunately for the Quakers who 
disbelieved in all war, they were called upon to cooperate 

10 CaZ. State Paps., CoL, 1681-1685, 3, 13; B. T. Jour., Ill, 253. 

11 Sliarpless, A Quaker Experiment in Government, 12-15; Trev- 
elyan, England under the Stuarts, 312-315. 



226 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

with the other colonies in the defense of the frontier. De- 
spite royal orders, the Quaker assembly refused to put the 
colony in a state of defense or to aid New York to defend 
her frontier. The refusal led the crown in 1692 to deprive 
Penn of his powers of government and to place the prov- 
ince under the control of the royal governor of New 
York.^- This was a premonition of the difficulties the 
Quakers were to suffer at the hands of the English govern- 
ment because of their religious principles. The institu- 
tion of royal control paved the way for the undoing of 
Penn's cherished views as to political privileges. The 
royal commission to Fletcher, as governor of Pennsylvania, 
directed him to call an assembly whose members before 
taking their seats should subscribe to the provisions of the 
Toleration Act of 1689.^^ By this action a test of office 
now for the first time appeared in the province, and de- 
stroyed Penn's plan with respect to political privileges, 
for thereby Catholics, Jews, and Socinians were excluded 
from the assembly. It is curious to note that the Tolera- 
tion Act, which in England was designed to grant freedom 
of worship to favored dissenting sects, was subverted to a 
political use in the colony. It is also noteworthy that this 
act, applicable only to England because the colonies were 
not mentioned therein, was extended to the colony by force 
of a royal order. In effect it was legislating for the colony 
by royal prerogative. To the imposition of this political 
test the members of the assembly made no protest, but the 
Quaker contingent objected to taking the oaths required 
by it. To meet this objection, fourteen Quakers by the 
grace and favor of Governor Fletcher were allowed '' for 
conscience sake " to make the affirmation instead.^* In 
1694 Penn's powers of government were restored to him 
on his promise to see that the assembly obeyed the orders 

12 See page 262. 

13 N. Y. Col. Docs., Ill, 856. 

14 Pa. Col. Recs., I, 398. 



THE QUAKER AND ANGLICAN 227 

from the crown as to defense. In the Frame of Govern- 
ment of 1696, drawn up by the colonists without Penn's 
consent, the English Toleration Act was made a test of 
office in the province. ^^ This action together with the fact 
that no objection was made to the imposition of the Tolera- 
tion Act as a test in 1693 makes plain that Penn's co-re- 
ligionists did not share his advanced and enlightened views 
as to civil liberties. They wished a government by Prot- 
estant Christians only. In 1699, on Penn's return to the 
province, the old order was restored. By the Charter 
of Privileges of 1701 the principles of freedom of worship 
to all believers in one God and civil privileges to all Chris- 
tions were reasserted and received further sanction in the 
laws of that year.^^ These acts still had to run the gaunt- 
let of the home government. 

The latter years of the reign of William III and the 
time of Queen Anne was a period of anxiety to the Quakers. 
The reasons for this are simple and clear. In the closing 
years of the reign of William III there developed reac- 
tionary tendencies against the stand taken in the Tolera- 
tion Act. This movement reached its culmination in the 
reign of Queen Anne, when a wave of High Church feeling 
set in against toleration and dissent. Queen Anne was 
favorable to the High Church Tory party, and encouraged 
by royal support, the party sought to put into effect its 
policy against non-conformity. After several unsuccessful 
attempts, the Tories were able to secure the passage of 
two laws in the last years of Queen Anne's reign. These 
were the Occasional Conformity Act of 1711 and the 
Schism Act of 1714; the former designed to check the eva- 
sion of the test act by dissenters, the latter intended to 
place the education of children of dissenting parents in 
the hands of the Church. ^^ It was under the influence 

15 Pa. Col. Recs., I, 50; Charters and Laws, 247-249. 

16 Pa. Col. Recs., II, 57 ; Pa. Statutes at Large, II, 3. 

17 Lecky, History of England, 1, 55-105; Trevelyan, England under 
the Stuarts, 475-476, 485-486, 503-517. 



228 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

of this reactionary movement at home that the Church be- 
came militant and aggressive in the colonies. Its reflex 
influence is seen in the establishment by law of the Angli- 
can Church in Maryland and the Carolinas and of the 
growth of Anglicanism in other colonies.^^ The efforts of 
Penn and the Quakers to obtain the consummation of their 
ideals fell upon unpleasant times. In the sphere of poli- 
tics the period is also marked by the institution of a closer 
control of the colonies as evidenced by the act of 1606, the 
creation of the Board of Trade, the establishment of ad- 
miralty courts and an orderly customs service in the col- 
onies, and the efforts to vacate the colonial charters. Then 
for the first time the Board of Trade demanded obedience 
to that provision of the charter which required that the 
laws of the province be submitted to the royal review. 
The board frequently called into consultation the bishop 
of London on laws affecting the interests of Churchmen in 
the colonies, and under his influence many such laws were 
disallowed. Henry Compton, the bishop of London at this 
period, was most active in his zeal and care for the Church 
in America over which his episcopal jurisdiction extended. 
Moreover, Pennsylvania was to become acquainted for the 
first time with royal officials in the admiralty and customs 
service, all of whom were zealous Churchmen as well as 
active agents of imperial control. Such were the influ- 
ences at work bringing the Anglican state-church system 
into conflict with the Quaker government and religion. 
It seems that the Church, from which the Quakers had 
hoped to flee, followed them into their new home. 

Had the colony been peopled solely by the followers of 
Penn, or by those like the German Pietists, whose reli- 
gious views were similar to those held by Quakers, or 
by those who were entirely indifferent on religious ques- 
tions, there would have been slight cause for the home 
government to interfere with many of the Quaker ideals. 

18 Osgood, Amer. Cols, in llth. Cent., II, 325-332. 



THE QUAKER AND ANGLICAN 229 

But this condition of affairs seldom existed. Within the 
province itself the Quakers were to meet with the sturdiest 
sort of opposition by the coming in of others who differed 
fundamentally from them on religious matters,. As those 
of the Anglican faith found their way into Pennsylvania, 
formed their congregations, erected their churches, and 
gained some influence in the community, there was bound 
to be a revival in the colony of the traditional enmity be- 
tween Anglican and Quaker. In 1695 there was organized 
in Philadelphia, Christ Church, the first Anglican church 
in the colony.^^ It became the center of a strong and ag- 
gressive Anglican minority against the Quaker govern- 
ment on the tender questions of the oath and war. From 
this time on there always existed two parties in the prov- 
ince, the Quaker party and the Church party. From the 
very nature of the case a conflict was inevitable between 
those who believed in the ecclesiastical laws of England 
and those who fled to America to be out of reach of the 
Church's power; between those who were desirous of de- 
fending their homes and lives against the assaults of the 
French and Indians and those who believed all war was 
iniquitous. The Quakers, who formed the dominant party 
in provincial politics, were able to carry into actual prac- 
tice their peculiar views; while the Anglicans could rely 
upon the support of the home government and the mother 
Church to safeguard their interests. The contest was vio- 
lent and bitter. 

The Episcopalians were weak in numbers but several 
circumstances combined to give them an influence all out 
of proportion to their numbers and position. They could 
look for support to the English government and the bishop 
of London. Then again there was established in 1701 by 
royal charter the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel 
in Foreign Parts.-^ It was organized by the English 

19 Watson, Annals of Phila., (1877), I, 378. 

20 Humphries, Historical Account of the Society for the Propaga- 
tion of the Gospel, 4-24, 



230 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

bishops and other Churchmen, both lay and clerical, and 
the object was to provide " learned and orthodox min- 
isters " to preach the gospel and administer the sacra- 
ments in America and to bring the colonists back into the 
arms of the historic church. In 1702, the Society sent 
out itinerant ministers, George Keith and John Talbot. 
They traveled from Massachusetts to the Carolinas preach- 
ing and organizing the scattered members of the Church 
into congregations. Great efforts were put forth espe- 
cially in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, the strongholds 
of Quaker power.-^ Keith especially was very bitter in 
his attitude toward the Quakers and very active in his 
work among them on behalf of the Church. This bitter- 
ness is explained by the fact that he had been turned out 
of the Quaker fold in Pennsylvania. He took orders in 
the Episcopal Church and returned to America fired with 
zeal for the church of his new adoption. In the Quaker 
provinces he was able to win over quite a few Keithian 
Quakers to the Anglican communion.-- As a result of 
the work of the Society and its missionaries, the Church 
grew in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. Christ Church, 
Philadelphia, increased in membership, churches were organ- 
ized at Chester and Radnor and other places in the prov- 
ince, and several in Delaware.-^ The Society supplied 
ministers and their salaries, while the English government 
contributed the passage money.-* These churches became 
the centers of the keenest sort of enmity to the Quakers. 
The hatred of the missionaries toward the Quakers is evi- 
denced by the fact that they classified Quakerism with 
heathenism, atheism, paganism, and, as one wrote, '' God 
knows what." They were referred to as " pests " and 

21 Humphries, op. cit., 31-36; Hills, History of the Church in Bur- 
lington, 18-23; passim. 

22 Hills, op. cit. 29-30, 45, 48-50, 52. 

23 Humphries, op. cit., 27-28, 35, 60-72. 

24 Andrews and Davenport, Guide to the Materials in British 
Archives, 398. 



THE QUAKER AND ANGLICAN 231 

their doctrines as " poisonous lyes." Talbot wrote that 
Penn in his writings appeared to be a " greater Anti- 
Christ than Julian the Apostate. "^^ Such was the char- 
acter of the feeling displayed by the Churchmen toward 
the Quakers whose colony they had invaded. The Angli- 
can position and influence was further strengthened by 
the activity of the royal officials. Prior to 1697 there were 
few agents of the crown in the colony or neighboring col- 
onies, but with the establishment of a revenue service and 
admiralty courts, Pennsylvania as well as other chartered 
colonies for the first time became acquainted with men 
who were not only active in enforcing imperial laws but 
equally zealous on behalf of the Church. Moreover, the 
hostility of the central government to the colonial charters 
resulted in Maryland's becoming a royal province in 1690 
and New Jersey in 1702.-^ The efforts of the royal agents 
in Pennsylvania and the neighboring provinces, the work 
of the Society and its missionaries, the activity of the 
bishop of London and the central government, all com- 
bined to threaten and overthrow the ' ' Holy Experiment. ' ' 
Governors Cornbury of New Jersey and Nicholson of Mary- 
land, Quary and IMoore, royal officers in Pennsylvania, 
were actively engaged in support of the Church, not only 
in their respective colonies, but also in the near-by prov- 
inces.-^ Hence when we consider the strength and activ- 
ity of all these various agents on behalf of Anglicanism 
we are able to appreciate the lamentation of the Quakers 

25 Hills, 41, 43, 83, 115; Perry, Hist. Collections rel. to the Amer. 
Col. Church, II, 68, 69, 163. 

26 Mereiiess, Maryland as a Proprietary Province, 437 ff., Tanner, 
Province of New Jersey, (Columbia College Studies, XXX), 579- 
601. 

27 Nicholson, Quary, Basse and other royal agents contributed in 
money and material toward the churches in N. J. and Pa. Nichol- 
son was called the " Prime Benefactor and Founder in chief of all." 
Hills, 28, 37, 39, 41, 45, 59, 129, passim; Dorr, History of Christ 
Church, 37, 39. Queen Anne sent gifts to the churches at Phila. 
and Burlington, Hills, 132; Dorr, 37. 



232 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

that they were being made dissenters in their own colony. 
The difficulty of working out their own religious ideas 
while remaining a dependency of England is well illus- 
trated in several cases. The colonial law of 1700 legalized 
the naming or writing of the days and months "as in 
Scripture and not by heathen names." In place of the 
calendar names for the days and months they were given 
a numerical nomenclature.-^ This is indicative of the 
Quaker scorn of pomp and love of simplicity. The home 
government disallowed this law on the ground that a man 
was privileged to call the names and days what he pleased, 
and the Board of Trade characterized the law " as in- 
significant and not fit to remain in force. ' ' -^ Such in- 
terference to say the least was unwarranted. By this law 
the Quakers did not at all interfere with the calendar ar- 
rangement nor seek to impose their peculiar views on 
others, but simply sought to legalize their own custom. 
But the disallowance in this case as in many others did 
not accomplish its design, for future laws legalized the 
naming of the days and months according to the Quaker 
custom. The whole situation is further illustrated in the 
case of the Quaker law imposing penalties upon those 
guilty of introducing stage-plays, masques, revels, bull 
baiting, cock-fighting, or guilty of playing at cards, dice, 
lottery and such like enticing games.^° This act of 1700 
was disallowed by the crown because " some innocent 
sports are thereby prohibited without reason. ' ' ^^ Twice 
the law was reenacted although twice rejected by the 
crown on the same ground.^- The disallowance finally had 
its effect, but it may be said that such unwarranted inter- 
ference in the internal polity of the colony served to create 
only disrespect for the will of the central government rather 

2s Pa. Statutes at Large, II, 19. 

^9 Ibid., 480. 

so IMcl, 4. 

3i/6t(7., 490. 

32 Ibid., 186, 360, 525, 529, 543, 550. 



THE QUAKER AND ANGLICAN 233 

than a proper regard for its authority. This lack of sym- 
pathy with colonial ideas simply illustrates the great weak- 
ness in the old British colonial system and it was without 
doubt one of the factors which tended to create discord and 
friction rather than a spirit of good-will between the two 
parts of the Empire. 

As regards the principle of freedom of worship it will 
be remembered that the law of 1700 granted religious lib- 
erty to all believers in one God. This was not in accord- 
ance with the Toleration Act which granted religious lib- 
erty to all except Catholics, Jews and Socinians. AVhen 
the colonial statute came before Attorney-General Northey 
for examination in 1705 he reported that it was not fit to 
be sanctioned because it showed no regard for the Chris- 
tian religion nor for the Toleration Act, which obliged peo- 
ple to renounce the Papacy and to believe in the Blessed 
Trinity and in the inspiration of the Old and New Test- 
aments, and he concluded his report with the words, ' ' none 
can tell what conscientious practices allowed by this act 
may extend to. ' ' ^^ The crown vetoed the law.^* But it is 
quite clear that at this time as in the time of Fletcher the 
Quakers did not share the enlightened views of Penn, 
w^hich were too advanced for that narrow age. Upon no- 
tice of the objections and even before the act was vetoed, 
the assembly reenacted the law to obviate the objections, 
thus placing religious toleration on the basis of the Eng- 
lish law.^^ The Quaker assembly went further and fell 
away from their great leaders' high ideals with regard to po- 
litical privileges, which by the law of 1700 were bestowed 
upon all Christians. The law of 1706 took the same stand 
as in Fletcher's time and made the Toleration Act a test 
of office.^® Although the excluded sects. Catholics, Jews 
and Socinians, formed no appreciable part of the popula- 

33 Pa. statutes at Large, II, 489. 
Si Ibid., 450. 
S5iud., 171. 
sGlhid., 219. 



234 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-17G5 

tion, yet the fact remains that the Quaker province down 
to 1776 denied religious and political liberty to those of 
the above faiths. On these questions there could be no 
conflict between the Quaker and the Churchman for the 
former acquiesced in the ideals of the latter. But it is 
interesting to note that the initiative on these points came 
from the English government by the exercise of its au- 
thority. 

The real quarrel between Quaker and Anglican came 
over the oath and war. Of the latter question we shall 
treat in subsequent pages; it will be enough to say here 
that the refusal of the Quaker assembly to defend the prov- 
ince and to cooperate in the defense of the colonies against 
the French led to the downfall of Quaker power in politics. 
On the question of the oath there could be no compromise 
between those who believed in the sinfulness of the oath 
and those who held that the affirmation was detrimental 
to good government. The law of 1700 allowed those who 
for conscience's sake scrupled to take the oath to affirm in 
all cases whatever.^^ There was no intention to make the 
affirmation absolute to the entire exclusion of the oath; 
what the Quakers desired was simply to legalize their own 
ideas and not to force them upon others. Hence the law 
provided that a magistrate who scrupled not to administer 
the oath should be free to tender it to one who was free 
to take it, but the administration thereof was to be re- 
corded as the act of the jurant magistrate only, although 
declared to be just as valid as if done in the name of the 
court. The difficulties of this position were serious. In 
the first place, while to the Quaker the afHrmation was a 
sufficient obligation, by the Anglican it was considered to 
be deficient in binding force and not of the strength nec- 
essary to elicit the truth and accuracy of a statement or 
to qualify a person for office. Then again, it is essential 
to remember that a Quaker could neither tender nor re- 

37 Pa. Statutes at Large, II, 39. 



THE QUAKER AND ANGLICAN 2S5 

ceive an oath. This fact created a serious dilemma. It 
would happen that in cases cognizable before a single 
Quaker justice, or before a bench composed entirely of 
Quakers, if the oath was demanded the oath could not be 
given and a failure of justice would ensue. To this ex- 
tent the law imposed the Quaker view on those who believed 
just as sincerely in the oath as did the Quaker in the affir- 
mation. Moreover, this condition of affairs would allow 
an unscrupulous culprit to cheat justice by insisting upon 
an oath. Then again, this law was repugnant to the Eng- 
lish statute of 1696 which forbade the use of the affirma- 
tion in giving evidence in criminal cases, in serving on 
juries, and in qualifying for an office of trust in the gov- 
ernment. Although this statute did not extend to the col- 
onies, it was but natural that the Churchmen in the prov- 
ince would claim the benefits of it. 

The passage of the affirmation act of 1700 aroused a 
storm of protest from the members of Christ Church. In 
January, 1701, the vestry directed a complaint to the Board 
of Trade praying for a disallowance of the act and saying 
that the law infringed their religious rights as Church- 
men guaranteed to them by the charter ; that their lives, lib- 
erty and property were put in jeopardy contrary to English 
statute and connnon law by judges and juries not under 
oath ; and that though burdened with taxes the Quaker gov- 
ernment would provide no military defenses whatever. ^^ 
Similar petitions were also directed to the archbishop of 
Canterbury and the bishop of London. ^^ In October the 
vestry again addressed the Board of Trade praying for 
royal government in the province.**' At this time they 
were especially desirous that the bill in Parliament to va- 
cate the colonial charters should pass. It was felt that 
the charters stood in the way of the progress of the Church. 

38 5. T. Paps., Props., VI, pt. 1, G 13; Jour., XIV, 16. 
SQ Ihid., Props., VI, pt. 1, G 13. 
40 Ihid., Props., VI, pt. 2, I 2. 



236 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, IG96-1765 

Apprehension was felt lest the return of Penn to England 
to defend his charter should prejudice the passage of the 
bill. The vestry charged that the Quakers voted funds to 
Penn to aid in the charter's defense on his assurance that 
he would keep the Churchmen out of the province and the 
government in the hands of the Quakers. In order to 
show the need of royal government the memorial retailed 
several instances of gross irregularities alleged to have 
been committed in the province during Penn's sojourn 
there, 1692-1701. In one case involving a capital offense 
the grand jury refused to take the oath, and in another 
a Quaker guilty of a heinous offense was freed by trickery. 
The memorial concluded by saying that ^' if the records 
of this country be searched they will furnish a picture that 
will surfeit the world with Quaker tenets and practices." 
Other petitions were directed to the English prelates nar- 
rating instances of gross immoralities and irregularities 
too hideous to be disclosed.*^ Penn felt very bitterly be- 
cause of these unfair aspersions cast upon the fair name 
of the Quakers and his colony. He laid his troubles to the 
activity of Quary with his ' ' artful letters, ' ' helped by the 
bishop of London and Governor Nicholson of Maryland. 
Penn wrote, '' Church is their Cry and to disturb us their 
Merit, whose labors have made this place; they misrepre- 
sent all we doe & would make us Dissenters in our own 
Countrey," and that although the Churchmen enjoyed many 
places of trust in the government " they must have all; 
and what they do not attempt in State, they do boldly in 
the pulpit. ' ' *- Penn wrote to Robert Harley, ' ^ They will 
have no office in the government unless they swear, and 
have power to swear others, because they know our gov- 
ernment is under attests only, as may be easily thought, 
and then complain they cannot be admitted into the gov- 

41 " Some remarkable passages relating to ye Governt. of Penn- 
silva. from 1694 to 1701." Clarendon Mss., (Bodleian Lib.) 102, 
ff. 24-32. 

^'^ Pa. Archives, 1st. ser., I, 141. 



THE QUAKER AND ANGLICAN 237 

ernment because they are churchmen ; a most abusive treat- 
ment of us " *^ Penn said further, ' ' The spring of this 
in good measure had been from Colonel Nicholson of Vir- 
ginia, a line from anybody to him, and from the Bishop to 
Dr. Bray his suffragan in Maryland, might quench this." 
It was not to be expected, as Penn wrote, that the Quakers 
w^ould be ' ' so self-denying as to let those who had no part 
of the heat of the day, not one-third of the number, and 
not one-fourth of the estate, and not one-tenth of the 
trouble and labor, should give laws to us, and make us dis- 
senters, and worse than that in our own country. ' ' ** 
These few statements show the nature as well as the bitter- 
ness of the struggle between those whose views on the ques- 
tion of the oath were so radically different. 

The Anglicans came to the conclusion that the only way 
by which the interests of the Church might be advanced 
was through royal government in the province. Randolph, 
Nicholson, Quary, and Cornbury repeatedly urged the va- 
cation of the charters not only for the sake of increased 
administrative efficiency in imperial concerns, but also be- 
cause the charters stood as obstacles to the progress of the 
Church. This movement naturally was supported by the 
Anglicans, both lay and clerical, in the province. As early 
as 1697 Governor Markham charged Nicholson with stir- 
ring up a cabal against the Quaker government, with col- 
lecting evidence and affidavits in order to fasten calumny 
upon the chartered colonies, especially Pennsylvania; and 
with saying that '^ rebellion would not be treason " in 
order to bring about royal control.^^ Penn as well as Win- 
throp of Connecticut twice appeared before the Board of 
Trade to complain of the '' imperious and arbitrary con- 
duct of Col. Nicholson. " ^'^ It has already been stated that 

43 Duke of Portland Mss., IV, 32, Hist. Mss. Com. Report 15, pt. 4. 

44 Ihicl, 32, 80. 

45 i?, T. Paps., Props., II, B 3. 16. 

46 7?. T. Jour., IX, 276, 401. Cf. the charges agcainst Nicholson 
by the council of Virginia. Va. Magazine of History, III, 373-382. 



238 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

the vestry of Christ Church in 1701 appealed to the home 
government for royal protection. Likewise the people of 
Delaware asked for royal government chiefly because the 
Quaker assembly would provide no defense for the colony 
and territories.*^ 

After the failure of the bill of 1701 in Parliament, 
Quary, then in England, laid before the Board of Trade 
a list of charges against the province. He came armed 
with addresses from the members of the assembly from 
Delaware asking for royal government, with letters from 
Christ Church, and various affidavits and depositions to 
show the prevalence of corrupt government under Quaker 
rule.*^ In April, 1702, Quary laid before the board this 
list of charges, a curious mixture of fact and fancy.*^ He 
asserted that a Quaker jury had come to a decision by 
flipping a coin, and instanced three other cases of partial 
and shoddy justice. Penn replied by saying that the jury 
had been punished and offered extenuating circumstances 
in explanation of the three cases. ^^ On the whole the 
charges were very shallow indeed, and from a survey of 
the complaints one comes to the conclusion that the enemies 
of the Quakers in their zeal to advance the cause of the 
Church and royal government stooped to means which were 
devoid of justice and fair-play. It is manifestly unfair 
to seize upon chance irregularities which are bound to ap- 
pear in any community, no matter how well ordered, and 
to dress them up to represent the true condition of af- 
fairs. It seems that this is what Quary and his followers 
were guilty of doing. Not only this. Churchmen sought 
to create disturbances in the province in order to be able 
to represent to the home government that anarchy pre- 
vailed there. ^^ The purpose of such low measures was to 

47 B. T. Paps., Props., VI, pt. 2, I 6. 

48 /bid., Jour., XIV, 389-391. 

49/6td., Props., VI, pt. 2, I 17; VII, M 21. 

50 lUd., VI, pt. 2, I 19. 

i5i James Logan wrote to Penn, 1702, " We are really unhappily 



THE QUAKER AND ANGLICAN 239 

heap odium on the Quaker government in hopes of securing 
royal control.^^ 

The Board of Trade lent a willing ear to Quary's 
charges. In May, it directed a letter to Penn requesting 
him to answer whether all officials in the colony take the 
oath as directed by English law or in lieu thereof the affir- 
mation allowed to Quakers, and whether all persons are 
allowed to take the oath who are obliged and willing to do 
so.^^ Penn replied that the people engaged with him in 
founding the colony were chiefly Quakers and that the con- 
stitution and laws were made to meet their peculiar views ; 
hence the solemn affirmation was the usual way of pledging 
faith to the crown and proprietor and in giving evidence, 
but that no attempt was made to force an attest on any 
one who desired the oath.^* In January, 1703, the board 
reported to the Privy Council that it was absolutely nec- 
essary for the king's service and quite agreeable to the 
charter that the following measures should be enforced 
in the province. First, that all persons before entering 
upon office should take the oath enjoined by the laws of 
England or in lieu thereof the affirmation allowed to 
Quakers; second, that all who in England were obliged 
and willing to take the oath in any public or judicial pro- 
ceeding should be permitted to do so in the province, and 
in case of default or refusal the proceedings should be 

engaged here by lying exposed to such malicious spies, whose se- 
dulity to serve a dishonest cause keeps their thoughts constantly on 
the tenters, and dresses up each trivial passage in their secret cabals 
into a monstrous shape of malfeasance, the real subject of which is 
so slight where acted, that the persons concerned in it scarce ever 
think of it more till they hear it roar from some mighty court or 
committee there, and made an argument for invading others' rights, 
though in itself scarce worthy of one thought of a man of business." 
Penn-Logan Corres., I, 85-86. 

52 Penn-Logan Corres., I, 218, 230, 343. 

53 B. T. Paps., Props., Entry Bk. C, f . 475 ; Entry Bk. D, ff. 55, 
170-172; Jour., XV, 37. 

5Uhid., Entry Bk. D, ff. 258-260; Props., VII, L 3. 



240 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

deemed null and void.^^ The council approved the report 
the same day and copies were dispatched to Quary, Nichol- 
son and Cornbury whose hostility to the Quakers was a 
sufficient guarantee of its enforcement.^^ Penn at once 
protested against the royal order on both religious and con- 
stitutional grounds.^^ On religious grounds he declared 
that the enforcement of this order would practically render 
incapable of holding office the best and wealthiest of the 
Quakers who would then have nothing but their labor for 
their pains in founding the colony. On constitutional 
grounds he held that the crown had no power to extend 
to the colonies by force of the prerogative a law of Eng- 
land wherein the colonies were not mentioned. This, he 
held, was in effect legislating for the province by royal 
order contrary to the charter which granted the proprietor 
and the freemen of the colony power to make laws. Penn 
said that the laws of the colony could be augumented only 
by the imperial Parliament or the provincial assembly, 
and he asked that the order be put in the form of an in- 
struction, but to this the board would not listen. ^^ 

Armed with the royal order Quary appeared before the 
provincial council in May, 1703, to demand compliance.^^ 
To the first part of the order which demanded that all per- 
sons before entering upon office should take the oath di- 
rected by the law of England, or in lieu thereof the affir- 
mation allowed to Quakers, no objection was made since 
the Quakers were already in sympathy with the Toleration 
Act as a test of office. But the last clause was sure to 
make trouble, for it meant that a failure of justice would 
follow in the case of an Anglican litigant and a Quaker 
court. The situation is best explained in the words of the 
provincial council. '' It will be very difficult, in Bucks 

55 B. T. Paps., Props., Entry Bk. D, flf. 285-288. 
SQlhid., ff. 291-292, 306; Props., VII, L 22, 26. 

57 Ibid., Props., VII, L 18. 

58 B. T. Jour., XV, 396. 

^9 Pa. Col. Recs., II, 89, 90, 97, 98. 



THE QUAKER AND ANGLICAN 241 

almost impossible, to find a sufficient number of fit per- 
sons to make a quorum of justices, that will take or ad- 
minister an oath ; it will be a very great hardship to have 
none on the bench but such as can swear; for our Friends 
can no more be concerned in administering an oath than 
they can take one ; and in all actions where the case pinches 
either party, if they can, from any corner of the govern- 
ment bring in an evidence that demands an oath, the cause 
must either drop, or a fit number of persons must be there 
always, to administer it, though only perhaps, on account 
of such an evidence. " ^^ In Philadelphia, after the court 
proceeded to business, when oaths came to be demanded the 
Quaker justices withdrew from the bench and left the ad- 
ministration of justice in the hands of those who could ad- 
minister the oath.^^ The Quakers quite naturally com- 
plained that by such measures, they, who by toil and hard- 
ship had settled the colony, were " thrust out of all busi- 
ness. ' ' 

It is evident that Quary and Moore, both royal officials, 
and other Churchmen, used this order as well as other 
means to cast discredit upon the government and to cause 
hardship to the Quakers.*^- This is evidenced by two cases. 
In March, 1703, Governor Hamilton died and according 
to law the government devolved upon the council ad 
interim. It became necessary then to administer to the 
council the oath enjoined by the acts of trade. The royal 
commission empowered six persons named to administer 
the oath. In June Quary appeared before the council to 
perform the obligation, but as a majority of the council 
were Quakers they asked that the affirmation be allowed 

60 5. T. Paps , Props., VII, M 19; Penn-Logan Corres., 1, 215, 229, 
239, 244. 

61 Penn-Logan Corres., I, 236, 238. 

62 In 1703 Logan wrote to Penn, that Quary and John Moore, 
"his viee-regent in mischief as well as other offices," had laid plots 
to create confusion and have cause for complaints home. Ihid., I, 
238. 



242 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

them instead. This request was denied on the ground that 
the commission did not warrant the administration of the 
affirmation. The council then fell back upon the alter- 
native and John Bewley, the collector, was enjoined to ap- 
pear and qualify the council. Bewley at first refused 
under pressure of Quary's threats, but after earnest so- 
licitation on the part of the council, he acquiesced and ad- 
ministered the oath to two and the affirmation to the rest; 
of the council.®^ In another case Governor Hamilton had 
issued a special commission of oyer and terminer directed 
only to such justices as could tender the oath. Hamilton 
deemed it best that capital offenses should be tried under 
oath, especially at this time when the Churchmen bitterly 
complained that persons were deprived of life, liberty, and 
property by courts not under oath.^* The court opened 
and only such as could take the oath were summoned to 
jury duty, but when the oath was tendered to them '' some 
refused for one reason, some for another and not one would 
act." The Quakers charged that the refusal of the jurors 
to be sworn was due to the intrigues of Quary and Moore. 
The latter held that the trial of these cases belonged prop- 
erly to the regular provincial court and not to a special 
commission, and that the commission issued by Hamilton 
was in itself invalid because the governor had not received 
the crown's approbation as required by the law of 1696.^^ 
To the Quakers the action of Quary and Moore appeared 
to be simply a plot to create trouble and confusion in the 
province in order to urge upon the crown the necessity 
of establishing royal government. The cases were then 
tried by the regular court composed of Quaker justices 
and by jurors and witnesses under affirmation. One was 
condemned to be burnt in the hand for manslaughter and 
a woman was sentenced to death for the crime of iufanti- 

6^ Penn-Logan Corres., I, 215-216, 239; B. T. Paps., Props., VII, M 
19, 20. 

64 Penn-Logan Corres., I, 193-196, 217. 

65 B. T. Paps., Props., VII, L 50. 



THE QUAKER AND ANGLICAN 243 

cide.*^^ Quary immediately wrote to the Board of Trade 
giving an account of the whole affair, saying that great 
excitement prevailed in the province because the court had 
not acted under oath and expressing amazement that the 
court would take such action when it knew that there were 
pending before the Board of Trade several complaints that 
subjects were executed without the use of the oath.^^ 
Cornbury of New Jersey likewise sent home a complaint.®^ 
On receipt of these letters the board wrote to Penn di- 
recting him to instruct his governor to stop such proceed- 
ings.®^ Penn replied rather indignantly asking what right 
Cornbury had to interfere in the province.'^^ 

The law of 1700 allowing the Quakers to affirm in all 
cases did not come up for final consideration till 1705. 
The Board of Trade objected that the affirmation was '' not 
sufficient. ' ' ^^ Penn replied that he could see no reason 
*' to oust a people that made it a country from the gov- 
ernment of it for their tenderness about an oath, that went 
thither to avoid it with other things. ' ' ^- The plea availed 
nothing and the law was disallowed by royal order of Feb- 
ruary, 1706.'^^ "Would the Quakers honor the royal order 
of 1703 and the veto of 1706 by passing a law prejudicial 
to themselves? or would they cast to the winds royal au- 
thority and reenact the law? The necessity of keeping 
the government in their own hands and of protecting their 
own interests led them to take the latter course. On no- 
tice of the board's objections and even before the law was 
vetoed the assembly framed a bill of the same tenor as the 
former. Governor Evans objected to it as contrary to the 
royal order of 1703. This contention was correct, for as 

66 Penn-Logan Corres., I, 195. 

67 N. Y. Col. Docs., IV, 1045. 

68 5. T. Jour., XVI, 187; Penn-Logan Corres., 1, 205. 

69 B. T. Paps., Props., Entry Bk. D, ff. 358, 360. 

70 Ihid., Props., VII, L 45 ; Entry Bk. D. f . 360. 

71 Pa. Statutes at Large, II, 465. 

72 Ihid., 468. 

73 lUd., 451. 



244 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

the bill stood it meant that one who was obliged and 
willing to take an oath would be forced to take the affir- 
mation before a court composed of Quakers. According 
to the construction placed upon the royal order by the as- 
sembly the bill was not contrary to it. The assembly ad- 
mitted that there would be a failure of justice if no jurant 
magistrate was present on the bench, but held that the 
Queen did not intend that there should be a stoppage of 
justice or that the Quakers should be excluded from the 
government which would inevitably follow if the Quakers 
were compelled to administer the oath. This argument 
was hardly warranted by the terms of the royal order but 
the Quakers were driven to it by force of circumstances. 
The govenor held otherwise and not wishing to violate the 
royal order he requested the assembly either to draw up a 
bill consonant to the order, or else insert a suspending 
clause. The house yielded by inserting a clause to suspend 
the force of the law for a short period. In justification 
of his assent to the law the governor wrote to the Board 
of Trade declaring that the country would not be satisfied 
or the assembly content with any other sort of measure.''^* 
At once the Church party was aroused to action. Quary 
wrote to the Board of Trade ^' of that daring insolent Act 
. . . which directly struck at the Queens Prerogative 
by disowning her orders and Instructions . . .," and 
suggested that ' ' whenever the Government is in the Crown, 
all these confusions will be at end, provided the Quakers 
are excluded from having the administration of govern- 
ment in their hands. " ^^ To the bishop of London the 
vestry of St. Paul's, Chester, addressed a memorial asking 
him to use his influence to secure the disallowance of the 
act and stating that the assembly raised money both on 
Quakers and non-Quakers in order to secure the crown's 

74 B. T. Paps., Props., VIII, pt. 2, 66, 67, 68 ; Pa. Statutes at 
Large, II, 507-511; Pa. Col. Recs., II, 225-230; 236. 

75 N. Y. Col. Docs., V, 17, 18, 19, 20. 



THE QUAKEE AND ANGLICAN 245 

approval of the law. The vestry held that there was no 
danger of a failure of justice, as the Quakers alleged, 
since in all the counties there existed sufficient persons 
fitted to administer the oath if authorized to do so, but that 
the real object of the Quakers was to exclude the Church- 
men from the government.'^^ The bishop laid this paper 
before the Board of Trade with a letter in which he stig- 
matized the law as a '^ new instance of Mr. Penns inso- 
lence," and added '' I presume the next fit of conscience 
will be not to allow the sight or conservation upon their 
holy ground (of those) that can take an oath or has al- 
ready defiled himself with it. ' ' " Christ Church, Phila- 
delphia, employed George Willcocks, Quary's London 
agent, to prevent the approval of the law and to secure 
a renewal of the order of ITOS."^^ The plea of Christ 
Church, like that of St. Paul's, was to the effect that the 
Quakers desired to keep other persuasions from a share in 
the government. In July, 1706, the attorney-general re- 
ported favorably on the law. Although, he said, the law 
was contrary to the act of Parliament which forbade the use 
of the affirmation in qualifying for public office, in serving 
on juries, and in giving evidence in criminal cases, yet as 
that statute did not extend to the province a law might 
be made in the colony to allow the affirmation in such 
cases '' because the greatest part of the inhabitants are 
Quakers." His sole objection was to the clause which al- 
lowed a deposition in writing as good evidence in criminal 
cases, which was considered ' ' too hard. ' ' '^^ After a re- 
view of the report of the crown lawyer and the letter of 
the bishop of London, the board decided to report the law 
for disallowance unless Penn gave assurance that the as- 
sembly would modify it so that no court should sit to try 

76 B. T. Paps., Props., VIII, pt. 2, 77. 

77 lUd., Jour., XVIII, 353. 

78lUd., Props., VIII, pt. 2, 82; Penn-Logan Cor., II, 235, 253. 
70 J5. T. Paps., Props., VIII, pt. 2, 78; Pa. Statutes at Large, 
II, 513. 



246 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

cases, either civil or criminal, unless there was always 
present on the bench a jurant magistrate, that those who 
refused to take the oath should be obliged to declare that 
they did so upon a '' conscientious scruple " before ad- 
mitted to take the affirmation, and that evidence in writing 
should be restricted solely to civil causes. ^^ The records 
disclose no response of Penn's to these conditions. In 
November Willcocks presented to the board a paper of 
objections against the law.^^ In summary, his chief ob- 
jection was that the law tended to establish the Quakers 
in the government to the total exclusion of other sects and 
to the detriment of the Church, that it was contrary to the 
act of Parliament, that an affirmation was not of sufficient 
validity or solemnity to insure truth and justice in judicial 
proceedings or to bind a person to a faithful execution of 
a public office, and that a deposition in writing was unjust 
in criminal causes. The board was slow to take action and 
in January, 1707, Willcocks urged a report.^- In July the 
board granted a hearing to Willcocks and Penn and the ob- 
jections were given to Penn to answer in writing. ^^ In Octo- 
ber Penn replied in a paper which characterized the charges 
as '^ frivolous, not to say malicious, to our persuasion," and 
declared that the object of the Churchmen was to dis- 
qualify the Quakers from a share in their own government. 
' ' Is it not very hard, ' ' said Penn, ' * that these Gentlemen 
Should make us Dissenters in our own Country? and effect 
themselves our Lords and Masters of life, Liberty and 
Property." ^* Both sides claimed that it was the intention 
of the one to exclude the other from participating in the 
government. Whatever the intention of each party may 

80 Pa. statutes at Large, II, 513-514; B. T. Jour. XVIII, 354. 
815. T. Jour., XVIII, 394; Props., VIII, pt. 2, 81; Pa. Statutes 
at Large, II, 514-518. 

82 Pa. Statutes at Large, II, 520; B. T. Jour., XIX, 26, 286. 

83 B. T. Jour., XIX, 293, 307, 310. 

84 B. T. Paps., Props., IX, P 11; for rejoinder of Willcox, ihid., P 
15; Jour., XIX, 335, 387, 402. 



THE QUAKER AND ANGLICAN 247 

have been the fact remains that the diverse views of the two 
sects on the question of the oath or affirmation which al- 
lowed of no compromise meant that either one or the other 
must be excluded in part from sharing in government. 
Had the English law, for which the Churchmen contended, 
been enforced in the province, the Quakers would have 
been compelled either to withdraw from politics or give 
up their cherished views on the affirmation. On the other 
hand had the Quakers forced the Churchmen to take the 
affirmation when an oath could not properly be admin- 
istered, the latter would have been excluded from govern- 
ment. The final outcome of the whole affair in England 
was that the board reported the law for disapproval, and 
this was done by the royal order of June, 1708.^^ But it 
is interesting to note that the law was condemned by the 
board not on the ground of the affirmation but solely on 
the objection of the crown lawyer that paper evidence 
should not be allowed in criminal causes.^^ It seems evi- 
dent that the home government did not support the con- 
tentions of the Churchmen and the bishop of London, but 
were inclined to allow the Quakers to affirm in all cases. 
This favorable attitude of the board is probably due to the 
fact that in 1707 the Tory membership was replaced by 
Whigs who were lenient to dissent. 

Some of the Quakers recognized the inconsistency of 
their position on the question of the oath. Isaac Norris, 
an eminent Quaker, wrote to Penn, " We say, our princi- 
ples are not destructive to or repugnant to Civill Govern- 
ment, and will admit of liberty of conscience to all ; Yet it 
appears, according to the best scheme I can form, from 
the opinion of many Friends, to be concerned in Govern- 
ment and hold them, we must either be independent and 
by ourselves ; or, if mixed, partial to our own opinion, and 
not allow liberty to others, who make conscience they say, 

85 B. T. Paps., Props., Entry Bk. F, flf. 22-23, 26 ; Pa. Statutes at 
Large, II, 506. 

88 Pa. Statutes at Large, 11, 523. 



248 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

to have an oath, we desire from them; or be as thou used 
to express it, ' Dissenters in our own country. ' " ^"^ The 
Quakers did not believe in any connection whatsoever be- 
tween church and state, yet in their effort to support and 
defend their religious principles by law they made them- 
selves guilty of forcing their views on others who held op- 
posite opinions. This is true not only on the question of 
the oath but also in rela,tion to war. The Quaker assembly 
refused to establish a militia or to provide military sup- 
plies and defenses against the French and therefore they 
were acting not on behalf of the people who desired mili- 
tary protection but only for the Quaker sect which was 
principled against war. The inconsistency of their posi- 
tion led men like Isaac Norris and James Logan to advise 
Penn to surrender his powers of government to the 
crown.^^ This fact together with the hostility of the home 
government to colonial charters led Penn in 1703 to make 
proposals to the crown looking to a surrender of his gov- 
ernmental powers. The negotiations dragged on till 1712 
when a deed of surrender was on the point of being con- 
summated only to fail by reason of Penn's serious illness 
which incapacitated him from further business.^^ 

Upon notice of the veto of the law of 1706 the assembly 
set to work to frame another of the same tenor, thus show- 
ing slight regard for the royal will in their determination 
to safeguard their interests. Governor Gookin, himself a 
Churchman, refused his consent. The next assembly sub- 
mitted a bill more conformable to the governor's wishes 
and it was passed into law. Comparing the act of Febru- 
ary, 1711,^^ with its predecessors we notice that whereas 
the former laws obliged one who desired the oath to take 
an affirmation when the court was composed wholly of 
Quakers, the present law provided that nothing therein 

87 Penn-Logan Corres., II, 431. 

&8lhicl, I, 226, II, 119, 138-139, 167-168, 190, 225, 239-240, 423. 

89 See page 364. 

90 Pa. Statutes at Large, II, 355. 



THE QUAKER AND ANGLICAN 249 

should hinder a magistrate or proper officer from admin- 
istering the oath to one who had no scruples against taking 
it. No attempt was made to impose the affirmation upon 
those who were willing and desirous to take the oath. 
This is significant, for it shows that the Quakers were 
yielding under the stress of opposition. Curiously enough 
protest against the approval of this law came not from the 
Churchmen in the colony, but from the vestry of St. Mary 's, 
Burlington, in New Jersey. This church was the center 
of Anglicanism in West Jersey. The minister and vestry 
of Christ Church, Philadelphia, notified their brethren 
across the river of the passage of the law.^^ St. Mary's 
drew up a petition to the Queen praying for the royal 
disapproval of the act.^^ Addresses were also sent to the 
bishop of London and the Earl of Clarendon, the former 
Lord Cornbury, to solicit their influence against the offend- 
ing law.^^ This action was taken because the Churchmen 
feared that the passage of the Pennsjdvania law would in- 
fluence the New Jersey assembly to enact a similiar law. 
In fact such a bill passed the lower house in that province 
in 1710 only to fail in the council. The petition to the 
Queen opens with the statement that the admission of the 
Quakers to public offices retarded the royal service, ob- 
structed the peace of the province and was a damp to the 
" best of Churches the Church of England." It expressed 
great fear for the ruin of both the church and state if the 
Quakers were allowed to govern the colony and to ad- 
minister justice without oaths, so contrary to English law. 
The specific objection to the law was that it provided for 
an affirmation which omitted the name of God. This omis- 
sion was contrary to the affirmation provided by English 
law which specified the following attest: " I, A. B., do de- 
clare in the presence of Almighty God the witness of the 

91 Hills, History of the Church in Burlington, 134. 

92 5. T. Paps., Props., IX, Q 17; Acts of Privy Council, Col., II, 
654; Pa. Statutes at Large, II, 536-538. 

93 Hills, op. cit., 135. 



250 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1606-1765 

truth of what I say." The Quakers held that the use of 
the divine name in an affirmation approximated an oath. 
The petition was turned over to the Board of Trade. 
Twice Penn attended the board to support the law,^^ but in 
spite of all, it was reported to the Privy Council for dis- 
allowance on the ground that it was contrary to the act of 
Parliament which required the name of God in the affirma- 
tion and forbade the use of the attest in criminal causes. ^^ 
It is significant to note that the report of the board was 
signed by the bishop of London, a thing rarely done, and 
is indicative of the activity of this prelate in the interests 
of the Church in America. The law was vetoed by order 
in council of December, ITll.^*^ 

The royal veto availed nothing for in June, 1712, a new 
act was placed on the statute book which in effect was 
similar to the one just negative. ^^ To this law the so- 
licitor-general made the very same objections as did the 
board on the previous measure.^^ The law was disallowed 
in February, 1714.^^ In the next year the assembly en- 
acted two laws in the hopes that one would escape annul- 
ment. The one provided an affirmation with the name of 
God inserted for those who could take the attest in this 
form, the other omitted the divine name to ease the con- 
sciences of those who objected to taking the affirmation in 
the other form.^^'^ These acts did not reach the board till 
1718 and it was charged in an unsigned letter to that body 
that the laws were withheld in order to escape the royal 
disallowance. ^^^ This is not a true statement of the rea- 
sons for delay. The records show that the laws were trans- 

94 S. T. Jour., XXII, 446, XXIII, 23, 33; Pa. Statutes at Large, 
II, 538, 539. 

95 Pa. Statutes at Large, II, 540. 
96/&if/., 535; B. T. Paps., Props., IX, Q 29. 
97 Pa. Statutes at Large, II, 425. 

s^IUd., 549-550; Pa. Archives 1st. ser., I, 157ff. 

99 Pa. Statiites at Large, II, 543. 

ioo76kZ., Ill, 39, 58. 

aoi lUd., II, 441 ; B. T. Paps., Props., X, Q 150. 



THE QUAKER AND ANGLICAN 251 

mitted to England in 1716 and failed to be submitted to 
the board in consequence of Penn's serious illness. In 
1718 Joshua Gee, a mortgagee of the province, promptly 
submitted the laws to the Board of Trade when notified 
of the delay/*^- The law which inserted the name of God 
in the affirmation received the royal approbation in July, 
1719, but the other omitting the name was again vetoed.^^^ 
Meanw^hile another question arose to cause perplexity in 
the province. In 1715 Parliament extended to the 
colonies the act of 1G96 which forbade the use of the affir- 
mation in qualifying for public office, in serving on juries, 
and in giving evidence in criminal causes.^^* On the other 
hand the colonial laws of 1715 allowed the use of the affir- 
mation in such cases and although the home government 
had not yet acted upon them they were undoubtedly null 
and void as contrary to the English statute. But the as- 
sembly did not think so. In October, 1716, the assembly 
asked the judges of the provincial court why justice in 
several criminal causes was so long delayed. They re- 
plied that the governor, from whose power their commis- 
sions were derived, held that the colonial laws were abro- 
gated by the recent statute of Parliament, and hence they 
thought it imprudent to act in defiance of this opinion. ^°^ 
The assembly then passed a resolution that the laws of the 
province w^ere valid till vetoed by the crown, and since the 
laws of 1715 had not been so vetoed they were in force 
in spite of the recent act of Parliament.^*^*^ The position 
of the assembly was hardly tenable, for there is little doubt 
that an English statute, passed after the enactment of a 
colonial law and before the latter was acted upon at home, 

102 5. T. Paps., Props., X, Q 155; Pa. Statutes at Large, II, 443- 
445. 

103 B. T. Paps., Props., X, Q 170; Pa. Statutes at Large, II, 440, 
458, 465. 

104 1 George I, c. 6. 

105 Pa. Votes of Assembly, II, 194. 
lOQlhid., 195. 



252 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

took precedence over it. The question was not settled for 
several years; but as the crown did not act upon the laws 
of 1715 till 1719 and as there was need of setting the 
wheels of justice in motion to prevent crime and relieve 
the prisoners languishing in jail, the colony sought to 
remedy matters by the law of May, 1718/^^ This law pro- 
vided that in all cases whatsoever, civil as well as criminal, 
judges, jurors, and witnesses could qualify according to 
their religious views, by taking either the oath or affirma- 
tion prescribed by English law. The new law was just 
as repugnant to the English statute as were the laws of 
1715. Why then did Governor Keith assent to it and de- 
clare the former acts void? Probably because the preva- 
lence of crime necessitated the administration of justice. 
The assembly drew up an address to the crown and ap- 
propriated £150 to employ an agent to solicit the royal 
confirmation. Thomas Beake, assisted by Joshua Gee and 
Henry Gouldney, two of the mortgagees of the province, 
acted as agent for the law.^'^^ Richard West, counsel to 
the Board of Trade, reported that the law was proper to 
be confirmed.^*^^ In turn the board represented to the 
Privy Council that the law granted the Quakers greater 
privileges than allowed them in England, but in considera- 
tion of the fact that without this concession the administra- 
tion of justice in the province would be difficult, the law 
was worthy of the crown's approval. ^^^ In May, 1719, the 
law was confirmed by royal order,^^^ and two months later 

107 Pa. Statutes at Large, III, 199. 

108 Pa. Votes of Assembly, II, 235-236, 240, 242, 272. 

109 5. T. Paps., Props., Entry Bk. G, ff. 162, 163; Props., X, pt. 2, 
Q 169. 

110 lUd., Entry Bk. G, f. 172; Props., X, pt. 2, Q 170; Pa. Statutes 
at Large, III, 438. 

111 Pa. Statutes at Large, III, 437; B. T. Paps., Props., Entry Bk. 
G, f. 204; Props., X, pt. 2, Q 180. At this point the question arises 
as to what authority the cro\vn could take upon itself the power to 
confirm a colonial law contrary to an act of Parliament which 
mentioned the colonies. The crown had the power to issue orders 



THE QUAKER AND ANGLICAN 253 

similar action was taken on one of the laws of 1715. Thus 
at last after twenty years of trial and vexation the Quakers 
won the right to use the affirmation in all cases whatever. 

In one particular, however, the Quaker contentions were 
not yet realized. One of the laws of 1715, that which pro- 
vided an affirmation with the name of God omitted, had 
been vetoed in 1719. Three years later the Quaker con- 
science on this question was eased by the action of Parlia- 
ment itself. The English statute of 1722 granted greater 
indulgences to the Quakers by providing new forms of at- 
testation which omitted the name of God.^^- In 1724 the 
assembly parsed a law specifying the new forms ^^^ and 
Joshua Gee was employed to obtain the royal confirma- 
tion.^^* No objections were made at home and the law 
was sanctioned by the crown in March, 1725.^^^ Great was 
the rejoicing of the Quakers when the glad tidings were 
received. The assembly and the Yearly Meeting of the 
Friends sent addresses to the crown offering thanks and 
expressing a sense of obligation to George I for his gracious 
favor to the Quakers.^^^ 

With the accession of George I the spirit of England 
toward dissent had changed. The advent of the House 
of Hanover and the rise to power of the Whig classes, 
favorable to dissent, saw the repeal of the Schism Act and 
the Occasional Conformity Act, the work of the Tory re- 
actionaries. Likewise, greater indulgence was granted to 

in accordance with acts of Parliament or where the legislature gave 
it discretionary power, but it is not clear by what authority the 
crowm could exercise a right to dispense with the provisions of an 
act of Parliament. This question, as many others, simply illustrates 
the loose constitutional relations which existed between England 
and the colonies. 

112 8 George I, c. 6. 

113 Pa. Statutes at Large, III, 427. 
ii^IMd., 516; B. T. Jour., XXXIV, 321. 

115 Pa. Statutes at Large, III, 514, 516, 517; B. T. Paps., Props., 
XI, R 50, 56, 57. 

116 Pa. Bundle, Amer. and W. I., 28, (P. R. 0.) XXIV, 10, 11; 
Sharpless, A Quaker Experiment in Gov't., 145-146. 



254 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

dissent, as seen in the law of 1722 favorable to Quaker in- 
terests. ^^^ The Church became less aggressive in the col- 
onies. The Society for the Propagation of the Gospel was 
less active. Henry Compton, the zealous bishop of London, 
was now dead, as was Quary the leader of the opposition 
of the Churchmen to the Quakers in Pennsylvania. The 
year 1713 saw the close of the first half of the war against 
France and for twenty-six years the Quakers were freed 
from anxiety on account of defense. Still such was the 
opposition of the colonial Churchmen, supported by the 
government and prelacy at home, that the Quakers were 
not able to obtain the full realization of their ideals. They 
sought to legalize their principles on the question of the 
affirmation but in so doing they perforce imposed the affir- 
mation in some cases on those who believed just as sin- 
cerely in the validity of the oath. In this particular they 
were forced finally to yield under the persistent attacks 
of the Churchmen, and after 1711 to allow an oath where 
an oath was required. But as Sharpless says, " the two 
systems did not work side by side without friction. " ^^^ 
The Quakers could not administer oaths in any way what- 
ever and were consequently excluded from any office which 
demanded the administration of the oath. Under these 
circumstances the Quakers either withdrew from such posi- 
tions in government or else retained office and violated 
their religious principles.^^^ 

Considering the whole situation from the standpoint of 
the imperial relations, one is impressed with the meddle- 
some attitude of the royal officials, such as Quary, Moore, 
Nicholson, Cornbury, Basse and others, not only in their 
official capacity, but also as supporters of the Church. 
Their tendency, as Penn expressed it, was *' to do us all 
despite they can in the name of the church and the revenue 

117 Lecky, History of England, I, 274 ff. 

118 Sharpless, op. cit., 146. 

119 lUd., 146-149. 



THE QUAKER AND ANGLICAN 255 

. . . to serve every turn of advantage or revenge. "^^^ 
Such conduct served rather to weaken than to strengthen 
the ties which bound the colonies to the mother country. 
One is also impressed with the unwarranted interference 
of the Board of Trade and Privy Council in the internal 
affairs of the colony in such cases as the disallowance of 
laws legalizing the Quaker customs with regard to the 
calendar nomenclature and forbidding certain sports and 
games. But on the question of the affirmation, the attitude 
of the crown was neither unjust or arbitrary. In fact, the 
crown was not inclined to grant the wishes of colonial 
Churchmen that the oath should be imposed according to 
English statute, but showed a decided willingness to grant 
the Quakers the right to use the affirmation in all cases. 
But when the Quakers sought to impose an affirmation on 
those who desired the oath, the disallowance of such laws 
was justified in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice. 
In brief, the crown simply upheld the principle of religious 
toleration, in which the Quakers themselves professed be- 
lief but failed to practice consistently. In this respect, 
the veto was effective and salutary, and the Quakers were 
forced to yield. 

The vexations of the Quakers had not yet come to an end. 
The colony as part of the Empire became involved in the 
long series of wars between England and France for the 
mastery of North America. The question of local and im- 
perial defense against the French and Indians drew into 
the vortex of controversy the religious principles of the 
Quakers who believed that all war was wrong. The next 
chapters concern themselves with this phase of the rela- 
tions between the province and the home government. 

^20 Duke of Portland Mss., IV, 80, Hist. Mss. Com., Report 15, 
pt. 4. 



CHAPTER NINE 

IMPERIAL DEFENSE^ 1689-1748. 

Few questions arose in the history of the Empire to 
create greater perplexity than the serious problem of de- 
fense. It was a problem so impossible of solution that it 
not only caused the overthrow of Quaker political power 
in the province, but of far greater import, it ^' was the 
rock upon which the old Empire was shattered." 

Prom the days of Hawkins and Drake to the close of the 
last French war in 1763, the Empire was almost continu- 
ally at war with the rival powers of France and Spain for 
supremacy of trade and dominion in the new world. The 
indeterminate boundary lines which marked the respective 
territorial claims of these rival nationalties laid deep the 
foundations of bitter wars. The struggle of European 
powers for commercial and colonial supremacy brought on 
a long series of international wars. The whole situation 
from the standpoint of the colonies as well as the Empire 
was fraught with serious problems. In 1760 Franklin 
stated the case thus: '^ Our North American colonics are 
to be considered as the frontier of the British Empire on 
that side. The frontier of any dominion being attack 'd, 
it becomes not merely the ' cause ' of the people affected, 
(the inhabitants of that frontier) but properly the ' cause ' 
of the whole body. ' ' ^ The problem then presented itself : 
what share of the cost of defending the Empire in America 
should be borne by the colonists and what share should 
fall to the lot of the English tax-payer.^ The problem of 

1 Franklin, Works ( Smyth ed. ) , IV, 50. 

2 Beer, British Col. Policy, 1754-1765, 6-15. 

256 



IMPERIAL DEFENSE, 1689-1748 257 

protection had both a military and naval aspect. The 
coastal defense of the colonies in time of war, the system 
of convoys to protect merchantmen plying to and fro be- 
tween the mother country and America,^ and protection on 
the high seas in that age of keen international rivalry was 
a burden placed entirely upon the English sea power and 
a charge supported entirely by the English treasury. It 
was also recognized that at a time when the Empire was 
at peace in Europe, the burden of defense against a purely 
local enemy, such as the Indians, should fall upon the 
colony or colonies involved. But at a time when the Em- 
pire was at war, the problem of distributing the burden 
was not so easy of solution. The home government did 
not tax the colonists directly or indirectly in order to 
create a revenue to support the charges of war. It was 
content to rely upon a system of requisitions, merely call- 
ing upon the colonies to vote men and money to cooperate 
with other colonies and the home government in military 
operations. Such a system left it entirely to the local 
legislatures to comply with the royal orders or to refuse 
to comply. In this chapter and the next w^e shall endeavor 
to describe the operations of this system. 

As far as the province of Pennsylvania was concerned 
this problem was complicated by the peculiar views of the 
Quakers upon the subject of war. One of the cardinal 
tenets of this sect was the belief in the iniquity of all war. 
Briefly stated, military non-resistance in its most extreme 
form, except for local police protection, was the accepted 
belief.* The biblical injunction " Resist not evil " was 
accepted as literally as the command " Swear not at all." 
But the efforts of the Quakers to work out in actual prac- 
tice this Utopian view fell upon an unfortunate age. 
Hardly had the province been founded when the Empire 

3 For Convoys, see Acts of the Privy Council, Col, II, index under 
convoys. 

4 Sharpless, A Quaker Experiment in Gov't., eh. 7. 



258 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 169G-1765 

became involved with France in a long series of wars for 
mastery in North America. The colony as part of the 
Empire found itself concerned not only in the question of 
local defense against the encroachments of the French, but 
also in the duty of cooperating with neighboring colonies 
and England in a cause which was of common concern. 
"Would the Quakers, dominant in the assembly, belie their 
doctrines and enter heartily into the war, or would they 
remain true to their convictions and refuse to honor the 
royal requisitions ? 

In April, 1689, the colonies were notified of the declara- 
tion of war against France, known in colonial annals as 
King William's War.^ A few days later the Lords of 
Trade recommended to the Privy Council that as the pro- 
prietary governments of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and the 
Carolinas w^ere not under immediate royal control, they 
should be directed by royal order to put their dominions 
in a. state of defense.^ Governor Blackwell of Pennsyl- 
vania placed this order before the provincial council and 
requested that a militia be established. The replies of 
the Quaker councilors are significant. Sa^id one, "I see 
no danger, but from the Bears and Wolves ' ' ; said another, 
'' the raising of arms would arouse the Indians "; and a 
third replied that the English king knew full well '' the 
judgment of the Quakers in this case before Governor 
Penn had his patent."^ These words were simply a pre- 
monition of the arguments to be used by the Quakers to 
evade compliance with the royal requisitions. Blackwell 
threatened to report the matter to the king and to Penn, 
but whether he did or not is a matter of conjecture.^ It 
is certain, however, that in this instance the Quaker as- 
sembly made no provision for the defense of the colony. 

But the situation involved more than putting the colony 

5 B. T. Jour., VI, 207. 

Qlhid., VI, 211; Pa. Col. Recs., I, 302. 

7 Pa. Col. Recs., I, 306. 

sihid., I, 311. 



IMPERIAL DEFENSE, 1689-1748 259 

itself into a posture of defense. It involved cooperation 
in the common undertaking of securing the protection of 
all. In the earlier days the crucial point was the St. 
Lawrence Vallej^ This territory was of prime importance 
to both England and France as the natural highway lead- 
ing to the Great West beyond. With the explorations of 
Lasalle, Marquette, and Joliet, and the building of forts 
and trading posts along the great lakes under the able ad- 
ministration of Governor Frontenac, France had taken 
determined steps to establish her claim, not only to the 
region drained by the St. Lawrence, but also to the wide 
expanses of the Mississippi Valley. French activity 
threatened English claims to the interior of the continent. 
The control of the situation was in the hands of the Iro- 
quois Indians who had their home in the St. Lawrence 
Valley. This strong confederacy could be used by either 
side to check the expansion of the other westward and it 
became the policy of the rival nations to secure the friend- 
ship and aid of the savages.^ With these facts clearly in 
mind we are able to understand why the defense of the 
New York frontier and the establishment of friendly re- 
lations with the Indians were objects of common concern 
and not burdens which were to be borne solely by the 
colony of New York and the home government. 

In 1689 the storm broke along the whole northern fron- 
tier and the French and their savage allies carried death 
and destruction into the English settlements. In July, 
1691, Governor Sloughter of New York called upon all 
the colonies north of Carolina for aid.^*^ After stating 
the designs of the French and the consequent danger to all 
the colonies, he asked from each a quota of one hundred 
and fifty men for the defense of the frontier and the 
dispatch of a commissioner to meet with the governor of 

9 Channing, Hist, of U. S., I, ch. 5; Osgood, Anier. Cols, in 11th. 
Cent., II, 426. 

ioCa7. State Paps., Col., 1689-1692, 503; 'N. Y. Col. Docs., Ill, 
184. 



260 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

New York to concert measures for common defense and to 
agree upon the raising of a common fund for the support 
of the military operations. The responses illustrate well 
the lack of a community of interests and the prevalence 
of a spirit of particularism and jealousy among the col- 
onies. The New England colonies claimed that they had 
their own frontiers to defend and were consequently un- 
able to send aid to New York.^^ Maryland sent a small 
sum and a complaint that it was unfair to ask her to con- 
tribute as much as Pennsylvania and Virginia whose popu- 
lation and trade were more considerable.^- Pennsylvania 
responded that she was unable to comply with the request 
because of the poverty of the province. ^^ None of the 
colonies sent commissioners to New York. 

New York was unable to bear the burden alone by reason 
of her meager population and resources. It was not just 
that an obligation which was of vital concern to all should 
be borne by only one colony and New York in her distress 
carried the case to the English government. In 16S2 fre- 
quent petitions reached the crown from this colony asking 
that the power of the home government be used to compel 
the other colonies to aid in the defense of the New York 
frontier.^* These petitions stated that people were leaving 
the province for other colonies in order to escape the ex- 
penses and burdens of war whereby the trade of New 
York was decayed, her strength diminished, and her reve- 
nue lessened and that the colony by its own exertions was 
unequal to the burden of defending Albany, the key to 
the situation. In consequence of these pleas, in October, 
1692, royal letters were directed to the colonial governors 

iiOai. State Paps., Col., 1689-1692, 475, 477, 508, 531; N. Y. 
Col. Docs., Ill, 786. 

i2Cal. State Paps., Col, 1689-1692, 515, 669; N. Y. Col. Docs., 
Ill, 788. 

isCal. State Paps., Col., 1689-1692, 513, 514, 525; N. Y. Col Docs., 
Ill, 789, 791. 

14 Cal. State Paps., Col, 1689-1692, 700. 



IMPERIAL DEFENSE, 1689-1748 261 

north of Carolina to assist New York with men and money 
when called upon and to appoint representatives to meet 
and agree upon the quotas.^'^ 

But the action of the central government went further. 
Frequent complaints assailed the ears of the home authori- 
ties as to the irregularities committed in the chartered 
colonies, free from royal control. ^^ They were accused 
of harboring pirates and fugitives from justice, of disobedi- 
ence to the acts of trade, and by refusing to aid in war 
measures drew into their bounds people who wished to es- 
cape this burden in the frontier colonies. Time and again 
royal appointees in the colonies had urged the vacation of 
the charters and the substitution of royal control as the 
only solution of the problem. In order to increase the 
strength of the province the government of New York 
urged either the restoration of the original boundaries 
under the patent to the Duke of York, which would have 
included Connecticut west of the Connecticut River and 
New Jersey, and in addition the colonies of Pennsylvania 
and Delaware; or else the revival of the old Dominion of 
New England as it exivSted under the administration of An- 
dros.^^ In June, 1691, Governor Nicholson of Virginia, 
wrote to the Lords of Trade that as long as the charters 
remained in force these colonies would be in a state of 
anarchy.^^ As to Pennsylvania he said, since the Quaker 
government refused to provide defenses of any sort, the 
province offered itself an easy prey to the conquest of the 
French, especially if the people are of '' Penn's pernicious 
principles they may hold correspondence with the French 
and Indians by land and the French by sea." This was 
not the only charge that the sympathy of Penn for the 
exiled Stuarts, whose cause was now championed by Louis 

15 Gal. State Paps., Col., 1689-1692, 717, 718. 
tGlhid., 473-474, 602, 703-704. 

mUd., 513, 514, 520; A^. Y. Col. Docs., Ill, 789, 791, 796, 812, 
833, 836. 

18 Cal. State Paps., Col, 1689-1692, 473-474. 



262 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

XIV, would probably lead to the acquisition of his prov- 
ince hy the French/^ The receipt of this letter brought 
the Lords of Trade to the resolution to recommend to the 
Privy Council that the province should be taken under 
royal control and annexed to some adjoining royal prov- 
ince.^^ No action was taken at the time but the frequency 
of the complaints led to the granting of the royal com- 
mission to Benjamin Fletcher in May, 1692, creating him 
governor of New York and Pennsylvania.-^ There is no 
doubt that this grant was a war measure induced by the ex- 
igencies of the struggle with France. Penn wrote that the 
usurpation of his powers of government was due to the 
misrepresentations of the neighboring colonies that be- 
cause of the Quakers the French would make their way 
into the colony.-^ In the case of Connecticut the powers 
of government were not taken away from the corporation, 
but the command of her militia was transferred by royal 
commission to Fletcher.-^ This transfer of the government 
of one colony and the command of the militia of another 
met in part the request of New York for greater resources, 
but it was not a true solution of the problem. The root 
of the trouble lay in the fact that each colony was a dis- 
tinct unit, organized with its separate machinery of gov- 
ernment, and able thereby to thwart the commands of the 
English government. 

In May, 1693, Fletcher met the assembly of Pennsyl- 

19 Ca?. State Paps., Col., 1689-1692, 200, 704; 1693-1696, 126. 
Among the Stuart papers there is a proposal of Thomas Willis, of 
April, 1716, in which he devises a scheme to collect money to effect 
a restoration of the Stuarts. It was proposed that several of the 
collectors should be frem " such of the Quakers as are called Penn- 
ites, many of them being men of consideration and as ready ta 
contribute to a restoration as any." Stuart Papers, IV, 28, in Hist. 
Mss. Com. Reports. See also Bruce, Institutional Hist, of Va., I, 
247-248. 

20 Cal. State Paps., Col., 1689-1692, 551. 

21 Ibid., 602, 624, 629, 638, 661, 725. 

22 Ibid., 744. 

23 N. Y. Col. Docs., IV, 29. 



IMPERIAL DEFENSE, 1689-1748 263 

vania and presented the royal order calling for assistance 
to New York on demand. At first he received a refusal, 
but a threat to dissolve the assembly was sufficient to elicit 
a grant of money on the express condition that it should 
not be '^ dipt in blood," but used '^ to feed the hungrie 
and clothe the naked " savage.^* Thus the Quakers did 
not go on record as absolutely refusing the demand of the 
home government, but in order to stand by their principles 
and to w^ard off censure from the English authorities, 
granted assistance provided it should not be employed di- 
rectly in war-like measures. Fletcher made continual 
complaints to the home government that nothing could be 
expected from this colony a^ long as the government was 
in the hands of the Quakers.-^ But Pennsylvania with 
her Quaker regime offered no more trouble than did the 
other colonies. Connecticut considered the royal commis- 
sion to command her militia contrary to her charter and in 
consequence Fletcher was compelled to depart in disappoint- 
ment from that colony as he had from Pennsylvania.^^ 
Moreover, the royal order of 1692 to other colonies met with 
little compliance. Phips of Massachusetts held that the 
transfer of the command of the militia of Connecticut and 
Pennsylvania made it less reasonable for New York to ask 
aid from other colonies.^^ Three colonies sent money, one 
sent a few troops, and only one a representative to New 
York.^^ Since the colonies would not unite through com- 
missioners to agree upon the quotas of men and money to be 
furnished by each one, it became necessary for the central 
government to intervene. As a result, in August, 1694, the 
English government fixed the number to be supplied by 
each colony for the defense of New York.^^ 

24 Pa. Col. Recs., I, 399, 400. 

25 CaL State Paps., Col., 1693-1696, 171, 235. 
2Qlhid., 192-199; N. Y. Col. Docs., IV, 69-71. 
27 CkiL State Paps., Col., 1693-1696, 157, 164. 
2sihid., 89, 112, 154, 164, 169, 171, 172, 191. 
29lhid., 299, 315, 316, 335-336. 



264 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

In the same year Penn's powers of government were re- 
stored on condition that he at once return to his province, 
take over the government, provide for the safety of the 
colony, and transmit to the council and assembly all royal 
orders to that end.^^ Penn expressed his opinion that the 
assembly would " dutifully comply and yield obedience " 
to all royal requisitions, but accepted the stipulation that 
if the orders were not obeyed the government was to be 
handed back to Fletcher. Despite Penn's belief the royal 
order was ignored in the colony, Penn was unable to return 
at once to America, nothing was done to put the colony 
in a state of defense, and the government was not restored 
to Fletcher. The quota to be supplied by Pennsylvania 
for New York was the small number of eighty men. In 
May, 1695, Governor Markham laid the requisition before 
the house and met with a refusal. ^^ Finally in October 
of the next year ,£300 was granted for the relief of the 
distressed Indians of New York.^- Little more was done 
by the other colonies in response to the royal order of 
1694. Some of them claimed] that they were too poor, 
others that they had their own problems of defense to solve 
and therefore could send no assistance to New York.^^ Vir- 
ginia, Maryland, and Massachusetts appealed to the home 
government to exempt them from the royal order for the 
reasons just stated.^^ Virginia voted £500 and Maryland 
£200, and the crown instructed Fletcher to accept this 
money in lieu of personal service. ^^ The money was a wel- 
come addition to the resources of New York, but it did not 
supply the military forces of which the province stood so 

30 Cal. State Paps., Col, 1603-1696, 245, 308, 310, 316, 317, 321, 
335. Cf. Sharpless, A Quaker Experiment in Gov't., 193. 

31 Pa. Col. Rccs., I, 486-487. 

32 Ihid., 492-495; Charter and Laws, 255; B. T. Paps., Props., II, 
B 3, 19, 20. 

33 Cal. State Paps., Col, 1693-1696, 361, 385, 477, 540, 560, 584, 
593, 597. 

34 Ihid., 383, 390, 493, 499, 635. 

35/6i(Z., 635, 636; Acts of Privy Council, Col., II, 227, 228. 



IMPERIAL DEFENSE, 1689-1748 265 

badly in need. New York appealed to England for troops 
and in response four companies were dispatched from home 
to the frontier of the colony in 1695.^^ The particularism 
of the colonies threw the burden upon the English govern- 
ment and a precedent was set which was followed to the 
close of the last French war in 1763. 

With the opening of the struggle with France the prob- 
lem of uniting the colonies for common defense became 
of paramount importance. Farseeing colonists were im- 
pressed with the need of a colonial union in order to make 
an effective stand against the French. The French were 
inferior to the English in point of numbers and compact- 
ness of settlement, but vastly superior in point of 
organization. Their centralized system of control, 
which gave the direction of all affairs into the 
hands of one man, was superior from a military point 
of view to the decentralized system prevailing in the Eng- 
lish colonies, where control was scattered among a number 
of petty governments, each with its own policy and jeal- 
ousies. It was felt that the encroachments of France were 
dictated by the lack of concert among the English col- 
onies. Peter de la Noy stated the case well in a letter to 
Penn in 1695: " The French assume a boldness purely 
from divisions into separate bodyes and the piques that 
are so common amongst the several governrs. of which the 
French don't want a constant intelligence."^^ It was 

sdCal State Paps., Col, 1693-1696, 221, 231-232; Acts of Privy 
Council, Col., II, 261. See the report of the Lords of Trade to the 
Privy Council, September 30, 1696, for a good summary of the 
whole situation. Cal. State Paps., Col, 16934696, 165-166. 

37 N. Y. Col. Docs., IV, 224. The memorial of John Nelson of 
New York to the Board of Trade in 1696 states that the greatest 
defect in the colonial system was " the number and independency 
of so many small governments, whereby our strength is not only 
reduced but weakened." He suggested that if New England and 
New York were placed under one government " we should at least 
be fifteen to one against the French in Canada, and instead of a 
bare defense might with ships from England, make an entire con- 
quest of the place." Cal. State Paps., Col, 1696-1697, 136. 



266 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

a fear which received repeated expression.^^ The lack 
of union, the working at cross purposes of the colonies, 
each doing as it seemed best without regard for the inter- 
ests of all, simply invited hostile attack. Frequent peti- 
tions were presented to the crown praying for the estab- 
lishment of a definite union. 

An imperfect union was established when the command 
of the troops of Connecticut and the powers of government 
in Pennsylvania were invested in the governor of New 
York. But such a temporary union did not solve the prob- 
lem. The assemblies of these colonies resisted all Flet- 
cher's demands. A system which made the English gov- 
ernment dependent upon the will of the local assemblies 
was a failure. ^'^ Furthermore, the colonies knew that the 
crown had no authority to march the militia outside the 
boundary of any colony without the consent of the men or 
by act of the assembly of that colony. Any league com- 
posed of a number of colonies, each organized with its own 
government and given the power to judge of the propriety 
of royal orders, had the means to thwart the will of the 
crown and render imperial interests subservient to local 
convenience.^^ The radical defect in the whole system was 
the policy of acting upon the colonists through a number 
of distinct governments rather upon the individual by 
some supreme authority. The mischief could be remedied 
by resorting to the power of the imperial legislature either 
to tax the colonists in order to create a revenue to support 

ssCal State Paps., Col., 1693-1696, 160-161; 1696-1697, 338. 

30 Fletcher wrote to the Lords of Trade, Nov., 1694, " My Com- 
missions for Pennsylvania and Connecticut cannot meet the malady, 
whereas if all were united under one government, all would be sub- 
ject to the same laws and duties." Cal. State Paps., Col., 1693- 
1696, 402. 

40 Fletcher wrote to the secretary of state, Dec, 1693, "Nothing 
is so weakening to Their Majesties service and interest in this part 
of the Empire as those Governments which act by separate interest 
from the Crown, make their own laws and exercise sovereign power 
without appeal." Ibid., 217. 



IMPERIAL DEFENSE, 1689-1748 267 

the charges of defense and to vest the command of the 
militia in the crown, or else to centralize control in the 
colonies. The former measure was not resorted to till 1765. 
On the other hand an efficient colonial union demanded 
that the charters be vacated and the colonies combined into 
larger administrative units. Such a policy was urged by 
royal appointees and others in the colonies, particularly 
by the officials of New York when they asked that either 
the original boundaries of the province be restored and 
Pennsylvania and Delaware be added, or else that a union 
similar to that under Andros be established. In 1695 a 
committee of the Privy Council proposed the revival of 
such a dominion for the purpose of defense *^ and the same 
scheme was urged upon the home government in various 
memorials from the colonies.^- On the other hand the ma- 
jor part of the colonists resisted such a scheme. Jealous of 
their charters, closely wedded to their peculiar institutions, 
and particularistic in their tendencies, all they wished was 
a loose military confederation. They asked that the royal 
governor of New York should be appointed governor also 
of the royal provinces of Massachusetts and New Hamp- 
shire and captain-general of the forces of these provinces 
and of the chartered colonies of Rhode Island, Connecticut, 
and New Jersey, and that " no breach be made on any of 
the Grants and Privileges of the several provinces in their 
Civil affairs. ' ' ^^ The plan of union offered by William 
Penn in 1697 likewise contemplated a loose confederation 
of the colonies much like that of the old New England 
confederation. When called upon by the Board of Trade 
to see that his province paid obedience to the royal order 
of 1694, Penn complained that his colony was over-rated 

41 Cal. State Paps., Col., 1603-1696, 541. 

42 76tU, 1696-1697, 136, 189, 435. Kellogg, Amer. Col. Charter, 
Amer. Hist. Assoc, Report, 1903, I, 280-281. 

^3 Cal State Paps., Col, 1696-1697, 338, 352; N. Y. Col. Docs., 
IV, 224. 



268 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

in comparison with other colonies.^* He declared to the 
board that the quotas could best be fixed by a congress of 
colonial deputies.*^ The board asked him to present his 
ideas in writing and he drew up his " Brief e and Plaine 
Scheme. ' ' **^ This scheme provided for a congress of two 
deputies from each colony to meet biennially in time of 
peace and annually or oftener in time of war. The busi- 
ness of this body was to adjust inter-colonial differences 
and to concert measures for the common defense. In this 
way Penn thought that quotas of men and money levied 
upon the colonies) could be more equitably apportioned 
than by the English government, for the simple reason that 
the colonists were more conversant with local conditions. 
Penn's scheme did not offer a true solution of the problem 
of creating an effective union for defense. The failure of 
the old New England Confederation and of the Articles 
of Confederation of a later period show conclusively the 
futility of placing any dependence upon a requisition sys- 
tem. Finally, in February, 1697, the Board of Trade re- 
ported to the Privy Council that because of the charters 
no other than a military union was practicable and recom- 
mended that it should be adopted.*^ This recommendation 
was carried out in the same year when the Earl of Bello- 
mont was commissioned royal governor of New York, Mas- 
sachusetts, and New Plampshire and captain-general of all 
the forces of New England, New York, and New Jersey.*^ 
But Connecticut and Rhode Island resisted all of Bello- 

44 B. T. Paps., Props., Entry Bk. A, ff. 36, 37, 52. 

45 5. T. Jour., IX, 276, 394, 400-401, 403. 

4G B. T. Paps., PI. Gen., IV, pt. 1, A 40; lY. Y. Col. Docs., IV, 296- 
297. 

4T CaZ. State Paps., Col, 1696-1697, 384; N. Y. Col. Docs., IV, 259. 
The board wrote " The importance and advantages of a Union for 
mutual defense and common security are by all sides agreed on ; but 
the objections against the methods proposed for putting it into 
execution are various, according to the different interests of those 
by whom they are made," 

48 2V^. Y. Col Docs., IV, 261, 262, 266-273, 284-292, 302. 



IMPERIAL DEFENSE, 1689-1748 269 

mont's attempts to command their troops, considering his 
appointment a breach of their royal charters.^'' The prob- 
lem was not yet solved. 

King William's War was ended by the treaty of Ryswick 
of 1697. This treaty met few of the difficulties which con- 
fronted the two nations in America. The boundary ques- 
tion on the north was by no means decided. In view of the 
likelihood of renewed hostilities the home government took 
steps to fortify the New York frontier. In 1700 the Board 
of Trade proposed that the colonies should contribute 
£5000 toward the charges of erecting fortifications in 
northern New York.^^ The English government consented 
to contribute two-fifths of the sum and the rest was to be 
apportioned among the colonies.^^ This proposal shows 
clearly that England was willing to bear its share of im- 
perial defense. The sum which fell to the lot of Pennsyl- 
vania was £350. The governor of New York was in- 
structed to call upon the colonies for their respective 
quotas. In August, 1701, Penn laid the requisition before 
the assembly but it refused to comply on the plea that the 
province was too poor, and, with the proverbial spirit of 
jealousy, pointed out that the neighboring colonies under 
royal control had done nothing.^- Thus the deficiencies 
of some furnished the pretext for refusal on the part of 
others. The next month Penn again urged the assembly 
to comply, but a resolution to vote the money was rejected 
with unanimity.^^ 

49 The agents of New York pointed out to the Board of Trade that 
the scheme would not work because it was still possible for the 
legislatures to thwart the royal commission to command their 
militia. It was suggested that no obedience could be expected until 
Parliament passed an act uniting all the forces of the colonies and 
vesting the military power in the crown during war. Cal State 
Paps., Col., 1696-1697, 352-353. 

50 N. Y. Col. Docs., IV, 706. 

51 lUd., 832, 839. 

52 Pa. Votes of Assemlly, I, 140-142. 
53i6id., I, 143, 146; Pa. Col. Recs., II, 78, 79. 



270 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

In 1702 England declared war against France and 
Spain. In September the Board of Trade directed Penn 
to put his province in a state of defense and in case of 
danger on the New York frontier to send the assistance 
as required by the order of 1700.^^ Governor Cornbury 
of New York called upon the colonies for the requisitions. 
Governor Hamilton of Pennsylvania urged the assembly 
to comply, as also to erect fortifications and to establish 
a militia.^^ The assembly would do nothing. The re- 
sponses of other colonies to the call of Cornbury were of 
a similiar character. Cornbury and Quary frequently in- 
formed the Board of Trade that the royal orders were not of 
sufficient force either to elicit compliance with the directions 
to aid New York or to provide internal defenses.^^ Both 
suggested that the only way to control the wayward col- 
onies was to make use of the power of Parliament. Quary 
wrote, " Nothing will do but a short act of Parliament " 
which would ' ' open the Peoples eyes to see their own inter- 
est, and make them more ready to comply with other of 
Her Majesty's just commands, and cure them of that sour 
temper which hath already possessed them in Opposition 
to Government." This remedy was suggested time and 
again and the logic of events finally forced Parliament 
to this step in 1765. In 1703 the board gave Penn strict 
orders to see that his assembly granted the money for New 
York defenses and to report promptly his success in 
the matter.^^ The house simply replied with the plea that 
the expense of securing its own frontier and maintaining 
friendly relations with the Indians of the province pre- 
vented the raising of a supply for New York.^^ This reply 
is characteristic of the other colonies also. The respective 

54 B. T. Paps., Props., VI, pt. 2, I 24. 

55 Pa. Votes of Assembly, I, Appendix, xx. 

56 N. Y. Col. Docs., IV, 1052-1053, 1060-1061, 1070, 1084. 

57 B. T. Paps., Props., Entry Bk. D, f. 316. 

58 Pa. Votes of Assembly, 1, pt. 2, 18; Pa. Col. Bees., II, 142, 155, 
165. 



IMPERIAL DEFENSE, 1689-1748 271 

colonies simply considered the conformity of the royal req- 
uisitions to their immediate needs without regard to the 
general welfare. Particularism was especially strong in 
those colonies whose frontiers were not subject to the im- 
mediate assaults of the French and Indians. But it was 
only a question of time till the middle colonies became a 
prey to the horrors of savage warfare and foreign invasion 
which was now the lot of the border colonies. Though 
freed from attacks by land, Pennsylvania suffered in com- 
mon with all from the depredations of hostile privateers 
upon colonial commerce. 

The thriving trade of the colonies, the basis of their 
prosperity, offered a vulnerable point of attack for the 
privateers of France and Spain. The activity of the priva- 
teers put a temporary check upon the trade of Pennsyl- 
vania to her chief markets in the West Indies. The at- 
tacks were not confined to the high seas, but reached also 
the shipping and settlements of Delaware Bay.^^ The mer- 
chants appealed to the assembly for protection. The 
Quaker assembly turned a deaf ear to the entreaties, con- 
tending that the erection of fortifications would cost more 
than the impoverished condition of the province could bear, 
and that after all the city of Philadelphia, the only port 
of the colony, was in no danger of attack by reason of its 
distance from the seas.^^ Furthermore, the house took the 
stand that it was incumbent upon the English government 
to afford protection by sea. The heavy losses of 1708 
again lead the governor to implore the house to take ac- 
tion.®^ It replied that the attacks were due to the neglect 
of the royal navy, for the Queen had given '' the High 
Adml. and his Deputies, ample authority to scour the 
Coast of such Robbers, and secure the Navigation of this 
as well as the rest of her Colonies, and protect the Mer- 
cs Penn-Lo^ran Cotres., I, 240, 289, 301; II, 123, 275, 348. 
60 Pa. Col. Recs., II, 249, 250. 
61 /6icZ., 413-414, 417-420. 



272 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

chants in their Lawful Trade. ' ' ^^ According to the inter- 
pretation of the house its legislative power under the char- 
ter was bounded by the limits of the province, hence it 
had no authority to fit out vessels of war or commission 
privateers to serve beyond these boundaries, and that under 
these conditions the merchants must appeal for protection 
to Lord Cornbury, whose vice-admiralty commission gave 
him authority over the river and bay and high-seas.*^^ The 
appeal to Cornbury availed nothing for the two ships sta- 
tioned at New York were then at sea.^* Likewise Gov- 
ernor Seymour of Maryland could give no assistance.^^ In 
1709 Governor Gookin informed the assembly of an attack 
upon Lewes and asked that some provision be made for 
fortifications.'^*^ The house replied that the admiralty had 
ordered the ship of war Garland to cruise between the Dela- 
ware Capes and Hatteras and that the coast would soon 
be cleared of privateers.^^ But the governor said that he 
knew of no orders received by the Garland regarding Penn- 
sylvania.*^^ The Quakers, as James Logan expressed it, 
'' threw the whole burden of defense upon the Lord High 
Admiral by sea and the Queen by land. ' ' ^^ 

In the earlier part of the war the colonists, left to them- 
selves, had failed in their attacks upon Canada. It was 
therefore decided to enlist the support of the combined col- 
onies and to secure the aid of the English government. 
Colonel Samuel Vetch and Governor Nicholson were the 
prime movers in this enterprise. In March, 1709, the 
crown sent letters to the colonies north of Maryland an- 
nouncing a campaign against Canada and requiring the 

62 Pa. Col. Recs., II, 415-416. 

esThid., 421-422. 

6^ Ihid., 418; Penn-Logan Corres., II, 281. 

65 Pa. Col. Recs., II, 417. 

66/&ifZ., 472; Pa. Votes of Assemhly, II, 43. 

67 Pa. Col. Recs., II, 475; Pa. Votes of Assemlly, II, 44. 

68 Pa. Col. Recs., II, 476; Pa. Votes of Assemhly, II, 45. 

69 Penn-Logan Corres., II, 344. 



IMPERIAL DEFENSE, 1689-1748 273 

governors to assist the undertaking and to obey the orders 
of Colonel Vetch/^ The plan of operation was two-fold. 
The troops of Rhode Island and Massachusetts in conjunc- 
tion with five regiments of British regulars were to attack 
Quebec; while the troops of New York, Connecticut, New 
Jersey, and Pennsylvania were to operate against Mon- 
treal. Pennsylvania was called upon for a quota of one 
hundred and fifty men. The governor, urging that the 
enthusiasm of New England be emulated, said that if the 
house would appropriate £4000 necessary to raise and equip 
the men, he would provide recruits.'^^ Out of respect for 
the Quaker principles he did not ask the assembly to pass 
a militia law but simply to vote money. The house de- 
cided that because of their principles no money could be 
raised for the expedition, but that a present might be 
granted to the Queen, and accordingly a gift of <£500 was 
voted.'^- Even this sum was placed in safe hands till the 
Quaker could be sure it would not be used for war-like 
purposes. But the campaign amounted to nothing. After 
the northern colonies had made all preparations the Eng- 
lish forces failed to appear and the operations had to be 
given up.'^^ The colonists on their own initiative in 1710 
captured Port Royal. Nicholson went to England to urge 
a renewal of the previous plan and in consequence the Eng- 
lish government directed the governors to the same effect 
as before. In June, 1711, the New England governors met 
in conference at New London to discuss the plan of opera- 
tions and to fix the quotas to be contributed by the col- 
onies.'^* Pennsylvania's levy was fixed at two hundred and 
forty men to be at Albany by the first days of July. The 
assembly, after complaining that the colony was rated too 

70 A^. Y. Col. Docs., V, 70-74. 

71 Pa. Votes of AssemUy, II, 34, 35. 

T2 Hid., 41; Penn-Logan Corres., II, 351; Perry, Church Papers, 
II, 51-52. 

73 Parkman, Half Century of Conflict, I, 137-140. 

74 N, Y. Col. Docs., V, 257. 



274 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

high and that the expense of maintaining friendship with 
its own Indians was all it could bear, expressed a willingness 
to pay tribute to Caesar as far as their religious principles 
would permit. Accordingly £2000 was voted to the 
' ' Queen 's Use. ' ' '^ Strange to say the men were never 
raised and the money was never used as intended. The 
expedition of 1711 proved a sorry fiasco, due chiefly to the 
utter incompetence of the British commanders. '^^ In 1712, 
the Tory party, then dominant in English politics, favored 
a policy of peace, and hostilities were suspended in Europe. 
The war was formally closed by the Treaty of Utrecht, 
1713. This brought no final determination of the conflict- 
ing territorial claims of England and Prance in North 
America. The struggle was gimply laid aside till some fu- 
ture time. 

It is clear that Quaker principles and the interests of 
the Empire seriously clashed. Two essential functions of 
government are the protection of life and property from 
domestic violence and the preservation of the dominions 
from external danger. In the first case there was no in- 
consistency between Quaker principles and government 
and the actual conditions of life. Constables, sheriffs, and 
a judicial system were provided for local police protection. 
In the second case the Quaker principles were in no way 
related to actual conditions, but were based upon a priori 
theories. The Quakers pleaded, as expressed by James 
Logan, '' we are a peaceable people, had wholly renounced 
war, and the spirit of it; that we were willing to trust 
ourselves to the protection of God alone, in an assurance 
that the sword can neither be drawn nor sheathed but by 
his direction. ' ' ^^ Had this principle been universally es- 
tablished, arms and the art of war would have wholly dis- 

75 7V. Y. Col. Docs., V, 262; Penn-Logan Corre^., II, 436; Pa. 
Votes of Assembly, II, 97, 99. 

76 Greene, Provincial America, 159-160. 

77 Penn-Logan Corres., I, 288. 



IMPERIAL DEFENSE, 1689-1748 275 

appeared, but the plea of the Quaker, noble though it was, 
found no support in the conditions prevailing in the eight- 
eenth century. The ideals of the Quakers did not conform 
to the needs of the imperial authorities or of those in the 
province who demanded protections^ The refusal of the 
Quaker assembly to comply with the demands of the home 
government drew upon this sect the charge that their prin- 
ciples were inconsistent with good government ; that a legis- 
lature dominated by Quakers representing but one sect and 
not the whole people, was contrary to all the known princi- 
ples of popular governmenf.^^ The fear was frequently ex- 
pressed that the province would fall an easy prey to the 
French because of the Quaker dominance. It was this 
charge chiefly which brought about the institution of royal 
government in 1692. In order to secure proper protection 
two remedies were proposed; that the Quakers should be 
excluded from government ^^ and that royal control be es- 
tablished. In 1694 the Lords of Trade agreed to represent 
to the Privy Council the great increase of Quakers in Penn- 
sylvania and other colonies and their refusal to aid in de- 
fense whereby the safety of some of the dominions were 
seriously endangered. ^^ Royal agents, such as Quary and 
Randolph, were never weary of calling the attention of 
the home authorities to the lack of defenses in Pennsyl- 
vania and urging the vacation of the charter. But such 
complaints were not confined to this colony. Repeated 
were the complaints of Bellomont, governor of New York, 
that Rhode Island and Connecticut refused to recognize 
his right to command their militia and neglected to provide 

78 Logan wrote, that the combatants in the colonies replied to 
the Quaker peace arguments, that should the Quakers lose their lives 
only " it would be little to the crown, seeing 'tis our doing, but 
others are involved with us, and should the enemy make themselves 
master of the country it would too sensibly touch England in the 
rest of her colonies." Penn-Logan Corres., I, 228. 

-^^Ihid., II, 125, 345. 

so lY. Y. Col. Docs., V, 32-33, 81. 

81 Acts of Privy CouncU, Col, II, 265. 



276 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1705 

defenses. These charges form one of the most serious 
items urged in support of the bill of 1701 in Parliament 
to vacate the charters. 

Especially active in support of the agitation to vacate 
the charter of Pennsylvania and to secure the benefits of 
royal control was the Church party. The Churchmen were 
desirous of crown government not only for the sake of ade- 
quate protection in time of war, but for the advance of 
the interests of the Anglican church. The vestry of Christ 
Church and the assembljTuen of Delaware represented to 
the king that all were taxed, Quaker and non-Quaker alike, 
for the support of government, yet the legislature refused 
to afford them any protection.^- The petition for royal 
government was doubtless justified, but the tactics used in 
some cases to effect this end were beyond justification. 
In 1702, when the assembly refused to establish a militia, 
Governor Hamilton exercised his authority as captain- 
general to raise troops. He commissioned officers with 
power to levy and command a militia. Opposition to the 
militia came not from the Quakers, but from some of the 
Church party, although loudest in their complaints against 
the Quaker government for refusing to afford protection. 
Hamilton wrote to Penn ' ' of the ungentlemanly conduct of 
those who call themselves Churchmen " who discouraged 
the enlistment of men with the purpose of discrediting 
the Quaker government in the eyes of the home authorities 
by representing the lack of defenses.^^ This charge is sub- 
stantiated by the evidence of Evans, Hamilton's successor, 
and of James Logan. ^* Such conduct was due to the petty 
treachery of small minds like Quary and a few others, who 
apparently left nothing undone to find a pretext for the 
establishment of royal control.^^ 

82 B. T. Paps., Props., VI, pt. 1, G 13; pt. 2, I, 2, 6, 7. 

83 Ihid., VII, L 10. 

84 Pa. Col. Recs., II, 162; Penn-Logan Corres., 1, 124, 128. 

85 See page 238. 



IMPERIAL DEFENSE, 1689-1748 277 

In 1702 Quary, then in England, laid before the Board 
of Trade a series of charges against the province. Num- 
bered among them was the complaint of the entire lack 
of defenses, although the French had advanced within four 
days' journey of Newcastle.^*' Penn with effect pointed 
out that Virginia and Maryland, although governed im- 
mediately by the crown, had provided no defenses. ^^ It 
was sufficient proof, as Penn no doubt meant to imply, 
that royal government was not a panacea for the ills of in- 
direct control. The truth is that the assemblies of the 
royal colonies were just as particularistic in their attitude 
toward the problem of defense as the chartered colonies. 
Penn well indicated this spirit of particularism when he 
said that there was no need of defenses for several reasons. 
In the first place he held that it was impossible to defend 
widely scattered settlements. Then again, that the prov- 
ince by reason of its geographical location was immune 
from attack both by sea and by land. Philadelphia, the 
chief port, was situated one hundred and sixty miles from 
the sea and navigation was quite dangerous because of the 
numerous shoals. By land the chief source of danger was 
the Indians, and not the French, and the kindly treatment 
accorded the savages freed the province from that danger. 
But such arguments did not at all justify the refusal of the 
Quaker government to contribute to the aid of New York 
when the security of all the colonies depended upon the 
defense of the northern frontier. Perhaps the real pur- 
pose of the Quakers is revealed in the reply of the as- 
sembly to Quary 's charges.^^ It said that the crown was 
fully aware of the Quaker principles regarding war when 
the charter was granted and that hence no expectation of 
the crown on this point had been disappointed. It de- 
clared that the Quakers had left the mother country to 

86 5. T. Paps., Props., VI, pt. 2, I 17; VII, M 21. 
8T Hid., VI, pt. 2, I, 19, 20. 
88 lUd., VII, M 18. 



278 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

escape all war-like preparations and that the province was 
better off without defenses. Moreover, the Quakers said 
that those who complained most had the least to lose, and 
since before coming into the province the Quaker princi- 
ples were known to them, they were free to depart if not 
contented. 

A few of the most prominent among the Quakers fully 
realized the weakness of their position. They saw the in- 
consistency of their ethical principles as compared with ac- 
tual conditions.^^ They were aware that they had not ad- 
hered to their high intentions to grant civil and religious lib- 
erty to all since the Quakers dominant in government rep- 
resented only their views on the question of war and not 
the views of a majority of the colonists who demanded 
protection. Isaac Norris and James Logan earnestly ad- 
vised Penn to surrender his powers of government to the 
crown.®^ On the other hand it may be said that the Quaker 
assembly did not place itself in a position of absolute re- 
fusal to grant aid. It granted money during King Wil- 
liam's "War to relieve the distressed Indians in New York, 
and during Queen Anne's War it voted a sum for the 
" Queen's Use." Fully realizing that this was only a 
specious device to evade a direct grant for military pur- 
poses, some justification was found necessary. The 
Quakers said, '' we did not see it inconsistent with our prin- 
ciples to give the Queen money, notwithstanding the use 
she might put it to, that being not our part, but hers."^^ 

89 Penn-Logan Corres., II, 276. Logan to Penn, " This place 
under such dangers, lying so naked and exposed, gives occasions 
for great murmurs, and Friends themselves, finding their princi- 
ples utterly unqualify them for the discharge of some duties of 
government, and which that of land now reckons indispensably nec- 
essary, are quite tired of it, and wish themselves free of the load 
which follows it." 

90 See page 355. 

91 Penn-Logan Corres., II, 436. Isaac Norris wrote, " The argu- 
ment in this case is, that our friends in England pay all taxes, 
and never scruple that which is expressly declared to be for carrying 
on a vigorous war against France." Ibid., II, 348. 



IMPERIAL DEFENSE, 1689-1748 279 

Responsibility was shifted to the shoulders of others. 
They held that tribute was due to the powers which God 
had set over them as far as their religious principles would 
allow. The position was not consistent and their motives 
lacked the element of the heroic, but they probably acted 
on the theory that in a complicated moral situation a sac- 
rifice of a part of ethical principles is necessary to safe- 
guard ideals. By voting money for the use of the crown, 
the Quakers saved themselves from the charge of an abso- 
lute refusal and warded off the censure of the home gov- 
ernment. By such means they escaped direct taxes for 
war, enabled the governor to raise troops without the 
passage of a law to establish a militia, and kept themselves 
in power in the government.^^ In the long run it was the 
geographical position of the province which permitted the 
continuance of this policy. When French invasions and 
Indian warfare reached the soil of Pennsylvania, then the 
Quakers were forced to yield the government into other 
hands. 

For twenty-six years after the Treaty of Utrecht the Em- 
pire enjoyed all the advantages of a long peace. This was 
due to the policy of the great premier, Robert Walpole, 
who realized that only under conditions of peace could he 
succeed in his policy of building up the trade and industry 
of England. But the keen international commercial ri- 
valry was at length to break out into open warfare. The 
clashing of the English and Spanish merchants for su- 
premacy of trade in the West Indies and South America, 
led England to declare war upon her rival in 173S'. Two 
months before the ultimatum of war was issued, John Penn 
wrote from London to Governor Thomas advising him to 
make an effort to secure the establishment of a provincial 
militia in view of the impending conflict.^^ Thomas called 

92 Sharpless, A Quaker Experiment in Gov't., 204-208. 

93 Penn Mss., Letter Bk., 1, 300-307, John Penn to Gov. Thomas, 
Aug. 2, 1739; ibid., 308, John Penn to Thos. Penn, Aug. 2, 1739. 



280 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

the attention of the assembly to the gathering clouds of war 
in Europe and recommended it to place the colony in a 
position of defense before it was too late.^* The house 
admitted the dark aspect of affairs abroad but refused to 
do aught except to revert to the well-worn arguments.^^ 
It asserted that to establish a militia by compelling some 
to serve and exempting non-combatants would be not only 
unfair to the latter class but also inconsistent with Quaker 
principles; that the governor had power by the charter to 
raise troops without the aid of the assembly; and finally 
that there was no need of defenses because of the fortunate 
geographical position of the colony by sea and lan'd. 

The battle-ground of the war with Spain was the West 
Indies. England anticipated the struggle by despatching 
a fleet under Admiral Vernon to ravage the Spanish main 
three months before the formal declaration of war. Early 
in 1740 the colonies were instructed to raise troops for a 
"West Indian expedition. By recruiting forces in the col- 
onies the English government saved the expense and delay 
of raising men at home and of transporting them to the 
field. The requisition only required the colonies to raise 
troops and furnish provisions and transports till their ar- 
rival in the West Indies, when men and transports would 
be cared for by the English government. When in June 
the governor of Pennsylvania asked the assembly to grant 

94 Pa. Votes of Assembly, III, 353. 

^^Ihid., Ill, 361, 367. Penn Mss., Off. Corres., Ill, 89, Gov. 
Thomas to John Penn, Nov. 5, 1739. William Allen wrote to John 
Penn that " at present the House of Assembly consists of almost 
all Quakers, who I believe will do nothing but Trust in the Lord." 
Penn Mss. Off. Corres., Nov. 17, 1739. Gov. Thomas also wrote to the 
Penns expressing disgust " with the mistaken zeal & folly of the 
Quakers in thrusting themselves into the Assembly at this critical 
Juncture, when they might have saved appearances & allowed others 
to do what is so absolutely necessary for their Protection. They 
who profess Conscience, will not allow others to act agreeable to 
theirs, that is, to make use of the Strength & Courage God has given 
them to defend all that can be dear to a man in this world," Ibid., 
Ill, Nov. 5, 1739. 



IMPERIAL DEFENSE, 1689-1748 281 

supplies to enable him to carry out the requisition, the 
house expressed regret that it could do nothing.^*^ The 
governor relying on his own powers then began to act with 
energy. By July he had raised and officered seven com- 
panies of troops. Again he asked the assembly to grant 
money for provisions and transports.^^ The Quaker house 
simply harped on the subject of its religious principles 
and further complained of the governor's action in en- 
listing indentured servants without securing the consent of 
their masters or of offering the latter any compensation. 
The merchants of Philadelphia appealed to the assembly 
to consider itself the representatives of the whole province 
and not of a Quaker minority alone, and not to act contrary 
to the royal order thereby drawing upon the colony the 
censure of the home government. ^^ The petition had the 
effect of eliciting a vote of £3000 to the " king's use," but 
with the proviso that payment should be withheld till the 
enlisted servants were released and the governor promised 
not to enroll any more.''^ This the governor refused to do, 
holding that the servants had enrolled themselves volun- 
tarily, and that in the opinion of able lawyers the crown 
had a right to their service ; hence to discharge them would 
not only violate the royal right but cause mutiny.^^^ Since 
no assistance could be expected from the assembly the pro- 
prietors and merchants came to the governor's relief by 
subscribing £6600, while others offered their ships as trans- 
ports on the condition of being reimbursed by the home 
government. ^^^ In pursuance of secret instructions Gov- 

96 Pa. Votes of Assembly, III, 389, 390-391, 392, 395; Gov. 
Thomas to Duke of Newcastle, July 21, 1740, Amer. and West 
Indies, (P. R. 0.), 28, Pa., XXIV, ff. 36-39. 

■■97 Amer. and W. I., 28, Pa. XXIV, ff. 40-42, Thomas to Newcastle, 
Aug. 29, 1740. 

98 Pa. Votes of Assemlly, III, 402. 

99 Ihid., Ill, 409. 

100 Amer. and W. I., 28, Pa., XXIV, ff. 40-42, Thomas to New- 
castle, Aug. 29, 1740. 

101/fetd., ff. 74-75, Thomas to Newcastle, Oct. 2, 1740. 



282 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

ernor Thomas drew upon the Commissioners of the Navy 
to liquidate the amounts due to the subscribers and ship- 
owners.^°^ The assembly retaliated by stopping the govern- 
or 's salary and threatening to appeal home against him.^^^ 
To anticipate this action Thomas wrote to the secretary of 
state and the Board of Trade giving a statement of the 
whole situation and taking the Quakers severely to task for 
their obstructing tactics.^^* He accused the Quakers of ex- 
erting their whole strength to secure the return of an assem- 
bly opposed to all war measures, and asserted that this pur- 
pose was realized only by an appeal to the German in- 
habitants who were persuaded to support the Quakers in 
power on the plea that a militia would bring them under 
as severe bondage to the proprietors as they were formerly 
under to their princes in Germany, that the expense would 
impoverish them, and that their liberties would be best 
safeguarded by a Quaker assembly. As a parting word 
Thomas wrote, ' ' I am too well acquainted with the narrow, 
bigoted views of this governing sect here not to be con- 
vinced that it is impossible for me to serve his Majesty faith- 
fully and please them under the present circumstances of 
affairs," and he expressed a wish to resign.^*^^ Richard 
Partridge, the London agent of the assembly, secured from 
the office of the Board of Trade by surreptitious means a 
copy of this letter which he forwarded to the colony where 
it was used to inflame the wrath of the Quakers against 
the governor. The board called upon Partridge to explain 
how he secured the copy and on his refusal to answer he 
was forbidden to act before that body for any colony until 
he made satisfaction.^^^ 

102,4.. and W. L, 28, f. 77, Thomas to Newcastle, Oct. 27, 1740. 

103 Penn Mss., Letter Bh., I, 339, John and Richard Penn to Thos. 
Penn, Nov., 20, 1740. 

104 Pa. Statutes at Large, IV, 468-477; Amer and W. I., 28, Pa., 
XXIV, f. 97, Thomas to Newcastle, Nov. 26, 1741. 

105 Pa. Statutes at Large, IV, 477. 

106 B. T. Paps., Props., Entry Bk. H, f. 146. 



IMPERIAL DEFENSE, 1689-1748 283 

The expedition against Cartagena in March, 1740, proved 
a disgraceful failure. Like the expedition against Quebec 
in 1711, the fiasco was due to the incompetence and wran- 
gling of the English commanders.^^^ In August came a call 
for recruits to fill up the sadly depleted ranks of the colo- 
nial troops. In response Thomas acted with energy but 
the horrible mortality of the troops in the West Indies and 
the persistent exaggeration of this circumstance by the 
Quakers caused great discontent and made enlistments very 
difficult.^^^ In spite of these obstacles, Thomas raised 
about one hundred and seventy recruits who were 
despatched to the south. He was compelled to advance 
from his own pockets a bounty of £4 to each man, drawing 
upon the Paymaster-General for reimbursement and upon 
the Commissioners of the Navy for provision and transport 
money.^°^ The clash between Quaker principles and the 
interests of the Empire precluded expectation of little as- 
sistance from the Quaker assembly and the share of the 
province in the enterprise was thrown upon the English 
exchequer. 

Moreover, on the question of internal defenses the assem- 
bly remained just as obstinate. During the Spanish war 
the commerce of the province suffered severely from the 
depredations of hostile privateers which infested the coast. 
Repeatedly the governor implored the assembly to provide 
fortifications. A petition signed by eighty-five merchants 
prayed for the protection of trade upon which the pros- 
perity of the province depended. ^^^ The house simply re- 
plied that no vessels of the colony had been taken since 
the war began, that no certain information existed that the 
coast was annoyed by Spanish privateers, and moreover, 

107 Fortescue, Hist, of British Army, II, 59-79. 

108 Amer. and W. I., 28, Pa., XXIV, f. 97, Thomas to Newcastle, 
Nov. 26, 1741. 

109 Hid., ff. 100, 102, 104, Thomas to Newcastle, May 22, Sept. 30, 
Nov. 24, 1742. 

110 Pa. Votes of AssemUy, III, 432, 433. 



284 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

that shipping was protected by the English navy without 
expense to the province. Finally, the assembly voted 
£3000 to purchase bills of exchange to pay into the royal 
exchequer/i^ By such means the Quakers sought to evade 
the charge that they refused to pay nothing toward de- 
fense and at the same time to avoid any direct compromise 
with their principles. Governor Thomas wrote that the 
province would never be adequately protected until the 
Quakers were excluded from the legislature by the imposi- 
tion of the oath/^- With this suggestion Thomas Penn 
agreed.^^^ In 1742 two hundred and sixty-five prominent 
men of the province petitioned the crown for protection. ^^* 
Despairing of assistance from the assembly, recourse to 
the home government was the only practical alternative. 
The petition set forth that the colony lacked fortifications, 
munitions of war, and a militia whereby the province lay 
exposed to the attacks of the French by land and privateers 
by sea; that the earnest efforts of the governor and pro- 
prietors to secure defense were rendered ineffectual by the 
Quakers in the assembly, who, though not a third of the 
population, refused to act because of religious principles, 
and that the civil power without a militia established by 
law was too feeble to repel the insurrection of slaves should 
they rise as in the neighboring colony. The petition was 
referred to the Board of Trade before which a hearing was 
granted in April to the counsel for the petitioners and as- 
sembly."^ Meanwhile some forty London Quakers es- 
poused the cause of their colonial brethren and presented 

111 Pa. Votes of Assembly, III, 432; Cal. Treas. Papers, 1742-1745, 
276. 

112 Penw Mass., Official Corres., Ill, 169; Gov. Thomas to F. J. 
Paris, May 14, 1741. 

ii3 76i(Z., Off. Corres., Ill, 141, Thos. Penn to Paris, March 27, 
1741; ibid, Letter Bk., I, 372, John Penn to John Kinsey, March 3, 
1742. See also the letter of Gov. Morris of New Jersey recommend- 
ing the same idea. N. J. Hist. Soc, Collections, IV, 187. 

114 B. T. Paps., Props., XV, T 57. 

115 B. T. Jour., LI, 27, 32, 34. 



IMPERIAL DEFENSE, 1689-1748 285 

a counter-petition."® It stated that the colonial Quakers 
had been unfairly attacked and asked that a reasonable 
time be allowed the latter to reply, not doubting that upon 
a fair hearing they would be able to acquit themselves of 
the insinuations and show their allegiance to the crown and 
their regard for the welfare of the province. The hearings 
were postponed in order to give the London Quakers time 
to lay their petition regularly before the Privy Council.^^^ 
Paris, solicitor for the petition, urged the board to take ac- 
tion before the counter-petition was received from the coun- 
cil. In the latter part of June two hearings were 
granted by the board at which appeared Paris, solicitor, 
and Bathurst, counsel, for the petitioners, and Sharpe, 
solicitor, and Hume Campbell, counsel, for the assembly.^^® 
For the assembly it was argued that by the Charter of Privi- 
leges of 1701 and the law of 1705 granting liberty of con- 
science the Quakers were exempt from military service; 
that the colony was in no need of armaments because of its 
peaceful policy toward the Indians, and that by the royal 
charter, which empowered the proprietors to raise and 
command the people, the Penns were obliged to defend the 
colony in time of sudden invasion. On the other side it 
was held that the grant of liberty of conscience pertained 
to matters purely religious and made no exemptions from 
military service. The Quaker contentions were to say the 
least weak and were refuted by the board in its report of 
July to the Privy Council.^^^ This report pointed out 
that an inspection of the laws of the province and the evi- 
dence of the letter of Governor Thomas clearly proved 
that the assembly had done nothing to provide for the se- 
curity of the colony, although from the nature of society 
and government and by charter it was obliged to perform 

116 B. T. Paps., Props., XV, T 60. 

117 B. T. Jour., LI, 36. 

118 lUd., 52, 53, 63, 65, 66, 68. 

119 Z?. T. Paps., Props., Entry Bk. H, ff. 210-217; Acts of Privy 
Council, Col, III, 710-712. 



286 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

this essential function.' The report declared that there was 
no more reason to exempt one colony than another from 
this obligation, especially since no law existed to exempt 
the Quakers from military service, and that the proprie- 
tors were no more obliged to defend the colony in time of 
war than was the governor of a royal province. In con- 
clusion, it proposed that the crown should instruct the gov- 
ernor of Pennsylvania to report what was necessary to 
place the colony in a position of security. Counsel for the 
assembly carried the case to the Privy Council, where, after 
a hearing, the report of the Board of Trade was upheld. 
The board was not directed to send the instruction to the 
governor till June, 1743, because of the unsettled condition 
of politics in England following the resignation of Robert 
Walpole.^^*^ In March, 1744, Governor Thomas replied 
saying that it was necessary to build forts and mount can- 
non at suitable places along the Delaware River for the 
protection of the three hundred vessels which traded yearly 
to the province.^-^ For the frontier he suggested that one 
or two forts should be built to protect the traders and to 
secure the colony from the incursions of the French and 
Indians. Finally, he stated that a quantity of stores of 
war should be supplied and a law enacted obliging the in- 
habitants to do military service as in other colonies. These 
suggestions were undoubtedly warranted by the situation 
in the colony, but the dominance of Quaker power pre- 
cluded a better order of affairs along this line. The gov- 
ernor's letter was referred to the Board of Trade for con- 
sideration. There the question arose as to how best to 
carry these recommendations into effect; could it be done 
by order in council, or did it require the passage of an act 
of Parliament? The board sent the charter of Pennsyl- 

i2openw Mss., Letter Bk., 1, 371, John Penn to Gov. Thomas, 
March 1, 1742; B. T. Paps., Props., XVI, V 2, 3; Entry Bk. H, ff. 
218-219. 

121 B. T. Paps., Props., XVI, Y 10; B. T. Jour., LII, 112. 



IMPERIAL DEFENSE, 1689-1748 287 

vania to the crown lawyers, asking an opinion as to how 
the colony could be compelled to provide for its own se- 
curity.^-^ They replied that in point of prudence and ex- 
pediency the colony was obliged to take all precautions nec- 
essary for its defense, but in point of law the colonial as- 
sembly was the sole judge of the methods to be taken for 
that purpose and could not be forced to do more than it 
saw fit ^' unless by the force of an act of parliament here, 
which alone can prescribe certain rules for their Con- 
duct. "^^^ This opinion is important in several respects. 
In the first place, it showed conclusively that nothing was 
to be expected from the assembly as long as the Quakers 
held control. Even before this opinion was received by 
the board, Thomas Penn wrote from London that '' some 
of the Ministers, conferring among themselves, are of the 
opinion nothing will do but an act of parliament and I 
think they cannot do the business without one."^^* The 
object of such an act was to exclude the Quakers from the 
legislature by imposing the oath upon all. No parliamen- 
tary action was taken at that time because, as Thomas Penn 
informs us, the Privy Council was too greatly pressed with 
other business. In the second place, the opinion of the 
crown lawyers was significant of the political change tak- 
ing place in England in the direction of parliamentary su- 
premacy over the colonies.^^^ The logic of the whole situa- 
tion, in other colonies as well as in Pennsylvania, was to 
force the English ministry to resort to parliamentary power 
twenty years later to obtain a proper defense of the col- 
onies. 

The conflict with Spain was now merged in the broader 

122 B. T. Paps., Props., Entry Bk. H, f. 220; B. T. Jour., LII, 121. 

123 j5. T. Paps., Props., XVI, V 12; Entry Bk. H, flF. 221-222. 

124 Penn Mss., Letter Bk., II, 102, 118, Thos. Penn to Gov. Thomas 
Sept. 4, 1744, March 7, 1745. 

12^5 The same question arose a little earlier in the case of the 
Connecticut Intestacy Law. C. M. Andrews, Yale Review, Nov., 
1894, 288-291. 



288 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

war of the Austrian Succession, or King George's War of 
colonial history. England declared war against France and 
Spain in March, 1744. Anticipating the outbreak of hos- 
tilities, the crown instructed the colonial governors in the 
previous year to put their respective colonies into a posi- 
tion of defense.^-'' Governor Thomas laid the royal order 
before the assembly of Pennsylvania, which answered that 
it was willing to give proof of its loyalty when the occasion 
demanded, but that recent information showed that war 
was less likely now than when the order was issued.^^^ In 
July, 1744, the governor published the declaration of war 
and the house had occasion to exhibit the loyalty pro- 
fessed.^-^ "When the governor entreated the house to pro- 
vide fortifications and a militia, it replied that he was well 
aware of its sentiments on the question of war and that no 
further explanation was necessary. Moreover, it stated 
that as the governor had raised troops before without a 
militia bill, he could do so again. ^^^ The same spirit was 
shown with regard to intercolonial military plans. 

The constant and irritating attacks on colonial commerce 
by French privateers exasperated the New Englanders. 
The source of this trouble was the strong French fortress 
at Louisburg, ' ' the Dunkirk of America, ' ' on Cape Breton 
Island. New England, especially Massachusetts under the 
activity of Governor Shirley, laid plans to capture the place 
and invited the colonies north of Maryland to cooperate 
in the enterprise. In February, 1745, Governor Thomas 
explained to the assembly of Pennsylvania that the capture 
of Louisburg, the only French harbor of strength in Amer- 
ica, would put an end to the depredations on colonial com- 
merce and asked support for the undertaking. ^^^ The suc- 
cess of the enterprise meant as much to Pennsylvania as to 

126 Pa. Votes of AssemUy, III, 537. 

127 Hid., 544. 

i28 76tc?., 553-554. 
^2Q Ihid., 557. 
130 Ibid., IV, 6. 



IMPERIAL DEFENSE, 1689-1748 289 

New England, but the assembly held a different opinion. 
In a narrow spirit of selfishness and jealousy it replied 
that ' ' if Massachusetts expects aid from us it is reasonable 
we should have been consulted, as it is a matter which 
concerns Massachusetts alone. ' ' '^^^ Similar evasive argu- 
ments were used: that the enterprise was too hazardous; 
that aid from the other colonies would arrive too late ; that 
the English government had not directed the undertaking 
and hence it might interfere with royal plans; and that 
support from England was too uncertain. In ]\Iay, the 
New England forces in conjunction with an English fleet 
under Commodore Warren laid siege to Louisburg without 
the aid of Pennsylvania. Shirley and Warren appealed 
to the province for assistance in the purchase of provisions 
and clothing, the lack of which rendered half the besieging 
forces unfit for duty.^^^ The assembly replied that since 
the enterprise was solely a private concern in which Massa- 
chusetts did not see fit to consult other colonies and that 
since the success of the undertaking would inure to the 
benefit of New England alone, that section had no right 
to involve Pennsylvania in the expense. ^^^ After the fall of 
Louisburg, Governor Thomas laid before the assembly in 
July a letter from Warren asking the province to contrib- 
ute eighty men, provisioned and armed for eight months, 
to aid in the preservation of the conquest, and a letter 
from the secretary of state directing the governor to assist 
Warren in case of application for men, provisions, and 
ships.^^* The house replied that its pacific principles did 
not permit it to join in direct military measures, " yet we 
have ever held it Our Duty to render Tribute to Caesar," 
and voted £4000 to purchase provisions for the garrison 
at Louisburg.^^^ Further appeals simply elicited the re- 
131 Pa. Votes of Assembly, IV, 7. 

132 /&td, 11. 

153 lUd., 12. 
i^^Ihid., 12. 
135 /6id, 14. 



290 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

sponse that the money already granted should excuse the 
house from any further aid.^^^ 

In 1746 a general campaign against Canada was planned 
along lines similar to that of 1709 and 1711. The New 
England troops acting in conjunction with British regu- 
lars and fleet were to attack Quebec, while the middle and 
southern colonies, except the Carolinas, were to operate 
against Montreal. In May Governor Thomas submitted 
to the assembly the requisition from the secretary of 
state.^^^ The troops were to enter into the royal pay on 
enlistment, arms and clothing were to be provided by the 
colony, but General St. Clair, financial agent of the crown, 
was authorized ^' to make a reasonable allowance for de- 
fraying that Expence." It is clear that the charges of 
these undertakings was thrown largely upon the English 
treasury. The governor asked the house to furnish arms 
and clothing pending the arrival of St. Clair and suggested 
that a bounty should be offered to encourage enlistments. 
In response £5000 was voted to the " king's use." ^^^ This 
sum was expended in bounties and furnishing provisions 
for four companies of troops, while the governor provided 
arms and clothing on his own credit, and deferred drawing 
on the paymaster-general for reimbursement in expectation 
of the arrival of St. Clair.^^^ Seven colonies raised forces 
for the campaign, but as in 1709 the English troops failed 
to arrive and the proposed operations came to naught. 
Meanwhile the provincials lay idle at Albany awaiting 
orders from England, the pay of the men was badly in ar- 
rears, and there were grave fears of mutiny. In August 
Governor Thomas asked the assembly to advance a sum of 
money sufficient to pay the arrears of the Pennsylvania 
troops and to support them at Albany till the English fleet 

136 Pa. Votes of Assembly, IV, 18, 19-20, 23, 27, 30-31. 

137 Ibid., 37. 
^sslbid., 38, 40, 41. 

139 Amer. and W. /., 28, Pa., XXIV, Thomas to Newcastle, Sept. 
10, 1746. 



IMPERIAL DEFENSE, 1689-1748 291 

arrived. 1*^ The assembly would do nothing and Governor 
Clinton of New York was forced to supply the Pennsyl- 
vania troops with blankets on the credit of their govern- 
ment to prevent desertion. In 1747 the assembly was in- 
formed that the failure of orders from England placed 
the care of the troops of the colony upon the local govern- 
ment.^^^ The house replied that it was evident the Eng- 
lish government had given up the enterprise and hence 
there was no need of holding the troops together, but if 
Governor Clinton felt justified in doing so he was to hold 
himself responsible for their subsistence. The troops were 
discharged in November, 1747, and there was due the men 
and officers of Pennsylvania the sum of .£2750. Twice 
Governor Thomas appealed to the house to advance a sum 
sufficient to liquidate the debt and to submit the account 
to England for reimbursement, but the assembly pleaded 
poverty and held that in consideration of the desertions 
and the pay granted by Clinton, and the expectation of 
payment by Parliament, the men had no reason to com- 
plain. ^*^ Whether Parliament made provision for the 
troops is a matter of conjecture. Governor Thomas was 
reimbursed for the sum of £3821 advanced on his own 
credit for arms and clothing by drawing upon the pay- 
master-general.^*^ Altogether the assembly contributed 
£6213 for support of the expedition.^** 

During the summer of 1747, Spanish and French priva- 
teers made attacks upon the Delaware coast and seized a 
number of merchant vessels. Fearing for the safety of 
the city and the destruction of trade, the provincial coun- 
cil and the merchants appealed to the assembly for protec- 

140 Pa. Votes of Assembly, IV, 43, 45, 49. 

i4i76id., 50; Franklin, Works, (Smyth ed.), IV, 82-83; Fortescue, 
Hist, of British Army, II, 259. 

142 Pa. Votes of Assembly, IV, 68, 70, 72. 

143 5. T. Paps., PL Gen., XIV, O 15; Entry Bk. G, ff. 213-214, 
331-332. 

144 Pa. Votes of Assembly, IV, 69. 



292 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

tion, but in vain.^^^ The house replied that the length 
of the coast line and the scattered condition of settlement 
made it impracticable to prevent these depredations.^*^ 
As to the outrages on the Delaware coast that was a mat- 
ter, said the house, which should be brought to the atten- 
tion of the government of Delaware. The refusal of the 
assembly forced the merchants to appeal to the neighboring 
colonies for cannon and to the Lords of the Admiralty in 
England for an armed vessel to be stationed at the Dela- 
ware Capes. ^*^ New York sent cannon and the admiralty 
board ordered the sloop Otter to service in Delaware 
Bay.^*^ At the same time the citizens organized volun- 
tary militia companies, and without aid from the assembly, 
arms were provided and batteries erected upon the river.^*^ 
Hostilities were ended in 1748 by the Peace of Aix-la- 
Chapelle. But it was realized that this treaty, like those 
of Ryswick and Utrecht before, brought no solution of the 
fundamental issues between England and France in North 
America. The boundary line of Nova Scotia and the St. 
Lawrence Valley was still a matter of dispute, but of far 
greater importance both from the standpoint of the Em- 
pire as well as the province of Pennsylvania was the im- 
pending struggle for mastery of the trans- Alleghany west. 
Then for the first time the colony found itself subject to 
the sufferings and charges of war which had befallen the 
border colonies to the north and south long before. French 
encroachments had at last reached the soil of Pennsylvania, 
what was to be her response ? 

145 Pa. Votes of Assembly, TV, 58, 66, 68; Pa. Col. Recs., V, 234, 
260. 

146 Pa. Votes of Assembly, IV, 60, 67; Pa. Col. Recs., V, 236-237. 

147 Pa. Col. Recs., V, 229, 231-232. 
14:8 Ihid., 239, 241-243. 

1^9 Ibid., 172, 174; Pa. Archives, 2d. ser., II, 501; Pa. Votes of 
Assembly, IV, 72. 



CHAPTER TEN 

THE FRENCH AND INDIAN WAR 

Until the middle of the eighteenth century, Maryland, 
Pennsylvania, and Virginia, by virtue of their geographi- 
cal situation, had been largely free from the sufferings and 
expenses entailed by French invasions and Indian attacks. 
New York and New England on the north and Georgia and 
South Carolina on the south had borne nearly the entire 
burden of military defense. These border colonies were 
compelled to act under the ever present menace of inva- 
sions by the French and Spaniards and their savage allies, 
while the middle colonies rested in comparative peace and 
security. These facts help to explain the lack of interest 
displayed by the middle group in the concerns of the border 
colonies. But irresistible forces were at work bringing 
the two nations together in a final struggle for supremacy 
in the Great West and involving the middle colonies in 
the burdens of war which long since had befallen the north- 
em and southern colonies. Under the treaties of Ryswick, 
Utrecht, and Aix-la-Chapelle the French laid claim to all 
the territory drained by the Ohio and its tributaries. By 
their sea-to-sea charters the English claimed the same re- 
gion. Both sides were strengthening their respective posi- 
tions by actual colonization and the erection of forts. 
Gradually the French drew their cordon of forts closer 
and closer around the English colonies till the middle of 
the century saw them passing the portages from Lake Erie 
to the Scioto, Muskingum, and Alleghany and thence to 
the Ohio. In 1749 the French governor sent an expedi- 
tion under Celeron de Bienville to lay claim to the Ohio 
Valley and to warn off English settlers and traders from 



294 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

the dominions of the king of France.^ By 1753 the French 
had built Fort le Bouef on French Creek, a tributary of 
Alleghany River, and had seized the English trading post 
at Fort Venango at the junction of the river and creek. ^ 
Meanwhile English traders and settlers were creeping west- 
ward over the barriers of the Alleghanies in search of new 
fields to exploit. In 1744 at a great council at Lancaster, 
the English wheedled the Iroquois into granting to them 
control of the Ohio country north of the river.^ In 1749 
the crown granted to the Ohio Company, composed of 
prominent Virginians, a large area of land along the river 
for purposes of trade and colonization.* Time and again 
the colonial governors and others had urged upon the Eng- 
lish government the need of forts in the Ohio Valley to 
protect the traders and settlers and to prevent the en- 
croachments of the French, but just as often these en- 
treaties had remained unanswered at home.^ It was left 
for the colonists themselves to demonstrate the validity of 
English claims to the trans- Alleghany west. 

In November, 1753, Dinwiddle, the able and energetic 
governor of Virginia, sent young Washington to Fort le 
Bouef to protest against the French occupation of a region 
** so notoriously known to be the property of the Crown of 
Great Britain." The French commandant refused to va- 
cate unless ordered to do so by his superior, Governor 
Duquesne. In August, 1753, the Earl of Holdernesse, 
secretary of state, directed letters to the colonial governors 
stating that the crown had received knowledge of a hostile 
invasion of English soil by a force of French and Indians, 
and instructed them to secure the withdrawal of the enemy 
by warnings, and if peaceful methods failed, to resort to 

1 Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, I, chs. i, ii. 

2 lUd., 1, cli. V. 

3 Detailed report in Pa. Col. Recs., IV, 598-737. 

4 Carter, Illinois Country, llGS-llUt, 103. 

5 B. T. Paps., Props., X, pt. 2, Q 179; XI, R 6; XIII, S 17; XVIII, 
V 84. 



THE FRENCH AND INDIAN WAR 295 

the use of the force.^ Since England and France were at 
peace in Europe the governors were cautioned not to em- 
ploy violence until they Avere assured that the incursion 
was within the undoubted limits of English territorial 
claims. This precaution was taken in order not to put 
England in the light of an aggressor in time of peace. 
The assembly of Virginia granted Governor Dinwiddle 
£10,000 to enable him to drive back the invaders."^ He 
called upon the neighboring colonies to support the Vir- 
ginia enterprise. Governor Hamilton of Pennsylvania in 
submitting the secretary's letter and Washington's report 
that English territory had been invaded, entreated the 
house not to delay in the granting of ample support for 
Virginia.^ The assembly refused to comply on the ground 
that the undoubted limits of the province were not in- 
vaded.^ The jurisdiction of the Ohio region was a matter 
in dispute between Virginia and Pennsylvania, and the as- 
sembly, therefore, did not consider itself qualified to fix 
the western limits of the province or to vote supplies con- 
trary to the secretary's letter.^^ The conduct of the as- 
sem.bly was reprehensible in view of the fact that the sec- 
retary directed the colonies to act in mutual assistance. 
Granting that the province of Pennsylvania was not in- 
vaded, the dominions of England were and Virginia should 
have been supported. Early in March Hamilton again 
declared to the assembly that he had actual proof that the 
soil of the colony was invaded, but if it thought otherwise, 
he plead for support on behalf of Virginia. ^^ The assem- 
bly adjourned without response. In April Hamilton again 
called the legislature in session in response to an urgent 

QPa. Votes of Assemhly, IV, 278-279; Pa. Col. Bees., V, 689-690. 

7 Dinwiddle Corres, I, 60-69, 79-82. 

8 Pa, Votes of Assembly, IV, 278-279; Pa. Col. Bees., V, 719-722. 
Pa. Votes of Assemlly, IV, 286 ; Pa. Col. Rccs., V, 748. 

10 Shepherd, Proprietary Gov't, in Pa., 161-162; Dinwiddle Cor- 
res., I, 93-94, 354. 

11 Pa. Votes of Assembly, IV, 294-296, 300; Pa. Col. Recs., V, 
753-755, 759 ff. 



296 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

plea for aid from Dinwiddle.^- The house reluctantly 
voted £10,000 in paper currency but on such conditions 
that the governor could not assent to the issue without a 
breach of the royal order of 1740.^^ The Virginia forces 
under Washington set out for the frontier in the last of 
March unsupported by the neighboring colonies. The 
regulars from New York and South Carolina arrived too 
late to be of service, while Pennsylvania and Maryland, so 
vitally concerned, did practically nothing/* Washington 
pressed on to repel the invaders from Fort Duquesne but 
in the early days of July he was attacked at Fort Necessity 
and forced to surrender to a superior body of French. 

In August Hamilton informed the house of Washing- 
ton's defeat and urged that the province should act on its 
own initiative until the plans of Virginia were known.^^ 
The assembly voted £15,000 in paper currency for the 
*' king's use " which the governor refused to confirm with- 
out the insertion of the suspending clause pursuant to the 
royal order of 1740.^^ Realizing the desperate needs of 
the situation, Hamilton agreed to assent to an issue of a 
sum of fiat money necessary for the occasion provided 
funds were established for sinking the same within five 
years as allowed by the act of 1751.^^ The house drew up 
a bill to create £20,000 in paper money to continue current 
for twelve years, the governor cut down the time to five 
years, each side remained firm and a deadlock ensued. 
The assembly refused to acknowledge the binding force of 
a royal instruction or to allow the governor the right to 
amend money bills.^^ The obstinacy of the house called 

12 Pa. Votes of Assemlly, IV, 302 ; Pa. Col. Bees., VI, 5, 7, 22. 

13 Pa. Votes of Assembly, IV, 304, 306, 309; Pa. Statutes at 
Large, V, 517-521. 

■^4: Dinwiddie Corres., I, 204, 206, 232. 

15 Pa. Votes of Assemlly, IV, 318; Pa. Col. Recs., VI, 133-135. 

16 Pa. Votes of Assembly, IV, 322, 324. 

17 See page 200. 

18 See page 201. 



THE FRENCH AND INDIAN WAR 297 

forth the just censure of the secretary of state. ^^ He ex- 
pressed surprise that the province had failed to aid Vir- 
ginia and laid the success of the French to the refusal of 
the colonies to cooperate. He demanded for the future 
that the provinee should act vigorously not only in defense 
of its own domain but in cooperation with other colonies. 
The assembly threw the blame on the governor, he shifted 
it to the assembly, but wherever condemnation rests the 
fact remains that the province was partly responsible for 
Washington's defeat. The interpretation put upon the 
secretary's letter of 1753 as to the undoubted limits of the 
English claim and the refusal to create a sum of money 
in accordance with the act of 1751 lends color to the charge 
that the Quaker pacificists, who dominated the assembly, 
were simply evading the summons to participate in the 
war. But the root of the matter lay deeper; an impor- 
tant constitutional principle was at stake. The Quaker as- 
sembly voted money for the ' ' king 's use, ' ' but in so doing 
insisted upon the sole right to judge for itself as well as 
the people of the utility and propriety of all laws without 
any outside direction from the crown or proprietors. The 
assembly was firmly convinced that subjection to the will 
of the crown or the Penns in fiscal matters meant the de- 
struction of free institutions. Indeed, the assembly held the 
constitutional issue of far more importance than the se- 
curity of the province or the welfare of the Empire. The 
attachment to the principle of self-control very largely ac- 
counts for the failure of the province to act with energy in 
the war. 

With the impending struggle between England and 
France for the mastery of the Great West, the problem 
of uniting the colonies again became a subject of very real 
importance. Two factors largely contributed to the agita- 
tion for a colonial union; the want of a concert of action 
among the colonies against the French, and the lack of 

19 Pa. Col. Bees., VI, 177. 



298 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

uniformity in the relations of the colonies to the Indians. 
It was thoroughly believed by farsighted colonists and 
royal officials that the decentralized system of defense 
among the colonies simply invited contempt and outrage 
on the part of the French. ^*^ Dinwiddle, Clinton of New 
York, Franklin and Hamilton of Pennsylvania, and others 
repeatedly urged the formation of a colonial union.-^ 
With regard to the Indian question, each colony was left 
free to control the political and commercial relations be- 
tween its settlers and the Indians within its boundaries. 
These relations were far from satisfactory, for the savages 
continually complained of the unjust encroachments of 
the English on their lands and of the unscrupulous conduct 
of colonial traders. The lack of uniform and just dealings 
mth the Indians was weakening their attachment to the 
English cause at this critical juncture and driving them to 
the side of the French. In 1750 Richard Peters wrote to 
the Penns, that the bad state of the relations of the Eng- 
lish to the Indians '' may bring on an Indian War and 
what will the event of that is altogether uncertain. The 
Assembly of this Province is unwilling to have anything 
to do with the New Yorkers as they are to join with us, 
and indeed all the colonies manage miserably and instead 
of strengthening his Majesties Interest they wilfully and 
foolishly break it into pieces, and in the End will destroy 
it. " 2- Peter's prophecy was fulfilled in 1763. 

20 Dinwiddle wrote to the secretary of state, that " The French 
too justly observe the want of connection in the Colonies, and from 
thence conclude . . . that altho' we are vastly superiour to 
them in Numbers, yet they can take and secure the Co't'y before 
we can agree 'to hinder them." Dimoiddie Corres., I, 203; see also 
II, 230, 265. Governor Clinton expressed the same view in a letter 
of October, 1750, addressed to Governor Hamilton of Pa. Pa. Col. 
Recs., V, 480. 

21 Franklin, Works (Smyth ed.), Ill, 40-43; Dinwiddle Corres., 
I, 285, 406-407; Penn Mss., Official Corres., Y, Qinton to Hamilton, 
Oct. 8, 1750; Hamilton to Thos. Penn, April 30, 1751; Pa. Col. 
Bees., V, 480. 

22 Penn Mss., Official Corres., V, Richard Peters to proprietors, 
Oct. 15, 23, 1750. 



THE FRENCH AND INDIAN WAR 299 

As hostilities became more imminent the English govern- 
ment lai4 plans to redress the complaints of the Indians 
and to secure their wavering friendship. With this pur- 
pose in view the Board of Trade in September, 1753, in- 
structed the governors north of the Carolinas, except 
Ehode Island and Connecticut, to hold a joint conference 
with the Iroquois.-^ Commissioners from eight colonies 
met at Albany in the summer of 1754 and seized the occa- 
sion to work out a scheme of colonial union.^* The con- 
ference decided unanimously upon two resolutions; '^ That 
a union of the colonies was absolutely necessary for their 
preservation "; and '^ That it was necessary the Union 
should be established by act of Parliament." It is need- 
less to recount the reasons which prompted the first resolu- 
tion.-^ The necessity of doing away with the old requisi- 
tion system had been proven beyond the shadow of doubt. 
The need of replacing the pernicious decentralized system 
of regulating Indian affairs by substituting a uniform 
policy was of vital concern. As to the second resolution 
it was deemed necessary to call upon the sovereignty of the 
imperial legislature to make the union binding and pre- 
clude the possibility of nullification and secession on the 
part of any colony or colonies " till the whole crumbled 
into its original parts. ' ' In the Albany Plan of Union the 
essential feature was a central authority with jurisdiction 
over all Indian affairs and with power to raise and pay 
troops, build forts, and equip vessels. In order to carry 

23 Pa. Votes of Assemhly, IV, 278-279. 

24 Franklin, Works (Smyth ed.), Ill, 203-226; Pa. Col. Bees., 
VI, 65-68, 71, 78, 105-109. 

25 Franklin wrote that from one or other of several causes, " the 
Assemblies of six out of seven colonies applied to, had granted no 
assistance to Virginia, when lately invaded by the French, though 
purposely convened, and the importance of the occasion earnestly 
urged upon them; — eonsidering moreover, that one principal en- 
couragement to the French, in insulting and invading the British 
American dominions, was their knowledge of our disunited state, and 
of our weakness arising from such want of union." Franklin, 
Works (Smyth ed.), Ill, 203-204. 



300 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

into effect these powers it was authorized to make laws and 
to levy taxes and duties. Here was a proper solution of 
a most serious problem ; a supreme authority with power to 
act directly upon the individual in matters of general in- 
terest. The only solution was either the scheme devised at 
Albany or else the exercise of the central and sovereign 
powers of Parliament. The former had the virtue of al- 
lowing the colonists to make laws and levy taxes through 
their own representatives. Franklin and others realized 
that taxation by Parliament in which the colonists had no 
representatives would give ' ' extreme dissatisfaction. ' ' ^^ 
The commissioners at Albany were without power to give a 
final assent to the plan and it was submitted to the colonial 
legislatures for ratification. But with the same spirit of 
unanimity in which the nationalists at Albany adopted 
the plan, the assemblies either failed to act or positively 
rejected it.^' Franklin wrote '' Every Body cries a Union 
is absolutely necessary ; but when they come to the Manner 
and Form of the Union, their weak Noddles are perfectly 
distracted. " 2^ The rejection is hardly a matter of sur- 
prise when one remembers the strength of local prejudices 
and the tendencies of the colonies toward complete au- 
tonomy. Parliament was finally forced to tax the colonies 
for the support of an American army, but the attempts to 
reconcile the apparently inconsistent claims of imperial 
sovereignty with colonial self-government led to the sev- 
erance of the Empire. Wlien left to form their own im- 
perial government the Americans established only a 
" league of friendship " which guaranteed local rights. 
It required all the anarchy of the Critical Period and the 
herculean efforts of such nationalists as Hamilton, Madi- 
son, and Wilson to overcome the particularism of the states 
and to bring about the adoption and ratification of the 

26 Franklin, Works (Smyth ed.), Ill, 232-237. 

27 Beer, British Col. Pol, 1154-1765, 21-22. 

28 Franklin, Works (Smyth ed.), Ill, 242. 



THE FRENCH AND INDIAN WAR 301 

federal constitution of 1789. In view of these facts the 
adoption of the Albany Plan of Union is hardly conceivable. 
The English conception of a union differed widely from 
the American idea as framed at Albany.^^ In the same 
month that the commissioners met at Albany, Sir Thomas 
Robinson, secretary of state, directed the Board of Trade 
to prepare *' a plan of general concert to be entered into 
by the American colonies for their mutual defense. ' ' ^^ 
English statesmen also saw clearly the need of a colonial 
union. In August the board presented a plan which con- 
templated merely a military union.^^ It provided for a 
congress of one commissioner from each colony to agree 
upon a military establishment and to proportion the quotas 
of men and money among the colonies. The colonial as 
also the English troops should be under the command of 
an officer appointed by the crown and who should also act 
as general superintendent of Indian affairs. This scheme 
kept intact the old unworkable requisition system and was 
therefore an inadequate solution of the problem of imperial 
defense. This defect was realized by the board. In pre- 
senting its report the board said that in case a colony re- 
fused to send a commissioner to the congress or to raise the 
required quotas, then '' no other method can be taken, but 
that of an application for an interposition of the Authority 
of Parliament." Franklin likewise realized that '' if ever 
there be an Union, it must be form'd at home by the Min- 
istry and Parliament. ' ' ^^ But any imposition of a plan 
by act of Parliament would have tended rather to alienate 
the colonies than to bind them together, the chief object 
in view. The plan of the board required the consent of 

29 Gov. Morris wrote in Nov., 1755, " The plan formed at Albany, 
was upon such Republican Principles, that I do not wonder it was 
not relished at home, as it seemed calculated to unite the Colonys 
in such a manner, as to give the Crown little or no influence in 
their Councils." Pa. Archives, 1st. ser., II, 499. 

30 B. T. Paps., PI. Gen., XV, O 125. 

31 Beer, British Col. Pol., 1754-1765, 27. 

32 Franklin, Works (Smyth ed.). Ill, 267, 276, 242. 



302 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 169G-17G5 

the colonies while the exigencies of the occasion demanded 
prompt action. Therefore, the board recommended that the 
crown should appoint immediately a commander-in-chief 
of all the forces in America and a general superintendent 
of Indian affairs. In view of these facts the home govern- 
ment was forced to fall back upon the requisition system. 
In the latter part of 1754, after the defeat of the Vir- 
ginia forces, Dinwiddle repeatedly called upon the home 
government for troops and stores of war.^^ This plea for 
aid was in line with the recommendation of the Board of 
Trade. In 1755 General Braddock was sent to the col- 
onies as commander-in-chief, supported by two regiments 
of British troops. Parliament made provision for this 
force and for two regiments to be recruited in the colonies. 
In October, 1754, the secretary of state instructed the 
colonial governors to raise troops to join Braddock 's forces 
on arrival, to make ready provisions for them, to furnish 
English officers with means of travel within the colony, to 
obey Braddock 's orders with respect to the quartering of 
troops, impressment of carriages, and necessaries for the 
troops raised in the colony.^* Since these expenses were 
deemed of a *' local and peculiar nature " the charges 
were to be borne by the colony itself. In addition each 
colony was required to contribute to a common fund for 
objects of a " more general concern." In Pennsylvania 
a bitter debate between the governor and assembly over the 
validity of royal instructions prevented compliance with 
the requisition. In January, 1755, General St. Clair, 
quarter-master to the English forces, asked Governor Mor- 
ris by letter how far the assembly had complied with the 
requisition.^^ Morris replied, *' such is the Infatuation 
and Obstinacy of the People, I have to deal with, or at 
least their Representatives, that tho' their Country is 

33 Dinwiddle Gorres., I, 280, 281, 364-365. 

34 Pa. Votes of Assembly, IV, 242-243; Pa. Col. Recs., VI, 200-203. 

35 Pa. Col. Recs., VI, 298-299. 



THE FRENCH AND INDIAN WAR 303 

invaded, and everything they enjoy depends upon remov- 
ing the French from their borders, yet I could not persuade 
them to act with vigor at this Juncture, or even to grant 
Supplies expected by the Crown and recommended by the 
Secretary of State. ' ' ^® This drew from Braddock a letter 
to Morris '* expressing the greatest surprise to find such 
pusillanimous and improper Behavior in your Assembly, 
and to hear of Faction and Opposition where Liberty and 
Property are invaded. " ^^ He threatened to employ ' ' un- 
pleasant methods " if the assembly did not act a part 
more becoming. 

Thus matters stood when Morris went to join the con- 
ference of governors called by Braddock to meet at his 
camp at Alexandria. Here a plan of campaign was agreed 
upon.^^ With respect to the common fund the governors 
frankly confessed to Braddock that applications to their as- 
semblies for that purpose proved futile and gave it as their 
unanimous opinion that such a fund *' can never be estab- 
lished without the aid of Parliament." They suggested 
that the English ministry should be urged to find a method 
to compel the colonies to contribute. Braddock was as- 
sured by the governors that they would leave nothing un- 
done to persuade their assemblies to honor the requisition 
but they expressed a fear that the ^' present expedition 
must be at a stand unless the General shall think proper 
to make Use of the Credit upon the Government at home 
to defray the Expense of all the operations under his di- 
rection." The governors returned to their respective col- 
onies to do what they could. 

Morris of Pennsylvania could accomplish little. The con- 
test between him and the assembly over royal instruction 
continued to prevent the province from fulfilling its proper 

36 Pa. Col. Recs., VI, 299-300. 

3T lUd., 307, 331, 332. 

sslhid., 365-368. The governors present were: Shirley of Mass., 
Delancey of N. Y., Morris of Pa., Sharpe of Md., and Dinwiddle 
of Va. 



304 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

share in the military operations. The assembly was willing 
to grant assistance but only on its own terms. On its own 
credit, the house issued £15,000 in treasury notes, one- 
third of which was expended in securing provisions for the 
troops, in clearing roads, and maintaining an express, 
while the remainder was given to Massachusetts for the 
support of Shirley's expedition. ^^ A great measure of 
praise is due Governor Morris and Benjamin Franklin for 
assistance afforded to Braddock in the expedition to drive 
the French from Fort Duquesne.*^ 

It is needless to relate the well-known story of the disas- 
trous defeat of the expedition. The British regiments 
marched on to defeat unsupported except by the Virginia 
militia. In July the governor informed the assembly of 
the failure at Fort Duquesne and of the retreat of the Eng- 
lish forces which affected none so much as Pennsylvania 
whose soil was now left exposed to the insults of the French 
and Indians.'*^ He exhorted the house to establish a militia 
and to grant supplies for the purchase of arms and am- 
munition. On August 4 the assembly submitted to the 
governor a bill to create £50,000 in bills of credit to be dis- 
charged by a tax on all property, real and personal. 
The governor amended it to exempt the estates of the 
Penns.*- Again a deadlock ensued which lasted all sum- 
mer while the inhabitants on the frontier were left unpro- 
tected against the horrors of tomahawk and fire-brand. 
The situation in the interior was pitiful. The success of 
the French let loose the savages to burn and kill to their 
hearts' content. The back-country folk, without arms, 
ammunition or military organization, were forced to evacu- 
ate their homes and flee to the east for protection.*^ The 

39 Pa. Votes of Assembly, IV, 391. 

40 Pa. Archives, 1st. ser., II, 294 flF., 311, 335, 372. 

41 Pa. Votes of Assembly, IV, 415-416. 
^2 Ibid., 419, 421-422. 

43 Pa. Col. Recs., VI, 645, 646, 671, 766-768; Pa. Votes of As- 
sembly, IV, 493. 



THE FRENCH AND INDIAN WAR 305 

situation was aggravated when Colonel Dunbar, instead 
of remaining with the English forces to check the Indians, 
marched on to safety at Philadelphia. From every quar- 
ter petitions came to the assembly pleading earnestly that 
all disputes be laid aside in this time of trial and that 
prompt measures be taken to protect the lives and prop- 
erty of the people.** So embittered were the frontier peo- 
ple at the refractory attitude of the Quaker assembly that 
threats of violence were made against it. In the counties 
of Bucks, Chester, and Lancaster the people threatened 
to march to Philadelphia and with arms in their hands to 
force the assembly to afford them protection.*^ On the 
other hand it was charged that the Quakers, free from at- 
tacks in the east, took " unconmion pains " to persuade 
the people from taking up arms, and so great is their in- 
fluence, wrote Governor Morris, upon the ' ' People and even 
upon the Assembly, a great Majority of which are Quakers, 
that the inhabitants seem as unconcerned as ever. " *^ In 
particular the Quakers were charged with appealing to the 
German Pietists, whose religious principles were similar 
to those of the Quakers, to support the latter in power on 
the plea that the Penns designed to abridge them of their 
rights and reduce them to slavery.*'^ 

Despairing of any assistance from the assembly, the gov- 
ernor appealed to Shirley, now commander-in-chief, and to 
the other colonies for aid. Shirley replied that he could 
do nothing.*^ Governor Belcher of New Jersey responded 
that if the populous and wealthy province of Pennsylvania 
would not protect itself it was unreasonable to ask his prov- 

44 Pa. Col. Recs., VI, 550, 647, 734; Pa. Votes of Assemhly, IV, 
493, 495, 502; Pa. Archives, 1st. ser., II, 385, 448, 449, 450. 

45 7^a. Col. Recs., VI, 667, 729; VII, 87. Edward Biddle wrote 
from Reading that " The people exclaim against the Quakers, & 
some are scarce restrained from burning the Houses of those few 
who are in This Town." lUd., VI, 705. 

iQlUd., VI, 563. 

^T Ihid., 599, 604, 621. 

48 Pa. Archives, 1st. ser., II, 450, 469, 493-495. 



306 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

ince to send aid and leave its own frontiers exposed.*^ 
Virginia had only sufficient arms to supply her own mili- 
tia.^^ Nothing could be expected from Maryland where 
the same controversy was in progress which rendered Penn- 
sylvania helpless. Governor Morris appealed to the re- 
ceiver-general of the Penns for a loan of £1000 to purchase 
arms but he replied that he had neither money or authority 
to comply.^^ In fact, the attitude of the assembly of Penn- 
sylvania had rather the effect of deferring other colonies 
from action than of eliciting a prompt response to the call 
for support. The assembly of Maryland in the struggle 
with its proprietor closely watched the trend of affairs in 
Pennsylvania and resorted to the same tactics.^- Belcher 
wrote to Morris that his assembly would do nothing for 
the common defense " taking for their Example, the bad 
one given by your Assembly, and that of Maryland. "^^ 
Dinwiddle declared that the obstinacy of Maryland and 
Pennsylvania made the Virginia assembly backward in vot- 
ing supplies.^* Herein we have a good illustration of com- 
mon political aspirations and community of interests among 
the colonies. 

The controversy in Pennsylvania aroused anew the ene- 
mies of the Quakers and of the proprietary government. 
The enemies of the former urged that the Quakers should 
be excluded from the government because their pacific 
principles were injurious to the welfare of the province. 
This idea had been suggested repeatedly during the eight- 
hs Pa. Archives, 1st. ser., II, 471. 
50lhid., II, 482. 
5i/6td, II, 475, 476. 

52 Black, Maryland's Attitude in the Struggle for Canada, Johns 
Hopkins Studies, X, 359-365. 

53 Pa. Archives, 1st. ser., II, 269. Belcher wrote that his prov- 
ince was well spirited, " altho Pennsylvania sets them so vile an 
Example." N. J. Archives, VIII, pt. 2, 169. 

^^t Dinwiddie Corres., II, 52. Dinwiddie wrote that the example 
of Pa. and Md. make application to his assembly for aid "an 
Up-hill Work." Ihid., II, 192. 



THE FRENCH AND INDIAN WAR 307 

eenth century and it was now urged by Governor Morris 
and others.^^ In fact, Thomas Penn wrote from London 
in March, 1755, that the English ministry had hinted to 
the London Quakers that if they could not persuade their 
colonial brethren to act more rationally '' they will not be 
suffered to continue in Station to perplex the Gov- 
ernors. ' ' ^^ Those hostile to proprietary government urged 
that the charters of Pennsylvania and Maryland should 
be vacated and direct control by the crown be established. 
Dinwiddle especially urged this remedy upon the English 
officials. ^^ He wrote '' we shall continue in distress 'd and 
distracted Condit'n till H.M'y takes the Proprietary 
Gov'ts into his own Hands." In fact, the English minis- 
try had approached the Penns several times with offers to 
purchase the powers of government.^^ Both of these recom- 
mendations were wise but neither reached the root of the 
situation. Other colonies were not hampered by Quaker 
principles and were governed directly by the crown, yet 
the assemblies proved to be just as refractory as that of 
Pennsylvania. Shirley, Dinwiddle, Morris, Belcher, 
Sharpe of Maryland, and Braddock saw with clear judg- 
ment that the only solution was parliamentary interfer- 
ence. The real difficulty was the requisition system. 

The dispute over the taxation of proprietary estates 
was temporarily allayed by a free gift from the Penns of 
£5000 for defense. A supply bill was passed granting 
£60,000 in paper currency to the king's use.^'^ Although 

55 Pa. Archives, 1st. ser., II, 281, 528, 531. 

56 Penn Mss., Saunders Coates, Thos. Penn to Richard Peters, 
March 26, 1755; Letter Bk., IV, Thos. Penn to Peters, July 7, 1756. 

57 Dinwiddle Corres., II, 414-415, 418. Belcher of N. J. also 
advised such action. Pa. Archives, 1st. ser., II, 478. 

58 Thos. Penn wrote to Richard Peters, May 8, 1756, " . . . 
there is no question but the Administration would very gladly get 
the Proprietary Governments into their own hands, and some of 
them have told me so but not without the free consent of the Pro- 
prietors, and paying a full consideration for the value of them." 
Penn Mss., Letter Bk. IV. 

59 Pa. Statutes at Large, V, 201-212. 



308 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-17G5 

the estates of the proprietors were freed from taxation it 
is significant to note that the Quaker assembly took pre- 
caution that the money should not be employed for direct 
warlike purposes. It stipulated that the funds should be 
expended in maintaining friendly relations with the In- 
dians, in relief of distressed settlers and " other purposes 
for the king's Service." " Other purposes " meant noth- 
ing when it is remembered that the disbursement of the 
funds was placed in the hands of a committee named by 
the assembly principled against war. At the same time 
a militia bill was passed which Dinwiddie characterized 
as a '' joke on all military affairs," and which Governor 
Morris declared '' was intended to answer no purpose but 
to amuse the people. ' ' ^^ Out of regard for Quaker prin- 
ciples the bill provided for voluntary enlistments. More- 
over, it provided that officers should be elected by the 
troops, and that the forces should not be led more than 
three days' journey from the inhabited parts of the prov- 
ince or serve more than three weeks in garrison duty with- 
out their consent. One may readily gather from the terms 
of these bills to what an extent the assembly had encroached 
upon the proper powers of the executive. In a crisis which 
demanded the concentration of military power, the gov- 
ernor was denied authority to employ the troops to the best 
advantage, to appoint the most efficient officers, and to dis- 
pose of the funds at his discretion. With the aid of these 
laws a cordon of forts and blockhouses were erected along 
the frontier at strategic points and garrisoned by pro- 
vincial troops. Both Governor Morris and Benjamin 
Franklin deserve praise for their untiring efforts at this 
time.^i 

Wearied with the repeated refusals of the Quaker as- 
sembly to respond to the demands for protection, over a 

<io Dinimddie Corres., II, 313; Pa. Archives, 1st. ser., II, 508, 
526, 531. 

61 Pa. Archives, 1st. ser., II, 535-575 passim; Franklin, Works, 
(Smyth ed.), Ill, 292-293, 304-305, 325-326. 



THE FRENCH AND INDIAN WAR 309 

hundred men of prominence in the province signed a pe- 
tition to the king picturing the distressed condition of the 
people and praying for royal aid.^^ The memorial stated 
that the attitude of the assembly was doubly injurious to 
the province, cooling the ardor of other colonies on behalf 
of the common cause and alienating the friendly Indians. 
It declared that no redress was possible as long as the as- ^ 
sembly was composed of Quakers who studiously avoided ' 
all military measures by spinning out the time in unrea- 
sonable disputes. In February, 1756, the petition was 
referred to the Board of Trade where a hearing was granted 
to the petitioners and the assembly through their respec- 
tive solicitors and counsel.^^ As the address was presum- 
ably drawn up before the passage of the military and sup- 
ply bills no mention was made of them. Hence counsel 
for the assembly branded as false the charge that the 
Quakers made no provision for defense.^^ The real object, 
said he, was to oust the Quakers from the government. 
He pointed out that the assembly had repeatedly offered 
the governor supply bills only to have them rejected by 
the arbitrary instructions of the proprietors. He held it 
to be gross injustice that the Penns should contribute 
nothing either to the maintenance of friendly relations 
with the Indians or to the cost of defense, although the 
proprietors reaped immense advantages from both. As to 
the Indian barbarities, he argued, they were not perpetrated 
by the allies of the French but by a small band of Dela- 
wares and Shawonese, long in amity with the province, 

62 5. T. Paps., Props., XIX, V 152; William Smith, Brief State of 
the Province of Pa., 1155, (Sahin Reprint). 

63 B. T. Jour., LXIV, 78, 90, 97-98. The petitioners were repre- 
sented by F. J. Paris, solicitor, Yorke and Forester, counsel ; the 
assembly by Joshua Sharpe, solicitor, Henley and Pratt, counsel, 
Richard Partridge and Robert Charles, agents. 

64 The argument for the assembly may be found in Add. Mss. 
(British Museum), 15489, ff. 47-50, (Transcript in the Lib. of 
Cong.) ; and for the petitioners, Pa. Mag. of Hist., Oct., 1886, X, 
294-315. 



310 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 169G-1765 

and he intimated broadly that these Indians were roused 
to vengeance by the unjust dealing of the Penns with 
them concerning land. In answer to the aspersion that 
the Quakers, principled against war, should thrust them- 
selves into the assembly at this critical time, the counsel 
for the house declared that the election of representatives 
was annual, by ballot, and without corruption, hence, if 
the Quakers continued to be the choice of the people under 
these conditions, it was good evidence of the '^ faith and 
confidence wch. the whole Community place in that De- 
nomination of Men and of the Belief that they will not 
betray nor give up the essential Liberties and advantages 
of this Constitution to purchase a little temporary Safety. ' ' 
But this statement was not sound. The Quakers did not 
represent the whole community.*'^ The three eastern 
counties returned twenty-six representatives to the legist 
lature, while the five western counties, equal in popula- 
tion, sent only ten. It is nearer the truth to say that the 
assembly represented the interests of the Quaker and con- 
servative classes of the east, who feared the growing democ- 
racy of the west. The dominance of the Quakers was also 
made possible by the high suffrage franchise, according 
to which only one in fifty in the city of Philadelphia cast 
a ballot. The large body of Scotch-Irish and Germans 
on the frontier and the large unenfranchised class in the 
east, all of whom demanded adequate protection against 
the enemy, were denied the means to make their sentiments 
felt. The report of the Board of Trade of March 3 to the 
Privy Council was favorable to the petitioners.*'® The 
report severely criticized the supply bill because it did 
not specify military services among the objects of expendi- 
ture and it said that the ' ' other things ' ' stipulated in the 
bill was rendered nugatory because the commissioners em- 
powered to dispose of the funds were named by a Quaker 

65 Lincoln, Revolutionary Movement in Pa., 40-52. 

66 Pa. Votes of AsseniUy, IV, 628-630. 



THE FRENCH AND INDIAN WAR 311 

assembly. It further declared that the military bill was 
intended rather to exempt persons from service than to 
encourage enlistments and that the restrictive features 
rendered the law quite impracticable. The report ex- 
pressed the opinion that the measures taken for defense 
were " improper, inadequate and ineffectual " and that 
there was no hope for a better order of affairs as long as 
the Quakers remained in power. In conclusion, the board 
recommended that the Quakers should be excluded from 
the assembly by the imposition of an oath on all represen- 
tatives by act of Parliament. A bill to this end was intro- 
duced but action upon it was forestalled by the London 
Quakers who promised to persuade their colonial co-re- 
ligionists not to stand at the next election in the province.®^ 
In 1756 several events of importance occurred. In May 
England formally declared war against France.®^ Until 
this time the Empire was nominally at peace although hos- 
tilities had begun between the subjects of the two nations 
in America. It was the final struggle between England 
and France for supremacy of trade and dominion, not only 
in North America, but in the West Indies, East India, and 
Africa. In December William Pitt was created secretary 
of state and under the masterful guidance of this great 
imperialist, English arms eventually emerged triumphant 
in all quarters of the globe. In Pennsylvania the power 
of the Quakers was broken. In the assembly which con- 
vened in the fall of the year few Quakers remained ; some 
had declined a reelection and others had resigned. An 
act of Parliament was not needed to exclude them.'^^ At 
last when the struggle had reached the borders of the prov- 
ince, the Quakers, whose principles stood out of touch with 
the stern condition of affairs, were forced to yield the 

67 Sharpless, A Quaker Experiment in Gov't., 252 ; Penn 3Iss., 
Letter Bk. IV, Thos. Penn to Richard Peters, July 7, 1756; Thos. 
Penn to Isaac Norris, Feb. 14, 1756. 

68 Pa. Archives, 1st. ser., II, 659, 735. 

69 Pa. Votes of Assembly, IV. 627. 



312 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

powers of government to others. The " Holy Experi- 
ment " of the founder and his followers had fallen indeed 
upon evil times. But, as Franklin said, " We shall soon 
see if matters will be better managed by a majority of 
different religious persuasions. ' ' ^*^ 

Pitt promptly made preparations for executing a vig- 
orous offensive campaign against the French. The colo- 
nies were divided into two military districts; the northern 
consisting of New England, New York, and New Jersey, 
the southern of Pennsylvania and the colonies south. In 
February, 1757, Pitt sent letters to the governors inform- 
ing them of the dispatch of troops and a fleet from England 
to operate against the French. "^^ The governors were in- 
structed to call upon their assemblies to raise as large a 
force as possible for the general campaign, under the com- 
mand of the Earl of Loudoun. This number was exclu- 
sive of the forces necessary for the immediate defense of 
the province. Each colony was required to raise, pay, and 
clothe its quota of men, while arms, stores of war, and 
provision were to be furnished at the expense of the crown. 
Pitt expressed the hope that the colonies would act zeal- 
ously and ' ' not clogg the Enlistments of Men, or the rais- 
ing of Money for their Pay &c with such Limitations as 
have been hitherto found to render the service difficult 
and ineffectual. ' ' Was the hope realized ? 

In March Loudoun met the governors of the southern 
district at Philadelphia when a plan of campaign was 
agreed upon and the quotas to be supplied by each prov- 
ince were fixed. ^^ Five thousand troops were named as 
necessary for the defense of the south, — twelve hundred 
English troops and thirty-eight hundred provincials. 

70 Franklin, Works (Smyth ed.). Ill, 345. 

71 Pa. Archives, 1st. ser., II, 657, 718; III, 95; Kimball, Pitt 
Corres., I, 1, 5-6, 9. 

72 Pa. Col Recs., VII, 470-471; Kimball, Pitt Corres., I, 6, note 
40. The governors present were Denny of Pa., Sharpe of Md., 
Dinwiddie of Va., and Dobbs of No. Car. 



THE FRENCH AND INDIAN WAR 313 

Pennsylvania's quota was fourteen hundred men, of which 
two hundred were to be sent south for the defense of 
South Carolina and Georgia and the rest to be employed 
in the protection of the province itself. The governors, 
on parting, promised Loudoun, as they had assured Brad- 
dock before, that they would make every effort to persuade 
their assemblies to fulfill the plans. 

Although the departure of the Quakers from the assem- 
bly of Pennsylvania wrought a change of attitude on the 
question of war, the position of a house of different religious 
persuasions remained the same on the constitutional ques- 
tion. The old quarrel between the governor and assem- 
bly prevented the province from carrying out its full share 
in the operations planned. This serious hindrance to mil- 
itary operations necessitated the personal interference of 
Loudoun/^ He first appealed to the leaders of the assembly 
but to no avail. Then in consultation with Dinwiddle it 
was agreed that under the circumstances the only alterna- 
tive was to advise the governor to waive his instructions 
from the proprietors. Loudoun wrote to Pitt that this 
was of supreme necessity, '' for had the (supply) bill 
been rejected the whole of their troops would have been 
disbanded immediately, and that Province laid open to be 
a Prey to the Enemy, or I had been obliged to have left 
more troops for its defence than could be spared from the 
other plans of operation for this campaign." The gov- 
ernor was placed on the horns of a dilemma ; he was forced 
either to violate the instructions from the Penns or else 
hinder the campaign. The former was the lesser evil and 
Governor Denny yielded. Although the proprietary es- 
tates were exempted from taxation, yet the funds were 
placed in the control of a committee named by the assem- 
bly."^* The bill provided for the raising of fourteen hun- 
dred men, three hundred for garrison duty and the rest 

73 Kimball, Pitt Corres., 1, 41; Pa. Col. Rec, VII, 453-454, 

74 Pa. Statutes at Large, Y, 294, 303, 309. 



314 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1G96-1765 

for offensive operations on the frontier of the province. 
No provision was made for the dispatch of two hundred 
men to South Carolina. Again it is obvious to what an 
extent the assembly had encroached on the powers which 
belonged properly to the executive or the commander-in- 
chief. Loudoun wrote to Pitt, " Their whole Attention 
seems to be, to usurp every part of the Prerogative, into 
the hands of the Assembly, and to disappoint every Plan 
of the Government. ' ' ' ^ Such dictation by the popular 
branch of the government was by no means peculiar to 
Pennsylvania; it was a condition which faced every pro- 
vincial governor."^*^ 

The troubles of Loudoun and Governor Denny were not 
at an end. In June the latter informed the assembly 
that it was not within his power to comply with the agree- 
ment to send troops to South Carolina, that the term of 
enlistment of the troops was near expiration, their pay 
was badly in arrears, and many had deserted whereby the 
frontier was left inadequately protected." The house re- 
fused to frame a militia bill such as the governor could 
properly sign or to raise an additional force of five hun- 
dred men called for by Loudoun. In July Loudoun 
WTote Pitt that the southern provinces '' behaved very 
111; Pennsylvania have not now raised near the Number 
of Men agreed upon; and have not sent their 200 ]\Ien to 
South Carolina. They have no Militia Law, and have re- 
fused to raise the Additional Number I desired of them." ^® 
While the colonies of the north, New Jersey excepted, 
acted with a fair show of energy in response to Loudoun's 
requisitions, the same cannot be said of the south.'^^ No 
support could be expected from Maryland where the strug- 

75 Kimball, Pitt Corres., 1, 77. 

76 Greene, Provincial Governor, 100-105. 

77 Pa. Col. Recs., VII, 563. 

78 Kimball, Pitt Corres., I, 76-77. 

79 As to the response of the colonies of the northern dep't., see 
Kimball, Pitt Corres., 1, 26, 58, 61-62, 



THE FRENCH AND INDIAN WAR 315 

gle over the taxation of the estates of Lord Baltimore 
could not be compromised. In New Jersey Loudoun was 
obliged to exert his personal influence in order to secure 
even one-half the quota of troops levied upon the prov- 
ince. ^° Under such a condition of affairs, the commander 
was unable to devote his undivided attention to the opera- 
tions of the campaign itself. Loudoun informed Pitt, that 
there were " so many difficulties to remove in this country 
in order to set things in Motion, that being on the spot 
was necessary at present. ' ' ^^ Such were the evils which 
flowed from the requisition system. Loudoun's expedition 
against Louisburg proved a dismal failure and the French 
captured Fort William Henry, a point of great strategic 
importance. 

In 1758 Pitt made a fresh start. The incompetent Lou- 
doun was replaced by James Abercromby.^^ It was the 
determination of the crown, wrote Pitt to the governors, 
*' to repair the Losses and Disappointments of the last 
inactive campaign & by the most vigorous and Extensive 
Efforts to avert the dangers impending in North Amer- 
ica. ' ' ®^ The plan of campaign was three-fold : an attack 
upon the center of Canada by way of Crown Point, and 
upon the flanks of French power at Louisburg and Fort 
Duquesne. The northern colonies were required to raise, 
pay, and clothe twenty thousand men. On similar terms 
the southern provinces were called upon to raise " a body 
of several thousand Men to join the king's Forces in those 
parts." Abercromby placed the quota of Virginia, Mary- 
land, and Pennsylvania at six thousand men.^* The cam- 
paign in the south was put under the command of General 
John Forbes. ^^ In March the assembly of Pennsylvania 

80 Kimball, Pitt Corres., 1, 41, 43, 63. 

81 Ibid., 54-55. 

82 Ibid., 1, 133-134; Pa. Col. Recs., VIII, 26. 

83 Kimball, Pitt Corres., I, 140-43; Pa. Col. Recs., VIII, 27-28. 

84 Kimball, Pitt Corres., I, 215; Pa. Col. Recs., VIII, 37-38. 

S5 Kimball, Pitt Corres., I, 146; Pa. Archives, 1st. ser., Ill, 321. 



316 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-17G5 

promptly responded with a resolve to raise, pay, and 
clothe twenty-seven hundred and fifty men, offered a 
bounty of £5 to encourage enlistments, and presented the 
governor with a bill to create £100,000 in paper currency 
to cover the expenses.^® The members of the house pro- 
fessed to be animated by great zeal and exhorted the gov- 
ernor to make every effort to have the troops ready by 
May 1, the time set by the requisition. Prompt action 
was again blocked by the revival of the old conflict over 
the taxation of the Penns' estates. After a month's delay 
Governor Denny signed a supply bill of the same tenor 
as the year before. The northern colonies evinced a lively 
spirit in the military operations,^'^ but the south was half- 
hearted.^^ On May 19 Forbes wrote to Pitt picturing the 
obstacles which confronted him.^^ Of the sum voted by 
Pennsylvania only one-half was available for the campaign, 
the remainder was consumed in liquidating the arrearages 
of the former enterprise. The delay in voting the money 
and printing the bills of credit seriously retarded the op- 
erations. Forbes said he had hopes of securing a thou- 
sand men by June 1, '' but when the rest will be got I 
can scarce say." From Virginia he hardly expected more 
than an equal number at the same time. Support from 
Maryland was out of the question.^^ Governor Sharpe 
of Maryland raised two hundred men on his own credit 
for the expedition against Fort Duquesne, while Governor 
Dobbs sent the same number at the expense of the crown.^^ 

86Pfl,. Votes of Assembly, IV, 797, 799-800, 801, 804-805, 806, 
813, 814-815. 

87 The colonies of the northern division were called upon to raise 
20,000 men, but the forces raised numbered only 17,480. Kimball, 
Pitt. Corres., 1, 135, 208, 213, 222, 226, 227; Beer, British Col 
Pol, 1754-1765, 60-61. 

88 Kimball, Pitt Corres., I, 185, 210, 229, 230, 237, 240, 243. 
S9lhid., I, 245-246. 

00 Forbes took into the pay of the crown a small force of Md. 
troops, for which the assembly refused to make provision. Ihid., 
1, 243, 279, 329. 

ei/6id., I, 241. 



THE FRENCH AND INDIAN WAR 317 

The provincials, according to Forbes, were not only seri- 
ously deficient in numbers, but also in quality.^- 

Like Loudoun before him, Forbes was also seriously 
handicapped by the short term of enlistments. The troops 
of Pennsylvania and Virginia were engaged only to the 
first of December. In October, after Fort Duquesne had 
fallen, Forbes asked the governors of Pennsylvania, Mary- 
land, and Virginia what number of provincials they could 
furnish for garrison duty for the winter, since he had not 
sufficient regulars at his command to undertake the task.^^ 
The Virginia assembly responded by instructing the gov- 
ernor to recall the forces on December 1, assistance from 
Maryland could not be expected, and the assembly of Penn- 
sylvania replied that Forbes could not reasonably ask the 
province to bear this additional expense in view of the 
large aids granted to the crown, especially since the fron- 
tier was so far distant from the inhabited part of the prov- 
ince and that garrison duty was usually performed by the 
regulars in other colonies.^* The same narrow spirit was 
shown by the assembly on several other occasions. Forbes 
wrote to Pitt that the assembly would do nothing to for- 
ward the service ^' that they did not think themselves com- 
pelled to do by the words of your letter to them." ^^ The 
following evidence in support of this statement may be 
offered. At the outset of the expedition Forbes was with- 
out camp necessaries by reason of their failure to arrive 

92 Forbes said of the Pa. and Va. forces that " a f ew of their 
principal Officers excepted, all the rest are an extream bad Collec- 
tion of broken Innkeepers, Horse Jockeys, & Indian traders, and 
that the Men under them, are a direct copy of their Officers, nor 
can it well be otherwise, as they are a gathering from the scum of 
the worst people in every Country, who have wrought themselves 
up, into a panick at the very name of Indians." Ihid., I, 242. 

93 Pa. Votes of AssemUy, V, 2-3; Pa. Col. Recs., VIII, 224, 227, 
233; Kimball, Pitt Corres., I, 374. 

94 Kimball, Pitt Corres., I, 407-408; Pa. Col. Recs., VIII, 229, 
240; Pa. Votes of Assembly, V, 6. 

95 Kimball, Pitt Carres., I, 338. 



318 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

from England. He applied to the assembly for them and 
received a frank refusal. The house declared that accord- 
ing to the requisition such impedimenta were to be fur- 
nished by the crown, that the province had fulfilled all 
required of it, and that Forbes had authority according 
to his orders to supply these things.^® Still another 
proof. Admiral Craven asked the assembly to provide him 
with thirty recruits for the fleet and in return promised 
to station a ship of war at Philadelphia.^^ The assembly 
replied that it was not expected that the colony should 
recruit the fleet at its own expense, neither was it able to 
bear this additional charge in view of the large number 
of troops raised and supported.^^ Such conduct shows up 
in a most unfavorable light compared with that of Massa- 
chusetts. The latter not only raised and supported seven 
thousand men for the general service, but equipped and 
manned two vessels to act with the English fleet and sup- 
plied the necessary recruits.^^ 

The successes at Louisburg and Fort Duquesne in 1758 
left the center of Canada still under French control. The 
undertakings of the next two years were devoted chiefly 
to the conquest of Montreal and Quebec. In the south 
the purpose was to fortify Fort Duquesne and to protect 
the long frontier.^^^ To recount in detail the conduct of 
the southern provinces during these two years would be 
needless and wearisome. The English commanders were 
confronted with the same condition of affairs as had per- 
plexed Braddock, Loudoun, and Forbes. Each year Pitt 
made requisition for the same number of men on the same 
terms. "^ Maryland and the Carolinas did practically noth- 
ing for the general service. Each year the assembly of 

96 Pa. Col Recs., VIII, 112; Pa. Votes of AssemUy, TV, 831-832. 

97 Pa. Votes of Assembly, IV, 832. 
QslMd., 833, 835. 

99 Kimball, Pitt Corres., I, 361-363; II, 253-254. 

100 iMd., I, 440; II, 12-13. 

101 Ibid., I, 417; II, 15, 234; Pa. Col. Recs., VIII, 272, 315, 451. 



THE FKENCH AND INDIAN WAR 319 

Pennsylvania voted to raise its quota of men but each time 
the same weary quarrel over the taxation of the proprie- 
tary estates arose to hinder and delay military operations. 
In 1759 General Amherst hurried to the province at the 
solicitation of Colonel Stanwix, to break by personal in- 
fluence the deadlock between the executive and assembly.^*^^ 
His appeal to the leading men of the house failed. He 
appealed to the assembly itself, pointing out that a refusal 
to yield meant the dismissal " of all thoughts of carrying 
on the intended Offensive Operations, and Building a Fort, 
but the house remained Deaf to all kinds of Remon- 
strances. ' ' Recourse to the governor was the only alterna- 
tive. The assembly considered the principle at stake of 
more vital concern than the success of the campaign. Gov- 
ernor Denny, under pressure of Amherst's advice and a 
judicious bribe from the assembly, waived his instructions 
and the proprietary estates were taxed for the first time. 
Again in 1761 Morris, Denny's successor, likewise violated 
his instructions at the request of Amherst. In order to 
justify his acquiescence, Morris wrote to Pitt that the as- 
sembly would do nothing for the general service '^ but at 
the price of obtaining the most unjust advantages over 
their proprietaries, with whom they are contending. And 
to which nothing could have induced me to submit, but my 
Zeal for the General Service, and my fears of depriving 
the King of so considerable aid at this most critical junc- 
ture. ' ' ^^^ It is clear that the assembly played upon the 
exigencies of the occasion to make itself the supreme power 
in the provincial constitution. Each year the number of 
troops available reached but half the number voted.^*^* 

102 Kimball, Pitt Corres., II, 88, 131; Pa. Col. Recs., VIII, 331- 
332. 

103 Kimball, Pitt Corres., II, 276; Pa. Archives, 1st. ser., Ill, 
715; Pa. Col. Recs., VIII, 331-332. 

104 Amherst and Stanwix agreed that Pa., Md., Va., and No. Car. 
should raise a body of 6400 men, but the latter said that he never 
expected any forces at all from Md. and No. Car., and only about 



320 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

Each year the controversy over the supply bill retarded 
operations. The funds voted for one campaign were spent 
in paying off the debts due for the previous campaign.^^^ 
The pay of the troops was usually in arrears, murmurings 
of mutiny were frequent, and desertions were many. The 
short enlistments precluded the employment of the provin- 
cials in winter garrison duty. In December, 1759, the 
assembly ordered the governor to disband all the troops 
except one hundred and fifty for garrison duty. This 
action was based on the plea of poverty and the claim 
that there was little need of troops to lie inactive during 
the winter season, since Quebec had fallen and Stanwix 
had made a treaty with the Indians. ^^^ The governor as 
well as Amherst and Stanwix strongly protested.^^^ They 
urged that the outcome of the conference with the Indians 
was uncertain, that Canada had not yet been wholly con- 
quered, and that there were not sufficient regulars to man 
the frontier garrisons. But the assembly saw no reason 
to alter its determination. ^^^ In the next year General 
Monckton experienced the same difficulty. It was only 
after Amherst was forced to withdraw Colonel Vaughan's 
regiment from the province that the assembly voted to 
keep three hundred men in garrison duty till November 
or until the conclusion of peace. ^^^ These evils were not 
confined to Pennsylvania; all the southern colonies ex- 
hibited the same refractory attitude. On the other hand, 

2700 from Pa. and Va. Kimball, Pitt Corres., II, 132. For the 
campaign of 1760, Md. and the Cars, sent no forces., Pa. voted 
2700 but raised only 1350, and Va. alone raised 1000, the number 
voted. Pa. Col Recs., IX, 48. 

105 Kimball, Pitt Corres., II, 130. 

106 Pa. Votes of Assembly, V. 92. 

107 Ibid., 93; Pa, Col. Recs., VIII, 426, 437; Pa. Archives, 1st. 
ser., Ill, 695. 

108 Pa. Votes of Assembly, V. 98; Pa. Col. Recs., VIII, 428; Kim- 
ball, Pitt Corres., II, 265-266. 

109 Pa. Votes of Assembly, V, 117, 118, 128, 130; Pa. Col. Recs., 
VIII, 495-596, 509-511; Pa. Statutes at Large, VI, 92. 



THE FRENCH AND INDIAN WAR 321 

the northern colonies acted a more becoming part, al- 
though the fall of Quebec in 1759 and the rumors of peace 
in 1760 caused a slight decrease in the number of men 
raised there.^^^ 

With the fall of Quebec and the conquest of Montreal, 
Canada became practically a British possession. For the 
operations of 1761 and 1762, the colonies were required to 
raise only two-thirds of the former levies.^^^ In May, 1761, 
Amherst informed Pitt that '^ nothing is to be expected 
from Pennsylvania. ' ' "- This sums up the situation for 
both years. The assembly refused to honor the requisi- 
tions except on the terms of the supply bills of the two 
previous years. The Privy Council had censured the sup- 
ply bill of 1759 as " fundamentally wrong and unjust," 
but confirmed it on condition that the assembly would alter 
it in the objectionable features. The house refused to 
abide by the agreement made between its agents and the 
crown, the governor refused to accept any grants except 
on the conditions stipulated by the Privy Council, both 
sides remained steadfastly firm in their positions and all 
expectation of aid from Pennsylvania for the general serv- 
ice vanished into tliin air. In 1761 the governor in- 
formed Pitt that the assembly ^' never did intend, from 
the beginning, to comply with his Majesty's requisitions 
in the smallest degree, but at the price of obtaining for 
themselves Powers and Advantages, which must have 
rendered the Government so weak and impotent, as to be 
unable, at any future time, to contend with them, however 
necessary it might be . . . " ^^^ j^j^ ^^le governor was 
able to secure from the house was a grant of £23,500, out 
of the Parliamentary fund, to provide forts and troops 

110 Beer, British Col. Pol, 64-67; Kimball, Pitt Corres., II, SOT- 
SOS, 461. 

111 Kimball, Pitt Corres., II, S67; Pa. Col. Recs., VIII, 588, 678. 

112 Kimball, Pitt Corres., II, 426. 

ii3/6itZ., II, 432-434; Pa. Archives, 1st. ser., IV, 47. 



322 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

for the defense of Philadelphia and to negotiate a treaty 
with the Indians. ^^* 

We have now passed in review, perhaps with too much 
emphasis on details, the administrative and political as- 
pects of the problem of imperial defense from the begin- 
ning of the wars between England and France for mastery 
in North America to the triumph of the former in 1763. 
From the facts deduced we are pressed to the conclusion 
that the requisition system was vicious and inadequate in 
practice and inherently wrong in conception. It would 
be needless to recount the evils of the system; they have 
already been laid bare. The dissatisfaction and jealousy 
created by unfair apportionment of quotas, the habit of 
one colony waiting to see what its neighbor would do for 
the general service, the conflict between the governors 
and assemblies, the influence of the assemblies in the di- 
rection of the troops and the expenditure of the funds, 
the short-term enlistments, the scanty levies of men in some 
cases, the fluctuations in the number of men available, all 
conspired to impair the efficiency of the army, to delay 
operations, to limit the scope of the activity of the troops, 
to hamper the English commanders by forcing them to 
consume their time and energy in local politics, and to 
harm the general interests and security of the Empire. 
The lack of unity and concert exerted a double influence 
for evil; it encouraged French attacks, and injured and 
alienated the friendship of the Indians. The system was 
unfair whether viewed from the standpoint of the colonies 
or England. In the colonies the burden of defense was 
very inequitably distributed. Galloway said in 1774 ' ' You 
all know there were Colonies which at some times granted 
liberal aids, and at others nothing; Other Colonies gave 
nothing during the war; none gave equitably in propor- 
tion to their wealth, and all that did give were actuated 

114 Po. Statutes at Large, VI, 226-229. 



THE FRENCH AND INDIAN WAR 323 

by partial and self-interested motives, and gave only in pro- 
portion to the approach or remoteness of the danger. "^^^ 
It is estimated that the three colonies of Massachusetts, 
New York, and Connecticut, although they numbered but 
one-third of the total white population in the mainland 
colonies, supplied seventh-tenths of the colonial forces.^^^ 
A system which threw the chief burden upon a few ener- 
getic colonies and permitted others to escape their due 
share in the common responsibilities was not only funda- 
mentally wrong and unjust, but created intercolonial dis- 
content and jealousy. But the system created greater 
dissatisfaction at home. At the close of the war with 
France it appeared unjust to the English tax-payer that 
he should be compelled to bear not only the whole cost of na- 
val protection, but also a large share of military defense. ^^^ 
Even in times of peace the home government kept garri- 
sons on the frontiers of New York, South Carolina, and 
Georgia.^^^ These military posts were necessary to guard 
the boundaries of the colonies, to protect the traders and 
prevent sudden incursions by the Indians stirred up to re- 
venge by the French and Spaniards. Although this was 
a burden properly belonging to the colonies, their refusal 
to assume the responsibility forced it upon the home gov- 
ernment. In the time of the imperial wars, England not 
only sent troops to cooperate w4th the colonial forces, but 
reimbursed the colonies for a portion of their outlay. 
This policy was followed chiefly in the last French war. 
For the campaign of 1755 the colonies expended about 
£170,000, and Parliament compensated them, except Penn- 
sylvania and Maryland which did practically nothing, to 
the extent of £165,000. For the campaigns of 1758-1762, 

115 Ford, Journals of Continental Congress, 1, 45. 

116 Beer, British Col. Pol., 68. 

117 Franklin, Works (Smyth ed.), V, 41-42; Beer, British Col. 
Pol., 272. 

118 Beer, British Col. Pol., 11-13. 



324 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

Parliament voted the colonies £866,666}^^ This was in 
addition to the charges borne by the English treasury in 
furnishing arms, ammunition, provisions, tents, and ar- 
tillery to the colonial troops. Franklin estimated that the 
parliamentary grants reimbursed the colonies for two- 
fifths of their outlay in raising clothing, and paying their 
troops.^^"' In the case of Pennsylvania, the province was 
reimbursed to the extent of thirty-five per cent, of her ex- 
penditures for the campaigns of 1758-1760.^^^ For the 
years 1761-1762 Pennsylvania did nothing and received 
nothing from Parliament. The purpose of these grants 
was partly to encourage the colonies to zealous and prompt 
action,^^^ but chiefly to secure as large a force as possible 
in the colonies in order to obviate the difficulties and ex- 
pense of recruiting troops at home and transporting them 
to America.^^^ 

By the Treaty of Paris of 1763, Canada and the territory 
east of the Mississippi River passed from French to Eng- 

119 Beer, British Col Pol., 1151^1165, 53-57. 

120 Franklin, Works (Smyth ed.), IV, 402. 

121 For the three years Pa. issued £300,000 in bills of credit, 
or £193,548 sterling computed at 55 per cent, discount, the rate 
of exchange between London and Phila., and received from the 
parliamentary funds £68,859 sterling. Pa. Statutes at Large, V, 
460; VI, 114', 329, 487. 

122 In 1757 Pitt wrote to the governors saying, " that no En- 
couragement may be wanting to this great and salutary Attempt," 
recommendations would be made to Parliament at the next session 
to compensate each colony for its outlay, according " as the active 
Vigour and strenuous Efforts of the respective Provinces shall 
justly appear to merit." Kimball, Pitt Corres., I, 139. This plan 
was followed each year. Governor Pownall of Mass. informed Pitt 
that " not only the Preservation of the Countrey by this Province 
being able to continue its Efforts, but the Preservation of the 
Government of this province itself depends upon that Recompence," 
Ibid., 1, 363. Likewise, Gov. Fitch of Conn., wrote that his colony 
was enabled to continue its efforts for the general service by " rely- 
ing on the gracious Assurance of a Compensation." Ibid., II, 85, 
141. 

123 Beer, British Col. Pol., 57 and note 4; Fortescue^, Hist, of 
British Army, II, 578. 



THE FRENCH AND INDIAN WAR 325 

lish control. The acquisition of a large conquered area 
to the Empire necessitated a readjustment of the colonial 
policy, which involved deeply the problem of defense. 
The problem now became of great importance because of 
the control over a number of French and western Indians, 
both unfriendly to the English. It was chiefly the Indian 
question which arose to vex the Empire. As early as 1760, 
when Canada was practically an English possession, Eng- 
lish troops replaced the French garrisons in many of the 
posts in the new territory.^^* These posts were necessary 
to prevent reconquest by the French and to check the hos- 
tility of the Indians. The feeling of discontent among the 
savages was very evident by 1761. This was due to several 
causes.^-^ " The fur trade under the French had been 
well regulated," says Carter, " but its condition under the 
English from 1760-1763 was deplorable." Then again, the 
Indians feared that their lands, heretofore left practically 
untouched by the French, would be appropriated by the 
English bent on permanent settlement. The spirit of dis- 
content among the Indians was kept alive by the French 
who filled the hearts of the savages with fear of the Eng- 
lish. Even before the conquest of Canada, as we have 
seen, colonial and English statesmen thoroughly appreci- 
ated the bad effects of the decentralized system of Indian 
control. In 1754 the Albany Conference and the Board of 
Trade sought to centralize the regulation of Indian affairs. 
The failure of these plans led the English government to 
appoint Indian commissioners for the northern and south- 
ern colonies respectively, with power over the political re- 
lations with the Indians only.^^e After 1760 the discon- 
tent of the western Indians brought the problem of cen- 
tralization again to the front. The Board of Trade ad- 
vised the crown of the danger of allowing settlement in 

124 Carter, The Illinois Country, 27. 

■i^25 lUd., 28-29, 77-80; Beer, British Col. Pol., 252-254. 

126 Carter, The III. Country, 80-81; Beer, British Col. Pol., 254-256. 



326 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

the new territory before the claims of the Indians were ad- 
justed. In 1761, on the basis of this report, the purchase 
of Indian lands was taken out of the control of the colonies 
and placed in the hands of the English govemment.^^^ 
This action foreshadowed the Proclamation of 1763 which 
forbade settlement west of the sources of the rivers empty- 
ing into the Atlantic and required traders with the Indians 
to take out licenses from the colonial governors.^-^ But 
before the policy could be applied, the western Indians, 
under the able leadership of Pontiac, rose in rebellion. 

In May, 1763, the storm broke on the frontier. Colonel 
Bouquet informed the governor of Pennsylvania that the 
forts at Le Bouef, Presquisle, and Venango had fallen w^th 
their garrisons, and that Forts Pitt and Ligonier alone 
had withstood attacks.^^^ Amherst informed Governor 
Hamilton that he had dispatched two companies of regu- 
lars to the province, but could spare no more, and urged 
the assembly promptly to raise troops to protect the fron- 
^jgj. 130 jj^ July the house resolved to take into the pay 
of the province " any number of back inhabitants and 
others," not exceeding seven hundred men, to be employed 
on the frontier " within the purchased parts of the said 
Province during the time of Harvest or until the next 
meeting of the House. ' ' ^^^ It is evident that a large ma- 
jority of the members of the assembly, who lived in the 
east free from Indian attacks, were alive only to their own 
security and felt a gross indifference to the needs of the 
people of the west. In September Governor Hamilton 
informed the house that the harvest was garnered, the term 
of the troops was about to expire, and urged the extreme 
necessity of continuing the forces. ^^- The assembly made 

127 N. Y. Col. Docs., VII, 473, 478. 

128 Beer, British Col. Pol, 256-257. 

129 Pa. Col., Recs., IX, 31, 32, 35. 
isolUd., IX, 34. 

is^IUd., 36. 
132 lUd., 42. 



THE FRENCH AND INDIAN WAR 327 

no immediate response. This drew from General Amherst 
and the Earl of Egremont, secretary of state, just and se- 
vere censures."^ In the last of October the assembly re- 
sponded by voting £24,000 to employ eight hundred and 
twenty-five men '' in the most effectual manner for the 
defense and protection of the province till the First of 
February next. ' ' ^^* 

By this time the insurrection had assumed such a seri- 
ous aspect that the Earl of Halifax, secretary of state, 
instructed Amherst to call upon the colonies for assistr 
ance.^^^ In November Amherst levied requisitions upon 
New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Virginia as the 
colonies most intimately concerned.^^® New York held it 
to be unreasonable not to include the New England col- 
onies, and made assistance from them a condition of her 
own contribution.^^^ New Jersey followed the lead of New 
York.^^^ In December General Gage, who succeeded Am- 
herst, levied requisitions upon the New England col- 
onies. ^^^ After considerable difficulty he was able to se- 
cure a small force from Connecticut, one-half the number 
required from New York and New Jersey, and Virginia 
alone acted with spirit. "What was the attitude of Penn- 
sylvania whose territory was so vitally concerned? On 



133 Amherst wrote to Gov. Hamilton of his surprise " at the in- 
fatuation of the People in your Province, who tamely look on 
while their Brethren are butchered by the Savages, when, without 
doubt, it is in their Power by exerting a proper Spirit, not only 
to protect the Settlements, but to punish any Indians that are 
hardy enough to disturb them." Pa. Col. Recs., IX, 62. For the 
censure of Halifax, see ihid., 114, Thos. Penn wrote to Gov. Ham- 
ilton, " As you apprehended I find General Amherst has made loud 
complaints of Pennsylvania." Penn Mss., Letter BJc., VIII, Nov. 11, 
1763. 

134 Pa. Statutes at Large, VI, 311-319. 

135 Beer, British Col. Pol., 262-263. 

136 Pa. Col. Recs., IX, 74-75; Pa. Archives, 4th. ser.. Ill, 249-251. 

137 Beer, British Col. Pol, 263. 

138 N. J. Archives, IX, 398-399, 401, 428-429, 431-432. 

139 Pa. Col. Recs., IX, 90; Beer, British Col. Pol, 263-264. 



328 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 
December 24 the assembly resolved to raise, pay and 
clothe one thousand men and presented the governor with 
a bill to create £55,000 in paper currency to cover the 
charges.^**^ Governor John Penn refused his consent to 
the supply bill on the ground that it contained clauses in 
violation of the agreement made in 1760 between the 
crown and the agents of the assembly concerning the tax- 
ation of proprietary lands.^*^ The house held a different 
view, and for five months in the midst of distress on the 
frontier the deadlock persisted. In the last of May the 
house, under the pressure of '' publick necessities and the 
distresses of war," was compelled to yield in the contest, 
but in so doing informed the governor that it had " waved 
very important Rights. "^^^ Intensely angered at the ar- j 
bitrary conduct of the proprietors and their governor, the 
assembly sent Benjamin Franklin to England bearing a 
petition to the crown praying for royal government. In 
order to preserve the liberties of the people it wns felt 
necessary '' to fly from petty tyrants to the throne." On 
the other hand, the people of the back country, provoked 
to wrath at the indifference of the assembly to the protec- 
tion of the frontier, took arms in their hands, killed certain 
Indians taken under the protection of the province, and 
then marched upon Philadelphia to secure a redress of 
grievances."^ But looking at the whole matter from the 
standpoint of the Empire, the events of Pontiac's Con- 
spiracy made clear, what the former wars had shown con- 
clusively, that the requisition system was a failure whether 
applied in time of local or imperial wars. 

The Treaty of Paris of 1763 added to the Empire im- 
mense areas of new territory and as a result the imperial 
government was confronted, as we have seen, with the 
serious task of readjusting her colonial system to meet the 

140 Pa. Col. Recs., IX, 98, 148. 

141 /&td., 152, 153-154. 

1^2 lUd., 188. 

i43/6trf., 94-96, 100, 138-145. 



THE FRENCH AND INDIAN WAR 329 

new conditions. Not the least of the problems awaiting 
solution was that of maintaining the conquered region from 
French intrigues and the incursions of hostile savages. 
It was felt at home that since the mother country had borne 
a heavy financial burden to save the colonists from foreign 
conquest, therefore, '' the colonists, now firmly secured 
from foreign enemies, should be somehow induced to con- 
tribute to the exigencies of state in future." To secure 
colonial contributions to general purposes two courses were 
open to the English ministry ; either to continue the requisi- 
tion system, relying upon the fidelity of the colonies to 
grant aids through their own assemblies, or else to resort 
to the latent powers of the imperial legislature. The 
harmful influence and the refractory attitude of the as- 
semblies in the matter of protection had created a feeling 
on both sides of the Atlantic that some central authority 
was necessary to over-rule colonial particularism. Far- 
sighted colonial statesmen at Albany took steps to remedy 
this great fault. But the failure of the colonies to adopt 
the Albany Plan of Union made it clear that the only 
alternative was the exercise of the powers of the British 
Parliament.^^* Parliamentary taxation was a remedy sug- 
gested repeatedly by colonial officials, such as Clinton, 
Shirley, Sharpe, and Dinwiddle among the the governors,^''^ 

144 Franklin wrote in 1789 that if the Albany Plan of Union had 
been adopted and carried into execution " the subsequent Separa- 
tion of the Colonies from the Mother Country might not so soon 
have happened, . . . For the Colonies, so united, would have 
really been^ as they then thought themselves, sufficient to their own 
Defence, and being trusted with it, . . . an Army from Britain, 
for that purpose would have been unnecessary; The Pretences for 
framing the Stamp Act would then not have existed, nor the other 
Projects for drawing a Revenue from America to Britain by Act of 
Parliament, which were the causes of the Breach & attended with 
such terrible Expense of Blood and Treasure." Works (Smyth ed), 
III, 226-227. 

145 AT. Y. Col. Docs., VI, 939; Dinwiddie Corres., I, 204, 207, 241, 
246, 250, 251, 329, 345; Sharpe Corres., I, 99; Beer, British Col 
Pol., eh. iii. 



330 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

and by Braddock and Loudoun among the commanders.^*® 
The logic of events forced the English ministry to this 
course at the close of the war.^*^ As a result two statutes 
were passed, the Sugar Act of 1764 and the Stamp Act of 
1765, whose express purpose was, as run the preambles, 
to create a revenue ** in your Majesty's said dominions 
in America, for defrajdng the expenses of defending, pro- 
tecting, and securing the same. ' ' ^*^ It was estimated that 
the operation of these acts would yield a revenue of 
£105,000 to £145,000 a year, which would cover from a 
third to a half of the cost of supporting an army of ten 
thousand men in America.^*^ But the extension of the 
powers of Parliament in the field of colonial taxation for 
revenue purposes involved a tremendous change in the colo- 
nial policy. The idea of creating a revenue by the au- 
thority of Parliament was a distinct innovation in the im- 
perial system of administration. It was perfectly clear to 
English statesmen that such a tax in the light of recent 
events was perfectly justifiable, and they never questioned 
the legal right of Parliament to exercise this latent power. 
But on the other hand, it is very evident that in so doing 
they had no conception whatever of the serious con- 
sequences involved in this step. The protests of the colo- 
nial assemblies and their agents against the passage of the 
stamp bill were looked upon simply as a strong popular 
outcry against new taxes and the bill found its way into 
law with practically no opposition in Parliament.^^^ The 

146 Kimball, Pitt Corres., I, 44; Beer, British Col. Pol, 45, note 6. 

147 In May, 1763, the secretary of state instructed the Board of 
Trade to report " in what Mode, least Burthensome & most palatable 
to the Colonies, can they contribute towards the Support of the 
Additional Expence " which is necessary to the protection of the 
new territory. B. T. Paps., PL Gen., XVII, Q 31; B. T. Jour., 
LXXI 256; Fitzmaurice, Life of 8helhurne, I, 249. 

148 4 George III, ch. 15; 5 George III, ch. 12. 

149 Beer, British Col. Pol., 285-286. 

150 Ihid., 284-285. Even Franklin did not appreciate the conse- 
quences involved in this action. In 1764 he wrote that Par^ 



THE FRENCH AND INDIAN WAR 331 

English ministry and Parliament were entirely ignorant 
of the temper and character of the colonists and of the 
nature of their political institutions. 

Former pages have set forth the character of the opposi- 
tion in the colonies to the Sugar Act of 1764. Colonial 
discontent was fanned into a flame on the passage of the 
Stamp Act. The orders of the crown or of proprietors to 
their governors could be thwarted by the assemblies in 
control of the financial (situation. Acts of Parliament 
could only be nullified by popular resistance. The offi- 
cials appointed to distribute the stamps were forced to re- 
sign their positions either through fear or persuasion.^^^ 
Threats were made against those who dared to use the 
stamps, in some cases trade was resumed without the use 
of stamps, and the power of the English Parliament was 
successfully defied and its statute nullified. What was 
the basis of this violent opposition? Various factors con- 
tributed to this end. In the first place, the colonists ob- 
jected to the mode of taxation. It was felt with substan- 
tial unity in America that the very existence of free in- 
stitutions was threatened by parliamentary taxation. As 
we have seen it was the devotion to the principle of self- 
government which provoked the bitter contests in Pennsyl- 
vania and Maryland between the assemblies and the pro- 
prietors over the control of the fiscal policy; it was the 
attachment to this principle that led the colonies to reject 
the Albany Plan of Union. It was unreasonable to expect 
that the colonists would permit Parliament to exercise a 
power to tax them when they had unanimously refused to 

liament may find it necessary to establish an army in Amer- 
ica to defend Canada and levy a tax on colonial commerce 
to create a revenue to support the troops, and he thought 
that in a few years the colonists would be well satisfied with the 
system. After the passage of the Stamp Act he wrote that the 
tax would probably be borne by the colonists. Works (Smyth ed.), 
IV, 237, 390. 

151 Howard, Preliminaries of the Revolution, ch. viii. 



332 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1690-1765 

yield this function to a central government in which they 
were to be represented. The political instincts of the col- 
onists were outraged when Parliament assumed an author- 
ity which violated the relations which had always existed 
between the two parts of the Empire. The whole contro- 
versy brought into the realm of discussion the nature of 
the relations between the two parts of the Empire. The 
colonists held that it was essential to freedom and the un- 
doubted right of all Englishmen that '' no Taxes be im- 
posed on them but with their own consent, given personally, 
or through their representatives, ' ' and as the colonies were 
not, and under the circumstances, could not be represented 
in Parliament, no taxes could be levied upon them '^ con- 
stitutionally " but by their respective legislatures. This 
familiar doctrine was enunciated in the resolves of a con- 
gress of colonial delegates, and found repeated expression 
in pamphlet literature, in newspapers, and in the resolves 
of colonial assemblies and public gatherings of various 
sorts. No matter how illogical and unscientific this doc- 
trine may be from the standpoint of law and political 
science, it was in accordance with the political growth of 
the colonies and was necessary to the continued existence of 
their systems of independent self-government. 

Furthermore, the colonists held that they were already 
sufficiently taxed in return for English protection. This 
feeling was well expressed by Alexander Hamilton when 
he wrote, '' The principle profits of our trade center in 
Great Britain ; . . . are not these principle profits a 
sufficient recompense for protecting it? " ^^- The colonists 

152 Hamilton, Works (Lodge ed.), I, 65, 110, 112, 113, 118-119; 
John Adams, V.orks (C. F. Adams ed.), IV, 46-47; Samuel Adams, 
Writings (Ciishing ed.), I, 42-43, 49-53; Dickinson, Writings I, 
237-239; Franklin, Works (Smyth ed.), IV, 402. The Stamp Act 
Congress resolved " that as the prolits of tlie trade of these colonies 
ultimately center in Great Britain, to pay for the manufactures 
which they are obliged to take from thence, they eventually con- 
tribute very largely to all the supplies granted there to the crown." 



THE FRENCH AND INDIAN WAR 333 

expressed a willingness that the mother country should 
regulate their commerce to her own exclusive advantage, 
but felt that this was a sufficient tribute for protection, 
and that further grants of aid to imperial purposes should 
be left to the fidelity of the assemblies. The colonists 
looked upon the war against France in the nature of a 
conquest to advance the interests of the mother country. 
They felt that they had already borne a burden even be- 
yond their abilities, as evidenced by the fact that Parlia- 
ment reimbursed them for a portion of their outlay, and 
that therefore it was unreasonable to ask them to bear an 
additional burden for the protection of a territory from 
which the metropolis and not the colonies reaped the ad- 
vantages.^^^ Opposed to this view was that of the English 
statesmen who held that it was a war for the protection 
of the colonies, and that therefore now secured from for- 
eign attacks, the colonists should help to share the ex- 
pense of defending the new territory. The whole con- 
troversy revealed not only the divergent views held on op- 
posite sides of the Atlantic as to the political nature of the 
Empire, but also brought out clearly the conflict between 
the provincialism of the colonies and the needs and policies 
of the Empire. 

The intense opposition to the Stamp Act cannot be ac- 
counted for solel}^ by an excessive attachment of the col- 
onists to principles of political and constitutional rights; 
the protest was as much economic as political. It must be 
remembered that the Stamp Act came as a sequel to the 
Currency and Sugar Acts of the previous year. These new 
regulations were considered especially burdensome in sev- 
eral respects. The colonies had always experienced a lack 
of specie because the balance of trade was against them, the 
Sugar Act now placed prohibitions upon the trade of the 
colonies to the foreign West Indies from whence they se- 

153 Dickinson, Writings, 1, 239-240; Franklin, Works, IV, 436- 
437: Samuel Adams, Writings, I, 41. 



334 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

cured the coin drained off at once to England, the Cur- 
rency Act abolished paper money, and now in a condition 
of economic depression and financial stringency, the duties 
of the Stamp and Sugar Acts were made payable in spe- 
gjgi54 rpj^g Stamp Act Congress resolved that '' from the 
scarcity of specie, the payment of them was absolutely im- 
practicable. " Then again, the scattered condition of set- 
tlements, the inadequacy of postal facilities, and the heavy 
postage charges would create delay, expense and incon- 
venience in securing the stamps, which would be felt espe- 
cially in the interior.^^^ Moreover, the stamp tax was con- 
sidered very unequal in incidence. Franklin and Dickin- 
son contended that it would fall most heavily upon those 
least able to bear it.^^® Colonial taxation was usually pro- 
portioned to the abilities of the inhabitants, the taxes were 
small and justified by the simple needs of the local govern- 
ment.^^"^ Hence they opposed the payment of taxes for the 
protection of Canada which brought no especial benefit to 
them. Franklin said before the bar of the House of Com- 
mons in 1766, that the people of America would never sub- 
mit to pay the stamp duty, even if moderated, '' unless 
compelled by force of arms." ^^^ 

154 Dickinson, Writings, I, 217-218. Franklin said in the House 
of Commons in 1766 that "there was not gold and silver enough 
in the Colonies to pay the stamp duty for one year." Works, IV, 
415. 

155 Franklin, Works, IV, 414. 

156 Dickinson, Writings, I, 229-232; Franklin, Works, IV, 414. 

157 Dinwiddle wrote in 1756 that the people would be angry if 
they heard of his proposals to levy a parliamentary tax upon them, 
for " they are averse to all Taxes." Gorres., II, 340-341. Loudoun 
wrote that the " Taxes which the People pay in this Country, are 
really so trifling, that they do not deserve the Name." Kimball, 
Pitt Gorres., I, 44. Cf. Callender, Economic Hist, of U. S., 123, 
137-140, which brings out the fact that social conditions in America 
were unfavorable to direct taxation. 

158 Franklin, Works, IV, 418. 



CHAPTER ELEVEN 

IMPERIAL CENTRALIZATION 

In 1701 the Board of Trade represented to the king and 
to Parliament that the chartered colonies " have no ways 
answered the chief design for which such large Tracts of 
Land and such Privileges and Immunities were granted 
by the Crown ' ' and recommended that the powers of gov- 
ernment should be '' reassumed to the Crown." The 
policy of centralizing and regulating colonial administra- 
tion took definite shape shortly after the passage of the 
acts of trade and navigation. Great praise and credit is 
due to individual and corporate enterprise for planting 
and developing English colonies in America, but with the 
formulation of a definite colonial policy, English statesmen 
began to realize that a system of indirect control under the 
charters no longer answered the purpose for which coloni- 
zation was undertaken. Indirect control constituted the 
chief defect in the system of chartered colonies. Instead 
of acting upon the colonists through its own agents, the 
crown was forced to rely upon officials practically outside 
the reach of royal authority. As Professor Osgood says, 
" In the face of such a situation and for the attainment 
of genuine imperial objects the English government was 
as helpless as would be the human body without arms or 
hands. ' ' ^ Hence, in order to make the Empire more co- 
hesive, and to secure efficiency and uniformity in colonial 
administration, it was necessary for the English govern- 
meut to resume the powers of government granted to pro- 
prietors and corporations. It is the purpose of this chap- 

1 Osgood, Amer. Cols., Ill, 22-24, 518-519. 

335 



336 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1G96-1765 

ter to set forth the needs and the methods which led to the 
transition from private enterprise to state control. 

The policy of vacating the charters and establishing direct 
control originated about 1676, when Edward Randolph 
was sent to New England to investigate the conduct of the 
colonies.^ He found by bitter experience that Massachu- 
setts ordered her own affairs without regard for the acts 
of trade or royal commands.^ As a result the English 
courts in 1677 denied the claim of Massachusetts to the 
territory of New Hampshire and the latter was erected 
into a royal province. The refractory conduct of Massa- 
chusetts led to the vacation of her charter by summary 
judicial proceedings in 1684.* The policy of the later 
Stuarts was broad in its scope, including not only the va- 
cation of the charters, but the consolidation of the colonies 
into larger administrative units in imitation of the French 
system in Canada,^ In 1685 New York became a royal 
province by the accession of the duke of York to the throne 
as James II. Charges were found against the colonies of 
Rhode Island, Connecticut, and the Jerseys, and menaced 
with the loss of their charters, they voluntarily submitted 
to royal authority.^ In 1686 the colonies of New England, 
New York, and New Jersey were erected into the Domin- 
ion of New England under the rule of one man, Sir Ed- 
mund Andros, invested with all the powers of government. 
The consummation of this policy was fraught with im- 
mense difficulties. There is little doubt of the justifica- 
tion of these measures viewed from the standpoint of im- 
perial interests. The advisers of James II saw clearly the 
anomalous position of the chartered colonies in the Em- 
pire. Unrestricted individualism and the idea of an un- 

2 Osgood, Amer. Cols., Ill, 310-313. 

3 Ibid., 228-239. 

4 Ihid., ch. X. 

5 Kellogg, Amer. Col. Charter, in Amer. Hist. Assoc, Reports, 
1903, I, 223-224. 

Osgood, Amer. Cols., Ill, 395-397. 



IMPERIAL CENTRALIZATION 337 

controllable power in each colony meant the destraction 
of the English colonial system. But on the other hand, 
the Andros regime, imposed from without, stood unrelated 
to the political and social institutions which the colonists 
had fashioned for themselves in the course of fifty years, 
untrammeled by English interference. Local and imperial 
interests and ideals were radically opposed to each other 
and their adjustment was beyond the region of probability. 
The news of the English revolution of 1688 fanned into a 
flame the smoldering discontent in New England and the 
Andros government was swept away.'' The upheaval of 
1689 in New England was simply a premonition of what 
was to occur several generations later when the English 
government again found it necessary to restrict colonial 
freedom of action, but the result was far more disastrous. 
The accession of William III witnessed no change in the 
policy initiated by the later Stuarts. The return to a set- 
tled condition of internal affairs at home brought a renewal 
of interest in the colonies similar to that which followed 
the Restoration. The reasons for this are clear. The be- 
ginning of the long series of wars with France for colonial 
and commercial supremacy made the question of imperial 
defense of paramount importance. The mercantile inter- 
ests, growing in power and influence, demanded a more 
vigorous administration of the acts of trade. The problems 
of defense and trade brought the colonies into sharp relief. 
To solve the problems the policy of vacating the charters 
and consolidating the colonies was still to be followed. 
In April, 1689, the Lords of Trade recommended to the 
Privy Council the reestablishment of a government in New 
England similar to the Andros rule for the sake of defense 
against French attacks.^ In the next month the Lords of 
Trade offered the opinion that a consideration of the re- 
lations which existed between the proprietary colonies and 

^ Osgood, Amer. Cols., Ill, ch. xiv. 
8 Cal. State Paps., Col, 1689-1692, 34. 



338 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1763 

the crown was a matter worthy the attention of Parliament 
in order to bring them '' under the nearer dependence on 
the crown, as his majesties revenue in the plantations is 
very much concerned therein. ' ' ^ But parliamentary ac- 
tion was not resorted to till a few years later and the cen- 
tralization of colonial control was left to the crown. 

Taking advantage of the overthrow of the rule of Lord 
Baltimore in Maryland, the crown established royal gov- 
ernment in 1691.^^ Despite the efforts of the agents of 
Massachusetts to secure a restoration of the old charter, 
a new instrument was granted which consolidated Massa- 
chusetts, Plymouth, and Maine into one province, and 
which provided for a royal governor and made a reserva- 
tion of a veto power and appellate jurisdiction to the 
crown. ^^ In 1692 William III deprived Penn of his pow- 
ers of government because of the necessities of war.^^ By 
royal commission the command of the militia of Rhode 
Island and Connecticut was placed in the hands of the royal 
governors of Massachusetts and New York respectively.^^ 
From the colonists themselves came appeals to the crown 
praying for royal control and consolidation. Far-sighted 
colonials saw that unity of action against the French and 
Indians was out of the question until the particular jeal- 
ousies and interests of the colonies were overcome.^* The 
governor and council of New York repeatedly entreated 
the home government to restore the original boundaries of 

9 Cal. state Paps., Col., 1689-1692, 39. 

10 Osgood, Amer. Cols., Ill, 503-506. 
ii76tcZ., 424-440. 

12 See page 262. 

13 See page 262. 

14 See page 265. In 1696 Stephen Sewall wrote that he wished 
the crown would reduce all the coloaiies to three administrative dis- 
tricts, each under the rule of a royal governor. Cal. State Paps., 
Col., 1696-1697, 189. Such also was the plan of Robert Livingstone, 
1701. N. Y. Col. Docs., IV, 874. John Nelson, in a memorial to 
the Board of Trade, also suggested the formation of the northern 
colonies into one government. Cal. State Paps., Col., 1696-1697, 136. 



IMPERIAL CENTRALIZATION 339 

the province or else reestablish the Dominion of New Eng- 
land as it existed not long since under Andros. The Privy 
Council concurred in the latter suggestion in 1695.^^ But 
to such a scheme the agents of the chartered colonies of- 
fered strong protests and the crown had to content itself 
by appointing in 1697 a governor of the royal colonies of 
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and New York, and in- 
vesting him with the command of the militia of Rhode 
Island, Connecticut, and New Jersey.^^ But as we have 
seen such a personal union did not solve effectively the se- 
rious problem of securing centralization of control and co- 
operation of intercolonial forces. 

Prior to 1696 Parliament was not called upon to assist 
in this task. By a combination of executive and judicial 
action the Stuarts established royal control. William III 
not only continued the colonial policy of his predecessors 
but like them resorted to the exercise of the royal preroga- 
tive to carry the programme into operation. The law offi- 
cers of the crown repeatedly gave the opinion that the king 
by virtue of his '^ prerogative and Soverainty over those 
Colonies ' ' had a right to assume the powers of government 
delegated by charters and, as we have seen, William III 
did not hesitate to exercise this right.^^ The chief objec- 
tion, however, to executive action was that the charters 
were never legally vacated.^® The annulment of the char- 
ters could be accomplished only by the action of the courts 
or by Parliament. Judicial procedure was a cumbersome 

15 See page 267. 

16 See page 268. 

nN. r. Col. Docs., IV, 1; Cal. State Paps., Col, 1693-1696, 20; 
R. I. Col. Recs., IV, 16; Chalmers, Opinions of Eminent Lawyers 
(ed. 1858), 66-67; Greene, Provincial Governor, 18-19. 

18 In 1694, the crown lawyers held in the case of Pennsylvania 
that the king had a right to assume the powers of government in 
case of necessity but when the reasons for which the government 
was taken from the proprietor ceased to hold good, the control 
again properly belonged to Penn. Cal. State Paps., Col., 1693-1696, 
308. See Channing, Hist, of U. 8., II, 225. 



340 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, lCOG-1765 

method because of the tedious delays incident to the great 
distance of the colonies from the courts at AVestminster 
and to the fact that separate action would be required in 
the case of each charter. Parliamentary action would be 
more effective because more comprehensive in character. 
After the Revolution of 1689 there was a decided tendency 
to look to Parliament to regulate colonial administration. 
This is evidenced by the act of 1696, chiefly administrative 
in character, and the efforts to establish a parliamentary 
council of trade, both of which are significant, not only of 
the assertion of the right of the legislature to deal with the 
colonial management, but of the tendency to encroach upon 
the royal prerogative. This tendency in the direction of 
legislative interference in colonial business was fraught 
with great possibilities for the future. 

Parliamentary interest in the colonies is further evi- 
denced by the appointment of a large committee in the 
House of Lords in February, 1697, to investigate the state 
of the trade of the kingdom. ^^ Before this committee the 
ever faithful Randolph appeared to prefer serious charges 
against the chartered colonies. At great length he de- 
tailed the abuses practiced in these colonies prejudicial 
to the authority of the crown and the welfare of the Em- 
pire.^^ Pennsylvania and Delaware were especially sin- 
gled out as the objects of Randolph's enmity and for spe- 
cial investigation by the committee.^^ Randolph expressed 
a grave fear that in view of the passage of the late Scotch 
Act incorporating a West India Company and the prev- 
alence of an illegal trade with Scotland and Holland, 
Penn's dominions would in a short time become a staple 
for Scotch and European goods. Randolph charged that 
Governor Markham connived at piracy and illegal trade 

^9 House of Lords Jour., XVI, 94; House of Lords Mss., n.s., 
II, 410. 

20 House of Lords Mss., n.s., II, 440-444. 
2i76id., 411. 



IMPERIAL CENTRALIZATION 341 

and accused the provincial courts of denjdng justice where 
the acts of trade were concerned. To substantiate the 
statements, Randolph not only brought evidence from the 
letters and records of the customs officials, but produced 
several witnesses.^- As a solution of the problem he rec- 
ommended that the charters should be vacated and royal 
control established instead.^^ With respect to Delaware, 
Eandolph suggested that it should be annexed to the royal 
province of Maryland, holding that Penn had no legal 
claim to the powers of government of that territory under 
the deeds of the duke of York.-* Five times William Penn 
attended the committee in his own defense. In refutation 
of the charges, he held that the contraband trade was due 
to the negligence of the royal officials and that they should 
be held responsible for it and not his government.^^ The 
committee, impressed with the extent of illegal trade, 
asked Penn " what objections he can make to the putting 
of the government of the Proprietors' Plantations into the 
King's hands." ^^ Penn made answer that the moment he 
lost his government the country was worth nothing to him, 
for without it he could not sell an acre of land. To meet 
this hostile feeling Penn proposed that his governor should 
be approved by the crown and give security for his good 
behavior. The committee adopted this suggestion and di- 
rected the crown to carry it out.^^ In conclusion Penn 
was told that if further complaints were made " Parlia- 
ment may possibly take another course in the matter, which 

22 House of Lords Mss., n.s., II, 462-466. 

23 lUd., 444. 

24 Professor Osgood had discussed in an able manner the important 
question whether the proprietors of New Jersey possessed a legal 
right to governmental powers under the sub-grants to them from 
the duke of York. Amer. Cols., II, 169-172. See also the case of 
Bellomont vs. Basse, Harvard Law Revieiv, XVIII, 483. 

25 House of Lords Mss., n.s., II, 412, 456-457. 
2Qlhid., 413. 

27 See page 50. 



342 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1600-1765 

will be less pleasing '* to the proprietors.^® That Penn 
feared Parliament would take away his charter is evi- 
denced by his letter of January, 1699, to Robery Ilarley, 
an influential member of the House of Commons.^" Penn 
wrote prior to his departure for America, saying, '' Pray 
be a friend to the absent, and without vanity, the meri- 
torious . . . Let us be treated like Englishmen, and 
not loose our domestick advantages for cultivating of wil- 
dernesses, so much to the honour and wealth of the crown." 
Penn was right in this feeling, for in 1701, during his ab- 
sence in Pennsylvania, the first bill was introduced in Par- 
liament to sweep away the charters. 

This action was based on the frequent complaints of the 
royal agents in the colonies, — Randolph, Quary, Nichol- 
son, Basse, and others. They found by experience that the 
act of 1696 did not have the desired effect in promoting a 
more efficient administration of the acts of trade in the 
chartered colonies. In former pages we have been made 
familiar with the sturdy oppovsition to the vice-admiralty 
courts, with the obstacles placed in the way of the customs 
officials, with the refusal or neglect of the governors to 
secure royal confirmation or to give security, and with the 
prevalence of illegal trade and piracy. We have seen that 
they refused to obey the royal requisitions for men and 
money for the defense of the New York frontier, and that 
they refused to honor the royal commissions to command 
their troops, and they denied appeals to the Privy Council. 
These charges form a partial catalogue of the reprehensible 
conduct of the chartered colonies, gleaned from the letters 
of the royal appointees. Therefore, with great frequency 
they urged the English government to vacate the charters 
and to substitute royal government.^'^ And it cannot be 

2fi TTouse of Lords Mfts., n.s., IT, 414. 

20 Duke of Portland Mss., Ill, 001-602, in Hist. Mss. Com., Re- 
port, 14, pt. 2. 

30/?. T. Paps., PL Ocn., IV, pt. 1, A 11; IV, pt. 2, B 40, C 18; 
V, pt. 2, D 48; No. Car. CoL Recs., I, 527. 



IMPERIAL CENTRALIZATION 343 

gainsaid that the evidence in support of these charges is 
strong and convincing. It seemed absolutely necessary 
that the home government should be given the powers 
adequate to control the affairs of the colonies in the in- 
terest of the Empire. 

In 1700 Randolph was back in London acting ener- 
getically with the Board of Trade in order to secure the 
annulment of the colonial charters. In February and 
March, 1701, he laid before the board two long papers 
charging high crimes and misdemeanors upon the gov- 
ernors of the chartered colonies, whether on the mainland 
or islands.^^ An examination of these papers simply re- 
veal the old charges made time and again in the numerous 
letters of the royal officials. Upon the basis of Randolph's 
statements, the Board of Trade represented the matter 
in a full and able document to the king on March 26, 
2701.32 Three days later the same report was submitted 
to the consideration of the House of Commons.^^ A re- 
view of this report exhibits in clear relief the evils which 
flowed from an indirect and decentralized system of im- 
perial control. It is needless to recount the charges made 
in the board's report, for in large part they simply reecho 
the familiar complaints. But one point demands considera- 
tion. The report pointed out clearly the injury worked 
to the royal provinces by the chartered colonies. By rais- 
ing and lowering the rate of coin to their particular ad- 
vantage,^"^ by exempting their inhabitants from taxes to 
which those of the royal colonies were subject, by harboring 
fugitives from justice and servitude,^^ the report held 

31 B. T. Paps., Props., V, F 69 ; VI, pt. 2, G 3 ; No. Car. Col. Rccs., 
1, 545-547; N. J. Archives, II, 358; Toppan, Edward Randolph, 
V, 263-273. 

«2B. T. Paps., Props., Entry Bk. C, 12-17; No. Car. Col. Recs., 
I, 535. 

33 House of Commons Jour., XIII, 399, 446-449. 

34 See page 183 ff. 

35 For the complaints of Fletcher, Nicholson, and Cornbury ag to 



344 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

that the chartered colonies undermined '' the Trade and 
Welfare of the other Plantations, and seduce and draw 
away the People thereof; by which Diminution of Hands 
the rest of the Colonies more beneficial to England do very 
much suff"". " The evils of a mixed system of direct and 
indirect control are very evident. In the royal colonies 
the crowTi by its hold on the governors and its power over 
legislation was able to secure uniformity in administration, 
while the chartered colonies, shielded by their royal patents 
from royal control, were enabled to order their affairs 
without much regard for the interests of the Empire or 
the colonies. In conclusion the report recommended that 
the powers of government delegated to proprietors and 
corporations by charter should be reunited to the crown, 
without prejudice to the territorial rights of the patentees. 
*' Which being no otherwise so well to be effected as by 
the Legislative power of this Kingdome " were the final 
words of the report. On April 24, in response to an order 
of the House of Commons, the board submitted a full ac- 
count of the charges against the chartered colonies, and on 
the same day a bill was introduced into the House of Lords 
to vacate the charters.^*' The bill simply provided for an 
annulment of those clauses in the charters which dele- 
gated powers of government to the patentees, leaving the 
latter in possession of their rights to the soil. It is also 
noteworthy that restrictions were placed on crown control 
by the stipulation that the king should govern in accord- 
ance with the laws in force in the colonies, and with such 
other laws as shall be passed by the colonial assemblies, 

desertion see: N. Y. Col. Docs., IV, 159, 160, 189, 1059, 1099; Cal. 
State Paps., Col., 1693-1696, 511, 630; 1696-1697, 420, 421, 511, 546. 
36 House of Commons Jour., XIII, 465, 502-505 ; House of Lords 
Jour., XVI, 659; B. T. Jour., XIV, 1, 3; House of Lords Mss., 
n.s., IV, 314. For the bill in full, consult House of Lords Mss., 
IV, 314-315; B. T. Paps., Props., VI, pt. 2, I 16; Entry Bk. C, 426- 
430. The bill included the charters of Rhode Island, Conn., N. J., 
Pa., Del., Md., Cars., Bahamas, and M^m, 



IMPERIAL CENTRALIZATION 345 

SO far as they were agreeable to the statutes of England. 
Thus Parliament, which stood as the embodiment of rep- 
resentative government in the English state, sought to 
vouchsafe to the colonists the same institution. 

With the introduction of the bill, Randolph and the 
Board of Trade set to work in earnest to secure its pas- 
sage. Randolph showed the same lively interest at this 
time as on earlier occasions. The board employed him to 
lobby for the bill and provided him with funds for that 
service.^'^ He secured witnesses in support of the charges, 
among whom were Joseph Dudley, Jeremiah Basse, and 
Jahleel Brenton, royal officials in the colonial service and 
arch-conspirators with Randolph against the chartered gov- 
ernments.^^ The board employed as counsel for the bill, 
Montagu and Darnell, who together with Randolph, Bren- 
ton, and Basse, concerted measures to effect its enacti- 
ment.^^ The House of Lords called upon the Boards of 
Trade, Customs, and Admiralty to submit all papers in 
their respective offices which concerned the colonies in- 
volved.''^ It is curious that the letters submitted by the 
customs and admiralty departments consisted only of 
those from Quary which detailed the opposition to the 
admiralty courts and the prevalence of illegal trade in 
Pennsylvania.*^ The whole procedure was planned with- 
out notice whatever to the interests of the proprietors or 

37 B. T. Jour., XIV, 7; Toppan, Edward Randolph, V, 273, 274; 
Vo, Car. Col Recs., I, 538. 

S8 House of Lords Jour., XVI, 666. Randolph spent about £96 
in lobbying for the bill, and he said he met " with nothing but 
trouble in Soliciting the said Bill." Most of the money was spent 
for witnesses, " keeping them together in the old palace yard, 
5sh., 8d.; dining them the same dayes, £2, Ssh., 12d. ; keeping wit- 
nesses together, "Ssh., 6d., etc." B. T. Paps., Props., VI, pt. 1, G 20. 

39 B. T. Jour., XIV, 21, 22-23, 25, 27. 

4:0 House of Lords Jour., XVI, 668, 670, 671; House of Lords 
Mss., U.S., IV, 318-355; B. T. Jour., XIV, 17, 26; B. T. Paps., Props., 
VI, pt. 1, G 16; Entry Bk. C, 63, 64, 66. 

^-i^ House of Lords Mss., n.s., IV, 317, 342-353; House of Lords 
Jour., XVI, 671. 



346 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

corporations. The first intimation they received of the 
danger to their charters came through the introduction of 
the bill. The proceedings savored rather of Star Chamber 
methods than a just, open, and full hearing of both sides. 
At once William Penn Jr., in the absence of his father, 
petitioned the Lords to be heard against the measure 
which was designed to deprive his father of an estate pur- 
chased from the crown upon a valuable consideration.*^ 
Sir Henry Ashurst, agent for Rhode Island, the Earl of 
Bath on behalf of the proprietors of the Carolinas and 
Bahamas, and Lord Baltimore also petitioned to be heard. *^ 
The burden of defense fell chiefly upon the shoulders of 
Penn Jr., and Ashurst. Four times they appeared with 
their counsel, Dodd and Phipps, before the Lords in de- 
fense of the charters.** Penn protested Randolph as an 
improper witness, but whether the objection was sustained 
is not disclosed.*^ Against Randolph's accusations, coun- 
sel for Penn produced in evidence several papers to show 
that the colony had taken action against illegal trade and 
piracy, and he expressed the hope that " the papers read 
will justify Mr. Penn " and " sufficiently expose Mr. Ran- 
dall in what he has said. ' ' *'' Randolph did not rely upon 
his own testimony, but produced several witnesses among 
whom was one, Captain Street, who testified that he was 
present at a trial in Pennsylvania where the court con- 
demned a man to be hung and yet neither judges, jurors, 
or mtnesses were under oath.*^ Darnell, counsel for the 

'i^ House of Lords Mss., n.s., IV, 317; House of Lords Jour., 
XVI, 660. 

^^ House of Lords Mss., n.s., IV, 317, 342; House of Lords Jour., 
XVI, 666, 670. 

^4= House of Lords Mss., n.s., IV, 315-316; House of Lords Jour., 
XVI, 679, 680, 688. 

4:5 House of Lords Mss., n.s., IV, 316. Randolph complained to 
the Lords that he had been threatened with arrest, whereupon he was 
given the protection of the house pending the passage of the bill. 
House of Lords Jour., XVI, 687. 

46 House of Lords Mss., n.s., IV, 316. 

47 lUd., IV, 316. 



IMPERIAL CENTRALIZATION 347 

bill, accused Penn of making temporary laws to evade the 
royal veto and of allowing justice to be administered with- 
out the oath.*^ The Lords proceeded to a second reading 
of the bill on May 23, and after a consideration of the 
bill was postponed four times, the measure was dropped 
altogether.'^^ Randolph informed the board on the day 
of the last postponement that there was no hope of its 
enactment this session. ^^ The board wrote to Nicholson 
that " the bill, by reason of the shortness of time and the 
multiplicity of other affairs " precluded final action.^^ 
The greater interest of the Lords in the impeachment trial 
of Whig leaders and the early dissolution of Parliament 
worked against its enactment. Then again it is very prob- 
able that the influence of Ashurst,^- Lord Baltimore, and 
the Earl of Bath was sufficiently strong to stay the hand 
of the Lords against the measure. 

The Board of Trade was in no way downcast in its 
initial failure. A determination to persist is clearly evi- 
dent. It wrote Nicholson that the bill would be renewed 
next session, to which he replied " I hope in God it will 
this Session. ' ' ^^ Ashurst informed his colony to be pre- 
pared for another attempt, as '^ Insolent Eandall & D. & 
another nameless friend was and are very active gentlemen 
against all proprietary governments. ' ' ^* Indeed such 
was the case. Randolph, preparatory to a second attempt, 
proceeded to take the affidavits of such witnesses as were 
unable to be present at the next session. ^^ The board, on 
the recommendation of Basse, instructed the royal govern- 
ors to investigate and report on the conduct of the char- 

4^8 House of Lords Mss., n.s., IV, 316. 

^9 Ihid., 316-317; House of Lords Jour., XVI, 688, 697, 717, 
722, 726, 736. 

50 B. T. Jour., XIV, 55; Toppan, Edward Randolph, V, 274. 

51 No. Car. Col. Recs., I, 539. 

52 Mass. Hist. Soc, Coll., sixth ser., Ill, 75. 

53 No. Car. Col. Recs., I, 539-541. 

54 Mass. Hist. Soc, Coll., sixth ser., Ill, 85. 

55 5. T. Jour., XIV, 55; Toppan, Edward Randolph, V, 274. 



348 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

tered colonies.^^ On the other hand, the representatives 
of chartered interests, now fully aware of the enmity to 
their charters, made active preparations for defense. 
When Penn in his province heard of the attack he sum- 
moned his council and informed it of the necessity of 
hastening to England. An assembly was promptly called 
which voted him £2000 and the proprietor hurried 
home.^^ However, just before his departure, Penn wrote 
to Robert Harley and to the Board of Trade in a spirit 
of just indignation at the falsity of the charges, the biased 
character of the witnesses, and the arbitrary manner in 
which the charters were considered.^^ To Penn it seemed 
a " great trifling with honour and property, when men 
must be forfeited in both, unheard." Penn said *' let 
our faults be proved, first the facts, next the malice or in- 
tention; but not behind our backs; ... a Bill to 
punish us before tried is worse than one of attainder." 
And there is much to be said in favor of Penn's contention. 
The board acted with perfect confidence in the veracity 
and accuracy of the statements of Randolph, Basse, Dud- 
ley, and others, proceeded in the dark without a full hear- 
ing of the proprietors or colonial agents, and without re- 
gard for the rights of those concerned. Penn wrote to 
the board in full refutation of the charges against his 
province and from a general survey of the evidence avail- 
able it appears that they were simply shreds and patches 
of the truth. Penn wrote that it seemed "as if all the 
old known Rules of Justice were to be read backward " 
when the charges of " persons gaping for Preferments 

56 B. T. Jour., XIV, 107; B. T. Paps., Props., VI, pt. 1, G 22. 
Cornbury and Dudley for New England; Blackiston, Randolph, and 
Andros for the other chartered colonies, were authorized to inves- 
tigate and report on conditions. As they were all royal agents 
and hostile to the chartered colonies it may not be said that this 
was a non-partisan method of investigation. 

57 Pa. Col. Recs., II, 32, 35, 51. 

58 Duke of Portland Mss., IV, 19-21 in Hist. Mss. Com., Report, 
15, pt. 4; B. T. Paps., Props., VI, pt. 1, G 39. 



IMPERIAL CENTRALIZATION 349 

under the Specious pretence of Serving the King's Inter- 
est .. . should be countenanced & encouraged and 
all their Representations without further Inquiry Cred- 
ited, and made the bottom for the Ruine of the rather 
meritorious than culpable." Moreover, the whole pro- 
cedure savored of confiscation when it is remembered that 
no monetary consideration was to be granted to the cor- 
porations or proprietors in return for the great expendi- 
ture of capital, blood, and brawn to plant colonies which 
yielded so considerable a profit to the metropolis. Penn 
said, '' I have sunk my fortune and family .£20,000 above 
my gains by land, to make and succeed this enterprise, 
which the loss of government will make one to me, and 
never count upon the money owing from the Crown to 
my father, that was at the bottom the consideration of the 
grant." And it does appear a gross violation of property 
and ingratitude to private initiative and capital for the 
state to step in and deprive the patentees, on ex parte 
evidence, of the rights of government without proper com- 
pensation.^^ It is true the bill to vacate the charters guar- 
anteed to the patentees the rights to the land, but they 
held that the land was worth naught to them without gov- 
ernmental powers. The whole matter serves to ilkistrate 
the want of a proper appreciation and consideration of 
colonial interests which characterized so much of imperial 
administration during the eighteenth century, and which 
contributed in no small degree to the severing of the 
Empire. 

On Penn's arrival in England he laid before the Earl 
of Manchester, secretary of state, some proposals to be 

59 Jeremiah Dummer wrote in 1715 at the time of an attack on 
the charters; "It seems therefore a Severity without a Precedent 
that a People who have the misfortune of being a Thousand Leagues 
distant from their Sovereign, . . . should Unsummon'd, un- 
heard, in one day be deprived of all their valuable Privileges, 
whicli they and their Fathers have enjoy'd for near a Hundred 
Years." Defence of the Charters (London, 1721). 



350 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

framed into a bill designed to give the English government 
those powers necessary to carry out imperial measures.^^ 
He proposed that the military powers in the charters 
should be reunited to the crown, that the commander-in- 
chief appointed by royal authority should be empowered 
to superintend the customs service and vice-admiralty 
courts, that judicial proceedings should run in the king's 
name, and that the crown should enjoy a veto power on 
all colonial legislation and the right to hear appeals in 
all causes involving the sum of £300 or over. Such a 
measure would have imposed serious limitations on the 
powers of government delegated by the charters, but it 
had the virtue of saving to the colonies the rights of gov- 
ernment in distinctly local affairs. This was probably the 
point Penn had in mind in view of the bitter hostility of 
the Board of Trade to the charters. But the board re- 
jected the proposals as in no way contributing to the end 
of conserving the interests of the Empire and held that the 
former bill was the only proper measure.*'^ In February, 
1702, Henry Baker was directed by the secretary of state 
to act as solicitor for the second bill about to be brought 
into the House of Commons for vacating the charters.^- 
Into his hands were given all the papers in the office of 
the Board of Trade relating to the irregularities com- 
mitted in the chartered colonies. The untimely death of 
William III in March prevented further action and thus 
ended the parliamentary attacks on the charters for a few 
years. 

The troubles of Penn were not yet ended. In January, 
1702, he wrote from England to James Logan that '* Col. 

60 B. T. Paps., Props., VI, pt. 1, H 13; Penn Mss., Penn-Forhes 
Coll., II, 68. 

61 B. T. Jour., XIV, 335, 336; B. T. Paps., Props., Entry Bk. C, 
381, 383. 

62 B. T. Jour., XIV, 338. In Nov., 1702, another effort was made 
to introduce into Parliament a bill to vacate the charters. Ihid., 
XV, 288, 292-293 ; B. T. Paps., Props., VII, L 2. 



IMPERIAL CENTRALIZATION 351 

Quary comes on purpose to do us mischief, (sent for hence 
by the party), as well as to himself what good he can." ^^ 
Quary, responsible for so much vexation to Penn and the 
Quakers in the province, now hurried to England to press 
his complaints before the Board of Trade. In October, 
1701, Quary wrote to the board informing it of his inten- 
tion to sail shortly for home to present matters of im- 
portance with regard to Penn's dominions.''* "Wishing to 
anticipate Penn's influence, Quary asked that no action 
should be taken relative to Pennsylvania until he arrived. 
The board was complaisant.®^ Quary came armed with 
complaints, petitions, affidavits, and other papers which 
he submitted to the board on March 31, 1702.«« At the 
board's request these charges were abstracted in two me- 
morials of April 16 and 20 and sent to Penn for answer.®^ 
After Penn's replies were at hand, several hearings were 
granted to both sides when the whole series of charges 
were threshed out.'^^ It is interesting to note that at these 
hearings Randolph, Basse, and Bjrfield, the persistent ene- 
mies of the charters, were present at Quary 's request to 
substantiate his complaints.*'^ These memorials consisted 
of a curious pot-pourri of complaints, a mixture of 
strength and weakness; a few of them of considerable 
truth, the rest were a gross misrepresentation of the facts 
in the case. Many of the charges we have already dis- 
cussed in treating of the vice-admiralty courts, the affirma- 
tion, and defense. It seemed that Quary was guilty of 
seizing upon every chance irregularity and distorting it 

63 Penn-Logan Corres., I, 69. 

64 B. T. Paps., Props., VI, pt. 1, H 2. 

65 i?. T. Jour., XIV, 288. 
ealUd., XIV, 389-39L 

67 5. T. Paps., Props., VII, M 21; VI, pt. 2, I 17; Entry Bk. C, 
402, 403, 432-435. 

68 i?. T. Jour., XIV, 396, 403-404, 447-448; XV, 15, 27, 29-35, 
53-59, 66-69, 75-80. For Penn's replies see B. T. Paps., Props., 
VI, pt. 2, I 19, 20. 

69 J5. T. Jour., XIV, 419-420; XV, 26. 



352 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

into a serious charge against the government of the prov- 
ince. He accused Penn of restoring to office Anthony 
Morris, who had issued a writ to seize some goods out of 
the hands of the marshal of the admiralty court, but on the 
other hand Penn pointed out that Quary had deputized 
as judge of the court, David Lloyd, at whose instigation 
the writ was issued. To Quary it appeared that Penn's 
action was reprehensible, while his own was proper. 
Penn stood accused of invading the jurisdiction of the ad- 
miralty court by appointing water-bailiffs, but Penn was 
able to show that he was forced to do this because of the 
necessity of preserving peace during Quary 's absence on 
a trading expedition when no one was left to exercise the 
powers of the admiralty court. Furthermore, Penn's 
right to issue such commissions was upheld by the crown 
lawyers. Quary charged Penn with the dangerous prac- 
tice of inviting foreigners and hostile Indians to come 
to the province for the exclusive trading purposes of the 
proprietor. Penn replied that he had discouraged French- 
men employed by Quary from trading with the Indians. 
Other charges of a similar absurd character were made 
but in many cases Penn was able to show them to be mis- 
representations. With respect to the question of defense, 
Quary was on much stronger ground. That the provincial 
government had established no militia, provided no fortifica- 
tions and stores of war, and had refused to honor the 
royal requisitions were charges strongly entrenched in fact. 
Penn's reply that there was no need of defenses by sea 
because of the inland position of the province, or hj land 
because of the kindly policy toward the savages did not 
meet the needs of the general interests which required each 
colony to look to its own defense and to assist those in 
immediate danger from foreign invasion and Indian out- 
rage. 

At the close of the hearing on Quary 's charges, Ran- 
dolph came forward to take up the wager of battle against 



IMPERIAL CENTRALIZATION 353 

Penn.'^^ He again attacked Perm's claim to Delaware as 
illegal. He charged that Pennsylvania had levied a ton- 
nage duty prejudicial to English shipping; that a large 
illicit trade with Scotland was allowed; that during Penn's 
second visit to his colony, laws were passed repugnant to 
the acts of trade; that Penn and his deputy-governor, 
Markham, had appropriated to their own use the king's 
share of seizures and forfeitures, and that Markham had 
illegally imprisoned Randolph until he gave up several 
forfeited bonds. Then came the complaint of Gabriel 
Thomas, a tool in Quary's hands, that he had been reduced 
to poverty by the unjust conduct of Penn in a land transac- 
tion and craved the aid of the board in securing satisfac- 
tion."^^ "When called upon for an answer, Penn charac- 
terized Thomas as a base and beggarly man upon whom he 
was sorry to waste any time."^^ Although Thomas pressed 
his complaint several times the board ignored it."^^ Con- 
vinced of the partiality of the board in entertaining these 
unjust accusations, Penn resolved to carry his case to higher 
authorities.'^* On June 26 the Privy Council requested 
the board to wait upon it in regard to matters submitted 
by Penn."^^ The board attended and was informed of the 
charges made against it by Penn. He complained that the 
board had shown great partiality to Quary, had recom- 
mended his expenses to the treasury for reimbursement and 

70 B. T. Jour., XV, 90. 

71 B. T. Paps., Props., VI, pt. 2, K 33. Thomas confessed that he 
was under a bond of £1000 to appear on behalf of Quary against 
Penn before the Board of Trade; and he also said that Penn had 
threatened him with imprisonment unless he testified that Quary's 
accusation were false. 

t2iUd., K 37, 46. 

73lUd., VII, L 1, 4; B. r. Jour., XV, 307, 308. 

74 In August, 1702, Penn wrote that he had decided to appeal to 
the Privy Council where he thought his affairs more properly lay 
than with the Board of Trade " after the Partiality those Gentlemen 
but too plainly exprest in favor of the common enemy of our poor 
country." Amer. and W. I., 599 (Public Record Office, London). 

75 B. T. Jour., XV, 106-107. 



354 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

in other ways supported and favored him. Penn asked 
that Quary should be stopped in his return to the province 
until he had answered charges of a serious character against 
him.'*^ On the other hand, the board accused Penn of caus- 
ing unnecessary delays in the hearing although frequently 
requested to be prompt because of the need of Quary 's im- 
mediate return to his duties in the province J ^ The 
charges brought by Penn against his arch-enemy have been 
treated at length elsewhere. '^^ Using his office for personal 
advantage, lack of a knowledge of the civil law of which 
he was judge, and arbitrary conduct were charged against 
Quary. Some he denied, to others he confessed and Penn 
was able to secure his dismissal as judge of the admiralty 
court and the appointment of his own nominee. Penn's 
victory was empty, for in a few months the board secured 
not only Quary 's restoration to the court but his promotion 
to the post of surveyor-general left vacant by the death of 
Randolph in 1703. This recognition of Quary certainly 
implied a confidence in his integrity and his faithfulness 
on the part of the Board of Trade. It may hardly be said 
with truth that the partisan and partial methods followed 
by the home government in dealing with colonial affairs 
was well suited to the ordering of an Empire. 

Beset on all sides by a sea of difficulties, Penn sought 
to end his trials by giving up his powers of government. 

76 Quary petitioned the board for the reimbursement of his ex- 
penses, amounting to £300, incurred by his visit to England; that 
Penn'a. and Del. should be given royal government; and that care 
should be taken to guard him in the discharge of his duties from 
the threats and malice of Penn. The board wrote to the secretary 
of state asking that Quary's expenses should be reimbursed from 
the exchequer, that he be granted a royal letter of favor, and be 
appointed a member of the royal councils in N. Y., Va., and Md. 
B. T. Paps., Props., VI, pt. 2, K 3; Entry Bk. D, 53. 

77 The hearings had been postponed several times because of 
Penn's illness, but finally the board resolved to proceed without 
him if he did not appear when summoned. B. T. Jour., XV, 40, 
43, 44. 

78 See page 112. 



IMPERIAL CENTRALIZATION 355 

To this conclusion he was forced, not only by the enmity 
of the English officials, but by vexations in the province. 
Quary, Basse, Nicholson and others, backed by the Board 
of Trade, left no stone unturned to force an entrance for 
royal government. The intrigues of Basse in the Jerseys 
led the proprietors to surrender their powers of govern- 
ment to the crown in April, 1702.'^'^ Penn wrote to James 
Logan, ' ' the Jersey surrender is an ugly preface ; however 
there is a higher hand to which I look. " ^'^ In the prov- 
ince the Church party, under the leadership of Quary and 
Moore, were bitter in their opposition to the Quaker gov- 
ernment on the questions of defense and the affirmation. 
From Christ Church and Delaware came petitions to the 
crown complaining of the lack of protection and praying 
for royal control. The quarrel between the democratic 
assembly, under the leadership of David Lloyd, and the 
proprietary officials over questions of popular power and 
private interests bred keen factional feeling among Penn's 
own people. Logan wrote, '' Thy dispute at home, the war 
without defense here, with the example of the Jersey's 
surrendering, make this government too precarious to be 
called one . . . our circumstances are uneasy and re- 
quire a speedy redress. ' ' ^^ Logan counseled Penn to ex- 
tricate himself from his difficulties by yielding his powers 
of government to the crown. Even the Quakers, who sym- 
pathized with Penn, were indifferent on the question of 
surrender because they saw *' government so ill-fitted to 
their principles " ; all they asked was that ' ' they might 
not fall a spoil to such base hands that now seek our 
ruin. ' ' ^- There is little wonder that Penn wished to seek 
relief from the difficulties which threatened to engulf him. 
In May, 1703, he wrote to the Board of Trade, that ob- 
serving '^ your bent is extreamly strong to bring all pro- 

79 Kellogg, Amer. Col Charter, 235-239. 

80 Penn-Logan Corres., 1, 78. 

81 Ihid., I, 87, 121. 
82lUd., 147, 233-234. 



356 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

prietary Governments more immediately under the disposi- 
tion of the Crown. ... I thought it fit to let you know 
that upon a just regard for me and the people in our civil 
rights ... I shall upon satisfaction resigne to the 
Crowne the Government thereof. ' ' ^^ After the Queen had 
signified her willingness to treat with Penn, he presented to 
the board in June the conditions on w^iich he would surren- 
der his governmental powers.^* He asked that Pennsylvania 
and Delaware should continue as distinct provinces; that 
a patent should be granted to him and his heirs for the 
territory of Delaware; that the rights to the soil of Penn- 
sylvania and the powers incident thereto should be guar- 
anteed to him and his heirs ; that the crown should confirm 
the laws and constitutions of the province ; that no appeals 
involving under the sum of £200 should lie to the crown; 
and that he and his heirs should have the privilege of nomi- 
nating two or more persons for goveimor from whom the 
crown should appoint one. The latter was asked for the 
purpose of safeguarding the interests of the Quakers 
and to distinguish the Penn family as founders of 
the province. As a monetary consideration Penn asked 
£30,000 and a revenue of one-half penny a pound on 
all tobacco raised in the province, which he " hoped 
would not be thought hard " considering that he had 
spent £10,500 at the first settlement and twice as 
much since in supporting the government of a colony which 
now yielded so great a benefit to England. Penn esti- 
mated that, besides the exportation to England of many 
products needed there, the province had purchased English 
goods on which the customs revenue had increased from 
£1500 to £10,000 a year since the founding of the 
colony. Penn held that the government was the best 
part of the consideration in lieu of the royal debt to his 

83 B. T. Paps., Props., VII, L 28; B. T. Jour., XVI, 104. 

84 5. T. Paps., Props., VII, L 29, 35, 36; Entry Bk. D, 314, 320, 
321, 338; B. T. Jour., XVI, 119. 



IMPERIAL CENTRALIZATION 357 

father, since he had purchased the lands from the Indians. 
Early in July the board took these conditions into consid- 
eration and held them to be exorbitant.^^ To reserve to 
himself the right to nominate the governor was in effect 
to retain in his own hands the power of government. 
Penn, not unmindful of his co-religionists, insisted that a 
reservation of this power was necessary to guard the 
Quakers, who hazarded their lives and fortunes to settle 
the province, against the possible hardships which might 
otherwise be visited upon them because of their peculiar 
views on religion.*^ The board held that to require as a 
condition the royal confirmation of the colonial laws took 
from the crown the power which it now possessed under 
the charter of vetoing or confirming them. Looking at 
the matter from the standpoint of Penn and the Quakers 
the conditions do not seem unfair. It was but natural 
that Penn, who had sunk his fortune in the colony without 
any countervailing returns, ^^ and that the Quakers, who 
had risked their all to establish a home for themselves, 
should seek to secure a proper safeguard of their interests. 
It was but proper that the English government should offer 
due compensation to Penn and the Quakers for planting a 
colony which proved to be so advantageous to the com- 
merce of the metropolis. The failure to agree on condi- 
tions brought a suspension of negotiations. 

85 B. T. Jour., XVI, 170-171. The board reported to Parliament 
in 1703 that Penn's proposals were "esteemed very unreasonable, 
and thereupon pressed him to come to more moderate Terms." 
Bulletin W. Y. Puhlic Lib., Oct., 1907, XI, no. 10, 472. 

86 Logan wrote, "... remember the people thou brought 
hither from their native land," to which Penn made answer, " Fear 
not my bargain with the Crown, for it shall never be made without 
a security to the inhabitants, according to the constitution and 
laws of the country." Penn-Logan Corres., I, 245, 263. 

87 Penn probably felt as Camden wrote of the failure of Humphrey 
Gilbert, " that it is a difficulter thing to carry colonies into remote 
Countreys upon private mens Purses, than he and others in an 
erroneous Credulity had persuaded themselves, to their own Cost 
and Detriment." Camden, Hist, of Elizabeth, 287. 



358 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

In January, 1705, Penn reopened the question of sur- 
render. Penn became hopelessly involved in debt through 
the treachery of his stewards, the Fords. ^^ The province 
continued to be rent by the factional struggles of the 
Quaker and Church parties and by the proprietary and 
anti-proprietary parties. The hostility of the Board of 
Trade and the royal officials in the colonies had not abated. 
The Churchmen of the province besought Lord Cornbury, 
governor of New York, to use his good offices to secure 
royal control.^^ Chiefly because of Penn's load of debts 
and the insurgency in politics in the colony, Logan contin- 
ued to advise his chief to surrender his govemment.^'^ In 
December, 1704, Penn personally acquainted the board with 
his desire to renew the negotiations and expressed a willing- 
ness to waive his former demand to nominate the gov- 
ernor.^^ In the next month, at the board's request, Penn 
submitted new proposals in wnriting.^^ They embodied 
much the same conditions as before, except that Penn 
now omitted any mention of the power to name the gov- 
ernor, but asked that he and his heirs should be exempt 
from '' troublesome office and the Public Taxes " in the 
province. After some debate and correspondence the 
board apparently considered the conditions too high and 
took no further action.^^ Early in March Penn asked the 
board what it was he was expected to surrender. To this 
came the reply demanding an unconditional surrender of 
his powers of government, and the reservation to himself 
and heirs the rights to the soil and the powers and privi- 

89 Shepherd, Proprietary Gov't, in Pa., 183-190; Pcnn-Logan Car- 
res., I, 280, 351, 354; II, 19-20, 71, 95-96. 

89 Penn-Logan Corres., I, 223. 

90 76if/., I, 350, 362; II, 2-3, 25, 41. 

91 B. T. Jour., XVII, 221. 

62 5. T. Paps., Props., VIII, pt. 1, N 1. 

93lhid., N 1, nos. 2, 3; Entry Bk. E, 87, 89-90; B. T. Jour., XVII, 
223, 230, 233. 



IMPERIAL CENTRALIZATION 359 

leges incident thereto.®* In April the proprietor pre- 
sented new conditions upon which he was willing to sur- 
render his government.®^ These were laid before the 
board in a formal statement in May.®^ He asked the royal 
approval for the laws of the province which guaranteed 
to the inhabitiants a representative assembly elected an- 
nually, with power to make laws, levy taxes, and sit on its 
own adjournments; a guarantee that it shall not be in the 
power of the governor and assembly at any future time 
to abridge the law granting liberty of conscience or to sub- 
ject the Quakers to any fines or forfeitures by reason of 
their peculiar dress or carriage or to compel them to serve 
in the militia or to contribute to warlike charges. For 
himself and heirs he asked that the county of Bucks 
should be erected into a palatinate with all the powers 
and regalities exercised at any time in the County Pala- 
tine of Durham, that his rights to the soil of Pennsylvania 
and Delaware should be guaranteed, and that he and his 
family should be exempt from provincial taxes. After 
sitting twice in consideration of these conditions the board 
replied that it could not concur in them.®^ It said that 
Delaware could not be considered in the negotiations as 
it formed no part of the province under the charter; that 
the palatinate of Bucks would give to the proprietor 
greater powers than he now enjoyed by the royal charter; 
and that it could not agree to the stipulations with regard 
to liberty of conscience or to the confirmation of the laws 
until each one was considered in particular. When Penn 
pointed out that liberty of conscience was already provided 
for by the law of the colony, the board decided to examine 
at once into the laws before proceeding further in the mat- 

94 5. T. Paps., Props., Entry Bk. E, 131, 132; B. T. Jour., XVII, 
318. 

95 B. T. Jour., XVII, 370. 

QQlhid.. 373, 386, 388; B. T. Paps., Props., VIII, pt. 1, N 30. 
97 B. T. Jour., XVII, 392, 398, 401. 



360 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1705 

ter of surrender. Although Penn entreated the board to 
proceed in the business of surrender and laid before it 
several new papers of conditions, no further action was 
taken. ^^ The board was again busily engaged in prepara- 
tion for another attack upon the charters. As a result not 
only were the laws granting freedom of worship and the 
use of the affirmation by the Quakers disallowed by the 
crown,^^ but the charters were again put in jeopardy by 
Parliament. 

Cornbury and Dudley, governors of New York and Mas- 
sachusetts respectively, were now the aggressors against 
the charters. Especially singled out for attack were the 
colonies of Ehode Island and Connecticut. Opposition to 
the admiralty courts, refusal to allow appeals to the Privy 
Council, illegal trade, piracy, lack of defenses, refusal to 
obey the royal requisitions for war, opposition to the royal 
commissions to command their militia, and a general tend- 
ency to independence, formed the list of familiar accusa- 
tions.^^° "With implicit confidence in these charges the 
Tory ministry and board again decided on parliamentary 
action.^^^ In February, 1706, Blathwayt, a member of the 
board and patron of Dudley, introduced into the House of 
Commons, at the direction of the crown, a bill to vest the 
powers of government in the chartered colonies in the 
crown.^^- The measure did not pass beyond the first read- 
ing. Whig influence in Parliament was now in the as- 
cendant and Whig regard for property and vested inter- 
ests probably accounts in part for the failure to overthrow 

98 B. T. Jour., XVII, 414; XVIII, 40, 53, 57, 93, 97, 99-100, 106; 
B. T. Paps., Props., VIII, pt. 1, N 32, 42. 

99 See pages 233, 243. 

100 5, T. Paps., Props., VIII, pt. 1, N 23, O 9-12, 19; VIII, pt. 2, 
38-47; N. Y. Col. Docs., IV, 1058, 1061, 1070, 1079. 

1015. T. Paps., Props., Entry Bk. E, 238; B. T. Jour., XVIII, 
160, 163, 165; No. Car. Col. Recs., I, 630-633; R. I. Col. Recs., IV, 
12-15. 

102 B. T. Paps., Props., VIII, pt. 2, O 30; Entry Bk. E, 324; 
B. T. Jour., XVIII, 219; House of Commons Jour., XV, 168. 



IMPERIAL CENTRALIZATION 361 

the charters. Then again the influence of the proprietors 
and colonial agents, especially Ashnrst, agent for Connecti- 
cut and a prominent Whig, was sufficient to check final ac- 
tion.^^^ In 1707 the membership of the Board of Trade 
was changed from a Tory to a Whig personnel and the 
charters were in no further danger till the Tories returned 
to power in 1710. 

Meanwhile, Penn's difficulties increased, his load of debts 
grew heavier, the factional struggles grew more bitter, and 
Logan urged the proprietor to resume negotiations for sur- 
render.^^* In January, 1707, Penn besought the Board of 
Trade to proceed upon his proposals.^^^ The conditions of 
1705 were submitted as a basis. In February the board 
reported on them to the Earl of Sutherland, secretary of 
state.^^^ The report pointed out the advantages of royal 
control ; it would conduce to the support of the royal pre- 
rogative, a more impartial administration of justice where 
so many different religious sects were concerned, and 
would afford the crown a better opportunity to administer 
the laws of trade and provide for defense. But as to the 
conditions of surrender the report gave the opinion that it 
should be absolute and unconditional, including a renuncia- 
tion of all claims to the powers of government in Pennsyl- 
vania and Delaware. But out of regard for Penn's claim 
upon the crown by reason of the royal debt to his father, 
and in consideration of the proprietor's vast outlay in 
founding a colony which yielded him no profitable returns, 
but proved so advantageous to the revenue and commerce 
of the metropolis, the report recommended that Penn 

103 Ashurst wrote to his government, "... I made such in- 
terest against it with some of the leading men of the House so 
that it was thrown out at the first reading. I have the vanity to 
say that if you had not employed me you would have been in a 
sad condition this day." Mass. Hist. Soc, Coll., sixth ser., Ill, 384, 

104: Penn-Logan Corres., II, 139, 146, 156, 167, 179. 

105 5. T. Jour., XIX, 53; B. T. Paps., Props., VIII, pt. 2, 87. 

106 5. T. Jour., XIX, 55, 57; B. T. Paps., Props., Entry Bk. E, 
439-442. 



362 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

should receive an equitable compensation/*^^ The report 
was referred to the Lords of the Treasury to fix upon the 
quantum/^^ The treasury board referred the report back 
to the Board of Trade to agree upon the compensation, on 
the ^ound that the board's knowledge of conditions made 
it a better judge of the matter. From the nature of the 
queries sent to Penn by the board it is evident that the 
crown did not wish to assume the power of government 
without counting the costs of supporting it. Penn was 
asked to state not only what amount he expended in found- 
ing the colony and what compensation he expected, but also 
what revenue the land yielded, what the charges of govern- 
ment were, and what revenue was settled for its support.^ ^'^ 
Penn replied indignantly that his profits from the land 
had nothing to do with the case, since his government was 
the only matter in consideration. In regard to the charges 
of government he could not give the exact amount, but 
stated that by the law of 1706 the assembly made provi- 
sion for its support for three years. As to compensation, 
Penn now asked £20,000.^^^ But the negotiations went 
no further for several years. 

Penn's cup of sadness was now filled to overflowing. 
The Fords sued Penn for debt, the court cast the verdict 
against him and the doors of a debtor's prison closed about 
the great Quaker.^^^ In October, 1708, Penn mortgaged 



107 Foi^ the period 1698-1704, imports of English and foreign 
goods to the colony amounted to £79,657; and exports to England 
equaled £23,043. B. T. Paps., Props., VIII, pt. 2, O 99, 100. 

108 5. T. Jour., XIX, 109; B. T. Paps., Props., Entry Bk. E, 439, 
460. 

109 5. T. Jour., XIX, 155; B. T. Paps., Props., Entry Bk. E, 472. 

110 5. T. Jour., XIX, 290; B. T. Paps., Props., IX, P 8; Entry 
Bk. F, 10-12. 

111 Shepherd, Proprietary Gov't, in Pa., 194-195; Penn-Logan 
Corres., II, 237, 251, 255. For aU) account of Penn's financial 
perplexities with the Fords see the statements in Clarendon Mss., 
102, f. 160; Rawlinson Mss., D, 923, f. 276. (Bodleian Lib., 
Oxford). 



IMPERIAL CENTRALIZATION 363 

his province and liquidated the Ford debt.^^^ Although 
eased in finances, his difficulties in the province increased. 
Outrages in Delaware on the part of Maryland were nu- 
merous. The people of Delaware, impatient of proprietary 
rule, questioned Penn's right to the government, com- 
plained of the lack of defenses, and threatened to appeal 
to the crown.^^^ The turbulent democracy under Lloyd 
tried to throw the province into confusion in order to se- 
cure royal control.^^* The refusal of the Quaker assembly 
to aid in the expedition against Canada and to provide 
protection against the French and Spanish privateers 
brought upon it the bitter invectives of those who demanded 
defense. ^^^ Isaac Norris wrote to Penn that the lack of 
defense '*' will give the government a severe jostle, if not 
quite cost it," and expressed a fear that " it must be a 
governor immediately from the Crown that must set us to 
rights. "^^^ In July, 1710, Penn renewed his proposals.^^^ 
The Board of Trade again examined into the matter and 
made its report in February, 1711, expressing the same 
opinions as made in the representation of 1707.^^^ In Feb- 
ruary, 1712, Penn's proposals were subject to the examina- 
tion of the attorney-general.^^^ Before him Penn appeared 
and made out his title to Delaware and a deed of surrender 
w^as dra.wn up. The question of compensation was referred 
to the Lord High Treasurer. When Penn had satisfied 
him that the assembly had made suitable provision 
for the support of the government, it was agreed that the 

112 Shepherd, op. cit. 196-198; B. T. Paps., Props., X, pt. 2, Q 207. 

113 Shepherd, op cit. 131; Penn-Logan Corres., II, 303, 311, 324- 
325, 326, 334. 

114 Penn-Logan Corres., II, 337. 

115 lUd., 347. 

ii-QlUd., 348, 351, 356, 357, 421, 423, 435. 

117 B. T. Jour., XXII, 89, 93; B. T. Paps., Props., IX, P 100; 
Entry Bk. F, 225-229. 

lis 5. T. Jour., XXII, 216, 222; B. T. Paps., Props., Entry Bk. F, 
254-261. 

119 B. T, Paps., Props., Entry Bk. F, 466-468. 



364 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

proprietor should receive £12,000 payable in four years.^-'' 
The deed of surrender stipulated that Penn, his heirs, and 
assigns should yield to the crown all title to the govern- 
ment, civil and military, reserving to himself and heirs 
all rights to the soil and the jurisdictions incident thereto 
provided in the charter, and that nothing in the deed 
should be construed to abridge the laws or acts of the gov- 
ernment passed prior to the consummation of the surrender 
and not disallowed by the crown/-^ On March 12, 1712, 
Penn received from the treasury £1000 on account before 
the deed was formally executed/^^ Soon after this Penn 
was stricken down with apoplexy w^hich rendered him in- 
capable of further business and thus through accident alone 
did the province of Pennsylvania remain a chartered col- 
ony.^^^ In 1714 the crown made an effort to perfect the 
deed by act of Parliament, but no action was taken be- 
cause of the unsettled differences between the mortgagees 
of the province and the Penn heirs.^-* 

The Tories returned to power in 1710 and again the 
representatives of the chartered colonies were alarmed. 
In July, 1712, Penn informed Logan that " you will find 
all the charters and proprietary governments annexed to 
the Crown by act of Parliament next session." ^^^ It was 
the purpose of Henry St. John, secretary of state, to place 
all the colonies under a uniform system of control by the 
home government.^-*^ In 1713 Jeremiah Dummer, agent 
for Connecticut, informed the governor of designs upon the 
charter. Alarmed by this news, the Connecticut govern- 
ment resolved to cooperate with Ehode Island and Massa- 

120 Cal Treas. Paps., 1708-1714, 360; B. T. Paps., Props., X, 
pt. 1, Q 53. 

121 Penn Mss., Penn-Forhes Coll., I, flf. 13-14. 

122 Cal. Treas. Paps., 1708-1714, 360, 428; 1720-1728, 14; B. T. 
Paps., Props., X, pt. 2, Q 208. 

123 Janney, Life of Penn, 538-542. 

124 See page 142 ff. 

125 Janney, Life of Penn, 538. 

126 N. Y. Col. Docs., V, 255-256. 



IMPERIAL CENTRALIZATION 3G5 

chusetts in defense of their patents, — a premonition of the 
method used by the colonies in 1765 to defend their rights 
of self-government against English interference.^-"^ The 
Tory ministry remained inactive in this policy and the ac- 
cession of the Whigs to power in 1714 under the House of 
Hanover freed the charters from serious danger. 

It is evident from the foregoing account that the policy 
of vacating the charters and of strengthening English au- 
thority came from a small group of active men in the colo- 
nial service, — Randolph, Nicholson, Quary, Basse, Corn- 
bury, Dudley, and a number of lesser lights. These men, 
backed by the Board of Trade, originated much of the colo- 
nial policy of the period of 1696-1714. One is impressed, 
as the records make clear, with the unwearied efforts of 
these officials, not only to support royal authority and im- 
perial interests, but also to advance the cause of the Eng- 
lish Church in the colonies. Randolph, the chief of them, 
said ' ' 'tis my only design in this, and all other my publick 
services, that His Majesties interests and the Acts of Trade 
be inviolably maintained and supported in His Majesties 
plantations, by all persons concerned." His career as a 
royal customs official to the year of his death bears ample 
mtness to the truth of this spirit. In the colonies he left 
nothing undone and spared no pains to secure a proper 
administration of the acts of trade. At home it was his 
official experience, his evidence, and untiring efforts which 
were largely responsible for the attacks on the charters 
and the policy of centralizing colonial control. Of much 
the same type, but in some cases of inferior ability, were 
the rest of this group. At home they were relied upon as 
faithful officials, frequently consulted by the Board of 
Trade, the Commissioners of the Customs, and Parliament, 
full credence given to their reports, and indeed much of 
the official action of the English government was based 
upon their recommendations. But in the colonies they 

127 R, J. Col. Recs., IV, 410', 414. 



366 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

were regarded with feelings of intense hatred. Their 
ceaseless hostility to the charters, their meddlesome activity 
in internal affairs embittered the hearts of the colonists 
against them. Their devoted (support of the Anglican 
Church brought upon them the denunciations of the dis- 
senters, Puritans and Quakers. There is much evidence 
to justify the attitude of the colonists toward them. The 
records indicate that they were ofttimes arbitrary in their 
dealings with the people, void of tact, over-zealous in the 
enforcement of their royal powers, and wanting in a proper 
appreciation of the needs and circumstances of the col- 
onists. The enforcement and adjustment of an economic 
and administrative system which was not of the colonists, 
own choosing nor the resultant of colonial needs and de- 
sires called for the highest and best type of official. Many 
of England's agents in all branches of the colonial service 
during this period in no way measured up to this standard. 
Too often they were merely placemen, dependent upon the 
pickings of office for support, defective in character, of a 
narrow cast of mind, and too often led by a blind devotion 
to the imperial system into arbitrary and unwarranted 
assumptions of power. Randolph was accused by the 
agents of Massachusetts and Pennsylvania and by Sir 
Lionel Copley, governor of royal Maryland, of arbitrary 
conduct toward the local magistrates, of prosecuting al- 
leged illegal traders on insufficient evidence, and of corrupt 
practices.^2^ In former pages we have dealt at length 
with the career of Robert Quary in Pennsylvania, and his 
'^ vice-regent in mischief," John Moore. They confessed 

128 B. T. Paps., Props., II, B 18; Cal. State Paps., Col, 1689- 
1692, 287-288. Copley and the council of Md. wrote that Randolph 
prosecuted vessels for illegal trade " on the bare account of what 
he calls New England rogues and pitiful damned Scotch pedlars," 
and by his arbitrary actions " has done here what he has done 
elsewhere — made the country weary of him." Cal. State Paps., 
Col, 1689-1692, 679, 750; see also, ihid., 1693-1696, 80, 110. See 
Osgood's characterization of Randolph, Amer. Cols., Ill, 379-380; 
also Channing, Hist, of U. S., II, 259-262. 



IMPERIAL CENTRALIZATION 367 

to an ignorance of the civil law which they were called 
upon to administer, they used their offices for personal 
advantage, they espoused the cause of Delaware in the con- 
troversy with Pennsylvania, and under their leadership 
the Churchmen of the province sought to discredit the 
Quaker government in the hope of securing royal control. 
Basse, who played the role of intriguer in New Jersey, 
was of the same arbitrary character.^-^ By the use of un- 
fair means he stirred up confusion in the Jerseys and 
forced the proprietors to surrender their governmental 
powers to the crown, and his later career as a royal official 
attests to the same sort of conduct.^^*^ The profligate ca- 
reer of Lord Cornbury, royal governor of New York and 
New Jersey, stands as a severe indictment of the English 
civil service. ^^^ Even Nicholson stood charged with se- 
rious offenses by the royal council of Virginia, and with 
insolent behavior toward some of the chartered govern- 
ments.^^^ Such in general was the character of the men 
on whose word and evidence the home government was 
content to rely with confidence. The frequent and volumi- 
nous letters of these royal appointees to the home govern- 
ment fail to reveal but little sympathy with the colonists 
and but little evidence of a proper understanding of colo- 

129 Hunter, governor of N. J., wrote to the Board of Trade in 
1711, saying that "Mr. Bass, the present Secretary being so ob- 
noxious a man and indeed infamous that I cannot believe her 
Majty. will be induct to keep him there after the representations 
I have made agt. him." N. Y. Col. Docs., V, 256. See also N. J. 
Archives, TV, 139, 172, 209 for further complaints against Basse. 
Bellomont, gov. of N. Y. characterized Basse as a man " puff' d 
up and exalted with vanity, that he was unsupportable to every- 
body," accused him of being a greater liar than Fletcher, a cor- 
morant in eating and drinking, and by his meanness and immorality 
made the people of N. J. tired of him. Bellomont to Penn, June 21, 
1698, Penn Mss., Penn-Forhes Coll., II. 

130 Kellogg, imer. Col. Charter, 238-239 ; Tanner, Province of 
N. J., Columbia College Studies, XXX, 93, 170, 176, 190, passim. 

131 Tanner, op. cit., 140-141, 168-180; Spencer, Phases of Royal 
Gov't, in N. Y., 10, 12-13. 

132 See page 237. 



368 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1 705 

nial conditions. On the one hand, such a type of official 
was not of the proper sort to adjust the imperial system 
to colonial needs or to strengthen the ties which held the 
mother country and dependencies together. On the other 
hand, the reliance of the central authorities on the biased 
evidence of the colonial officials did not conduce to a wise 
and rational management of colonial business.^^^ The fail- 
ure of the imperial government to appoint to the colonial 
service men of merit and to organize the colonial office at 
home with the purpose of securing an intelligent adminis- 
tration of colonial affairs goes far to account for the de- 
velopment of inharmonious relations between the two parts 
of the Empire. 

The accession of the House of Hanover in 1714 witnessed 
a change in the attitude toward the charters and to colo- 
nial concerns in general. During the previous period the 
colonists found themselves on the defensive because of the 
attempts to centralize control. In the next period this 
policy was less persistently followed and the charters were 
freed from pressure. Several factors combined to effect 
this change of attitude. Not the least of these was the 
passing of the royal officials of the earlier period from the 
scene of activity. The careers of Randolph and Quary 
had been stayed by the hand of death. The profligate 
conduct of Cornbury brought about his dismissal as gov- 
ernor. The influence of Nicholson and Dudley was on the 
wane. Then again, the former active Board of Trade had 
grown lax in its duties and had deteriorated in personnel 
under the baneful influence of the corrupt patronage sys- 
tem in English politics of the era of Walpole and New- 
castle. Furthermore, in the province of war and religion 
the colonists found themselves free from vexation. The 

133 To support a list of charges against Rhode Island, Dudley 
sent home the affidavits of four men; Paul, his son, Nathaniel By- 
field, and James Menzies, royal agents and tools of Dudley, and 
Nathaniel Coddington, a man with a grievance against the colony. 
B. T. Paps., Props., VIII, pt. 2, O 10-12. 



IMPERIAL CENTRALIZATION 369 

Treaty of Utrecht of 1713 brought twenty-five years of peace 
and the problem of defense had fallen into the background. 
Henry Compton, the zealous bishop of London, was dead, 
the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel was less 
active, the Whig regime was favorable to dissent, and the 
Puritans and Quakers were freed from the pressure of the 
English Church. It was during this period of freedom 
from rigorous imperial control that the colonists became the 
aggressors and made rapid strides in curtailing and ab- 
sorbing the powers of the proprietary and royal officials. 
Yet it must not be presumed that the English authorities 
both at home and in the colonies were oblivious to the de- 
fects in the system of colonial administration. We have 
seen that they tried to reorganize the Board of Trade in 
order to give it greater powers and to centralize colonial 
management at home. As far as the colonies were con- 
cerned they continued to point out the necessity of vacating 
the charters. In 1715 the conditions of anarchy in the 
Carolinas, due to the inefficient administration of the board 
of proprietors, led to the bill in Parliament to vacate all 
the charters, but the influence of the proprietary interests 
checked the measure. ^^* But in 1720 the crown took ac- 
tion in the case of South Carolina by establishing royal 
government.^^^ In 1719 the Board of Trade, aroused by 
the irregular way in which Pennsylvania submitted its 
laws to the home government, urged the Privy Council 
to vacate the charters. Again in the oft-quoted report of 
1721 the board detailed fully the abuses practiced in the 
chartered colonies and advised that the powers of govern- 
ment should be reunited to the crown.^^« This plan not 
only contemplated the vacation of the charters, but went 
further in proposing the appointment of a governor-gen- 

134 Kellogg, Amer. Col. Charter, 308-310. 

135 Smith, So. Car. as a Royal Province, 11-14; McCrady, So. 
Car. under Royal Gov't., chs. i, ii. 

136 N. Y. Col. Docs., V, 591-629; B. T. Paps., PL Gen., Entry Bk. 
E, 286 ff. 



370 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

eral over all the colonies, — an approximation of the French 
system in Canada or the old Andros regime. This plan 
was supported by the Earl of Stair and by Martin Bladen, 
an active member of the Board of Trade. ^^^ The board 
continued to take advantage of every opportunity to urge 
upon the ministry or Parliament the necessity of curtailing 
the powers of the chartered colonies. In 1723, at the sanc- 
tion of the crown, the board sought to induce the colonies 
of Rhode Island and Connecticut to submit voluntarily to 
royal government, but in plain terms they refused to yield 
to the suggestion.^^^ In the case of the Carolinas the 
crown was more fortunate. In 1729 the proprietors, 
weary with the expense and trouble of governing turbulent 
colonies, sold their interests to the crown for £25,000.^^^ 
In 1731 the board suggested to the crown that Connecticut 
should receive an explanatory charter placing it in the re- 
lations which Massachusetts held to the crown. The col- 
ony turned a deaf ear to the proposal. ^*^ Neither Con- 
necticut or the proprietors of Pennsylvania would willingly 
permit their affairs to be brought to the attention of Par- 
liament for fear that such a step would endanger their 
charters.^*^ They had reason to feel apprehension.^*^ 

137 ]Vo. Car. Col. Recs., II, 625 ff.; King's Mss., 205, f. 972 (Brit- 
ish Museum ) , quoted in full in Carson, Anniv. Hist, of Const, of 
U. 8., II, 460-464. Golden of N. Y. is authority for the statement 
that the English ministry in 1723 planned to send the Earl of 
Stair to America as governor-general over all the colonies, but that 
the want of a monetary support prevented the execution of the 
scheme. Franklin, Works (Smyth ed.). Ill, 201. 

138 Kellogg, Amer. Col. Charter, 313-314; Acts of Privy Council, 
Col, III, 11. 

139 Kellogg, op. cit., 246-250. 

i^oTalcott Papers, Gonn. Hist. Soc, Coll., I, 175-176; 232; II, 
435-436 ; Andrews, Conn. Intestacy Laiv, Yale Review, Nov., 1894, 
288-292. 

141 See page 134. 

142 Partridge, agent for Rhode Island, wrote to his government 
in 1732, "... the Lords of Trade I doubt not are glad of any 
opportunity to laj^ hold of an advantage against the Charter Gov- 
ernmts. that if possible they may be resumed to the Grown, for I 



IMPERIAL CENTRALIZATION 37 1 

The reports of 1732 and 1734 from the board to Parliament 
complained that Connecticut and Rhode Island sent no 
laws to the crown and that Pennsylvania and Massachu- 
setts submitted theirs very irregularly/*^ This led to the 
bill of 1734 which proposed that each colony should sub- 
mit its laws to the crown within a year after enactment 
and that no law, except in extreme cases, should become 
operative till the royal sanction was given. In 1744 and 
1748, because of disobedience to royal orders, it was pro- 
posed to give royal instructions the force of law. But just 
as often as these measures were recommended, so often 
Parliament failed to act upon them. The fact is that Par- 
liament proved to be a better friend of the colonies than 
the Board of Trade. Yet this period, especially after 1730, 
marks the beginning of a more active parliamentary in- 
fluence in colonial management. The regime of Walpole 
and Newcastle witnessed the gradual transfer of colonial 
administration from the king in council to Parliament 
acting through various administrative boards. This is 
seen in the several addresses to the crown calling for re- 
ports on colonial laws, trade, finances and manufactures. 
Positive action was taken in the interests of the English 
industrial and trading classes; such as the Hat Act of 
1732 and the Iron Act of 1750, the Molasses Act of 1733, 
the address of 1740 to the crown forbidding colonial 
governors to assent to the issue of bills of credit without 
the suspending clause, the act of 1741 against the Massa- 
chusetts Land Bank, the Currency Act of 1751, and the 
act of 1732 to protect English merchants in the collection 
of colonial debts. This increased display of interest and 
activity of the imperial legislature in colonial concerns 
foreshadowed the action of that body after 1763 which 

don't take them to be Friends to our Northern Colonies." Kimball, 
Corres. of Govs, of R. L, 1, 30. 

lis For the report of 1734, see Talcott Papers, Conn. Hist. Soc, 
Coll., II, 445-462. 



372 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-17G5 

raised the fundamental question of the relations between 
Parliament and the colonies and caused the disruption of 
the Empire. 

On the other hand much of the pressure against the 
charters came from the colonists themselves. Those who 
attacked the charters in the interest of royal government 
were actuated by various motives. The Churchmen in 
Pennsylvania and other chartered colonies desired crown 
government in the interests of the English Church.^** 
Others petitioned for a change of government because of the 
inefficiency of proprietary rule. The conditions of confu- 
sion in the Jerseys led the people to ask for royal govern- 
ment and the proprietors yielded in 1702.^'*^ The people of 
South Carolina, a prey to incompetent proprietary rule, 
overthrew the government which led to crown control in 
1720. Still another group protested against what they con- 
sidered the arbitrary character of proprietary government. 
In 168C' a body of Protestant insurgents, out of sympathy 
with the narrow Catholic official system in Maryland, de- 
stroyed the government of Lord Baltimore and offered the 
province to the crown.^**^ In Pennsylvania during the 
eighteenth century the assembly, which reflected demo- 
cratic sentiments and which stood for self-government, 
found itself hedged about by proprietary authority 
Hardly had the province been settled when there developed 
a bitter conflict between the assembly and the proprietary 
officials over questions of finance and government. Au 
tonomous government w^as out of the question if the will 
of the assembly could be thwarted by the governor acting 
under proprietary instructions and caring rather for the 
landed interests of the Penns than the welfare of the peo- 
ple. The struggle waged about the questions of paper cur- 
rency and the taxation of the Penn estates. Each dispute 

144 Kellogg, Amer. Col Charter, 291-298. 

145 A^ /. Archives, II, 322-327, 380-384, 394. 

146 Osgood, Amer. Cols., Ill, 495-499. 



IMPERIAL CENTRALIZATION 373 

involved the question of political power. If the proprie- 
tors could determine by instructions the financial policy 
of the province, the assembly was reduced to a subordinate 
position. Such was not the case in the corporate colonies 
where by charter the assembly was the central and con- 
trolling organ of government. It was this position which 
the assemblies of the provinces sought to attain. Oft- 
times the proprietary governor was forced to submit to the 
will of the assembly in contravention of his instructions, 
but when this method failed a threat was made to appeal 
to the crown for a redress of grievances. The first con- 
certed effort to overthrow proprietary rule came in 1728-9. 
Sir William Keith, a political adventurer, took advantage 
of the quarrel between the governor and assembly over the 
issue of bills of credit to promote disturbance in order to 
secure royal interference and government. ^*^ Keith was 
probably actuated by a desire to secure a royal appoint- 
ment,^*^ but his plot w^as frustrated when the governor 
yielded to the wishes of the assembly. Again in 1741-2 
Governor Thomas and the assembly quarreled over a grant 
of supplies for the West Indian expedition. Thomas in- 
formed John Penn that the assembly " publickly avow 
their design to throw the Government into the hands of 
the Crown " and sought to create confusion '' as the most 
probable way of bringing it about. "^^^ John Penn wrote 
that he was " under no uneasiness about the Success of 

147 Penn Mss., Official Corres., Ill, Gov. Gordon to proprietors, 
Oct. 6, 1728; to John Penn, May 16, 1728. 

148 Keith, while governor of Pa., with singular duplicity, wrote to 
the Board of Trade in 1717 pointing out the advantages of con- 
solidating the colonies of Pa., Del., and West Jersey into one gov- 
ernment. B. T. Paps., Props., X, pt. 1, Q 140. In 1724 he sug- 
gested to the duke of Newcastle the advisability of perfecting the 
agreement with the Penn heirs in order to put the colony under 
royal government. Amer. and W. I., 28, f. 8. In 1736, Keith ap- 
plied for the post of lieutenant-governor of N. J. 2V". J. Archives, 
V, 446. 

149 Penn Mss., Official Corres., Ill, Gov. Thomas to John Penn, 
Nov. 4, 1740; March 25, 1741; June 4, 1742. 



374 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

their petition." ^^^ The fact is that the refusal of the as- 
embly to honor the royal requisition did not place it in a 
favorable position before the home government. The dis- 
pute between the two branches of government reached a 
crisis at the time of the French and Indian war over the 
question of taxing the Penn estates. Unable to compel the 
governor to break his instructions forbidding the taxation 
of the proprietary lands, the assembly sent Franldin to 
England in 1757 to secure a redress of grievances. The 
time seemed propitious for a change of government. 
Pennsylvania and Maryland were not in good repute be- 
cause of their inactivity during the war. Dinwiddle of 
Virginia repeatedly urged that these charters should be 
vacated. ^^^ Richard Partridge, agent for Rhode Island, 
wrote to the governor informing him of the '' satirical ex- 
pressions " hurled against the charters at the last session 
of Parliament, and added that it was not the first time 
'' harsh Things have been vehemently uttered before the 
Lords of Trade as well as in the House of Commons. ' ' ^^^ 
Such was the time when Franklin wrote from England to 
Isaac Norris suggesting that petitions from the people of 
Pennsylvania and Maryland expressing dislike for pro- 
prietary rule and praying for royal government would be 
favorably received.^^^ Franklin was not above the arts 
of the intriguer. He said " Tumults and Insurrections, 
that might prove the Proprietary government unable to 
preserve order, or show the People to be ungovernable, 
would do the business immediately." Such were the rep- 
rehensible means employed by Basse and Keith. Al- 
though the ministry had several times mentioned the ques- 
tion of a change of government to the Penns, yet there was 



150 Penn Mss., Letter Bk., I, John Penn to Gov. Thomas, Aug. 16, 
1742; 0-fJicial Corres., Ill, Thos. Penn to Paris, April 24, 1741. 

151 Dinwid die Corres., I, 142; II, 414-415, 418. 

152 Kimball, Corres. of Govs, of R. I., II, 140-141. 

153 Franklin, Works (Smyth ed.). Ill, 455, 472. 



IMPERIAL CENTRALIZATION 375 

no thought of forcing them.^^* The attitude of the home 
government had changed from one of hostility in the 
earlier period to one of support now. In 1760 the crown, 
at the recommendation of the Board of Trade, disallowed 
six laws protested by the Penns as prejudicial to their 
powers of government and landed interests. In conclud- 
ing this report, the board said that steps must be taken to 
curb the exorbitant demands of the assembly and uphold 
the royal prerogative vested in the proprietors by char- 
ter."^ 

The climax was reached in 1764 when Franklin again 
left for England bearing a petition from the assembly to 
the crown asking for royal government. In that year the 
assembly was forced to yield to the governor in a supply 
bill under stress of the Indian insurrection. In yielding, 
the assembly informed Governor John Penn that it had 
given up important rights and hoped that an " equitable 
government ... is not far distant " when the arbi- 
trary conduct of proprietary rule would be ended.^^^ In 
seeking a change of government, the members of the assem- 
bly, under the leadership of Franklin and Joseph Gallo- 
way, were not actuated by motives of zeal for the royal 
prerogative or imperial interests, but by the hope that 
royal government would free them from the evils of pro- 
prietary^ rule. This is evidenced by the introduction of the 
international dispute. When the assembly learned of the 
passage of the Sugar Act and the intention to levy a stamp 
tax, the house was inclined to proceed more cautiously in 
the matter. The aim of the assembly was freedom from 
any outside direction or interference whatever. Hence 

154 Penn Mss., Letter Bh., V, Thos. Penn to Gov. Hamilton, July 7, 
1757; to Logan, June 21, 1757; VI, to Gov. Hamilton, June 0, 1760. 

155 See page 156. 

156 Pa. Col. Recs., IX, 188; Franklin, Cool Thoughis on the 
Present Situation, Works (Smj'th ed.), IV, 226-240; Lincoln, Revolu- 
tionary Movement in Pa., 101-102; Shepherd, Proprietary Gov't, in 
Pa., 555-559, 562-564. 



376 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

the agent was instructed not to present the petition if 
upon careful inquiry and advice he had reason to fear that 
a change of government would mean the loss of the '' in- 
estimable Privileges, Civil and Keligious," which the peo- 
ple enjoyed under the present laws and constitution/^^ 
On the other hand, John Dickinson, a man of conservative 
temperament and sound judgment, pointed out the weak- 
ness in the position of the assembly.^^^ He was aware of 
the evils of proprietary government, but held it was better 
to bear those ills '' than fly to others we know not of." 
He pointed out in the first place, that the province was now 
under the ban of " royal and ministerial displeasure " be- 
cause of its course during the late war; a feeling which 
will be greatly heightened when the ministry learns of its 
'^ obstinacy and inactivity " during Pontiac's Conspiracy. 
In the second place, he said it was absurd to think 
that the crown would be disposed to grant the re- 
quest for a change of government which proceeded 
from the refusal of the assembly to abide by the 
agreement made between the crown and the agents of the as- 
sembly in 1760. Then again, he argued that it 
was better to preserve those privileges, civil and re- 
ligious, which the people now enjoy, than to have them 
'' consumed in a blaze of royal authority," especially at a 
time when the home government were designing the 
" strictest reformations " in the colonies. Finally, Dick- 
inson showed that royal government was not a " security 
for that tranquility and happiness we promise ourselves 
from a change," by pointing out the frequent and violent 
quarrels which have occurred between the royal governors 
and their assemblies. But no arguments could move the 
assembly and Franklin left for England with the petition 

157 Lincoln, op. cit., 129-130; Shepherd, op. cit., 567; Votes of 
Assemhly, V, 361; Penn Mss., Official Corres., IX, Wm. Allen to 
Thos. Penn, Sept. 25, 1764. 

158 Dickinson, Writings (Ford ed.), 21-60. 



IMPERIAL CENTRALIZATION 377 

in November, 1764. He did not present the application 
till a year later, because the colonial agents were busily 
engaged in trying to cheek the passage of the stamp 
bill.^^^ Dickinson was right when he said that instead of 
granting greater privileges the home government was bent 
on diminishing those the colonists possessed. In spite of 
the vigorous protests the Stamp Act was passed. "With its 
enactment the opposition to proprietary rule was gradually 
hushed.^^^ All factions united to protect the powers of 
self-government against the aggressions of the mother 
country. The levy of a direct tax by Parliament was a 
far more serious matter in the minds of the people of Penn- 
sylvania than the vexations of proprietary rule. 

159 Penn Mss., Letter Bk., VIII, Thos. Penn to Peters, Nov. 15, 
1765; to John Penn, Nov. 9, 1765; to Wm. Allen, March 8, Feb. 9, 
1765; to Wm. Peters, Feb., 1765; to Chew, Feb. 7, 1765. Thos. 
Penn wrote to John Penn, Nov. 30, 1765, " The petitions have 
been considered by the Kingf in Council, and resolved not to be 
proper for further consideration, but by his Majesty's order post- 
poned, sine die, that is (to use my Lord President's own ex- 
pression) forever and ever, ... we shall not have any further 
trouble about them, not any of the Council thought them proper 
to be referred to a Committee, as they prayed for a thing not in 
the King's power to grant nor in the least in his will, not giving 
any good reasons for their request." Penn Mss., Letter Bk., VIII, 
Thos. Penn wrote to Wm. Allen, Dec. 15, 1765, that not one of 
the council would consider the petition " for they were sure our 
fault was yielding too much to the Assembly." Letter Bk., VIII. 

1*50 John Penn wrote that " the People seem to have forgot 
former differences and are all united against the Stamp Act, that 
we shall not hear of their revival (i. e. of faction), especially as 
the petition for change of Government is laid aside," Penn Mss., 
Letter Bk., VIII, Thos. Penn to John Penn, Feb. 26, 1766; to Dr. 
Smith, April 1, 1766. 



CHAPTER TWELVE 

CONCLUSION 

In this work the relations between an individual colony 
and the dominant government have been closely examined 
with the purpose of elucidating the character of British 
colonial administration in the seventy years prior to 1765 ; 
it is now fitting to summarize the results of this inquiry. 

The central fact in the history of the imperial relation, 
running like a thread through the period, was the conflict 
between the interests and purposes of the imperial govern- 
ment and the colonists. The English theory of empire was 
primarily economic. A colonial policy was adopted, em- 
bodied in the acts of trade and navigation, which regulated 
the economic and political life of the colonies in the inter- 
est of a self-sufficient commercial empire. The enforce- 
ment of this policy required that the colonies should be 
strictly subordinate to the law and sovereignty of the 
mother country. The success of the policy implied a large 
measure of political and social unity between the province 
and metropolis, and a sense of pride in the empire on the 
part of the colonists. They did not exist. The motives 
which impelled William Penn and the Quakers to colonize 
in America were not imperial and commercial in character. 
They hoped to found a state based upon principles of reli- 
gious and political liberty which were not accepted by the 
dominant classes in England. Self-control and not Eng- 
lish control was the chief desire of the colonists. This 
pronounced spirit of separatism and individualism was in 
turn fostered by the leveling influences of a primitive 
frontier life which made for democracy and self-reliance. 
Moreover, the isolation of the province bred provincialism, 

378 



CONCLUSION 379 

and the thousand leases of ocean which lay between the 
colony and the center of authority and the difficult means 
of communication created a mutual failure of colonists 
and Englishmen at home to understand the needs and de- 
sires of each other, weakened the force of sovereign com- 
mands, and placed insuperable obstacles in the path of im- 
perial administration. In brief, differences in purpose, in 
economic needs, in social structure, and the consequent 
institutional divergences produced an antagonism between 
the colony and the mother country which constitutes the 
key-note of the imperial relation. Fundamentally, the 
question at issue was that of reconciling " tv/o very diffi- 
cult points, superiority in the presiding state, and freedom 
in the subordinate." The English colonial policy, based 
upon abstract and general principles from the point of 
view of the temper and genius of the colonist and his en- 
vironment, was in the nature of an experiment. 

Colonial and commercial expansion was not undertaken 
directly by the state, but was the result of private initia- 
tive. The instruments of empire building were the trading 
corporation and the proprietorship or fief, fashioned upon 
models hitherto limited in scope to England itself, but 
now adapted to new uses. By royal charter the crown 
granted to William Penn and his heirs liberal powers of 
government which they were required to exercise in har- 
mony with the law and sovereignty of England. But a 
feudal and provincial system did not harmonize with the 
desires of the people. In a series of constitutional con- 
flicts between the popular and prerogative elements in the 
constitution of the province, the government experienced a 
democratic transformation. The chief contests between the 
assembly, which stood for popular interests and power, and 
the governor, who represented the private interests and the 
prerogatives of the proprietors, surged about the question 
of taxation and expenditure of public funds, the regula- 
tion of the judiciary, the appointment of judges and other 



380 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

officers, the issue of paper currency, and proprietary in- 
structions, each of which involved the question of sover- 
eignty. The triumph of the assembly was facilitated by 
the liberal spirit of the first proprietor who identified him- 
self in a large measure with colonial tendencies. To a 
greater extent it was due to the isolated position of the 
Penns. Endowed with royal power, but possessed of none 
of the dignities of a Iring, they were compelled to yield in 
an unequal struggle to the superior strength of the forces 
of democracy. By the time of the Stamp Act Pennsyl- 
vania was de facto a self-governing colony of the modern 
type, in which the assembly enjoyed a position of political 
supremacy, controlling to a large degree the policy of the 
colony through its own laws and committees. In fact, 
within its sphere the legislature was scarcely less powerful 
than the British Parliament, claiming the same privileges 
which Parliament possessed and considering itself as 
clothed with a similar power and authority. The most 
convenient and effective weapon to effect this transforma- 
tion was the popular control of the finances, a control 
which formed the basis of autonomy and hence was 
guarded with unfaltering resolution against any outside 
interference, proprietary or imperial. In this contest for 
the mastery of government, the people insisted upon the 
principles of English common and statute law whicli g^iiar- 
anteed the liberty and rights of the subject against the 
arbitrary exercise of royal power. 

This advance toward independence involved also the 
power and authority of the central government and the 
interests of the Empire. It was found by experience that 
the power of government placed in the hands of private 
individuals was insufficient to check the forces of par- 
ticularism and to uphold imperial policies. The charters 
erected institutional barriers against an effective exercise 
of the sovereign will. The assembly availed itself of the 
incomplete provisions of the charter to disregard the royal 



CONCLUSION 381 

disallowance and it showed no hesitation in doing so when 
bent upon upholding the religious principles of the Quak- 
ers, the privileges of freemen, the regulation of the judi- 
ciary, and the issue of bills of credit. Moreover, by act 
of assembly and by process familiar to common law, the 
people thwarted the power and limited the jurisdiction 
of the royal vice-admiralty courts. Oaths, bonds, and 
royal confirmation required of the governors appointed by 
the proprietors did not insure a more effective enforce- 
ment of the acts of trade. From the standpoint of im- 
perial control the chartered colony was an anomaly and 
in the judgment of colonial administrators the substitu- 
tion of direct royal control was eminently necessary. In 
the two decades after 1696 several serious attempts were 
made to sweep away the charters by act of Parliament, 
but such measures failed to pass chiefly through the in- 
fluence of the representatives of chartered interests. 

The charters answered neither the purposes of the cen- 
tral government, nor met the demands of the colonists. 
The disparity of interests between the proprietors and 
the colonists provoked many protests against proprietary 
government. Loyalty to the charters was strong in the 
corporate colonies where the people possessed a system of 
complete self-government which harmonized with their de- 
sires. In the provinces much of the pressure against the 
charters came from the colonists themselves. In Maryland 
and South Carolina the people overthrew proprietary gov- 
ernment and in response to popular appeals, royal govern- 
ment was established. The proprietors of New Jersey sur- 
rendered their powers under pressure of popular discon- 
tent and English hostility. In Pennsylvania, Churchmen 
petitioned for royal government to protect their interests 
against Quaker domination and to advance the interests 
of the English Church, non-Quakers appealed for royal 
protection when military defenses were denied them by a 
Quaker assembly principled against war, and the assembly 



382 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1G96-1765 

itself, hampered in its contest for self-control by proprie- 
tary orders, appealed to the throne for redress. The 
Quakers themselves, finding that their principles were ill- 
suited to government, expressed a willingness to yield. 
Factional differences, financial distress, and the enmity of 
the home government to the charters, led Penn in 1703 to 
offer to surrender his powers of government to the crown. 
His demands of a monetary consideration and a guarantee 
of religious liberty to the Quakers proved too high, but 
under the stress of increasing difficulties they were abated 
and a treaty of surrender was drawn in 1712, only to fail 
of execution through the untimely physical disabilities of 
the great Quaker. In subsequent years colonial adminis- 
trators continued to direct the attention of Parliament to 
the ills of chartered government, but that body remained 
a friend of the charters till 1774. The assembly, on the 
other hand, continued to threaten to appeal to the crown 
for royal government, not out of regard for the interests 
of the Empire, but in the hope that thereby the colony 
would be freed from the ills of proprietary rule, but the 
crown reversed its former policy and showed a decided in- 
clination to uphold the proprietors in their powers of gov- 
ernment. 

The eighteenth century was preeminently the period of 
the royal province.^ The question naturally arises, was 
the substitution of the responsible agents of the crown for 
the officials of corporations and proprietors sufBcient to 
check the forces of independence and insure greater ad- 
ministrative efficiency. The history of the royal provinces 

1 Royal government was established ultimately in all the colonies 
except Rhode Island, Connecticut, Maryland, and Pennsylvania. 
Maryland was administered as a royal province from 1691 to 
1715, when the government was restored to the Protestant heir. 
Georgia was established as a chartered colony in 1732, but in 
1754, according to the terms of the charter, the government re- 
verted to the crown. 



CONCLUSION 383 

warrants the conclusion that direct crown control did not 
check violations of the laws of trade ^ and attacks upon 
the vice- admiralty courts, nor elicit greater obedience to 
the commands of the crown. With the vacation of the 
charters institutional barriers had been overcome, but nat- 
ural and social barriers remained to thwart the will of 
the imperial government. Distance, difficulties of com- 
munication, the isolation, strange environment, and indi- 
vidualism of the colonists precluded the possibility of ad- 
justing to the colonies a system of government not their 
own. But these factors do not account in full for the 
failure to enforce imperial policies. The evils of a cor- 
rupt patronage system, a low sense of public duty, and the 
vicissitudes of party and factional politics at home com- 
bined to impair the efficiency of colonial administration. 
These faults characterized not only colonial administration, 
but the entire English governmental system, particularly 
in the age of Walpole and Newcastle. In the selection of 
colonial administrators too frequently family and political 
influence were the chief considerations. Absenteeism in 
the customs service contributed to a lax enforcement of 
the acts of trade, lack of leadership accounts in large part 
for the failure of the expeditions against Quebec in 1711 
and Cartagena in 1740, and incompetency characterized 
appointments to other branches of the colonial service. 
In some cases the royal agents were unfaithful, using their 
powers for personal advantage. In other cases they were 
deficient in tact and a Imowledge of colonial conditions and 
hence were inclined to be arbitrary in the exercise of 

2 In 1701, Penn wrote " that being King's governments, the 
end proposed to prevent false trade, will not do it, and if so, the 
hardship is imposed in vain " ; and he pointed out that in spite 
of the vigilance and activity of the royal officials, " Maryland 
since a King's government was twenty times a greater sinner " 
than Pennsylvania under proprietary rule. Duke of Portland 
Mss., IV, 19-20, Hist. Mss., Com. Report 15, pt. 4. 



384 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

their functions. The failure of the crown to appoint uni- 
formly to the colonial service men of integrity, breadth of 
view, and experience goes far to account for the discontent 
with English rule.^ 

After all the fault was not so much with the men as 
the system they were called upon to administer. The 
neglect of the central government to create a permanent 
revenue to support the civil and military establishments in 
America invested the particularistic assemblies with the 
power to judge of the propriety and convenience of royal 
commands. The legislative control of the finances enabled 
the colonists to encroach upon the power of the royal 
agents and force them to submit to popular dictation.* 
The failure to define wdth certainty the power and juris- 
diction of the vice-admiralty courts left them subject to 
humiliating attack by the colonists. The convenience of 
the American coast-line made it impossible for customs 
officers to check illegal trade without the assistance of 
revenue cutters. The vicious fee system and the inade- 
quate compensation granted to customs and admiralty of- 
ficials tempted them either to collude with illicit traders 

8 Franklin justified the dependence of royal governors upon the 
assemblies for financial support on the ground that " they are 
generally strangers to the Provinces they are sent to govern, have 
no estate, natural connexion, or relation there; that they come 
only to make money as fast as they can; are sometimes men of 
vicious characters and broken fortunes, sent by a Minister to get 
them out of the way." Works (Smyth ed.),V, 83. Cf. Greene, 
Provincial Governor, 46-47, 172, 175, and Spencer, Constitutional 
Conflict in Mass., 78. 

4 Colden of New York wrote that the " unreasonable increase 
of popular power by which the Ballance of power essential to 
the English Constitution is destroy'd in the Colonies is wholly 
owing to the Governours having no subsistence but from the As- 
sembly. I can give several instances . . . where Governours 
have for several years stood firm to the Kings Instructions in 
Support of his prerogative & . . . after all were obliged to 
comply with the humours of the Assembly or starve or be sunk 
in debt." Keys, Cadivallader Colden, 235. Cf. N. Y. Col. Docs., 
IV, 1050; V, 805, 844, 887. 



CONCLUSION 385 

or to act arbitrarily against fair traders. Repeatedly and 
earnestly royal officials called the attention of the home 
government to these imperfections in the system of ad- 
ministration,^ but Parliament and the ministry seemed un- 
willing to adopt a policy of coercion.^ In the face of the 
determined resistance of the colonists to the authority of 
the imperial government, royal agents without support 
from home found it impossible to enforce their powers. 
Moreover, the lack of centralization and coordination in 
the system of administration at home and the subordinate 
position of the Board of Trade, the chief office concerned 
with colonial business, created delay, confusion, and fric- 
tion in imperial administration. Here again the crown 
was advised repeatedly to raise the Board of Trade to a 
position of ministerial executive authority in order to give 
American affairs the prompt and undivided attention de- 
manded by their importance and the remoteness of the 
colonies from London. Again the advice fell upon un- 
heeding ears. Moreover, the lack of an expert knowledge 
of colonial conditions and institutions on the part of Par- 
liament and administrators at home, the long drawn out 
delays in the transaction of colonial business, and the 
expense and labor connected therewith made the colonies 
reluctant to submit their affairs to the judgment of the 

5 Royal oflficials through the eighteenth century proposed with 
frequency the levy of a tax upon the colonists in order to sup- 
port the charges of royal government. Beer, British Colonial 
Policy, 1754-1765, 38-48; A^. Y. Col. Docs., VI, 268-269; No. Car. 
Col. Recs., II, 635. Quary wrote, " A Governor ought to have his 
support as well as dependence from the Crown, though at the same 
time the fund should come from the people, but by such means 
as ought first to settle it in the Crown." N. Y. Col. Docs., IV, 
1050. 

6 When the assemblies refused to grant the governors permanent 
salaries in response to royal commands, threats were usually made 
to appeal to Parliament to tax them, but such a policy was not 
resorted to till after 1763. Spencer, Constitutional Conflict in 
Mass., 70, 71, 75, 79, 84, 88; Beer, British Col. Policy, 1754-1765, 
37-38.' 



386 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1690-1765 

imperial government. The ignorance of colonial desires 
and tendencies made the action of a far distant government 
and its agents seem arbitrary and autocratic, and in con- 
sequence the colonists adopted an attitude of resentment 
toward English control. 

On the other hand, judged from the history of one 
colony it may be said in general that English control was 
not harsh or oppressive. In the consideration of the laws 
of the colony the Board of Trade did not act in an arbi- 
trary manner, but threw every safeguard about them and 
showed a desire to consult the convenience of the colony 
in most cases. For example, when the crown disallowed 
colonial laws granting the Quakers the privilege of using 
the affirmation in all cases, it was done not out of hostility 
to the Quakers, but in the interest of religious liberty and 
to prevent a miscarriage of justice. When such laws were 
modified to meet the objections, the Quakers were allowed 
the full use of the affirmation, although contrary to Eng- 
lish statute. Furthermore, the assembly was left in con- 
trol of the internal affairs of the colony and of taxation 
both for local and imperial purposes. This political free- 
dom was due partly to the charter and the defects in the 
system of colonial administration, and in part to the for- 
bearance of the home government. Parliament and the 
ministry were undoubtedly cognizant of the determined 
resistance of the colonies to the law and commands of the 
home government, but they were unwilling to interfere in 
colonial matters in the direction of greater centralization. 
Fortunately for the colonists the lack of vigor in English 
control, the cumbersome system of administration, and 
distance left them to develop their institutions in a normal 
and natural fashion and thereby royal and proprietary 
government was brought into harmony with actual condi- 
tions. 

In the matter of imperial defense the colonies fell far 
short of their duty. It is true that their trade was regu- 



CONCLUSION 387 

lated by imperial statute primarily in the interest of the 
wealth and strength of the mother country, but in return 
the colonists enjoyed many compensating advantages, not 
the least of which was protection. Protection on the high 
seas in that age of piracy and frequent international con- 
flict was borne entirely by the home government without 
expense to the colonies. Naval protection was absolutely 
necessary for the security of colonial commerce upon which 
their prosperity was founded. In addition, in time of 
w^ar in Europe English troops and money were employed 
to cooperate with the colonies in attacks upon French and 
Spanish strongholds in America. In the protection of the 
long and vulnerable frontier of the Empire the conduct 
of many of the colonies was deficient. In this respect the 
attitude of Pennsylvania was particularly offensive. The 
assembl}^, dominated by Quaker pacificists, failed to as- 
sume one of the most essential functions of government 
and hence was delinquent in duty, not only to the people 
of the colony, but to the neighboring colonies. Other colo- 
nies proved to be equally lacking in public spirit, although 
they wxre not vexed with Quaker domination. Distance, 
primitive methods of travel, and the little intercourse be- 
tween the colonies narrowed their experience and range of 
vision and made them indifferent to the remote dangers 
on the frontier. This was particularly true of the colonies 
between New York and the Carolinas whose frontiers were 
not immediately subject to the invasions of foreign troops 
and their savage allies. Moreover, the system of crown 
requisitions which called upon the colonies for men and 
supplies in time of war enabled the assembly to judge of 
the propriety of imperial measures according to local con- 
venience. In fact, the distribution of authority among co- 
ordinate bodies impaired the effectiveness of frontier de- 
fense. Between the colonies, planted at different times 
and working on separate lines, there was little community 
of interest, and in consequence disunion encouraged the 



388 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

French to attack the colonies.'^ The frontier problem cre- 
ated a desire for a union, but the intense antipathies cher- 
ished by one colony against another and their strong at- 
tachment to principles of self-government precluded the 
possibility of establishing a supreme and central authority 
demanded by the exigencies of defense. The indifference 
of the colonies and their failure to cooperate for defense 
led imperialists to propose that a union and taxation 
should be imposed by act of Parliament, but the home gov- 
ernment was unwilling to interfere. As a result many of 
the colonies fell far short of their abilities in time of im- 
perial war, and in time of peace forced the home govern- 
ment to garrison the frontier and thereby assume a re- 
sponsibility properly belonging to the local governments. 
The fifth decade of the century saw the beginning of a 
stricter control over the colonies and the renewal of war 
after a long period of peace and laissez-faire administra- 
tion. Under the presidency of Halifax the Board of Trade 
exhibited a new vigor and colonial administration was in 
some degree centralized in this office. Parliament re- 
strained the issue of bills of credit in New England and 
regulated their issue in other colonies in order to protect 
property and commerce against the evils of an unsound 
financial policy. The efforts to give royal instructions the 
force of law and to look to Parliament to curb the inde- 
pendence of the colonies are significant, not only of the 
helplessness of the royal prerogative to curb the colonies, 
but of the transition taking place in English constitutional 
development in the direction of parliamentary supremacy. 
But it was chiefly the problem of defense which demanded 
attention. The French and English realized that the 

7 A memorialist wrote in 1697, " The English colonies being 
planted at severall times and by distinct grants from the Crown 
having different interests in Trade, looke upon themselves as so 
many distinct Principalities, are jealous of each other, and stand 
upon their separate Laws & Customs to the prejudice and weaken- 
ing of the whole." Cal. State Paps., Col., 1696-1697, 338. 



CONCLUSION 389 

Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle did not settle the claims of the 
contending parties in North America; the final decision 
rested with the judgment of the sword. In view of the 
impending crisis, the home government laid plans to com- 
bine the forces of the colonies for defense and to centralize 
the management of Indian affairs. Such a policy Avas of 
pressing necessity. Colonial disunion led the French to 
force the issue and the unscrupulous dealings of the colo- 
nists with the Indians weakened their friendship for the 
English cause. Colonial representatives met at Albany in 
1754 to make a treaty with the Iroquois and seized the 
occasion to frame a scheme of colonial federation. In the 
same year the Board of Trade drafted a plan of military 
union, but the unanimous rejection of the Albam^ plan 
made the acceptance of the board's plan improbable. The 
refractory and obstinate conduct of the colonies was largely 
responsible for the failure of the attempts of Washington 
and Braddock to check the first advances of the French 
and provoked colonial governors and commanders to urge 
colonial union and taxation by act of Parliament.^ In 
1756 England declared formal war against France and 
such schemes were simply laid aside to a more convenient 
time. 

The events of the war revealed completely the unwieldy 
and disjointed character of the structure of the Empire. 
Indifference to the security of the frontier, intercolonial 
jealousy, conflicts between governors and assemblies, and 
local interference in the raising and direction of the troops 
contributed to retard military operations, limited their 
scope, and made necessary large bounties from the home 
government to encourage the colonies to greater activity. 
Some colonies .acted with great spirit, others in a half- 
hearted manner, and the rest were sadly deficient in con- 
duct. Indifference and the plea of poverty accounts only 
in part for the delinquency of Pennsylvania in particular; 

8 Beer, British Col. Policy, 1154-1165, 28-30, 43-51. 



390 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

a fundamental constitutional principle was at stake. The 
assembly with unfaltering determination refused to allow 
either the crown or the proprietors to interfere in the 
taxation of proprietary estates, the issue of paper cur- 
rency, the expenditure of public funds, and the control of 
the militia. This firm devotion to abstract principles of 
self-government led the assembly to place the rights and 
liberties of the subject above the security of the province 
and the welfare of the Empire and caused the colony to 
falter in its duty in the earlier years of the war and ren- 
dered it helpless after 1760. Moreover, the merchants of 
Pennsylvania and other colonies were deeply implicated 
in a treasonable trade with the French, whereby the enemy 
was supplied with provisions and the efforts of the English 
naval and military forces were in part neutralized. This 
trade was furthered by the unfaithfulness and greed of 
governors and customs officials and by the partiality of 
admiralty judges. It was evident that there was little 
spirit of loyalty to the Empire and a sense of pride in 
the imperial connection on the part of a considerable num- 
ber of the colonists.^ 

With the advent of peace in 1763 the English govern- 
ment was confronted with the problem of reorganizing the 
colonial system. The exaltation of British power over the 
French created a strong sentiment of imperialism similar 
to that which followed the Restoration of 1660 and the 
Revolution of 1689. The large additions of territory to 
the Empire and the defects in the system of administra- 
tion revealed by the war necessitated a reconstruction of 
the colonial policy in both its economic and political fea- 
tures. The laws of trade were modified and extended to 
bring the new dominions within the scope of the mercantile 

9 Governor Morris of Pennsylvania wrote in 1755 of the colo- 
nists, " I cannot accuse them of disaffection to the Royal Family 
now upon the Throne, but they are certainly disaffected to Gov- 
ernment itself, and consequently to his Majesty's Office and Au- 
thority." Pa. Archives, 1st. ser., II, 439. 



CONCLUSION 391 

system. In order to enforce the laws of trade absenteeism 
in the customs service was abolished, the authority and 
power of the customs and admiralty officials was strength- 
ened, and men of war were employed as revenue cutters. 
The over-issue of legal tender paper currency and its dele- 
terious effect on trade and commerce led to the prohibition 
of this financial policy. English troops were placed on 
the western frontier to hold in check hostile Indians and 
disaffected Canadians and to guard against the probability 
of renewed French attacks. Plans were laid to make the 
Indians the wards of the imperial government in order 
to protect their interests and preserve their friendship. 
The events of the French war and Pontiac's Conspiracy 
showed conclusively that the colonies could not be de- 
pended upon to guard the frontier. The heavy drain 
upon the English exchequer to save the colonies from for- 
eign conquest justified in the minds of English statesmen 
a parliamentary tax upon the colonies to support in part 
a standing army in America. Such were the objects which 
the Currency and Sugar Acts of 1764, the Stamp Act of 
1765, and other measures, parliamentary and ministerial, 
were designed to accomplish. These reforms did not 
spring from motives of oppression, nor did they originate 
as party measures. They had been urged repeatedly by 
colonial administrators in the period prior to 1763 and 
were now forced upon the imperial government by the 
stern logic of the events of the war. 

The reconstruction of the colonial policy fell upon an 
unpropitious time. Two factors in the main tended to 
hold together the unstable structure of the Empire; the 
particularism of the colonies and their dependence upon 
the imperial government for support. Time and again 
the agents of the central government had interpreted the 
resistance of the colonies to the sovereign mil as indicative 
of a determined effort to throw off English rule.^" This 

10 Beer, British Col. Policy, 1754-1765, 167-169. Chalmers, In- 



392 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

charge the colonists consistently repudiated. Keith, Dum- 
mer, Pownall, Shirley, and Franklin pointed out that in- 
tercolonial prejudices and jealousies were too strong to 
permit of a union without which they could not hope to 
sever the imperial relation.^^ The chief factor which kept 
in check the forces of disintegration was the need on the 
part of the colonies of the naval and military protection 
granted by the home government. In fact, some held that 
Canada in French hands was desirable in order to per- 
petuate the utilitarian bond of union.^- The removal of 
French power from Canada broke that tie and gave scope 
to the centrifugal forces within the Empire, and the as- 
sumption by Parliament of an authority which violated 
long established customs and threatened to undermine the 
independence of the colonies furnished them with a prin- 
ciple of union. 1^ Substantial unity of action, disobedi- 
ence to the recent regulations of Parliament, attacks upon 
royal officials and a general spirit of defiance are not ac- 
counted for solely on the ground of intensity of attachment 
to abstract principles of self-government. The arguments 
against the new system were as much economic as political. 
The commercial restrictions upon a foreign trade which 
formed the basis of colonial prosperity, the prohibition 
upon the issue of legal tender paper currency which the 
colonists considered necessary to their welfare, and the 
collection of the new taxes in specie when the coloniesi 
were drained of their gold and silver by a balance of trade 
in favor of England, together with the existing economic 
distress, intensified the spirit of opposition to parlia- 

troduction to the Revolt of the Colonies, II, quotes frequently 
from the letters of royal officials to show that the colonies were 
consciously aiming at independence from the mother country. 

n Dummer, Defence of the Charters (London, 1721), 36; Frank- 
lin, Works (Smyth ed.), IV, 41, 70-71; Po^vnall, Administration 
of the Colonies (ed. 1768), 93. 

12 Beer, British Col. Policy, 1754-1765, 142-147; Channing, Hist, 
of U. 8., II, 596-597; Franklin, Works (Smyth ed.), IV, 70-77. 

13 Beer, British Col. Policy, 1754-1765, 171-173. 



CONCLUSION 393 

mentary interference. Moreover, the controversy revealed 
the partial nature of the colonial policy. The colonists 
felt that it was unjust to force them to contribute to the 
support of guarding Canada in view of the heavy debt 
they had incurred on behalf of the conquest of a territory 
of which the mother country reaped the sole advantage; 
and they felt grieved that the interests of the continental 
colonies should be sacrificed to the advantage of a few Brit- 
ish planters in the West Indies. 

The clash of interests provoked a final scrutiny into 
the nature of the constitution of the Empire. Both sides 
professed to draw their arguments from the principles and 
precedents of English law, and their claims varied little 
from those urged formerly in the contest between the 
provincial governors and assemblies. English and colonial 
statesmen were of one accord on the principle of '' no tax- 
ation without representation," one of the basic doctrines 
of English constitutional liberty, but they disagreed funda- 
mentally on the interpretation of that principle. In 
America, the generally accepted theory considered the Em- 
pire as composed of a number of separate and independent 
political entities in which their several legislatures were 
'' entitled to a free and exclusive power of legislation 
. . . in all cases of taxation and internal polity," sub- 
ject to the accustomed negative of the crown.^* The colo- 
nists conceded to Parliament the right to levy taxes upon 
their trade for the purpose of regulating the commerce 
of the Empire, but they claimed that the assumption of 
a power to tax them for revenue purposes was uncon- 
stitutional.'^ They interpreted the provisions of the 

14 Ford, Journals of Continental Congress, I, 68. 

15 Samuel Adams, Writings (Gushing ed.), I, 18, 24-26, 157, 171; 
Hopkins, Rights of the Cols. Examined, (R. I. Col. Recs., VI, 423, 
426) ; Otis, Rights of the British Cols. Asserted, and Dulany, Con- 
sideration on the Propriety of imposing Taxes in the Cols., (Al- 
mon, Tracts, London, 1766) ; Dickinson, Letters from a Farmer, 
Works (Ford ed.), 316, 320, 328-335; Pa. Votes of Assembly, V, 



394 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

Magna Charta and Bill of Rights which guaranteed the 
subject against taxation without his consent as a constitu- 
tional limitation upon the power of Parliament/^ There- 
fore, the colonists concluded that since the principle of rep- 
resentation was alone preserved in the local assemblies, 
they only were legally competent to levy taxes. Franklin 
saw that in this distinction between taxation and legisla- 
tion in other respects *' no middle ground could be well 
maintained." He said that " Something might be said 
for either of the extremes, that Parliament has a power 
to make all laws for us, or that it has a power to make 
710 laivs for us," and he advanced to the more logical con- 
clusion that the Empire consisted of separate states bound 
together exclusively through the crown.^^ With this 
theory John Adams, James Wilson, Hamilton, and Jeffer- 
son concurred.^^ Hamilton and Adams conceded to Par- 
liament a power to regulate the trade of the Empire as a 
matter of expediency, but not of right.^^ On the other 
hand, English statesmen and jurists would recognize no 
theory which denied the supremacy of Parliament in all 
cases whatsoever, and held that the colonists were virtually 

361, 376. Dickinson held that "parliament unquestionably pos- 
sesses a legal authority to regulate the trade of Great Britain, 
and all her colonies," but entered a " total denial of the power 
of parliament to lay upon these colonies any ' tax ' whatever." 
Works, 312, 328. 

16 Franklin contended that although the charter of Pennsylvania 
contained a reservation of the right of Parliament to tax the 
colonists, yet it had no right to do so under cover of that clause 
until it had admitted representatives from the province. Works 
(Smyth ed.), IV, 445. Pitt and Camden in Parliament also looked 
upon this principle as a fundamental law binding upon the power 
of Parliament. Hansard, Pari. Hist., XVI, 168, 169, 171, 179, 195. 

17 Franklin, Works (Smyth ed.), V, 115; see also V, 280. 

18 John Adams, Novanglus, Works (Adams ed.), IV, 33, 37, 38, 
46, 48, 49, 99; Hamilton, The Farmer Refuted, Works (Lodge ed.), 
I, 76, 77, 81; Jefferson, Summary Vieio of the Rights of British 
America, Writings /Ford ed.), I, 421-447. 

19 Hamilton, The Farmer Refuted, 109, 112, 115, 123, 163; Adams, 
Novanglus, 105-107, 113, 115. 



CONCLUSION 395 

represented in the imperial le^slature.-^ In point of law 
this theory of parliamentary omnipotence was unassailable 
and in point of precedent nothing could be urged against 
the late statutes which was not equally true of the acts 
of trade. Theoretically, there was no disparity between 
the realm and dominions over-sea; in law the colonies were 
provinces or municipal corporations on the same footing as 
their prototypes in England, subject to the will of the 
sovereign legislature, and so they were considered in Eng- 
land.^^ But the theory of parliamentary supremacy was 
hedged about with serious limitations as far as colonies 
were concerned. It was a principle of government pe- 
culiar to England itself and by reason of limitation of 
place it contained no solution of the problem of governing 
dependencies. The colonists felt, and justly so, that ' ' Par- 
liament cannot wisely and well make laws suited to the 
Colonies, without being properly and truly informed of 
their circumstances, abilities, temper, &c. This it cannot 
be without representation from thence. ' ' ^~ But the actual 
inclusion of the colonies within the English representative 
system, the incorporation of the dependencies into the 
body politic, was rendered impracticable not only by rea- 
son of distance, but by the strong attachment of the colo- 
nists to the principles of home rule. In fine, geographical 
separation, difference in social structure, in institutions, 
and in economic needs precluded the possibility of a con- 
solidated and centralized imperial fabric. The idea of 
complete independence and separation was repudiated by 

20 Hansard, Pari. Hist., XVI, 161, 164, 165, 167, 173. 

21 Bernard, governor of Mass., wrote, " In Britain the American 
governments are considered as corporations, empowered to make 
bye-laws, existing during the pleasure of Parliament; who hath 
never done anything to confirm their establishments, and hath at 
any time a power to dissolve them." Select Letters on Trade (Lon- 
don, 1774), 32. 

22 Franklin, Works (Smyth ed.), V, 17-18, 241. 



396 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

the colonists until the hope of reconciliation was lost.^^ 
What they wished was the restoration of the relations 
which existed between the colonies and the mother coun- 
try prior to the entrance of Parliament into the domain 
of legislation and taxation hitherto left to the colonial 
assemblies.^* In this way the constitution of the Empire 
had developed by a natural growth and a recognition of 
this fact was necessary to the permanence of the Empire. 
But the mutual failure of the colonists and English states- 
men to understand and appreciate the needs and desires 
of each other rendered compromise impossible and in the 
end it led to the disruption of England's first Empire in 
the West. 

23 Ford, Journals of Continental Congress, I, 15-30; II, 13-23; 
155, 160; IV, 142-143. 

2-t Hopkins of Rhode Island likened the Empire to the old German 
Confederation : " In an imperial state, which consists of many sep- 
arate governments, each of which hath peculiar privileges, and of 
which kind it is evident the empire of Great Britain is." R. I. 
Col. Recs., VI, 420. John Adams wrote that the " Patriots of the 
province desire nothing new; they wish only to keep their old 
privileges. They were, for one hundred and fifty years, allowed 
to tax themselves, and govern their internal affairs as they saw 
best. Parliament governed their trade as they thought fit. This 
plan they wish may continue forever." Works ( Adams ed. ) , IV, 
116, 121, 131. 



BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 

A. — Manuscript Sources. 

A considerable part of the present work has been based 
upon manuscript sources, chiefly the papers and journals of 
the Board of Trade and Plantations. A large part of the 
material was drawn from the transcripts of these volumes 
made from the original manuscript in the Public Record 
Office, London, for the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, as 
follows: Journals, 1675-1782, 90 vols., (London, 1895-1898); 
Papers, Proprieties, 1697-1776, 25 vols., (London, 1901-1904) ; 
Papers, Plantations General, 1689-1780, 28 vols., (London, 
1904). The Journals contain a record of the meetings held, 
the members present^ and minutes of the debates, procedure 
and action of the board on colonial business. The Papers 
embrace copies of memorials, petitions, complaints, letters, 
reports of legal advisers, and orders in council sent to the 
board. The division of these documents into two separate 
series of volumes. Proprieties and Plantations General, is 
based on the relation of the colonies to the central govern- 
ment, the former comprising the charter colonies under in- 
direct control, and the latter the royal provinces under direct 
crown control. 

The original volumes of the Entry Boohs, Proprieties 
and Plantations General in the Public Record Office, and 
lacking in the collection of the above named historical society, 
have been used. This series contains the out-letters of the 
board, reports and representations to the Privy Council and 
Parliament, and the commissions and instructions issued to 
colonial governors. 

In addition the following collections in the Public Record 
Office have been of particular help: (a) America and West 
Indies, No. 28, a bundle which includes letters from Gov- 
ernors Keith and Thomas, James Logan, Thos. Peun and 
others to the Duke of Newcastle concerning Pennsylvania 
affairs; No. 599, a bundle containing various petitions, let- 
ters, memorials, legal opinions, etc. concerning Pennsylvania, 
(b) Customs Books, a series of manuscript volumes contain- 
ing entries of warrants issued by the Lords of the Treasury 
for granting commissions and the payment of salaries to the 
customs officials at home and in the colonies, as also min- 
utes of the reports of the Customs Board to the Lords of 
the Treasury, (c) Admiralty Books, a series containing en- 
397 



398 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

tries of warrants issued by the Lords of the Admiralty for 
commissioning officials of the vice-admiralty courts, minutes 
of the reports of the judge of the High Court of Admiralty 
to the admiralty board, etc. 

Among the Raiclinson MS8. and Clarendon MS8. in the 
Bodleian Library, Oxford, were found a few papers relating 
to Pennsylvania, and a few relating to the vice-admiralty 
jurisdiction in America. 

Some use was made of the transcripts of the British 
Museum Additional MSS. deposited in the Congressional Li- 
brary, Washington. 

A valuable and detailed description of the colonial records 
in various British archives may be found in two articles by 
Professor C. M. Andrews of Yale, American Colonial History, 
(American Hist. Asso., Reports, 1898, pp. 55-60), Materials 
in British Archives for American Colonial History, (Amer. 
Hist. Rev., X, 325-349). A hand-book of the greatest value 
for investigators is C. M. Andrews and F. G. Davenport, 
Guide to the Manuscript Materials for the History of the 
United States to 1783, in the British Museum, in Minor 
London Archives, and in the Libraries of Oxford and Cam- 
bridge, (Washington, 1908). The description of documents 
and pamphlets and their location is of the highest value to 
the student of our colonial history. A similar guide for 
the materials in the Public Record Office is now in prepara- 
tion under the editorship of Professor Andrews and Miss 
Davenport. Professor Andrews has also compiled a very 
useful List of the Journals and Acts of the Thirteen Original 
Colonies preserved among the Colonial Office Papers in the 
Puhlic Record Office (Amer. Hist. Asso., Report, 1908, I). 

The following collections of the Penn Papers, in the Li- 
brary of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, were of 
considerable importance for the light they threw not only 
upon the relations of the proprietary system to the colonists, 
but also on the relations of the colony to the home govern- 
ment: Official Correspondence, 1683-1817, 12 vols.; Letter 
Books, 1729-1834, 12 vols.; Forhes-Pcnn Collection, 2 vols., 
(catalogued in Pennsylvania Magazine of History, April, 
1904) ; and the Saunders-Coates Collection, 1720-1766, 1 vol. 
In the same library the Customs House Papers, a collection of 
the papers of the collector of the port at Philadelphia, have 
been of some value in throwing light on the administration 
of the acts of trade after 1750. 
B. — General Collections of Printed Sources. 
1. English. 

Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and 
West Indies, 1574-1701, 14 vols. (London, 1860-1911), con- 
tain extracts from the colonial office papers. This series 



BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 399 

has not progressed beyond the opening of the eighteenth 
century, and further, although the calendaring is well done, 
it does not take the place of the complete document for 
the investigator. The gap for the eighteenth century is 
partly filled by the publication of the Documents Relative to 
the Colonial History of Neio York, 14 vols., (Albany, 1856- 
1883), of which vols. III-VIII contain the London Docu- 
ments; Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New 
Jersey, 26 vols., (Newark, Paterson, 1880-1904) ; and Colo- 
nial Records of North Carolina, 10 vols. (Raleigh, 1886- 
1890). These three collections contain many of the state 
papers in full. To a great extent the gap for the eighteenth 
century is filled by the recent publication of the Acts of the 
Privy Council, Colonial Series, 1613-1766, 4 vols, (Hereford, 
1908-1911). With the appearance of this admirably edited 
series, which prints many of the papers in full, much light 
is thrown on the policy, procedure, and organization of the 
Privy Council acting on colonial afi'airs. (These volumes 
are well reviewed by Professor C. M. Andrews in American 
Hist. Rev., XIV, 590, XVI, 119, 638, XVII, 130.) Calendar 
of Home Office Papers of the Reign of George III, 4 vols. 
(London, 1878-1899), are of value for the revolutionary 
period. Calendar of Treasury Papers, 1557-1728 , 6 vols. 
(London, 1868-1889), and Calendar of Treasury Books and 
Papers, 1729-1745, 5 vols. (London, 1897-1903), contain some 
material bearing on the administration of the acts of trade, 
fiscal matters, etc. 

Journals of the House of Lords and Journals of the House 
of Commons are of considerable value for the history of im- 
perial legislative action. They contain minutes of the houses 
on colonial matters, reports of various boards, and addresses 
to the crown. For typical reports of the Board of Trade 
to Parliament, such as those on 1702 and 1703, consult the 
Bulletin of New York Public Library, X, no. 5, XI, no. 10. 
William Cobbett, Parliamentary History of England (1806- 
1820), is of some value. Of course the Statutes of the Realm, 
to 1713, 12 vols. (1810-1828), and the Statutes at Large, 
Danby Pickering, 109 vols. (1762), are indispensable. House 
of Lords MSS. new series, 1693-1704, 5 vols. (London, 1900- 
1911), in continuation of the series started under authority 
of the Hist. MSS. Commission, are valuable for a study of 
the legislative attacks on the colonial charters. 

Greorge Chalmers, Opinions of Eminent Layivers on various 
points of English Jurisprudence, chiefly concerning Colonies, 
Fisheries, and Commerce of Great Britain, (Burlington, 1858), 
is of first rate importance as a convenient hand-book of the 
opinions of crown lawyers and English jurists on matters 
of law affecting the colonies. Reports and Arguments of Sir 



400 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

John Vaughan, Lord Chief Justice of Common Pleas (Lon- 
don, 1706), contains several illuminating opinions on the 
legal relations of the colonies to the mother country given 
in the time of Charles 11. 
2. Colonial Records. 

Adelaide R. Hasse, Materials for a Bibliography of the i 
Public Archives of the Thirteen Original Colonies (Amer. | 
Hist. Asso., Report, 1906, II), furnishes a list of the official I 
archives and is valuable as a guide to the documentary ma- < 
terial of the colonies. For colonial charters and constitutions I 
consult, F. N. Thorpe, Federal and State Constitutions, Colo- ! 
nial Charter's, and other Organic Laws, 7 vols. (Washington, \ 
1909) ; and B. P. Poore, Federal and State Constitutions and 
Colonial Charters, 2 vols. (Washington, 1878). Volume II ) 
of Anniversary History of the Constitution of the United ? 
States, H. L. Carson, 2 vols. (Philadelphia, 1889), gives in '\ 
full the various plans proposed for a union of the colonies. ; 

The most valuable of the colonial records are: Colonial 
Records of North Carolina; Documents Relative to the Colo- 
nial History of New Jersey; Documents Relative to the i 
Colonial History of New York, (these collections have been ] 
cited above) ; Public Records of the Colony of Connecticut, I 
15 vols. (Hartford, 1850-1890) ; Records of Rhode Island and ] 
Providence Plantation, 10 vols. (Providence, 1856-1862). 

For Pennsylvania in particular the following public ar- 
chives have been indispensable; Minutes of the Provincial 
Council of Pennsylvania, 1683-1776, 10 vols. (Harrisburg, 
1851-1852) ; Pennsylvania Archives, first series, 12 vols. 
(Phila., 1852-1856) ; second series, 19 vols. (Harrisburg, 1874- 
1893) ; Votes and Proceedings of the House of Representa- 
tives of Pennsylvania, 1682-1776, 6 vols. (Phila., 1752-1776). 

For a study of the royal disallowance, the Acts and Re- 
solves of the Province of Massachusetts Bay, 1692-1760, 16 
vols. (Boston, 1869-1909); Laivs of New Hampshire, 1679- 
1702, 1 vol. (1904); and the Statutes at Large of Penn- 
sylvania, 1700-1793, 14 vols. (Harrisburg, 1896-1909), are 
of lirst-rate importance. They contain the procedure of the 
home government on the laws of the colony and tlie reasons 
for disallowance. The appendixes of the Statutes at Large of 
Pennsylvania are of particular value in these respects, for 
they include in full the minutes and reports of the Board 
of Trade, the reports of crown lawyers and other officials 
on the laws of the colony, and the orders in council affirming 
or annulling laws. 

The following collections have been of assistance for the 
history of the English Church in the colony; G. M. Hills, 
History of the Church in Burlington, N.J. . . . from 
original, contemporaneous sources (Trenton, 1876); W. S. 



BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 401 

Perry, Historical Collections relating to the American Colo- 
nial Church, 5 vols. (1870-1878), of which vol. II gives the 
papers relating to Pennsylvania. 
-Correspondence, Writings, Tracts. 

1. The correspondence of English officials in the colonial 
service with the authorities at home is necessary to a proper 
understanding of colonial administration. The following col- 
lections may be cited as having particular value, Belcher 
Papers, 2 vols. (Mass. Hist. Soc, Collections, VI, VII, Boston, 
1893-1894) ; Official Letters of Robert Dinwiddie, 1151-1158, 
2 vols. (Va. Hist. Soc, Collections, n.s. Ill, IV, Richmond, 
1883-1884); Papers of Lewis Morris, 1738-1746, (N. J. Hist. 
Soc, Collections, IV, N. Y. 1852) ; Official Letters of Alex- 
ander Spotswood, 1710-1722, 2 vols, (Va. Hist. Soc, Collec- 
tions, n.s. I, II, Richmond, 1882-1885) ; Correspondence of 
Horatio Sharpe, 3 vols. (Maryland Archives, VI, IX, XIV, 
Baltimore, 1888, 1890, 1895). The letters of these provincial 
governors contain highly valuable data for a study of con- 
stitutional development in the provinces, and for the rela- 
tions of the governors to the central government. Much of 
the correspondence of the governors of New York, New Jer- 
sey, and North Carolina may be found in the records of 
these colonies already enumerated. The letters of Governor 
Dinwiddie of Virginia, of Governor Sharpe of Maryland, and 
the Correspondence of William Pitt when Secretary of State 
with Colonial Governors and Military and Naval Commanders 
in America, 2 vols. ed. by G. S. Kimball (N. Y., 1906), are 
essential for a knowledge of the attitude of the colonies 
toward the question of imperial defence during the French 
and Indian War. Letters and Papers of Edward Randolph, 
7 vols. (Prince Society, Publications, Boston, 1890, 1899, 
1909), are invaluable for a study of the administration of 
the acts of trade prior to 1703. 

The Correspondence of the Governors of Rhode Island, 
1723-1775, 2 vols. ed. by G. S. Kimball (N. Y., 1902) ; Penn- 
Logan Correspondence, 2 vols. (Hist. Soc. of Penn'a. Memoirs, 
IX, X, Phil., 1870, 1872); and the Talcott Papers, 2 vols. 
(Conn. Hist. Soc. Collections, Hartford, 1892, 1896), are im- 
portant for the relations of the corporate colonies of R. I. 
and Conn., and the proprietary province of Pennsylvania with 
the home government. A few letters of William Penn of 
much importance may be found in Duke of Portland MSS., 
Ill, IV, (Hist. MSS. Com., Reports 14, pt. 2, and 15, pt. 4). 

The following essays by English officials who had served 
in the colonies throw considerable light on the character and 
defects of the system of colonial administration, and also 
contain proposals of remedial measures; Francis Bernard, 
Select Letters on Trade and Government of America (London, 



402 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696- 17G5 

1774), Thomas Pownall, Administration of the Colonies (ed. 
London, 1768), Sir William Keith, Collection of Papers and 
other Tracts written occasionally on various Subjects (Lon- 
don, 1740). 

2. Of the writings of English statesmen, the Correspond- 
ence of John, Fourth Duke of Bedford, 3 vols. (London, 
1842) ; A Narrative of the Changes of Ministry, by Duke of 
Newcastle, (Camden Society, Publications, London, 1898) ; 
Horace Walpole, Memoirs of the Reign of King George the 
Second, 3 vols. ed. by Lord Holland, (2d. ed., London, 1847) ; 
Letters of Horace Walpole, 9 vols. ed. by Cunningham, (Lon- 
don, 1891); and a few letters of Lords Dartmouth, Hills- 
borough, and Chesterfield in the Dartmouth MSS., Ill, (Hist. 
MSS. Commission, Report 15, pt. 1), contain some material 
dealing with history and personnel of the Board of Trade. Of 
more importance on this point are H. R. Fox Bourne, The 
Life of John Locke, 2 vols. (London, 1876), which includes 
extracts of letters relative to the establishment of the board 
in 1696 and some account of the activity of Locke as a mem- 
ber of the bureau; Life of William, Earl of Shelburne, with 
extracts from his Papers and Correspondence, ed. hy Lord 
Edmond Fitzmaurice, 3 vols. (London 1875), which contains 
letters valuable for the later history of the board, as also the 
activity of Shelburne as president of the board and as sec- 
retary of state during a critical period. Charles Davenant, 
Political and Commercial Works, ed. by Chas. Whitworth, 
5 vols. (London, 1771), are valuable for a discussion of the 
British Colonial Policy in its economic and administrative 
features. Works of Edmund Burke, Bohn ed., 6 vols. (Lon- 
don, 1872), contain much of great value on the relations of 
the colonies to the mother country and on the colonial policy 
in general. Grenville Papers, Correspondence of Richard 
Grenville, etc., ed. by W. J. Smith, 5 vols. (London, 1852), 
throw light on the reformations of the colonial policy in 
1763-1765. 

3. Of the colonial statesmen Benjamin Franklin, Writings, 
ed. by A. H. Smyth, 10 vols. (N. Y., 1905), have been espe- 
cially helpful for a knowledge of the popular attacks on the 
proprietary system in Pennsylvania, of Franklin as a colonial 
agent in London, and for controversial material concerning 
the parliamentary regulations after 1763. John Dickinson, 
Writings, ed. by P. L. Ford, (Hist, Soc. of Penn'a., Memoirs, 
XIV, Phila., 1895), contain pamphlets of importance on the 
conflict between the popular and proprietary parties in Penn- 
sylvania, as also on the controversy with Great Britain after 
1763. 

William Smith, A Brief State of the Province of Penn- 
sylvania, 1155, (Sabin Reprint, N. Y., 1764), is an attack on 



BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 403 

the Quaker power in Pennsylvania politics. Jeremiah Dum- 
mer, A Defence of the New England Charters (London, 1721), 
contains much of value on the administrative side of the 
colonial policy. 

For the constitutional and economic arguments put forth 
by colonial leaders consequent upon the passage of the Sugar 
and Stamp Acts the following have been especially helpful; 
John Adams, Novanglus: or a History of the Dispute with 
America, Works, IV, ed. by C. F. Adams (Boston, 1851); 
Samuel Adams, Writings, I, ed. by H. A. Gushing (N. Y., 
1904) ; Alexander Hamilton, The Farmer Refuted, Works, I, 
ed. by H. C. Lodge (N. Y., 1885) ; Stephen Hopkins, The 
Rights of the Colonics Examined, 1764, (R. I. Col. Recs., VI, 
416-427) ; Thomas Jefferson, Summary Vieto of the Rights of 
British America, 1774; Works, I, ed. by P. L. Ford (N. Y., 
1892) ; James Otis, The Rights of the Colonies asserted and 
proved, 1764, (Almon, Tracts on the Colonies, I, London, 
1766) ; and the pamphlets in the Writings of Dickinson and 
Franklin cited above. An analysis and discussion of this 
controversial material is found in M. C. Tyler, Literary His- 
tory of the American Revolution, 2 vols. (1897). 
D. — Secondary Works. 

No claim to completeness is made in the following list of 
secondary works, and only such books and articles as the 
present writer has found of particular assistance will be cited. 

The neglected phases of British-American history have been 
well pointed out in C. M. Andrews, American Colonial His- 
tory, (Amer. Hist. Asso., Report, 1898); Some Neglected 
Aspects of Colonial History (Paterson, 1896) ; William Mac- 
donald, A Neglected Point of View in American Colonial His- 
tory (Amer. Hist. Asso., Report, 1902, I); H. L. Osgood, 
Study of American Colonial History (iUd., Report, 1898) ; 
and also the addresses by G. L. Beer and H. L. Osgood, at 
the Conference on Research on American Colonial History, 
(ihid., Report, 1908, I, pp. 111-121). 

General works on the political conditions in England; 
W. E. H. Lecky, History of England in the Eighteenth Cen- 
tury, 8 vols. (N. Y., 1878-1890) ; I. S. Leadam, History of 
England from the Accession of Anne to the Death of George 
II, (Political Hist, of Eng., X, London, 1909) ; Grant Robert- 
son, England under the Hanoverians (London, 1911); G. M. 
Trevelyan, England under the Stuarts (London, 1904). 

General works dealing more particularly with the history 
of the imperial policy, H. E. Egerton, A Short History of 
British Colonial Policy (2d. ed., London, 1908), gives a gen- 
eral view of the subject on historical lines. George Chalmers, 
Introduction to the Revolt of the Colonies, 2 vols. (Boston, 
1845), is a work of importance for the unity it gives to 



404 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

colonial history, although written from a prejudiced point 
of view. H. L. Osgood, American Colonies in the 11th Cen- 
tury, 3 vols. (N. Y., 1904, 1907), is a work of authority. 
Volumes I and II deal entirely with the development of 
purely local institutions, and vol. Ill is confined to a study 
of the development and application of a system of imperial 
control. Such an able treatment of our colonial history from 
these points of view for the 18th century still remains 
to be written. G. L. Beer, Origins of the British Colonial 
System, 1518-1660 (N. Y., 1908), and British Colonial Policy, 
11541165 (N. Y., 1907), are eminently judicial in tone and 
are models of historical workmanship. The former traces 
the beginnings of the colonial policy, chiefly in its economic 
features, and the latter deals with the character of the im- 
perial system during the critical period of the French and 
Indian War and with the reorganization of the system as a 
result of the events of that conflict. C. M. Andrews, Colonial 
Self -Government and E. B. Greene, Provincial America, (Amer- 
ican Nation Series, V, VI, N. Y., 1904, 1905), include well- 
written chapters on the imperial relation, and contain excel- 
lent critical essays on authorities for the colonial period. 
Edward Channing, History of the United States, 2 vols, pub- 
lished (N. Y., 1905, 1908), especially vol. II on the period 
1660-1760 includes chapters of value on the imperial system. 

On the commercial policy of England, the best general ac- 
count is G. L. Beer, Commercial Policy of England toivard 
the American Colonies (N. Y., 1893). Mr. Beer's Origins of 
the British Colonial System and certain chapters in his Brit- 
ish Colonial Policy, both cited above, are important for the 
economic features of the colonial policy. ^ G. S. Callender, 
Selections from the Economic History of the United States 
(Boston, 1909), is a valuable handbook of extracts from 
sources throwing light on the economic history of the colo- 
nies and the commercial system of the mother country. 
Chapters i and ii of Andrews, Colonial Self- Government and 
chapter vii, vol. Ill, of Osgood, American Colonies (cited 
above), are excellent discussions of the principles of the com- 
mercial policy of England and the administration of the acts 
of trade in the 17th. century. W. J. Ashley, " England and 
America, 1660-1760," in his Essays Historical and Economic 
(1900), is an attempt to show that the commercial regula- 
tions were in general not oppressive. Theodora Keith, Scot- 
tish Trade with the Plantations before 1101 (Scottish Hist. 
Rev., October, 1908), and The Economic Causes for the Scot- 
tish Union, (English Hist. Rev., January, 1909), give the 
conditions surrounding the passage of the statute of 1696 
which strengthened the administration of the acts of trade. 

Little of a comprehensive character has been written on 



BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 405 

the subject of the central institutions of colonial control. 
C. M. Andrews, British Committees, Commissions, and Coun- 
cils of Trade and Plantations, 1622-1675, (Johns Hopkins 
Studies, XXVI, nos. 1-2, 1908), gives the early history of 
the development of a colonial office. Mary P. Clarke, The 
Board of Trade at Work, (American Hist. Rev., XVII, Octo- 
ber, 1911, pp. 17-43), is interesting for the light it throws 
on the organization, staff, and procedure of the board. W. R. 
Anson, Laio and Custom of the Constitution, 2 vols. (2d. ed., 
Oxford, 1892) ; Alpheus Todd, Parliamentary Government in 
England, 2 vols. (2d. ed., London, 1887), contain helpful 
material on the Privy Council, the secretaries of state, the 
Lords of the Treasury, and the Lords of the Admiralty. 
C. H. Mcllwain, The High Court of Parliament and its Su- 
premacy (New Haven, 1910), contains a very valuable chap- 
ter on the history of the theory of parliamentary supi-emacy 
and the attempt to apply it to the governance of an empire. 
Bernard Holland, Imperium et Lihertas (London, 1901), in- 
cludes a good discussion, with extracts from contemporary 
opinions, of the principle of parliamentary supremacy as ap- 
plied to the colonies. Chapter i, vol. Ill, Osgood, American 
Colonies, is an excellent discussion of the nature and organs 
of imperial control in the 17th century. 

C. M. Andrews, Connecticut Intestacy Law, (Yale Review, 
1894, reprinted in Anglo-American Legal Essays, I) ; O. M. 
Dickerson, The British Board of Trade and- the American 
Colonies (Mississippi Valley Hist. Asso., Proceedings, 1907- 
1908) ; A. M. Davis, Frost vs. Leighton, (American Hist. 
Rev., II) ; and H. D. Hazeltine, Appeals from the Colonial 
Courts to the King in Council (Amer. Hist. Asso., Report, 
1894), about conclude the list of articles on the very im- 
portant subjects of the royal disallowance and appeals to the 
Privy Council. Louise P. Kellogg, The American Colonial 
Charter (Amer. Hist. Asso., Report, 1903, I), is a good mono- 
graph dealing with the attempts to bring the chartered colo- 
nies into closer administrative relations with the crown, and 
with the efforts to abrogate the charters. E. P. Tanner, 
Colonial Agencies, (Political Science Quarterly, XVI), is a 
useful essay on the colonial representatives in London. 

E. C. Benedict, The American Admiralty, its jurisdiction 
and practice (3d. ed., N. Y., 1894) ; R. G. Marsden, Select 
Pleas in the Court of Admiralty, 2 vols. (VI, XI, Selden 
Society, PuUications, London, 1894, 1897) ; Josiah Quincy, Jr., 
Reports of Cases Argued and Adjudged in the Superior 
Court . . . of Massachusetts, 1161-1112, (Boston, 1865) ; 
and W. S. Holdsworth, History of English Laic, 3 vols. (Lon- 
don, 1903, 1909), have been helpful for the study of vice- 
admiralty jurisdiction in America. 



406 PENNSYLVANIA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1696-1765 

On the questions of imperial defence and Indian policy, 
J. W. Black, Maryland's Attitude in the Struggle for Canada 
(Johns Hopkins Studies, X, no. 7, 1892) ; C. E. Carter, Great 
Britain and the Illinois Country, 1763-1774 (Washington, 
1910) ; and certain chapters in Francis Parkman, Half Cen- 
tury of Conflict, Montcalm and Wolfe, Conspiracy of Pontiac, 
are useful. More particularly. Beer, British Colonial Policy, 
1754-1765, contains excellent chapters on these subjects during 
the critical period of the French and Indian War. J. W. 
Fortescue, A History of the British Army, 2 vols. (London, 
1899), II contains useful chapters on the history of the 
British forces in the colonies. 

Questions of coin and paper currency have been treated 
in C. J. Bullock, Essays on the Monetary History of the 
United States (N. Y., 1900) ; A. M. Davis, Currency and 
Banking in Massachusetts Bay, 2 vols. (Amer. Economic 
Asso., Puhlications, 3d. ser., I, II) ; and certain chapters in 
Smith, South Carolina, cited below. 

On the English Church in America consult, J. S. M. Ander- 
son, History of the Church of England in the Colonies, 3 vols, 
(rev. ed., 1856) ; S. E. Baldwin, The Jurisdiction of the 
Bishop of London, (Amer. Antiquarian Society, Proceedings, 
n.s., XIII) ; A. L. Cross, The Anglican Episcopate and the 
American Colonies (Harvard Historical Studies, IX, 1902) ; 
David Humphreys, An Historical Account of the Society for 
the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts (London, 
1730). 

The best general account of the provincial governor and the 
constitutional development in the provinces is to be found 
in E. B. Greene, Provincial Governor (Harvard Historical 
Studies, VII, 2d. ed., 1907). For particular provinces there 
are: E. J. Fisher, 'New Jersey as a Royal Province, 1738-1776 
(Columbia Univ. Studies, XLI, 1911) ; W. H. Fry, New Hamp- 
shire as a Royal Province, (ihid., XXIX, 1908) ; M. D. Mere- 
ness, Maryland as a Proprietary Province (N. Y., 1901); 
C. L. Raper, North Carolina (N. Y., 1904) ; W. R. Smith, 
South Carolina as a Royal Province (N. Y., 1903) ; C. W. 
Spencer ; Phases of Royal G overnment in New York, 1601-1719 
(Columbus, 1905) ; H. R. Spencer, Constitutional Conflict in 
Provincial Massachusetts (Columbus, 1905) ; E. P. Tanner, T/ie 
Province of New Jersey, 1664-1738, (Columbia Univ. Studies, 
XXX, 1908). These special monographs are valuable for 
the light they throw on the interaction of colonial and im- 
perial interests, particularly in the royal provinces. Everett 
Kimball, The Pullic Career of Joseph Dudley, (Harvard His- 
torical Studies, XV, 1911), deals with the colonial policy of 
the Stuarts in New England, 1660-1715. 

On the history of Pennsylvania, W. R. Shepherd, Proprie- 



BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 407 

tary Government in Pennsylvania, (Columbia College Studies, 
VI, 1896), and C. H. Lincoln, The Revolutionary Movement 
in Pennsylvania, (Univ. of Penn'a., Publications, 1901), have 
been of great assistance. Isaac Sharpless, A Quaker Experi- 
ment in Government (Phila., 1898) gives a fair-minded view 
of the religious and political principles of the Quakers. Other 
works on Pennsylvania history found useful: Benjamin Dorr, 
An Historical Account of Christ Church (Phila., 1859) ; 
S. M. Janney, The Life of William Penn (2d. ed., Phila., 
1853) ; C. J. Stille, Life and Times of John Dickinson (Hist. 
Soc. of Penn'a., Memoirs, 1891); J. F. Watson, Annals of 
Philadelphia and Pennsylvania in the Olden Times, rev. by 
W. P. Hazard, 3 vols. (Phila., 1877). 



INDEX 



Abercromby, General James, 208, 
315. 

Absenteeism, in customs service, 
72-73, 85-86, 383, 391. 

Acts of Parliament, see Statutes. 

Adams, John, 394, quoted 396n. 

Admiraltj'-, Lords of, 14, 85, 92, 
94, 105, 113, 115, 116, 122, 125, 
132, 292, 345. 

Admiralty, High Court of, 14, 94, 
110, 115, 121; appeals to, from 
Pa,, 101 ; prohibitions issued 
by, 105; question of appellate 
jurisdiction of, 105-107. 

Affirmation, 224; Quaker princi- 
ples on, 234; colonial laws on, 
225, 235, 244, 248-249, 250, 
252; royal order of 1703 on, 
239-241; use of, alloAved to 
Quakers in all cases, 252, 253, 
254. 

Agent, colonial, 25-26, 50-51, 172, 
252; influence of, 146, 197; 
protests of, against parlia- 
mentary action, 145-146, 197, 
217-218. 

Ag^nt, colonial, of Pa., ^^provis- 
ions of charter on, 2-§; Wil- 
liam Penn as, 131; temporary 
appointments as, 131, 193, 
194; permanent appointment 
as, 139. See also Beake, 
Charles, Franklin, Gee, Jack- 
son, Paris, Partridge, Perry. 

Albany Congress (1754), plan of 
of union adopted at, 299, 389; 
Franklin's later view of 
(1789), 329n. 

Amherst, General, 84, 208, 209, 
216; difficulties in Pa., 319, 
320, 321, 326. 



Andrews, Judge, quoted on op- 
position to admiralty court in 
R. I., 124. 

Andrews, C. M., ii, quoted 12. 

Andros, Sir Edmund, 267, 336. 

Appeals, to Privy Council, 107, 
158, 160, 360. 

Archbishop of Canterbury, 235. 

Ashurst, Sir Henry, colonial 
agent, 346, 347, 361 and n. 

Assembly of Pa., conflicts of, 
with governor over affirma- 
tion, 243-244, 248, over judici- 
ary, 162-164, 175, over taxa- 
tion of proprietary estates, 
205-210, 372, over paper cur- 
rency, 202-203, 372, over em- 
bargo, 79-80; opposition of, to 
royal and proprietary instruc- 
tions, 153, 194, 197,"^ 199, 372, 
379-380; dominant position of, 
128, 156, 207, 308, 314, 321, 
380; ideals of, 174-176, 205, 
207; Quaker domination of, 
281; refusal of, to provide mil- 
itary defenses, 258, 271, 288, 
291-292, 304; refusal of, to 
honor royal requisitions, 263, 
264, 269,* 270; refractory atti- 
tude of, in support of military 
expeditions, 273, 281-282, 283, 
288-291, 295-296, 297; bitter- 
ness of people against, 305; 
protests of, to crown against 
proprietary government, 363, 
372-377, 382; repudiates agree- 
ment of 1760 with crown, 215- 
216. 

Assemblies, colonial, position and 
power of, 40-41; 373; relations 
of, to Parliament, 43; domin- 



409 



410 



INDEX 



ant position of, 156; power of, 
over purse, 154, 196. 

Attorney-General, of England, 
17, 39, 43, 51, 52, 93, 130, 131, 
143, 152, 184, 186-187, 211, 
245, 363. See Crown lawyers, 
Northey, Pratt, Ryder, Trevor. 

Atwood, chief-justice of N. Y., 53. 

Auditor-general of colonial reve- 
nues, 46. 

Bahamas, 97, 124. 

Balance of trade, theory of, 181- 

182; unfavorable to colonies, 

333. 
Baker, Henry, solicitor, 350. 
Baltimore, Lord, 338, 346, 347, 

372. 
Barbados, 187, 192. 
Barclay, David, 193. 
Basse, Jeremiah, hostility of, to 

colonial charters, 342, 345, 347, 

365; arbitrary conduct of, 254, 

355, 367 and n., 374. 
Bath, Earl of, 346, 347. 
Bathurst, counsel, 285. 
Beake, Thomas, special agent for 

Pa., 252. 
Bedford, Grosvenor, collector of 

customs at Phila., 72-73, 85- 

86. 
Beer, G. L., ii; quoted 76n. 
Belcher, Governor Jonathan, 24 

and n., 27, 305, 306n., 307. 
Bellomont, Earl of, 50n., 183, 

268, 275, 367n. 
Bernard, Governor Francis, 124, 

126n., 395n. 
Bewley, John, collector at Phila., 

101, 242. 
Birch, Matthew, collector of cus- 
toms, 99, 101. 
Bishop of London, jurisdiction 

of, over colonies, 3, 224, 228, 

235, 236; consulted on colonial 

laws, 132, 244, 245, 247, 249, 

250, 254, 369. See Compton, 

Henry. 



Blackwell, Governor (Pa.), 258. 

Bladen, Martin, member of Board 
of Trade, 24, 28, quoted 38n., 
370. 

Blathwayt, William, auditor- 
general of colonial revenues, 
46; member Board of Trade, 
18, 24, 360. 

Bollan, William, colonial agent, 
201n. 

Board of Trade, 72, 116, 154, 
197, 202; an experienced body 
to 1707, 18; efforts to enforce 
provisions of law of 1696, 50- 
54 ; instructions to governors to 
lay embargo, 79; to check il- 
legal trade, 86; efforts to se- 
cure establishment of admi- 
ralty courts, 91-94; dismisses 
Gov. Markham, (Pa.), 103; 
hearing on Browne-Gordon 
charges, 121; report on Pa. 
laws (1760), 155; efforts to 
secure fixed standard for coin, 
184; hearing on petition of as- 
sembly against proprietary 
orders, 202; reports to Privy 
Council on affirmation laws of 
Pa., 244, 250, 252; hearing 
and report on colonial peti- 
tions for defense, 284 ff., 309 
ff. ; issues instructions to gov- 
ernors to hold conference with 
Indians (1753), 299; creation 
of, 8; functions of, 15-16; or- 
ganization of, 16-18; subor- 
dinate position of, 22, 23 
and n., 385; lacks expert 
knowledge, 24-26, 348-349, 
354, 365-367; efforts to 
erect, into department of state, 
28-31; reports of, to Parlia- 
ment, 145, 184, 186, 195, 196, 
343, 344, 345, 369-371; vigor 
of, to 1714, 17-18; deteriora- 
tion of, after 1714, 18-19, 137, 
139, 140, 149, 154, 368; re- 
newed vigor of, after 1748, 20, 



INDEX 



411 



141, 149; activity of against 
charters, 345, 347-350, 355, 360- 
361, 365, 369; on colonial un- 
ion, 268 and n., 301 ; procedure 
of, on examination of colonial 
laws, 130-135; hearings of, on 
Quary's charges against Pa., 
352-354 ; hearing and report of, 
on protest of Penns, 210-214; 
hearing and report of, on paper 
currency, 216-219; negotia- 
tions of, with Penn for sur- 
render of government, 355-360, 
361-364; inquiries of, into 
qualifications of governors, 55. 

Boundary dispute, between Va. 
and Pa., 295. 

Bouquet, Colonel, 326. 

Braddock, General Edward, 78, 
302, 303, 304, 307, 313, 329. 

Bray, Dr., suffragan, 237. 

Brenton, Jahleel, 345. 

Browne, Joseph, admiralty judge, 
115, 118, 119; charges against, 
122. 

Bucks County, to be erected into 
palatinate, 359. 

Burke, Edmund, 19 and n., 22, 
32n., 37 and n., 43n., 113, 126. 

Burnet, Governor, 220n. 

Bute, Earl of, 30. 

Campbell, Hugh, counsel for as- 
sembly, 285. 

Canada, French government in, 
370; conquest of, by English, 
321, 324; effect of conquest of, 
on colonies, 392; necessity of 
guarding, 325. 

Carolinas, 369, 370. 

Carter, C. E., quoted, 325. 

Charles, Robert, agent for Pa., 
211, 309n. 

Charters, colonial, deficiencies of, 
2, 335 ; barriers to royal control, 
287, 380-381; hostility of Par- 
liament to, 370n.; vacation of, 
urged, 28, 144, 187, 237, 365; 



opposition of colonists to, 235, 

276, 372-376, 381; methods of 
vacating, 339-340; relation of, 
to crown, 339 and n., parliamen- 
tary attacks on, 336, 337, 341- 
350, 360-361, 364-365, 369, 
381; bill formulated by Penn 
to curtail powers of, 349-350. 

Chartered colonies, charges 
against, 261, 335, 336, 340-341, 
342-343; injury of, to royal 
colonies, 343-344; anomalous 
position of, in Empire, 144. 

Charter of Pa., deficiencies of, 2; 
provisions of, for royal con- 
trol, 2-3; as to courts, 158 ff., 
as to government and terri- 
torial rights, 4; allows evas- 
ions of royal disallowance, 139, 
140 ff. 

Charter of Privilege (1701), 40, 
153, 227, 285. 

Chesterfield, Earl of, quoted 3 In. 

Christ Church, Phi la., 229, 230, 
235, 238, 245, 249, 355. 

Clarendon Code, 222. 

Clinton, Governor George, 291, 
298 and n., 329. 

Colden, Governor Cadwallader, 
82, 370n., 384n. 

Colonies, study of, as part of 
Empire, i ; legal relations of, to 
England, 34, 37, 38, 395; par- 
ticularism of, 265, 267, 271, 

277, 289, 299 and n; provincial- 
ism of, 378-379, 387, 388 and 
n., 389, 391; balance of trade 
against, 333; deficient conduct 
of, toward defense of N. Y. 
frontier, 259-260, 263, 264, 
269 ; deficient conduct of south- 
ern, during French and Indian 
War, 314, 320; public spirit of 
northern, during French and 
Indian War, 315, 316n., 321; 
poor management of Indian 
affairs by, 298, 300, 389; re- 
jects Albany Plan of Union, 



412 



INDEX 



300; lack of union of, 265, 
297-298, 322, 330, 389; parlia- 
mentary grants to, for defense, 
323-324. 

Colonies, royal, administration 
of, 344; substitution of, for 
chartered control not produc- 
tive of better administration, 
382, 383 and n. 

Colonial administration, reor- 
ganized (1696), 5-9; reorgan- 
ized (1763-1765), 85 ff., 391; 
factors which impaired system 
of, 383; defects in system of, 
384-385 ; lack of expert knowl- 
edge in, 385-386; system of, 
not oppressive, 386; opposition 
of colonies to, after 1763, 392- 
393 ; readjustment of system 
of, 325, 328-329, 390. 

Colonial office, decentralized or- 
ganization of, 20; ill eflfect of 
decentralization on colonial ad- 
ministration, 21-22, 32-33. 

Collectors of customs, in Pa. and 
Del., oath, bond and powers of, 
59-60; salaries and fees of, 
70; corruption of, 82; instruc- 
tions to, to lay embargo, 78 
ff. 

Commissioners of Customs, Cus- 
toms Board, 47, 56, 58, 59, 85, 
91, 94, 132, 345; jurisdiction 
in colonies, 7-8, 14, 46, 49; in- 
structions of, to customs of- 
ficials, 59-61. 

Committee of Privy Council on 
Plantation Affairs, 212, 214. 

Common law, colonists insist on 
principles of, 116 ff., 146. 

Compton, Henry, bishop of Lon- 
don, 224-225, 228, 369. See 
Bishop of London. 

Comptroller of customs, in Pa., 
59 and n. 

Connecticut, 39, 145, 273, 371; 
opposition to admiralty court 
in, 97; depreciation of cur- 



rency in, 195; militia of, 
placed under royal command, 
262, 268, 338, 340; opposition 
of, to royal command, 263, 268, 
275; charges against, 336, 358; 
attacks on charter of, 360, 364; 
public spirit of, during French 
and Indian War, 323. 

Cook, Sir John, advocate general, 
98, 109 ff. 

Copley, Lionel, 366 and n. 

Cornbury, Governor, 184, 231, 
243, 270, 272, 343n., 358, 368; 
arbitrary conduct, 254, 366; 
hostility to colonial charters, 
348, 358, 365. 

Courts, colonial, charged with 
partiality to illegal traders, 
91-92; opposition of, to admi- 
ralty courts, 96-100, 108-110. 

Craven, Admiral, 318. 

Crown lawyers, 169, 202, 286- 
287, 339 and n. See Attorney- 
general, Solicitor-general. 

Crown, the chief organ of gov- 
ernment concerned with colo- 
nies, 33, 39 ; nature of con- 
trol, 33-34; prerogatives of, 
curtailed, 35-36; power of, to 
issue instructions to gover- 
nors, 202; right of, to dis- 
pense with statute extending 
to colonies, 252n.* 

Crown Point, expedition against, 
315. 

Customs service, laxity in, 48, 
58, 73-74, 76, 82; cost of, 58; 
reorganized, 1696, 58, 1763, 
86 ff. 

Darnell, special counsel to Board 

of Trade, 345-346. 
Davenant, Charles, 28. 
Dartmouth, Earl of, 28, 3 In. 
De Grey, Sir William, counsel 

for assembly, 211, 212. 
De la Noy, Peter, 265. 
Delaware, 356, 359, 363, 367; 



Index 



413 



6pposition of, to Penn's gov- 
ernment, 355, 361, 363; Penn's 
powers to, questioned, 341, 
353; crown's claims to, as- 
serted, 53-54. 
Denny, Governor William (Pa.), 
79, 313, 314; violates pro- 
prietary instructions, 154, 176, 
' 209-210, 313, 318; fraudulent 
issue of flags of truce by, 81. 
i Desertion, 343 and n. 

Dickinson, John, 89, 90, 334; 
on paper currency, 219 ff.; ar- 
guments of, against change of 
government in Pa., 376-377. 

Dinwiddie, Governor Robert, 
77n., 78, 294, 295, 306 and n., 
308, 374; on colonial union, 
298 and n., 312n., 313, 329, 
334n. 

Distance, effect of, on adminis- 
tration from England, 22, 379, 
383, 395. 

Dobbs, Governor Arthur, 312, 
316. 
! Dodd, counsel for proprietors, 
346. 

Dominion of New England, es- 
tablished, 336; overthrow of, 
337; restoration of, urged, 
339. 

Dudley, Governor Joseph, 368; 
hostility to charters, 345, 348, 
358, 365. 

Dummer, Jeremiah, 71n., 118 and 
n., 349n., 364, 392. 

Dunbar, Colonel, 305. 

Dyer, William, surveyor-general 
of customs, 46. 

East India Office, compared with 
Board of Trade, 26-27. 

Egremont, Barl of, secretary of 
state, 85, 327. 

Embargos, during French and 
Indian War, 78, 79n., 80 and 
n.; methods employed to 
evade, 80-81. 



Empire, colonial theory of con- 
stitution of, 332, 392-394; 
English theory of, 378, 395; 
historical character of 43, 44, 
395; economic theory of, 45, 
378; instruments of expan- 
sion of, 379 ; strained rela- 
tions in, 221, 389; factors 
holding together the, 391-392; 
ideals of colonists clash with 
interests of, 378-379; problem 
of defense of, 256; colonies 
deficient in conduct toward 
defense of, 387, 389. 

English Church in Pa,, strength 
of, 229-230; opposition of, to 
Quaker government, 230, 236; 
opposed to charter, 235-236, 
276, 355, 358, 372, 381; arbi- 
trary conduct of, 238-239, 241- 
242, 276. 

English Church, 228, 249, 369; 
militancy of, in colonies, 227, 
230. 

English commanders, incompet- 
ency of, 274, 283, 382. 

English officials, arbitrary con- 
duct of, in colonial service, 
365-368, 383. 

Evans, Governor John (Pa.), 55, 
164, 174, 186, 243, 276; in- 
come as customs agent, 57. 

Fame, condemned for illegal 
trade, 168-169. 

Fane, Francis, counsel to Board 
of Trade, 140, 171-172. 

Fauquier, Governor Francis, 81 
and n. 

Fee system, evils of, in customs 
service, 70, 71, 76 and n.; in 
admiralty service, 113, 115, 
118, 119, 126 and n.; on ad- 
ministration in England, 27, 
133, 384. 

Fitch, Governor, 324. 

Fitzwilliam, Richard, surveyor- 
sreneral of customs, 170. 



414 



INDEX 



Flags of truce, fradulent use of, 
80, 81 and n. 

Fletcher, Governor, 65, 67, 262, 
263, 264, 266n., 343n. 

Forbes, General John, 315; criti- 
cism of provincial forces, 317 
and n. ; difficulties in south- 
ern colonies, 316-318. 

Fords, Penn's stewards, 358, 303. 

Forester, counsel, 309n. 

Fort Duquesne, defeat of Brad- 
dock at, 204, 304; expedition 
of Forbes against, 315, 318 ff. 

Fort le Bouef, 204, 326. 

Fort Ligonier, 326. 

Fort Pitt, 326. 

Fort Presquisle, 326. 

Fort William Henry, 315. 

Fort Necessity, defeat of Wash- 
ington at, 204. 

Fox, Henry, secretary of state, 
79n. 

Fox, W. E. collector at Phila., 
72. 

Frame of Government, 1696, 227. 

Franklin, Benjamin, 304, 308, 312, 
334 and n., 384n., 392; as co- 
lonial agent, 208-209, 211, 374, 
375; on colonial union, 298, 
299-300, 301; on paper cur- 
rency, 219 ff.; opposition of, to 
proprietary rule, 374-376; on 
colonial representation in Par- 
liament, 42 ; retrospective 
view of Albany Plan of Union, 
329n. 

Freedom of conscience, in Pa., 
223, 224, 225, 227, 233-234, 
285. 

French, expansion of, into Miss- 
issippi Valley, 259, 292; sys- 
tem of administration in Can- 
ada, 265, 336; illegal trade of 
colonies with, 80 flf., 123; basis 
of, claims to west, 293-294. 

Frontier, left undefended in Pa., 
206, 216, 286, 304, 310; upris- 
ing of people on, in Pa., 216, 



305, 328 ; defense of New York, 
259-265; defense of, of Em- 
pire, 256, 293, 323, 326. 

Gage, General, 327. 

Galloway, Joseph, on requisition 
system, 322-323; opposition of, 
to proprietary government, 
375. 

Gee, Joshua, agent for Pa., 131, 
138, 251, 252; consulted by 
Board of Trade, 192. 

Germans, 188, 310; Quakers sup- 
ported in power by, 282, 305; 
religious principles of, 229. 

Gilbert, Sir Humphrey, 357n. 

Gookin, Governor Charles (Pa.), 
55, 165, 248, 272. 

Gordon, Governor Patrick (Pa.), 
57, 58; hostility of, to ad- 
miralty court, 118 ff., 121; 
139; quarrel of, with assembly 
over paper currency, 193, 194. 

Gouldney, Henry, 252. 

Governors, character of royal, 
26; trade instructions to, 55- 
56; oath, bond, and royal con- 
firmation required of chart- 
ered, 49-54; conferences of, 
183, 303 and n., 312 and n. 

Grants, parliamentary, to col- 
onies for defense, 323-324. 

Grenville, Earl of, 85, 86. 

Halifax, Earl of, president of 
Board of Trade, 20, 28, 155; 
centralizes colonial adminis- 
tration in board, 29-30; activ- 
ity of board under, 141, 388; 
as secretary of state, 327. 

Hamilton, Alexander, 300, 332, 
394. 

Hamilton, Andrew, judge of ad- 
miralty court, 123. 

Hamilton, Governor Andrew 
(Pa.), 53-54, 270, 276. 

Hamilton, Governor James 
(Pa.), 42-43, 82, 123, 326; 



INDEX 



415 



contest of, with assembly over 
paper currency, 198, 200, 
295-296; on colonial union, 
298. 

Hardy, Governor, 79. 

Harley, Robert, 236, 342. 

Hedges, Sir Charles, judge of 
High Court of Admiralty, 94, 
106. 

Henley, counsel for assembly, 
309n. 

Henry, Patrick, on Parson's 
Cause, 219. 

Hillsborough, Earl of, president 
of Board of Trade, 28, 31; sec- 
retary of state for America, 
32. 

Holdernesse, Earl of, secretary 
of state, 294. 

Holy Experiment, Penn's, 223, 
231, 312. 

Hopkins, Stephens, 81n., 90n., 
395n. 

Hopkinson, Thomas, judge of ad- 
miralty court, 123. 

House of Commons, 40, 41, 197, 
343, 344; on paper currency in 
colonies, 195, 374; bills in, to 
vacate charters, 350, 360-361. 

House of Lords, 40, 50; investi- 
gates colonial abuses, 340-341 ; 
bill in, to vacate charters, 
344 and n., 345-347. 

Hunter, Colonel, financial agent 
of crown, 210, 211. 

Hunter, Governor Robert, 367n. 

Hutchinson, Governor, 76n. 

Illegal trade, 6, 15, 73, 360; with 
Dutch, 62, 63, 340, 353; with 
Scotland, 62 flf., 67, 340, 353; 
Molasses Act evaded by, 75, 
76n.; during French and In- 
dian War, 76 ff., 390. 

Imperial centralization, need of, 
334-335; urged by English of- 
ficials, 338n., 369-370, 373; dis- 
advantages of lack of, 343- 



344; under the rule of An- 
dros, 336-337; under Bello- 
mont, 339. 

Indentured servants, 281. 

Independence, spirit of, in col- 
onies, 156, 179, 221, 360; in 
Pa., 205, 207, 378; colonists 
repudiate charges of, 391-392, 
396. 

Indian AflFairs, decentralized 
management of, 298, 300, 389; 
attempts to centralize control 
of, 325-326; superintendent of, 
302, 325. 

Indians, ravages of, 204, 205, 
216, 304-305; 326-328; discon- 
tent of western, 325; at- 
tempts to preserve friendship 
of, 300; control of highway to 
west by Iroquois, 259, 389. 

Instructions, proprietary, on 
paper currency, 193; opposi- 
ion of assembly of Pa. to, 203, 
372; appeals of assembly to 
crown against, 203-204; up- 
held by crown, 204. 

Instructions, royal, 140, 141, 
142, 148; of 1703 on oath in 
Pa., 239-240, 243; efforts to 
give, force of law, 371, 388; 
legislation by, 226, 240; op- 
position of colonies to, 154, 
196, 201 and n., 302; of 1740 
on paper currency, 195-196, 
200, 202. 

Jackson, Richard, agent for Pa., 
87, 217, 218; counsel for as- 
sembly, 211. 

Jacob, libeled for illegal trade, 
99, 101, 105. 

Jamaica, 177. 

Jefi"erson, Thomas, 394. 

Judges, struggle over tenure of 
office of, in Pa., 163, 174-179. 

Judiciary in Pa., acts to estab- 
lish, 159 flf., 165-166, 167, 168, 
170; quarrel between gover- 



416 



Index 



nor and assembly over, 162- 
164; established by ordinance, 
164-165; laws on, disallowed 
by crown, 161-162, 166, 168, 
173. 
Jury system, colonists insist on, 
97-100, 108, 124, 125; preju- 
dice of, 91, 98, 124, 126n. 

Keith, George, 230. 

Keith, Sir William, 28, 72, 168, 
252, 373 and n., 374, 392; sur- 
veyor-general of customs, 48- 
49; governor of Pa., 55, 137, 
169; on paper currency in Pa., 
189. 

Keppel, Commodore, 77. 

King George's War, 288. 

King William's War, 258, 269, 
278. 

Laud, archbishop, 222. 
Livingstone, Robert, 338n. 
Lloyd, advocate-general, 106. 
Lloyd, David, 104, 352, 355, 363 ; 

opposition of, to admiralty 

courts, 100 fif., 120. 
Logan, James, 41n., 185, 193, 

194, 238n., 248, 272, 276, 278 

and n., 350, 355, 357n., 361. 
Locke, John, member of Board of 

Trade, 18, 24. 
Lords of Trade, 14-15, 258, 262, 

265, 275, 337. 
Lords of Treasury, 14, 46, 47, 

58, 86, 91, 125, 361. 
Lord High Treasurer, 363. 
Loudoun, Earl of, commander, 

312; difficulties in colonies, 

313, 314, 315, 318, 329, 334n. 
Louisburg, expeditions against, 

288-289, 315, 318. 

Madison, James, 300. 
Magna Charta, 394. 
Manchester, Earl of, secretary 

of state, 349. 
Mansfield, Lord, 214. 



Markham, Governor William 
(Pa.), 100, 237, 264, 353; 
charges against, 64, 340; dis- 
missed from office, 53, 103 fT. 

Maryland, 183, 228, 323, 363; 
becomes a royal province, 231, 
338, 372, 381, 382n.; failure 
to support N. Y. frontier, 260, 
264; failure of, to support ex- 
pedition against Duquesne, 
296; lack of public spirit in, 
315, 316, 317. 

Massa-chusetts, 2, 78, 84, 87, 124, 
183, 185, 196, 273, 306; refuses 
to aid in defense of N. Y. 
frontier, 264; charter of, va- 
cated, 336 ; new charter to, 
338; public spirit of, in im- 
perial defense, 288, 318, 323; 
refractory attitude of, during 
Pontiac's Conspiracy, 327; 

Mein, Patrick, surveyor-general 
of customs, 46. 

Menzies, John, 115, 116. 

Mercantile system, principles of, 
45, 180-181. 

Merchants, of England, influence 
of, 337; consulted by Board of 
Trade on colonial laws, 132, 
195; opposition of, to paper 
currency, 192, 194, 195 and 
n., 196,^199, 216, 217; opposi- 
tion of, to colonial laws taxing 
trade, 148. 

Mompesson, Roger, 98, 114. 

Monckton, General, 320. 

Montagu, special counsel to 
Board of Trade, 345, 346. 

Montgomerie, Governor, 220n. 

Montreal, expedition against, 
273, 290, 318; fall of, 321. 

Moore, Daniel, collector at New- 
castle, 119-120. 

Moore, John, 118, 168, 169, 171, 
231; arbitrary conduct of, 71- 
72, 241-242, 254, 366; advo- 
cate of admiralty court, 102, 
113, 355. 



INDEX 



417 



Morris, Anthony, 100, 102, 104, 
352. 

Morris, Lewis, 26, 146. 

VIorris, Governor R. H. (Pa.), 
77n., 189n., 205, 302, 304, 305, 
307, 308; on Albany Plan of 
Union, 301n.; violates instruc- 
tions, 319; contest of, with as- 
sembly over paper currency, 
200-201, 202, 203. 

S^aval officer, 7, 49, 57-58. 

^avy, English, dependence of 
colonies on, for protection, 257, 
271-272, 387; employed as 
revenue cutters, 83 and n., 85, 
391. 

kelson, John, on need of colonial 
union, 265, 388n. 

sTewcastle, Duke of, secretary of 
state, 13, 72, 368, 371, 373n., 
383. 

*^ew England, campaigns of, 
against Canada, 272-274, 288- 
289, 290; Dominion of, 336; 
Revolution in, 337; Confedera- 
tion, 268. 

^ew Hampshire, royal govern- 
ment established in, 336. 

'Tew Jersey, 79, 230, 249, 273; 
charges against, 336; be- 
comes a royal province, 231, 
355, 372, 381; obstinacy of 
assembly of, 306 and n. ; lacks 
public spirit during French 
and Indian War, 315, 327. 

STewton, Isaac, master of mint, 
185. 

STew York, 79, 82, 187, 192, 195; 
lack of colonial co-operation in 
defense of frontier of, 259 ff. ; 
proposals for restoration of 
original boundaries of, 338 ; 
attitude toward the French 
and Indian War, 323, 327. 

Nicholson, Governor Francis, 
183, 261, 272, 273 343n., 368; 
a zealous Churchman. 231 and 



n., 236; hostility to charters, 
342, 347, 355, 365; arbitrary 
conduct of, 237, 254, 367. 

Norris, Isaac, 247, 248, 278 and 
n., 363, 374. 

North Carolina, 176, 195, 228, 
316-317. 

Nor they. Sir Edward, attorney- 
general, 109 ff., 233. 

Oath, imposed on Quakers by 
royal order, 239-241; conflict 
between governor and assem- 
bly over, 234; proposals to ex- 
clude Quakers from assembly 
by imposing, 284, 287, 311. 

Ohio Company, 294. 

Orders in council, 12, 29, 30, 
130, 133, 134, 135. 

Ordinances, issue of in Pa., 4, 
164, 167. 

Osgood, H. L., ii, 12, 335, 341n. 

Otis, James, 76n. 

Paper currency in Pa., agita- 
tion for, 183-185, 191; struggle 
over, 191, 200 ff., 372, 390; 
currency laws, 189, 192, 193, 
194, 195, 197, 208, 210; 
amoimt issued, 217; deprecia- 
tion of, 220; ill effects 
of, 217, 218; royal order 
of 1740 on, 37, 194, 195-196, 
197, 198, 200, 201, 202; issue 
of, prohibited by parliament, 
219 ff. 

Paris, F. J., 285, 309n.; agent 
for Pa., 139, 146, 172, 173. 

Parliament, 39, 40, 42, 43, 85, 
199; statut-es of, affecting colo- 
nies, 37; attempts of, to give 
royal orders the force of law, 
196, 197; attempts of, to estab- 
lish a council of plantations, 
15; extent of power of, over 
colonies, 34-36; principle of ex- 
tension of statutes of, over col- 
onies, 39, 117; activity of, in 



418 



INDEX 



colonial affairs after 1730, 371; 
proposals to establish union of 
colonies by, 299, 300, 301 ; bills 
in, to vacate charters, 144, 
338, 339, 340, 342, 343-350, 
360-361, 369; bills in, to re- 
quire colonies to send laws 
home, 143, 145; opposition of 
colonies to authority of, 89, 
90, 188, 331; see Statutes. 

Parliamentary supremacy, 8, 37, 
202; theory of, not suited to 
imperial government, 395; de- 
velopment of theory of, 287, 
371, 388. 

Parliamentary taxation, of col- 
onies suggested, 300, 307, 385 
and n., 388, 389, 393; colonial 
opposition to, 88, 331-334, 392- 
393. 

Partridge, Richard, colonial 
agent, 282, 309n., 374. 

Patronage system, evils of, 383. 

Paxton Boys, 216, 328. 

Penn, John, 139, 279, 328, 373- 
374, 377n. 

Penn, Thomas, 82n., 197, 198, 
216, 218, 284, 287, 307 and n., 
327n., 377n. 

Penn, William, 61, 66, 70, 71 
and n., 104, 107, 114n., 133, 
243, 246, 250, 342, 348 ; charter 
to, 50, 51, 65; influence of, at 
court, 23-24, 100; as governor 
of colony, 53, 66; reasons for 
founding colony, 222, 378; 
charges against Quary, 112- 
113; replies to Quary 's charges 
67, 109, 238-239, 341, 348-349; 
financial difficulties of, 358, 
361, 363-364, 382, 383n.; criti- 
cism of Board of Trade, 24-25, 
353 ; negotiations of, with 
crown for surrender of govern- 
ment, 248, 355-360, 361-364; 
formulates plan of union, 267- 
268; powers of government 
usurped by crown, 262, 264; 



on fixed standard for specie, 
183, 184; complaints against 
royal officials, 236-237, 246, 
255; religious and political 
principles of, 40, 159, 223; as 
agent of colony, 131, 137; pro- 
poses substitute for bill to va- 
cate charters, 349-350. 

Penn, William Jr., 346. 

Pennsylvania, commerce of, 75, 
89, 181 and n. ; opposition to 
admiralty court in, 97 ff. ; il- 
legal trade in, 62 ffT, 76 ff., 
340-341, 353; exports and im- 
ports of, 74n., 181, 356; royal 
government established in, 2^6. 
262, 264, 338 ; embargos Tn, 
79 ff. ; charges against, 346-347, 
351-353; currency problem in, 
183, 186-187, 189-190, 193, 
198; fails to aid in defense of 
N. Y. frontier, 260, 264; fails 
to co-operate in military en- 
terprises, 204, 273, 289, 290- 
291, 303-304; deficient conduct j 
of, during French and Indian ] 
War and Pontiac's Conspiracy, 
314, 316-321, 326-328; appeals 
for aid, 284-285, 292, 306-307, 
308-310; parliamentary grants 
to, for defense, 323-324; self- 
government in, 380. 

Penrice, Sir Henry, judge of High 
Court of Admiralty, 121. 

Perry, Micajah, agent for Pa., 
193, 194. 

Peters, Richard, 298. 

Phipps, counsel for proprietors, 
346. 

Phipps, Governor, 263. 

Piracy, 6, 63 ff., 360. 

Pitt, William, secretary of state, 
14, 30, 32, 83, 311, 312, 313, 
314, 319, 321, 324n. 

Political privileges in Pa. 223, 
225, 226, 227, 233. 

Pontiac Conspiracy, 206, 216, 
326-328, 376. 



INDEX 



419 



Popples, secretaries to Board of 
Trade, 17. 

Port Royal, expedition against, 
273. 

Povey, Thomas, 22. 

Pownall, Governor Thomas, 23, 
28, 185n., 201, 220-221, 324n., 
392. 

Pratt, Charles, attorney-general, 
179, 211, 309n. 

Privy Council, subordination of 
Board of Trade to, 22 ; action 
of, on affirmation in Pa., 239- 
240, 252; hearing on Penn's 
charges against Quary, 353; 
action on Pa. laws (1760), 
155, 156, 321 ; retains control 
of colonial laws and appeals, 
11-12, 107, 128 ff.; commit- 
tees of, 8, 12, 136, 142, 171, 
267. 

Proclamation of 1763, 326. 
I Proprietors of Pa., conflicts of, 
with colonists, 10 and n., 355, 
358, 361, 372; opposition of, to 
paper currency, 190, 194, 199; 
assembly nullifies instructions 
of, 153-154, 193-194; appeals 
of, to crown against colonial 
laws, 151,152, 155 ff., 176 ff., 
210-214: crown upholds powers 
of, 204; conflicts of, with as- 
sembly over taxation of their 
estates, 206-209; gift of, to- 
ward defense, 208, 307; sub- 
scription of, for West Indian 
expedition, 281. 

Proprietary estates, contest over 
taxation of, 205-210, 304, 313, 
319, 372, 390; contest carried 
to England, 210-214; agreement 
between crown and agents of 
assembly over taxation of, 214; 
assembly repudiates agreement, 
215. 

Providence, libeled for illegal 
trade, 102, 105, 107. 

Puritans, 222, 223. 



Quakers, 100, 103, 105, 107, 114; 
persecution -^f, 222; purpose 
in founding colony, 223, 378; 
religious principles of, 223 ff., 
225 ; opposition of, to oath and 
war, 205, 226, 234, 257, 258; 
conflict of, with Churchmen, 
228 ff., 234; difficulties of, 
223, 226, 231, 234-235, 240- 
241, 247, 254-255; inconsis- 
tency of principles of, with 
practice, 247-248, 255, 274-275, 
278, 280n., 387 ; methods of, to 
evade violation of principles, 
258, 264, 273, 274, 277, 279, 
284; threatened exclusion of, 
from government, 305, 306- 
307 ; domination of government 
by, 310; complaints against, 
for refusing to provide defense, 
258, 261, 262n., 272, 283-284, 
288, 289, 308-310; express will- 
ingness to yield power of gov- 
ernment, 355, 382; power of, 
in assembly broken, 311. 

Quary, Robert, 21, 23, 41, 42, 53, 
69, 115, 164, 184; as surveyor 
of customs, 48, 59, 115, 354; 
as vice-admiralty judge, 48, 
94 ff., 100 ff., 108; charges of, 
against Pa., 102, 104 ff., 107, 
109, 238-239, 276, 351-352; 
charges of, against chartered 
colonies, 342, 345; ex parte 
character of charges, 102, 351; 
arbitrary conduct of, 115, 354, 
365-366; charged with corrup- 
tion, 112-113, 114-115; favored 
by Board of Trade, 115, 354n.; 
zeal of, for English Church, 
231 and n., 237, 244. 

Quebec, expedition against, 273, 
290, 318; fall of, 321. 

Queen Anne, 227, 23 In. 

Queen Anne's War, 278. 

Randolph, Edward, 6, 23, 49, 51, 
52,53,70,91,94,109; activities 



420 



INDEX 



of, as surveyor-general, 46-48, 
59; hostility -of, to colonial 
charters, 336, 340-343, 345 and 
n., 346-347, 365; charges of, 
against Pa., 353; charges 
against, 65, 365, 366 and n., 
zeal of, for English Church, 
237, 275. 

Randolph, Peter, surveyor-gen- 
eral of customs, 74. 

Eaymond, solicitor-general, 166. 

Eazer, Peter, surveyor of cus- 
toms, 73. 

Reade, Charles, judge of admir- 
alty court, 122. 

Representation in Pa., unfair, 
310. 

Requisition system, 257; failure 
of, 266, 269, 299, 322-323, 328, 
387, 389; unfair, 322; propos- 
als to substitute parliamentary 
taxation for, 266, 270, 287, 
329; succeeded by parliament- 
ary taxation, 330. 

Revenue cutters, lack of, facili- 
tates illegal trade, 68, 69 and 
n., 76; appointed (1694, 1698), 
69; British cruisers employed 
as, after 1763, 85, 391. 

Revolution of 1689, 337, 340. 

Rhode Island, 39, 87, 145, 273; 
illegal trade in, 82, 84; oppo- 
sition to admiralty court in, 
97, 124; charges against, 336; 
attacks on charter, 361, 364, 
370; militia of, placed under 
royal command, 268, 275, 338, 
340. 

Robinson, Sir Thomas, secretary 
of state, 301. 

Rolfe, Josiah, admiralty judge in 
Pa., 115. 

Royal disallowance, provisions 
for, in Pa. charter, 3, 133; de- 
fects of provisions for, 135- 
136, 137, 141, 371; reasons for 
exercise of, 148-151; evasions 
of, in Pa. by re-enactment and 



temporary laws, 141 ff., 143, j 
144, 146, 147-148, 188, 232-^ 
233, 244; number of laws an- 
nulled by, in Pa., 147-148; 
effectiveness of, 143, 147, 156 I 
ff., 173, 188; arbitrary exer- 
cise of, 232-233; basis of co- 
lonial opposition to, 138-139; 
exercise of, on colonial laws; 
freedom of conscience, 233, ju- 
dicial, 161-162, 167, 168, 178, 
coin, 184, 187 ff., 192, affirma- 
tion, 243, 247, 250, paper cur- 
rency, 214, militia, 151, 311. 
Ryder, Sir Dudley, attorney-gen- 
'eral, 201, 202, 203. 



St. Clair, General, 290, 302. 

St. John, Henry, secretary ofj 
state, 364. 

St. Louis, prize case, 101, 102. 

St. Mary's Church, Burlington,] 
249. 

St. Paul's Church, Chester, 244- 
245. 

Sarah, libeled for illegal trade, 
120. 

Scotland, illegal trade with, 62 
ff., 67, 340, 353. 

Scotch West India Co., 340. 

Scotch-Irish, 188, 310. 

Secretary of State, control of, 
over colonies, 13-14. See Egre- 
mont. Fox, Halifax, Holder- 
nesse, Manchester, Newcastle, 
Pitt, Robinson, St. John, 
Shelburne, Sutherland. 

Secretary of state for America, 
(1768), 32. 

Sewall, Stephen, 338n. 

Seymour, Governor, 272. 

Sharpe, Governor Horatio, 307, 
312n., 316, 329. 

Sharpe, Joshua, solicitor for as- 
sembly, 285, 309n. 

Sharpless, Isaac, 254. 

Shelburne, Earl of, president of 



INDEX 



421 



Board of Trade, 22, 28, 30; 
secretary of state, 31, 32. 

Shippen, Edward, judge of ad- 
miralty court, 123. 

Shirley, Governor William, 77n., 
78, 305, 307, 329, 392. 

Sloughter, Governor, 259. 

Smith, James, 115, 116. 

Solicitor-General, of England, 
130, 131, 187, 211. See" Ray- 
mond, Yorke. 

Society for the Propagation of 
Gospel, 229-230, 254, 369. 

South Carolina, 36, 97, 192, 228; 
royal government established 
in, 369, 381; proprietary gov- 
ernment overthrown in, 372. 

Spain, 182, 183, 255, 280, 283, 
288. 

Spanish coin, rating of, 183, 185, 
187. 

Spanish Cmmeil of Indies, com- 
parison of, with Board of 
Trade, 20-27. 

Specie, scarcity of, in colonies, 
180, 182, 2i8, 220, 333, 334 
and n.; export of, forbidden by 
England, 182, 183n.; need of 
fixed standard for, 183-184; 
rated by royal proclamation, 
185; by act of Parliament, 
187; raising of rate of, by col- 
onies, 183 if., 343. 

Stair, Earl of, 370 and n. 

Stamp Act Congress, 332n., 334. 

Stanwix, Colonel, 208, 319 and 
n., 320. 

Survevor of customs for Pa,, 59, 
61, '73. 

Surveyor-General of Customs ; 
duties and salary of, 46-47 ; see 
Keith, Sir William, Randolph, 
Edward, Randolph, Peter. 

Sutherland, Earl of, secretary of 
state, 21, 361. 

Statutes of Parliament, Acts of 
Trade, 34-35, 110-111; Act of 
Settlement, 35, 174; Coin Act 



(1708), 187; Currency Act 
(1751), 198, 200, 202, 203, 
217, 371; Currency Act 
(1764), 219 ff., 333, 334, 391; 
Embargo Act (1757), 80; Hat 
Act (1732), 371; Iron Act 
(1750), 371; Mass. Land Bank 
Act (1741), 371; Molasses Act 
(1733), 74, 188, 371; Naviga- 
tion Act (1650) 34; Naviga- 
tion Act (1696), 5-8, 38, 51, 
54, 91, 98, 106, 224; Occasional 
Conformity Act (1711), 227, 
253; Piracy Act (1698), 64; 
Schism Act (1714), 227, 253; 
Stamp Act (1765), 42, 87, 330, 
331, 333, 334, 377, 391; Sugar 
Act (1764), 86-88, 330, 331, 
333, 334, 375, 391; Toleration 
Act (1689), 224, 226, 227, 233. 

Talbot, John, 230. 

Taxation, social conditions in col- 
onies unfavorable to, 334 and 
n. 

Thomas, Gabriel, 353 and n. 

Thomas, Governor George (Pa.), 
41, 153, 194, 197, 200, 279, 280 
ff., 282, 283, 284, 288, 290-291, 
373. 

Tory Party, 361, 364, 365. 

Treaties, Aix-la-Chapelle (1748), 
292, 293, 388; Paris (1763), 
324, 328; Ryswick (1697), 
269, 293; Utrecht (1713), 274, 
279, 292, 369. 

Trevor, Attorney-General, of Eng- 
land, 93. 

Union of colonies, need of, 265, 
297-298, 300, 322, 330, 389 ; lack 
of, invites French attacks, 265 
and n., 266 and n., 387-388; 
plans for, proposed, 265-268; 
imperfect, formed, 266, 268; 
plan of, formulated at Albany 
(1754), 299-300; plan of, by 
William Penn, 267-268; plan 



422 



INDEX 



of, by Board of Trade (1754), 
301, 389. 

Vaughan, Colonel, 320. 

Vaughan, Sir John, 35. 

Vice-admiralty courts, estab- 
lished in colonies, 92, 94; pow- 
ers of, 95 ff. ; opposition of col- 
onists to, 97 ff., 102 ff., 116 ff., 
123 ff. ; character of officials of, 
114, 122-123; defects in sys- 
tem of, 11, 122; partiality of, 
during French and Indian War, 
123 ; opposition of colonists to 
extension of (1764), 88, 125, 
352. 

Virginia, 183n., 277, 306; sup- 
ports N. Y. frontier poorly, 
264 ; expedition of, against Du- 
quesne, 295; conflict of, with 
Pa. over boundary, 295; lacks 
public spirit during French 
and Indian War, 316, 317; ob- 
stinacy of assembly of, 306 
and n. ; currency difficulties 
in, 183, 216. 

Walpole, Horace, 19, 30, 86; au- 
ditor-general of colonial reve- 
nues, 46. 



Walpole, Robert, 279, 286, 368, 
371, 383. 

Warren, Commodore, 289. 

Washington, George, 294. 

Water bailiffs, commissions to, 
105, 107 ff., 110; grants to, 
justified, 108; commissions to, 
infringe admiralty jurisdiction, 
108, 352. 

Webb, Robert. 99. 

West, Richard, counsel to Board 
of Trade, 116-117, 143 ff., 167, 
252. 

West Indies, 75, 88-89, 181, 198; 
illegal trade with, 76 ff. ; ex- 
pedition to, 280. 

Wentworth, Governor, 81 and n. 

Whig Party, 360, 365, 369. 

Willcocks, George, 245, 246. 

William III., 337, 338, 350. 

Wilson, James, 394. 

Writs, of prohibition against ad- 
miralty courts, 96, 115-116, 
117n., 120, 124; of injunction 
against same, 119, 120; of re- 
plevin against same, 100. 

Yorke, Sir Charles, solicitor-gen- 
eral, 39, 211, 309n. 



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